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ABSTRACT 
According to conventional wisdom winning hearts and minds is one of the most 
important goals for defeating terrorism. However, despite repeated claims about U.S. 
efforts to build popular support as part of the war on terror during the first seven years 
after 9/11, a steady stream of polls and surveys delivered troubling news. Using a 
counterinsurgency and social movement informed approach, I explain why the United 
States performed poorly in the race for Muslim hearts and minds, with a specific focus 
on problems inherent in the social construction of terrorism, the use of an enemy-centric 
model while overestimating agency, and the counterproductive effect of policy choices 
on framing processes. 
 
Popular support plays wide-ranging roles in counterterrorism, including: influencing 
recruitment, fundraising, operational support, and the flow of intelligence; providing 
credibility and legitimacy; and, sanctifying or marginalizing violence. Recognizing this 
the U.S. emphasized public diplomacy, foreign aid, positive military-civilian 
interactions, democracy promotion, and other efforts targeting populations in the 
Muslim world. 
 
To explain the problems these efforts had, this thesis argues that how Americans think 
and talk about terrorism, reflected especially in the rhetoric and strategic narrative of the 
Bush administration, evolved after 9/11 to reinforce normative and enemy-centric biases 
undermining both understanding of the underlying conflicts and resulting efforts. U.S. 
policy advocates further misjudged American agency, especially in terms of 
overemphasizing U.S. centrality, failing to recognize the importance of real grievances, 
and overestimating American ability to implement its own policies or control the 
policies of local governments. Finally, the failure to acknowledge the role of U.S. 
policies counterproductively impacted contested framing processes influencing the 
evolution of mobilization. The resulting rhetoric and actions reinforced existing anti-
American views, contributed to the perception that the war on terror is really a war on 
Islam, and undermined natural counter narratives. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
“We are in ... a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.” 
–Ayman al-Zawahiri writing to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 20051 
Seven weeks after the 9/11 terrorists attacks former U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations Richard Holbrooke famously asked, “How could a mass murderer who 
publicly praised the terrorists of September 11 be winning the hearts and minds of 
anyone? How can a man in a cave out communicate the world’s leading 
communications society?”2 Holbrooke argued the battle of ideas would be as important 
as any other aspect of the current struggle, and lamented, “Every expert in Islam, every 
analyst of what is happening in the Muslim world, agrees that Osama bin Laden has 
gained the initial advantage.” This thesis seeks to explain why seven years later, at the 
end of President George W. Bush’s second term, the United States continued to perform 
poorly in the race for Muslim hearts and minds despite its superpower advantages. 
The logic of a hearts and minds strategy is compelling. Many believe that 
gaining popular support – and denying it to one’s opponent – through engaging the 
ideas, attitudes, expectations, and beliefs of the broader public has often proven 
decisive. Popular support for the cause and actions of groups using terrorism plays a 
significant role in their ability to recruit new members, raise funds, avoid state 
enforcement, and carry out operations. Popular sentiment can excuse, sanctify, and 
glorify or moderate, marginalize, and condemn violent tactics. For governments, the 
backing of the people increases the flow of intelligence, provides credibility and 
legitimacy, and generates patience. All of which are necessary to successfully conduct a 
larger counterterrorism campaign – including necessary aggressive and hard 
counterterrorism efforts targeting the incorrigible violent core – while providing 
security, promoting development, and addressing underlying grievances.  
                                                
1 al-Zawahiri, 2005, "Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi," Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, October 11, 
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20051011_release.htm. 
2 Holbrooke, 2001, "Get the Message Out," The Washington Post, October 28, 
http://www.cfr.org/pub4148/richard_c_holbrooke/get_the_message_out.php. 
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Recognizing this logic, U.S. counterterrorism strategy after 9/11 placed 
increasing emphasis on public diplomacy, foreign aid, positive military-civilian 
interactions, democracy promotion, and other efforts to win the hearts and minds of 
targeted populations. Immediately after the 2001 attacks, President Bush made a point 
of appearing with American Muslim leaders to emphasize that the war on terror was not 
a war on Islam.3 He quickly appointed Charlotte Beers, once nicknamed “the most 
powerful woman in advertising,” to be his first Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. 
In the spring of 2002, the United States launched the Arabic-language Radio Sawa, 
aimed at appealing to Arab youth with popular music, balanced news, and a positive 
perspective of America. A year later the Arabic-language Alhurra TV followed as a 
counter to the perceived biases of al-Jazeera and other regional news service thought to 
promote extremism and anti-Americanism. State Department and USAID resources 
were increased and retargeted to support the “soft side” of U.S. counterterrorism. The 
National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006, and the National Strategies for 
Combating Terrorism of 2003 and 2006 gave increasing emphasis to diminishing the 
underlying conditions terrorists seek to exploit and winning the war of ideas. While the 
U.S. military was involved in two major shooting wars, it also publicly emphasized 
hearts and minds efforts, such as building schools and digging wells in Africa as well as 
responding to natural disasters and working to improve local military-civilian relations 
in South East Asia. As part of the administration’s signature Freedom Agenda, the 
United States gave high visibility to democracy promotion policies, promising to 
increase pressure on repressive regimes to liberalize, and trumpeting popular democratic 
successes such as the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, the Cedar Revolution in 
Lebanon, and the large number of civilians who voted in Afghanistan in October 2004 
and in Iraq in January 2005, dying their fingers in defiance of terrorist death threats. 
While a long list of policy initiatives support the claim that the United States 
during the first seven years after 9/11 pursued hearts and minds goals, many experts and 
                                                
3 I follow President George W. Bush’s language choices and discuss the American 
response to 9/11 as the “war on terror” instead of calling it the “war on terrorism.” The 
second phrase is commonly used by others and therefore appears in many of the 
quotations throughout this thesis. Unless specifically noted there is no intended 
differentiation between what the two phrases represent, and in my experience they are 
almost always used interchangeably with the same meaning when discussing post-9/11 
American counterterrorism efforts. 
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observers argued that in the overall context of the war on terror those efforts were given 
too low of a priority. Too often population-centric tactics were relatively deprived of 
key resources, top-level support, and the necessary follow through to be successful. 
Experts and observers also questioned whether concerns for foreign attitudes had 
actually been consistently and seriously considered in the shaping of post-9/11 foreign 
policy, rhetoric, and actions. 
At the same time a steady stream of public opinion polls, expert evaluations, and 
other indirect or anecdotal measures suggested that the United States was failing to win 
popular support. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks the United States enjoyed 
unprecedented levels of international support and sympathy, captured in the 13 
September Le Monde headline “We Are All Americans.”4 That support, as measured in 
a variety of regularly conducted public opinion polls around the world, quickly declined 
below pre-9/11 levels as the United States began its war on terror, and fell dramatically 
with the invasion of Iraq. The repeated consensus of experts was that negative views of 
the United States “increased sharply” during this time, and that anti-American attitudes 
became especially common in the Muslim world.5 Whereas international opinion of the 
United States was mostly positive in the 1990’s, seven years after 9/11 those views were 
mostly negative. 
If winning hearts and minds is as strategically important as many argue, and if 
the United States made increasing efforts to pursue this goal, why did the conventional 
wisdom remain that the U.S. was failing? I believe the answer lies in the way we think 
about terrorism after 9/11, the assumptions of the overall U.S. approach and capability 
to influence attitudes, and the effect of rhetoric and actions in pursuit of the war on 
terror. In addressing each of these areas, I will argue that research, analysis, and policy 
making would be improved by recognizing that in the current conflict, as with most 
                                                
4 Colombani, 2001, "Nous Sommes Tous Américains," Le Monde, September 13, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/opinions/article/2007/05/23/nous-sommes-tous-
americains_913706_3232.html. 
5 Kull, 2007c, "Negative Attitudes Toward the United States in the Muslim World: Do 
They Matter?," Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on 
International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, U.S. House of 
Representatives (May 17), 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/361.php?lb=btv
oc&pnt=361&nid=&id=. See Chapter Three for analysis of Muslim attitudes towards 
the United States. 
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other cases, terrorist violence is best understood as part of a larger social movement 
dynamic.6 Using lessons from the study of insurgencies and popular mobilization this 
thesis advocates a population-centric approach to counterterrorism and a social 
movement based model of analysis.  
The Logic of Hearts and Minds 
When this project began I believed that pursuing a hearts and minds strategy, 
placing emphasis on winning and maintaining the support of broader publics around 
those using tactics of terrorism, was strongly advisable. I recognize this was and is a 
bias. Throughout the course of my research, while reading criticisms and exploring the 
many problems discussed later, I regularly considered whether my conclusion should be 
that hearts and minds efforts really do not play an important role in determining the 
success of counterterrorism campaigns. In the end, despite changes of opinion and 
deeper considerations on many details, I remain convinced governments should 
strategically and tactically be guided by hearts and minds precepts, and that the 
difficulties many states have experienced often stem from a failure to successfully adopt 
a population-centric approach. This includes the United States in the war on terror. 
The phrase hearts and minds does not refer to a specific set of policy 
prescriptions, but instead to the strategic recognition that winning and maintaining the 
popular support of vital populations is an important goal for state and anti-state actors. 
The phrase captures the idea that the attitudes and beliefs determining popular support 
have emotive as well as cognitive aspects. Popular support is a complex influence 
aggregating many specific dimensions including: who the public wants to win and 
expects to win; what they are willing to risk or are motivated to do; who they trust and 
turn to; who has their loyalty and their cooperation; as well as, what they believe when 
they make a thoughtful assessment and how their prejudices shape gut reactions. As a 
community level measure it most always involves differences of individual and sub-
group opinions and the intensity with which those opinions are held. The level of 
diversity and disagreement within a contested population is an important concern. As a 
strategy it involves both proactive and precautionary measures. Actors should take 
positive steps aimed at winning hearts and minds as well as include the importance of 
                                                
6 Tilly, 2004b, "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists," Sociological Theory 22 (1), March. 
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popular support as a guiding consideration in the development and implementation of 
other actions, especially those which may be negatively perceived by or have adverse 
consequences for key populations. 
How this strategic goal is operationalized varies by context. In the classic 
counterinsurgency version a hearts and minds strategy often meant that the local state 
should provide the population with security, good governance, and an improving social 
and economic quality of life.7 A hearts and minds strategy generally also involves 
engaging the opposition’s attempts to win over popular support, often referred to as the 
battle of ideas. In the context of the war on terror the United States is engaged in a 
counterterrorism campaign against a global insurgency promoting transnational 
grievances and aspirations while also based in and connected to many different local 
conflicts with the primary communities whose hearts and minds are contested living 
under diverse governments. Again, the specifics of a population-centric approach 
should be different with increased importance given to disaggregating the assorted local 
conflicts and populations from the violent transnational movement while proactively 
working to gain the support of credible intermediaries. 
Hearts and minds strategies are often misunderstood as targeting those using 
violence. While it is beneficial to a counterinsurgent or counterterrorist to have anti-
state actors disengage and renounce brutality, the focus of a population-centric approach 
targets the broader populations. This thesis examines efforts to win popular support 
from the populations potentially sympathetic to those groups targeted by the war on 
terror – that is the Muslim populations around the world whom militant Islamists allege 
to fight for, recruit and raise funds from, and generally are active within.8 
A hearts and minds strategy is also not about “being nice so that they like us,” as 
it is caricatured by many critics. A classic counterinsurgency campaign aimed at 
winning popular support must prove to the population that the state will remain the 
authority in charge, that it has the will and capacity to prevail, and that it is capable of 
                                                
7 Shafer, 1988b, "The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency," Political Science 
Quarterly 103 (1), Spring: 63. 
8 Other research has looked at government efforts to win hearts and minds domestically, 
as part of maintaining support for government policies to pursue counterinsurgency or 
counterterrorism efforts as well as for other agendas. For example: Carruthers, 1995, 
Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media, and Colonial Counter-
Insurgency, 1944-1960, London, Leicester University Press. 
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protecting itself and its charges against violence.9 Although the differences of 
countering a transnational insurgency complicate the classic prescriptions, in most cases 
a global strategy will also involve the use of a state’s coercive force and authority for 
similar reasons.10 A population-centric strategy for the war on terror should still include 
targeted operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders, to disrupt or destroy terrorist 
operations, and to otherwise engage the violent core to diminish the threat they pose and 
physically isolate them from the larger population. These efforts are complimentary 
with a population-centric strategy. For example, the increased intelligence enabled by 
better relations with vital communities benefits kinetic operations, while carefully 
targeting the violent extreme can facilitate nonviolent shifts within a movement. 
However, as fundamentally an ideological and movement based conflict, similar to 
classic insurgencies, capturing or killing terrorists and similar operations are “ultimately 
defensive (keeping today’s terrorists at bay) rather than decisive (preventing future 
terrorism).”11 Because a hearts and minds strategy recognizes the importance of the 
larger communities potentially sympathetic and tied to those using terrorism, it will 
often involve the use of less force, more narrowly and carefully targeted, and credibly 
                                                
9 For example, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 
explains: “‘Hearts’ means persuading people that their best interests are served by 
COIN success. ‘Minds’ means convincing them that the force can protect them and that 
resisting it is pointless. Note that neither concerns whether people like Soldiers and 
Marines. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, successful 
trusted networks grow like roots into the populace. They displace enemy networks, 
which forces enemies into the open, letting military forces seize the initiative and 
destroy the insurgents.” United States Army, 2007, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24: Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press. 
10 As the new U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide explains: “COIN is a 
complex effort that integrates the full range of civilian and military agencies. It is often 
more population-centric (focused on securing and controlling a given population or 
populations) than enemy-centric (focused on defeating a particular enemy group). Note 
that this does not mean that COIN is less violent than any other conflict: on the 
contrary, like any other form of warfare it always involves loss of life.” "U.S. 
Government Counterinsurgency Guide," 2009: 12, United States Government 
Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf. 
11 Kilcullen, 2009, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big 
One, Oxford New York, Oxford University Press, 12-3. Kilcullen observes, “To 
paraphrase the Arab proverb, an approach to the takfiri threat that solely involved 
strategic disruption would be akin to sweeping the sand out of our house without first 
closing the door.” Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 288-9. 
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justified so as to maintain legitimacy. Such strategies generally also require actions to 
address larger grievances terrorists may be using as mobilizing causes, and even the 
creation of opportunities for reconciliation and rehabilitation of those who may turn 
away from political violence. 
Drawing from the counterinsurgency tradition, hearts and minds efforts are part 
of a larger strategic approach balancing concerns about popular perception with other 
necessary actions and policies to eliminate, disrupt, deter, and protect against violence 
threatening civilian populations and other state interests. Advocacy of a population-
centric strategy is neither to deny that real security threats exist, nor a belief that if a 
state simply left things alone those threats would go away. By the time terrorism rises to 
the level of a significant national security threat a state is already starting out on the 
wrong foot in a context where promising options are severely constrained. The threat 
posed in such circumstances generally involves incorrigible elements radicalized to a 
cause and dedicated to violent action against whom a state will necessarily need to use 
coercive military or law enforcement powers in order to protect its citizens. In the 
current context some of these are Islamist militants including members of al-Qaida 
motivated by millennial goals, focused on carrying out local and transnational mass 
casualty attacks, building upon decades of experience and increasing sophistication, 
whose potential threat is magnified by modern technology and globalization.12 An 
optimal U.S. counterterrorism policy in this context requires hard counterterrorism 
efforts and military action, coordinated and balanced with the sustained use of other 
available tools of national power including diplomacy, law enforcement, financial 
regulation, foreign aid, and intelligence.  
It is from this perspective that I advocate a population-centric approach for the 
war on terror. General Stanley McChrystal, who “spent most of his career since 9/11 
leading the U.S.’s most elite counterterrorist element,”13 has warned his troops in 
                                                
12 I use the transliteration al-Qaida, unless quoting other sources where I have left in 
place the spelling used in the original. I follow the same practice for transliterating other 
common Arabic names and words, such as Usama bin Ladin, while leaving quotations 
unaltered. 
13 Petraeus, 2009, "Afghanistan is Hard all the Time, But It's Doable," The Times, 
September 18, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article683922
0.ece. 
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Afghanistan that the danger of pursuing the convential enemy-centric approach, which 
seems natural from our cultural thinking, risks being like the “bull that repeatedly 
charges a matador’s cape – only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker 
opponent… While a conventional approach is instinctive, that behavior is self-
defeating.”14 Marine Lt General Wallace Gregson speaking more broadly about the war 
on terror observed, “hearts and minds are more important than capturing and killing 
people” because “we don’t have enough ammunition to kill all the terrorists that the 
enemy can run at us” if we don’t win over the “population from which the terrorist foot 
soldiers are recruited.”15 Finally, retired Army general and former Special Forces 
commander Ambassador Dell Dailey similarly stressed, “incarcerating or killing 
terrorists will not end terrorism – it only buys us time.”16 
Looking at a conflict from the perspective of anti-state actors illustrates the 
importance of the struggle for popular support. In order to prevail in the asymmetric 
conflicts typical of insurgencies or cases involving terrorism, anti-state groups must 
maintain sources of new recruits and fundraising, as well as conceal and protect 
themselves from state enforcement. Popular support facilitates these goals, while a lack 
of it requires anti-state groups to divert additional efforts away from the pursuit of their 
strategic objectives towards these needs while also taking greater risks from 
counterinsurgent or counterterrorist efforts.  
Recruitment is especially important to anti-state groups involved in long term 
struggles in order to at least replace members who are captured, killed, or otherwise 
lost. For groups hoping to take control of political power, as opposed to simply 
affecting changes within an existing system, recruitment to their greater cause is even 
more important to ultimately eliminate the asymmetrical advantages of the existing state 
or system. In a sympathetic popular environment recruitment is an easier process as 
external communities provide much of the motivation and incentive to radicalize and 
                                                
14 McChrystal, 2009b, "ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance," Abu 
Muqawama (August 25), http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/08/comisaf-
coin-guidance-released.html. 
15 Castelli, 2005, "Winning Hearts and Minds Stressed," InsideDefense.com, June 20, 
http://defense.iwpnewsstand.com/newsstand_special.asp. 
16 Dailey, 2007, "An 'All Elements of Power' Strategy for Combating Terrorism: 
Remarks at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy," (December 12), 
Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/07/97165.htm. 
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join the fight for a larger pool of potential recruits. A sympathetic climate is also likely 
to include nonviolent or otherwise less radical organizations aligned with the same or 
similar ideology serving as stepping-stones to joining the group using violence. In a less 
supportive or even hostile climate the group using terrorism must not only put much 
more of its own effort in to the recruitment and radicalization process, the receptive 
pool of potential recruits is likely to be significantly smaller, and the chances that 
recruitment efforts will expose the group to state enforcement or enable penetration of 
the group are significantly higher. The more unfavourable the climate of opinion 
becomes for a militant group, the more non-state actors including family, friends, 
educators, and religious leaders will lead the effort of discouraging radicalization and 
recruitment, as well as encouraging disengagement and deradicalization. 
Fundraising follows a similar logic as recruitment. Terrorist groups operating 
within a sympathetic climate are more likely to find receptive, even eager sources of 
funds from related communities. In a sympathetic climate it is more likely that there 
will be ideologically aligned nonviolent groups, better able to escape prosecution under 
the law, who may serve as covers (whether knowingly or not) and otherwise enable 
funds to flow to violent groups. In a hostile climate such sources of funds dry up forcing 
groups using terrorism to put more effort into other methods of raising cash, often 
including criminal enterprises carrying their own risks. Terrorist groups without a 
sympathetic community for their cause are more likely to turn to coercive means of 
extracting funding and resources from their surrounding population, which creates 
opportunities for the state to proactively win popular support further decreasing a 
terrorist group’s chances of success or long term survival. A less supportive or even 
hostile environment again aids the ability of the state to clamp down on sources of 
funding while increasing opportunities and acceptance of policies to track the transfers 
of funds as a means to expose a terrorist group to other counterterrorism efforts.  
Mao’s “fish in the sea” advice for guerrillas was in the context of a broader 
supportive population providing concealment for and allowing guerrilla forces relatively 
free operation without detection by the state. Similarly, groups using terrorism are less 
vulnerable to the state when they can depend on sympathetic communities, and at far 
greater risk when these communities are hostile. This effect occurs directly through 
active public efforts to protect and conceal or inform on and expose individuals 
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involved with terrorist groups. This effect also occurs indirectly because militants either 
find it easier to blend into a community with many others who believe as they do (and 
show outward manifestations of that belief such as particular forms of dress or patterns 
of behaviour), or find the popular climate more dangerous when they must take extra 
efforts not to stand out and be noticeable in a less sympathetic environment.  
The climate of popular opinion influences the ability of violent groups to carry 
out operations as well as how those operations are perceived. A larger public 
sympathetic to an anti-state group will increase opportunities to prepare for and conduct 
operations, including members of the public willing to provide information on 
vulnerabilities or otherwise play small but crucial roles in the success of attacks. A 
receptive public can amplify the effect of attacks by emphasizing agreement with the 
goals of a group and magnifying the pressure on a state to change policy or give up 
power. An unsympathetic public is more likely to report unusual behaviour and disrupt 
operations, or otherwise act as the crucial omnipresent first line of defence that allows a 
popular government to overcome the reverse asymmetric advantage that a terrorist can 
strike anywhere, at anytime changing targets in response to state defences. The moral 
condemnation of an unsympathetic public can drown out the intended message of an 
attack; deterring future violence as such tactics prove counterproductive.  
A recurring theme in the role popular support plays for recruitment, fund-
raising, concealment, and carrying out operations involves the direct relationship 
between public attitudes and the gathering of quality intelligence useful to both state 
and anti-state actors. The more segments of a population support one side or the other, 
the more likely they are to give or proactively volunteer quality information as opposed 
to frustrating intelligence gathering by remaining silent or offering misleading 
information. The new U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 
explains: 
Without good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like blind boxers wasting 
energy flailing at unseen opponents and perhaps causing unintended harm. With 
good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like surgeons cutting out cancerous 
tissue while keeping vital organs intact. Effective operations are shaped by 
timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest 
possible level and disseminated throughout the force.17 
                                                
17 United States Army, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 
41.,  
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This is also emphasized from the insurgent’s perspective as Che Guevara wrote: 
“Nothing gives more help to combatant forces than correct information. This arrives 
spontaneously from the local inhabitants, who will come to tell its friendly army, its 
allies, what is happening in various places.”18 The value of increased intelligence from 
gaining popular support is one of the primary reasons that hearts and minds strategies 
directly strengthen other elements of an overall counterterrorism campaign, while 
damage from a failure to appropriately balance the coercive and hard aspects of 
counterterrorism may in the long run be self-defeating. 
Popular support also plays a uniquely important role for states, who are expected 
to continue governing while they pursue a counterterrorism campaign, as it provides 
legitimacy. The new Counterinsurgency Field Manual again explains: 
[L]egitimacy makes it easier for a state to carry out its key functions… 
Legitimate governance is inherently stable; the societal support it engenders 
allows it to adequately manage the internal problems, change, and conflict that 
affect individual and collective well-being. Conversely, governance that is not 
legitimate is inherently unstable; as soon as the state’s coercive power is 
disrupted, the populace ceases to obey it.19 
A state losing public support may find itself unable to maintain the resources and 
political will necessary to continue to pursue an effective counterterrorism strategy, 
risking a self-reinforcing feedback loop further undermining the state and benefiting 
anti-state actors. Ultimately, an unpopular government may fall, potentially enabling 
those using violence to take power. 
In the case of an international actor, such as the United States in the war on 
terror, legitimacy plays a similar role. The U.S. is largely dependent upon the 
cooperation of local states for pursing terrorist activity within their own borders, and the 
ability of those states to act is in turn influenced by whether their own publics support 
or are at least tolerant of such actions. The U.S. is also dependent upon the attitudes of 
publics in third countries, whose governments often are called upon to assist the United 
States or may be similarly involved in the war on terror for their own reasons – or 
alternatively may place international pressure hindering U.S. action. Finally, the United 
States is sensitive to domestic public support. To the extent the Bush administration 
                                                
18 Guevara, 1961, Guerrilla Warfare, Monthly Review Press, 99.,  
19 United States Army, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. 
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increasingly lost public approval for its prosecution of the war on terror over its last few 
years it found itself less able to pursue its own desired strategies. 
Analytic Blinders and Traps 
A central argument of this thesis is that how we think about terrorism adversely 
affects our research, analysis, policymaking, and policy implementation. While later 
chapters will examine particular biases in greater depth, two that recur repeatedly are 
introduced here. First, our approach to terrorism is too enemy-centric – we concentrate 
too much on the actors using terrorism and specifically on their use of violence, often 
distorting our understanding of important larger dynamics. Second, our thinking is 
overly influenced by the moral judgments inherent in our condemnation of terrorist 
violence, prejudicing our evaluations of other actors and actions. While these influences 
arise from reasonable and desirable roots, individually and in combination they 
undermine our ability to comprehend and react to the phenomenon of terrorism. 
The enemy-centric focus is understandable. It is the threat of violence to our 
interests – and not the larger related (usually local) social, political, religious, or 
ideological struggles – which generally make conflicts involving terrorism a priority. 
The danger is that because eliminating the violent threat motivates the response, 
understanding of the local situation is disproportionately driven by a narrow focus on 
the violent actions of these terrorist groups. Too often this becomes a starting point bias, 
framing and prejudicing evaluations of other actions and actors, as well as assessment 
of competing histories and explanations. This prejudice particularly undermines a hearts 
and minds strategy, as it tends to produce a more adversarial approach instead of 
enabling the understanding necessary to successfully engage with the larger populations 
connected to a group using tactics of terrorism. Militants targeting the U.S. with 
violence are appropriately seen as enemies and threats, the problem is in allowing this to 
counterproductively dominate the focus, distorting analysis and undermining the 
ultimate security goals by which policies and actions should be measured. 
The moral bias in labelling an act as terrorism is also understandable. Inherent in 
the construct is the intent to condemn and eliminate violence against non-combatants. 
Unfortunately this normative goal too often and too easily prejudices understanding and 
evaluation of other aspects of the conflict based upon a simple question of whether 
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someone or something is associated with or opposed to the group using terrorism. These 
prejudices accentuate the enemy biases of the enemy-centric focus, more strongly 
predisposing assessments against other actors, actions, and explanations perceived to be 
associated with or sympathetic to those using terrorism. The culpability of any actor 
opposed to the terrorist is diminished while anyone potentially sympathetic to the larger 
cause or grievances of those using terrorism is treated as suspect. These biases inherent 
in how we think about terrorism are especially relevant to understanding why hearts and 
minds efforts and counterterrorism policies in general often experience problems 
successfully engaging the larger populations necessary for developing good 
intelligence, decreasing terrorist support, and otherwise combating the threat of 
extremist violence. 
A Social Movement Perspective 
The academic study of social movements provides a rich research tradition 
examining the dynamics of why and how populations mobilize outside of normal 
political structures, based on shared beliefs and around contentious issues, to seek 
change through a variety of protest repertoires. This thesis argues that examining 
conflicts involving terrorism from a social movement perspective will improve our 
understanding of the complex dynamics involved, revealing important aspects of the 
problems counterterrorism policy faces. This perspective facilitates shifting our analysis 
from an overly enemy-centric to a more population-centric focus, helping to remedy the 
normative bias discussed in the previous section, and enabling the development of more 
effective policies. 
This thesis posits that in most cases terrorism is a form of violent protest or a 
tactic to achieve change chosen by individuals or groups active within a larger social 
movement dynamic.20 Whereas terrorism analysis and research tends to focus the area 
of study on the violence – who uses it, who is targeted by it, and how states respond to it 
– a social movement perspective suggests stepping back to see how a group using 
tactics of terrorism fits into the larger social context to better understand the motivations 
and drivers, affinities and conflicts, and choices and limitations for all of the significant 
actors involved. Recognizing the logic of a hearts and minds approach, a social 
                                                
20 Tilly, "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists." 
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movement perspective should better focus analysis on what motivates larger 
populations and how best to win their support. 
Consciously applying a social movement framework, as one of multiple 
approaches available to understanding terrorism, provides new perspective for 
examining the complicated motivations and interactions typical in the larger contexts 
where terrorist violence arises. The insights and tools developed in the academic social 
movement literature serve as “orienting devices” for sorting and making sense of our 
observations.21 In the same manner, a social movement framework becomes a 
reorienting device exposing and helping to overcome biases. 
The popular impression of social movements within the United States often 
focuses on the successes of non-violent forms of protest, which in turn are part of the 
legend of why those movements succeeded. But most of the major U.S. social 
movements have included more radical or fringe elements that defended, espoused, or 
employed violent tactics. The civil rights movement included groups such as the Black 
Panthers, the Weather Underground, and the Symbionese Liberation Army as well as 
opposition groups equally part of the movement dynamic such as the Klu Klux Klan, 
White Citizens’ Councils, and Aryan Nation. Internationally civil rights movements 
have taken more violent turns. For example, the Provisional IRA arguably rose out of 
the failures of nonviolent protests to address civil rights grievances in 1960’s Ireland 
coupled with reaction to violent state responses such as the 1972 Bloody Sunday killing 
of 14 unarmed civilian protesters at a civil rights march. 
The study of social movements also includes cases where collective action 
aimed not only at changing some element of social or political structures – such as 
providing protections for workers or encouraging a more environmentally conscious 
mindset – but also cases where the goal of the groups involved was ultimately to take 
over political power. The American and French revolutions for example have been 
usefully examined from such a perspective, especially to understand the earlier stages of 
protest, consciousness raising, and mobilization.22 Such cases remind us that political 
violence – including acts of terrorism – can play a central role for different purposes in 
a popular movement. 
                                                
21 Tilly, 2004a, "Foreword," In Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, 
ed. Wiktorowicz, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
22 Tarrow, 1998, Power in Movement, Cambridge University Press, 182. 
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In reviewing the long history of individuals and groups who have used terrorist 
tactics, there are many cases that do not easily fit within a social movement explanation. 
Although small terrorist groups can exist outside of a meaningful larger movement 
dynamic, I would suggest that these tend to be less dangerous groups either from a 
perspective of their total capability for violence or from the perspective that they are the 
least likely to be capable of achieving strategic goals of significant social change or 
outright state control. The reasons for this are well captured in the earlier section on 
why popular support is important for the long-term operation and success of groups 
using terrorist tactics.  
While the academic literature studying social movements spans a variety of 
theoretical schools and approaches, many of which offer interesting potential insights to 
the study of terrorism, this thesis employs a basic social movement approach drawing 
upon general concepts and tools from current major trends in that research tradition. 
This starts with analysis of the grievances and hopes around which a population 
mobilizes to seek change, and then looks at three dominant explanations for what 
shapes movements in the current literature: political opportunity structures, mobilizing 
networks, and framing processes.23 
Social movements are often defined by the grievances or causes around which 
they mobilize. Considering how a population perceives these is important to 
understanding the dynamics and relationships of the larger conflict. Social movement 
scholars have emphasized that mobilization is dependent not just on the perception of 
grievances or a cause, but also on creation of optimism that collective action will be 
successful. Different elements of a movement, or the same elements at different times in 
a movement’s history, may describe different grievances or causes as well as different 
means and goals for bringing about desired change. The history of social movements 
                                                
23 These analytic tools are typical of social movement research in the tradition of 
sociologists and political scientists such as Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Doug 
McAdam, William Gamson, John McCarthy, David Snow, and Mayer Zald. This is 
often referred to as the American research tradition (despite including many researchers 
from other countries) and differentiated from the European tradition which has focused 
on “new social movements.” See discussions of the American and European traditions 
in: Crossley, 2002, Making Sense of Social Movements, Buckingham, Open University 
Press. Della Porta and Diani, 1999, Social Movements: An Introduction, Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishers Inc. McDonald, 2006, Global Movements: Action and Culture, 
Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishing, 19-41. 
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suggests populations may mobilize around a broad range of social, political, and 
ideological grievances, including: lack of access or representation in the political 
system, non-responsive or corrupt leaders, a failure to solve economic and development 
problems, and perceived threats to a shared identity. 
To explain why movements emerge at a given time or take different forms, 
researchers often start by looking at changes to the nature of political opportunity 
structures. Such structures include the relative openness or closure of the political 
system, the stability or instability of elite alignments, the presence or absence of elite 
allies, and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression.24 Many of these factors 
have also been studied in research on terrorism and political violence, although without 
focusing on how these influences also shape the sympathies and attitudes of the larger 
population with relation to groups using violent tactics. 
The second major set of factors for understanding social movements is described 
under the category of mobilizing structures. These include informal structures such as 
friendship and kinship networks or connections formed around churches or mosques, as 
well as more formal structures such as labour unions and professionalized activist 
organizations. These formal and informal networks play a significant role in who joins a 
movement, the development of identity including in-group and out-group effects, what 
other issues the movement may adopt or align with beyond the core grievances or cause, 
how the movement protests and seeks change, conflict and competition within a 
movement or with countermovement actors, and how states respond to the movement. 
One major strain of the academic literature examining formal mobilizing 
structures has focused on the role played by social movement organizations. Adopting 
the approach of this thesis, it is useful to think of terrorist groups as a particular form of 
social movement organization. Like other such organizations, terrorist groups generally 
have a more formalized structure of responsibilities and procedures for recruiting new 
members, raising and allocating resources, planning and conducting operations, as well 
as engaging in strategic communication contests. It is also beneficial to consider how 
                                                
24 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing 
Structures, and Framing Processes – Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on 
Social Movements," In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political 
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. McAdam, McCarthy 
and Zald, New York: Cambridge University Press, 10.,  
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terrorist groups may uniquely differ from many other social movement organizations, 
for example because of their increased need to act clandestinely and in cell structures to 
avoid more intensive state prosecution.25 
The study of framing processes covers the final major set of theoretical tools this 
thesis adapts from the social movement literature. Framing processes capture the 
ideational, ideological, and cultural aspects of a social movement, looking at the ways 
in which groups of people socially construct and make sense of reality. This is the 
principal focus of movement researchers on the battle of ideas, looking at the contested 
process over the construction of shared meaning and popular perception that occurs 
both within a movement as well as between movement elements and state or 
countermovement actors. Examining the framing dynamics of a movement focuses 
analysis on how a wide variety of important issues are defined, perceived, and 
contested. This includes whether various populations perceive themselves to be 
aggrieved or motivated by a cause and whether they are sufficiently optimistic that 
collective action may achieve a desired change.  
Chapter Organization 
The analysis of this thesis develops over the following seven chapters. Chapter 
Two begins with a review of the academic literature related to terrorism, social 
movements, and insurgencies. This establishes the theoretical base for this thesis of a 
social movement approach to studying terrorism and hearts and minds efforts informed 
by the lessons of American and British counterinsurgencies. Chapter Three introduces 
the background context by first reviewing the wide variety of policies pursued in the 
first seven years after the September 11 attacks justified as part of a hearts and minds 
strategy, and then by examining the presumptive argument that the United States 
performed poorly over this time period in the race for Muslim hearts and minds based 
                                                
25 Della Porta, 1992b, "Political Socialization in Left-Wing Underground Organizations: 
Biographies of Italian and German Militants," In Social Movements and Violence: 
Participation in Underground Organizations, ed. Della Porta, London: JAI Press Inc. 
Della Porta, 1995a, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," In Terrorism in Context, ed. 
Crenshaw, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Della Porta, 
1995b, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of 
Italy and Germany, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Della Porta and Diani, 
Social Movements. 
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upon a large body of survey and opinion research. Chapter Four applies a social 
movement perspective by situating militant Islamists within the larger movement 
dynamic of political Islam. This analysis examines the grievances and aspirations, 
mobilizing networks, political opportunity structures, and framing processes influencing 
popular attitudes and the potential for various forms of contentious action across the 
Muslim world. Chapter Five examines changes in how Americans talk and think about 
terrorism after 9/11. The chapter argues that this new social construction undermines the 
understanding of terrorism and leads to ineffective or counterproductive 
counterterrorism efforts. Chapter Six argues that the American approach to hearts and 
minds efforts in the war on terror is based on a flawed conceptual model of the conflict, 
which detrimentally overestimates U.S. agency and centrality, discounts real grievances 
driving the larger public’s attitudes, and misconstrues the role played by local 
governments. Chapter Seven explores how U.S. policy and rhetoric after 9/11 fed the 
framing of militant Islamists by reinforcing existing grievances with American policies 
and contributing to perceptions that the war on terror is really a war on Islam. At the 
same time American actions undermined the intended counter narrative of the United 
States as a force for good in the world. Chapter Eight concludes the analysis with a 
summary discussion of the prospects for hearts and minds efforts, the value of a social 
movement approach to terrorism, and the potential for overcoming the central biases to 
rescue a normative construction of terrorism. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the  
minds and hearts of the people, – a change in their religious sentiments, of their duties 
and obligations. This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments  
and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution.  
–President John Adams1 
In order to examine the central question of this thesis, why U.S. hearts and 
minds efforts in the war on terror over the first seven years after 9/11 often appear to 
have been unsuccessful, I draw on three areas of literature which are introduced and 
reviewed in this chapter. As foremost a question about the efficacy of state efforts to 
respond to terrorism this thesis starts from that literature, understanding terrorism as an 
identifiable tactic of political violence which often suffers from a number of conceptual 
challenges and abuses. Although supportive of the dominant theoretical rational actor 
approaches to studying terrorism, in this thesis I seek to explore how applying tools and 
insights from the study of social movements would benefit research and understanding 
of terrorism as well as the development and implementation of counterterrorism efforts. 
Finally, because of the focus on hearts and minds based efforts in the war on terror, as 
well as recognizing the strong overlap between insurgencies and the use of terrorism, 
this thesis incorporates the study of classical and contemporary counterinsurgency 
literature. The lessons from this literature create guidelines to help evaluate hearts and 
minds efforts over the last seven years as well as for what a future population-centric 
strategy of counterterrorism should include when responding to a global insurgency 
using tactics of terrorism connected with many more local violent conflicts. 
Studying Terrorism 
The word terrorism derives from the Latin root terrere (“to tremble”) to which 
the French added the suffix -isme (“to practice”) creating terrorisme (becoming “to 
cause or create the trembling.”) Following the French Revolution in 1789 the Jacobins 
                                                
1 From a Letter to Hazekiah Niles, 15 February 1818. Grinnell, 1871, Fanaticism: A 
Sermon Delivered Before the Executive and Legislative Departments of the Government 
of Massachusetts, at the Annual election, Wednesday, January 4, 1871, Wright & 
Potter. Seldes, 1985, The Great Thoughts, New York, Ballantine, 7.,  
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used this term to self-describe their “reign of terror” from which the word comes to 
English. The label then evolved to describe a particular tactic or form of political 
violence whose use is primarily identified with sub-state groups seeking a wide variety 
of goals including national independence, social revolution, ethnic rights, and religious 
transformation.2 This section examines what terrorism is and how it is understood, the 
major theoretical approaches to studying terrorism, and how governments respond. 
How Do We Understand What Terrorism Is? 
Weinberg is certainly not alone in observing that: “Few terms or concepts in 
contemporary political discourse have proved as hard to define as terrorism.”3 The 
pursuit of an acceptable definition has been likened to the quest for the holy grail.4 It is 
a problem that has “vexed the international community”5 for most of the last century,6 
caused legal experts to regret that such a concept “was ever inflicted upon us,”7 led 
                                                
2 Crenshaw, 1998, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of 
Strategic Choice," In Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States 
of Mind, ed. Reich: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 10. Golder and Williams, 2004, 
"What is 'Terrorism'? Problems of Legal Definition," UNSW Law Journal 27 (2): 270. 
Tuman, 2003, Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism, 
Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, 2-5. 
3 Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004, "The Challenges of Conceptualizing 
Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (4), Winter: 777. 
4 “The search for a legal definition of terrorism in some ways resembles the quest for 
the Holy Grail: periodically, eager souls set out, full of purpose, energy and self-
confidence, to succeed where so many others before have tried and failed. Some, 
daunted by the difficulties and dangers along the way, give up, often declaring the quest 
meaningless. Others return claiming victory, proudly bearing an object they insist is the 
real thing but which to everyone else looks more like the same old used cup, perhaps re-
decorated in a slightly original way. Still others, soberly assessing the risks, costs and 
benefits attendant upon the attempt, never set out at all, preferring to devote their 
energies to humbler but possibly more practical tasks. But the long record of 
frustrations and failures often seems to spur further efforts...” Levitt, 1986, "Is 
'Terrorism' Worth Defining?," Ohio Northern University Law Review 13: 97. 
5 Scharf, 2005, "Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes: 
Problems and Prospects," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 37: 359. 
6 Levitt, "Is 'Terrorism' Worth Defining?," 114-5. 
7 Baxter also concluded that terrorism “serves no operative legal purpose.” Baxter, 
1974, "A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism," Akron Law Review 7 (3), Spring: 
380. Two decades later the first female judge elected to the International Court of 
Justice reached a similar conclusion writing “terrorism is a term without any legal 
significance.” Higgins, 1997, "The General International Law of Terrorism," In 
Terrorism and International Law, ed. Higgins and Flory. 
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diplomats to decide that it is “as a practical matter, insurmountable,”8 and driven at least 
one academic to conclude “a comprehensive definition was impossible” (one would 
simply know it when they saw it).9 The concept of terrorism is said to be “hopelessly 
loaded,”10 “deeply contested,”11 and “highly subjective.”12 The term’s use “is often 
polemical and rhetorical ... meant to condemn an opponent’s cause as illegitimate rather 
than describe behaviour.”13 Attempts at definition may become “ethnocentric 
exercises”14 as the word’s meaning is too often “relative to one’s political ideology and 
agenda, and even one’s culture.”15 Given the depth of the term’s abuse Beinin asks 
whether it can be “rescued” and whether it is “worth doing so.”16 
The difficulties posed by attempts to define terrorism, the seeming lack of 
consensus between definitions, and the perception that a good definition may simply not 
be possible have all been obstacles to serious research as well as to the acceptance of 
the research that has been done.17 While the concept is not easy to define – it is 
complex, normative, and political – I believe that the academic controversy is inflated, 
often about other issues, and decreases as the quality of research improves with some 
                                                
8 Scharf, "Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes," 359. 
9 Quoting Weinberg describing Laqueur’s conclusion. Laqueur, 1977, Terrorism, 
Boston, Little, Brown, 5. Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler, "The Challenges of 
Conceptualizing Terrorism," 777-8. 
10 Sick, 1987, "Terrorism: Its Political Uses and Abuses," SAIS Review 7, Winter-
Spring: 13. 
11 Crenshaw, 2000, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century," 
Political Psychology 21 (2): 406. 
12 Lesser, 1999, "Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy," In 
Countering the New Terrorism: RAND, 85 footnote. 
13 Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism," 406. 
14 Lesser, "Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy," 85, footnote. Or 
even “specieist.” Best and Nocella, 2004, "Defining Terrorism," Animal Liberation 
Philosophy and Policy Journal 2 (1), 2004. 
15 Best and Nocella, "Defining Terrorism," 2-3. 
16 Beinin, 2003, "Is Terrorism a Useful Term in Understanding the Middle East and the 
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict?," Radical History Review (85), Winter: 22. Also see 
Wieviorka asking whether the “idea of terrorism can be deconstructed and 
reconstructed”: Wieviorka, 1995, "Terrorism in the Context of Academic Research," In 
Terrorism in Context, ed. Crenshaw, University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 598. 
17 Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism," 406. Wieviorka, "Terrorism in the 
Context of Academic Research," 598. 
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consensus over the tactic’s core features.18 Even with popular and political usage, where 
the term suffers regular abuse, there is a largely consistent (albeit shallower) 
understanding of the same key features and (especially amongst experts within the same 
culture) general agreement about what is and is not an actual case of terrorism. 
For this thesis I employ two ways of defining the concept: first, viewing it as a 
social construction to better capture how the public actually uses and reacts to the term 
as well as what really guides policy makers and the implementation of policy; and 
second, as an analytically definable phenomenon for academic study.19 While there are 
cases where these approaches do not overlap, both perspectives provide important 
insight and for my purposes the differences between them are not problematic. 
Terrorism can first be usefully understood as a social construct – something that 
exists and can be so labelled because people behave as if it does, largely displaying a 
                                                
18 Weinberg and Eubank, 2008, "Problems with the Critical Studies Approach to the 
Study of Terrorism," Critical Studies on Terrorism 1 (2), August: 185-8. 
19 My position is that there is an academically interesting concept called terrorism, 
which demonstrates significant, regular, and recurring features and effects. I believe that 
most of the time neutral experts can agree with sufficient consistency about what is and 
is not terrorism. Despite its normative nature and history of abuse, I argue that it is best 
to label this concept as terrorism. I acknowledge that the act of choosing to use this 
term, and related language, is a normative one. Terrorism is a pejorative label and this 
thesis contributes to already strong arguments that this discourse brings an inevitably 
biasing perspective. Naming an act as terrorism both consciously and subconsciously 
casts a judgment, affecting wider evaluations. Even if one strives to remain conscious of 
such effects (recognizing they also occur when not using contested terminology) the 
discursive choice still draws a response from the subject studied, initiating feedbacks of 
further biases (drawing one towards certain sources and away from others, affecting the 
interaction that takes place with those, and influencing the cycle of review through 
which the research work is created). But the conscious choice to use alternative 
language is also a normative act, potentially merely a masking move or an equally 
judgmental reverse evaluation, complete with its own biasing influences. Acts of 
terrorism – acts that intentionally target non-combatants with violence to indirectly 
achieve a political purpose – deserve condemnation, even if in context of wider 
conditions that may deserve sympathy, understanding, and action. In an analytic 
enterprise that defends making difficult evaluations we should be able to make such 
judgments. I believe terrorism can be usefully studied as both a socially constructed and 
an objectively defined phenomenon that exhibits recurring characteristics and processes 
of interest for academic and policy evaluations. I also recognize that terrorism, like 
other complex and politically contested phenomena, exhibits contingent and context 
dependent traits, suffers from blurred boundaries and conceptual confusion, and 
requires careful attention to a wide range of biasing factors as well as strong caution in 
the confidence placed in any conclusions. 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  31 
shared conception of the term’s meaning at least within societal and historical 
contexts.20 While there may not be a universally accepted definition or deep 
understanding, and recognizing cultural differences, 21 many who have written on the 
subject report that people “know” what one means by terrorism and generally do not 
have trouble deciding what should and should not be classified as such.22 The “one 
knows it when they see it” approach to defining terrorism is a manner of referring to 
this shared construct.23 
Within mainstream popular and political discourse in the United States most 
people accept that terrorism is an appropriate label applied to specific types of political 
violence. This shared conception is clarified by researchers who, in attempts to define 
the term, have generated similar lists of features they see as common to how it is used,24 
usually including: violence or the threat of violence; targeting civilians, the innocent, or 
non-combatants; an aim to terrorize a larger audience in order to change behaviour; and, 
political or ideological motives.25  
                                                
20 Crenshaw, 1995a, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts," In 
Terrorism in Context, ed. Crenshaw, University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 8-9. Greisman, 1977, "Social Meanings of Terrorism: Reification, 
Violence, and Social Control," Contemporary Crises 1 (3). Tuman, Communicating 
Terror, xiv. Wardlaw, 1989, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-
Measures, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 5-7. Wieviorka, "Terrorism in the 
Context of Academic Research," 598. 
21 Merari, 1993, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency," Terrorism and Political 
Violence 5 (4), Winter: 215. 
22 Horgan, 2005, The Psychology of Terrorism, London, Routledge, 1, 5-6. Pillar, 2003, 
Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, Paperback Edition ed, Washington, DC, Brookings 
Institution Press, 16-7. Tuman, Communicating Terror, xiv.  
23 Echoing U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s approach to defining 
pornography. Harmon, 1992, "Terrorism: A Matter for Moral Judgement," Terrorism 
and Political Violence 4 (1), Spring: 2. Laqueur, 1986, "Reflections on Terrorism," 
Foreign Affairs 65 (1), Fall: 88-9. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 16-7. 
24 As a starting point for defining terrorism researchers often refer to Wittgenstein’s 
advice of “let the use of words teach you their meaning.” Wittgenstein, 1953, 
Philosophical Investigations, Translated by Anscombe and Anscombe, Blackwell 
Publishers, 187. 
25 For example: Best and Nocella, "Defining Terrorism," 8. Ganor, 1998, "Defining 
Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?," 
http://www.ict.org.il/ResearchPublications/tabid/64/Articlsid/432/Default.aspx. 
Hoffman, 1998, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, 43. Schmid and 
Jongman, 1988, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data 
Bases, Theories and Literature, Second Edition ed, Amsterdam, North-Holland 
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Examining terrorism as a social construct allows us to easily observe that the 
term’s meaning is “inherently flexible and ambiguous,” at times “contradictory,”26 and 
suffers many forms of abuse. Understanding terrorism as a social construct also allows 
us to capture: the term’s highly emotional nature (in terms of the reaction it elicits and 
the pejorative judgment it connotes); the tendency to only apply the term to one’s 
enemies and similarly the power of the term to shape perceptions about those to whom 
it is applied; and, the propensity of groups (or those sympathetic) to reject the label 
when applied to them and to react negatively towards those doing the labelling.27 Using 
this approach we may find that the difficulties of definition are part of answering the 
central question of this thesis.28 What is most important for this research is that there is 
a socially recognized phenomenon labelled as “terrorism,” and in attempting to respond 
to situations identified this way governments are often called upon to use hearts and 
minds strategies. 
I also believe that there is an identifiable phenomenon of interest to academic 
research, which displays recurring features and effects, and should be labelled as 
terrorism. While critics often note that there is no consensus definition,29 which does 
create some problems,30 the lack of agreement is neither as great nor as damaging as 
critics imply – especially considering that other widely accepted complex phenomenon 
of interest to social science suffer from the same problem.31 In many cases different 
                                                
Publishing Company. Shamir and Shikaki, 2002, "Self-Serving Perceptions of 
Terrorism Among Israelis and Palestinians," Political Psychology 23 (3): 537-8. 
26 Crenshaw, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts," 8-9. 
27 Richardson, 2006, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the 
Threat, New York, Random House, 6-10. 
28 Clyme, 2003, America's Culture of Terrorism, UNC Press, 177. 
29 Best and Nocella, "Defining Terrorism," 3. Levitt, "Is 'Terrorism' Worth Defining?," 
103-8. Schmid, 2005, "Terrorism - The Definitional Problem," Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 37: 376-7. Young, 2006, "Defining Terrorism: The 
Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on 
Definitions in Domestic Legislation," Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review 29, Winter: 24. 
30 For example: Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 4-5. 
31 Maskaliumaite, 2002, "Defining Terrorism in the Political and Academic Discourse," 
Baltic Defence Review 2 (8): 49. Ken Booth, for example, writes: “Actually, the 
tensions within the field have been normal. When a hitherto marginal field is thrust into 
prominence by world events, it is not unusual to discover just how fuzzy key concepts 
can be, how undeveloped some ideas are, and how irreconcilable can be the differences 
over praxis. ‘What is terrorism?’, for example, is no more of a conundrum than 
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definitions largely overlap,32 with the disparities in terminology explained by practical 
focus,33 and rarely generate significant differences in whether real world cases would or 
would not be considered as terrorism.34 Further many have noted a growing consensus 
in academic research and even in international agreements.35 Based upon frequently 
repeated common elements in previous research, I define terrorism in this work as a 
tactic involving the norm violating use or threat of violence against non-combatants in 
order to influence wider or other audiences for politically motivated reasons. 
Perhaps the most important aspect to emphasize is that terrorism is a tactic, 
method, or tool and is not defined based on who does something or why they do it.36 
Consistently using the term in this manner would resolve much of the confusion, abuse, 
and disagreements that surround the concept. This also emphasizes that terrorism is 
neither synonymous with nor exclusive to other forms of political violence (such as 
insurgencies, guerrilla revolutions, or civil wars).37 
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33 For example: Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler, "The Challenges of 
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34 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 16. 
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Terrorists Nor Freedom Fighters," www.armedgroups.org, March 3-5, 1, 
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Terrorism," Madrid: Club de Madrid. Schmid, "Terrorism - The Definitional Problem," 
383-4. Wilkinson, "Can a State be 'Terrorist'?," 1-2, 15. Mackinlay for example 
emphasizes: “Terrorism is an important part of the insurgents’ inventory of tactics, but 
it is a tool that achieves a greater long-term effect when used together with subversion, 
agitation, and propaganda as part of a political strategy.” Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, 
2008, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," In RAND Counterinsurgency Study - Volume 5, 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 5. 
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The second defining feature is that the violence used or threatened is norm 
violating – that is, the action itself, and not the cause in which it is done, is considered 
illegitimate, illegal, or otherwise normatively unacceptable. This distinction arises in the 
framing of terrorism as “the peacetime equivalent of war crimes,”38 which seeks to 
extend the normative consensus about what is unacceptable in the conduct of war to the 
more politically contested issue of defining terrorism.39 Other authors similarly draw 
upon this norm violating nature in differentiating acts of terrorism from similar, but 
accepted, uses of military force.40 
The most important way in which terrorism is norm violating is that the violence 
threatens “the innocent,” “civilians,” “noncombatants,” or other “out of bound” targets. 
What separates terrorism from other forms of violence, and causes many to so strongly 
condemn this tactic, is the sense that targeting innocent civilians or non-combatants 
violates a universal sense of justice or fairness.41 Similar to the normative power behind 
rules of war, the various ways in which terrorism is particularly condemned can be seen 
as attempts to reinforce the notion that targeting non-combatants cannot be justified.42 
Terrorism is also differentiated from other forms of violence in its heavily 
communicative nature.43 Most commonly labelled cases involve identifiable audiences 
beyond the direct target,44 and are often associated with sending a message of terror to 
                                                
38 Post, "Conference Document: Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism.". Scharf, 
"Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes.". Schmid, 1992, "The 
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40 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 34. 
41 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 5-6. 
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arguably easier to politicize) or “civilians” (which suggests that political, security, or 
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Wilkinson, "Can a State be 'Terrorist'?," 14. 
44 Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979, Hostage-Taking, Lexington, Lexington Books. Horgan, 
The Psychology of Terrorism, 3. Post, "Conference Document: Frameworks for 
Conceptualising Terrorism.". Sloan, 2000, "Beating International Terrorism: An Action 
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this wider audience as a coercive leverage seeking to accomplish other purposes such as 
pressuring governments to change policies.45 Many associated elements of terrorism 
facilitate this, including: the perceived random nature of the attacks on “normal” people 
(it could happen to anyone); the preference for more dramatic attacks (loud bombs over 
slow poisons); warnings that attacks will recur (but you never know when); the often 
cultivated perception of terrorists being a little crazy and fanatical (or otherwise 
irrational and undeterrable); and, the well documented media sophistication of many 
groups who use terrorism to maximize coverage of attacks. Used in this fashion 
terrorism is a tactic of persuasion,46 propaganda,47 or psychological warfare,48 and is 
similar to strategies of coercive diplomacy.49 This communicative nature does not 
require explicit verbal or written messages, and communication may occur tacitly or 
implicitly through the way in which those using violence can assume that their actions 
                                                
Strategy for Preemption and Punishment," Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air 
University Press, April, 3. 
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Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," In International Terrorism and World Security, 
ed. Carlton and Schaerf: Croom Helm, 15. Jenkins, 2006, Unconquerable Nation: 
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48 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 3-4, 13-7. Sloan, "Beating International 
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Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Crenshaw, 2003, "Coercive 
Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism," In The United States and Coercive 
Diplomacy, ed. Art and Cronin, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
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Press. Lebow, 1998, "Beyond Parsimony: Rethinking Theories of Coercive 
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American Journal of Political Science 26 (4), November. Sagan, 1994, "From 
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Diplomacy, ed. George and Simons, Boulder: Westview Press. Schelling, 1966, Arms 
and Influence, New Haven, Yale University Press. Schelling, 1980, The Strategy of 
Conflict, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University. Schoppa, 1999, "The Social 
Context in Coercive International Bargaining," International Organization 53 (2), 
Spring. 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  36 
will be understood or interpreted by target audiences.50 While the public focus is often 
on threatening messages, terrorism also involves other communicative purposes, 
possibly with different messages for multiple audiences, and perhaps even with the 
primary intended audience entirely distinct from the population targeted with violence 
such as larger populations affiliated with the group using tactics of terror.51 We can 
better appreciate the cost-benefit rationality and instrumental logic of terrorism by 
recognizing that it can be used as a tool of recruitment, to demonstrate strength to a 
sympathetic audience, or to warn an uninvolved party to stay away as well as a method 
to gain attention for a cause, to coerce an opponent to give in through threats of 
continued suffering, or to undermine a regime by highlighting vulnerability or 
repressiveness. 
Terrorism is also an inherently political activity, understood in a broad sense 
subsuming social, religious, and other ideological aims.52 This does not require that we 
know the political reasons behind a specific attack, instead it highlights that political 
elements play a fundamental role.53 While kidnap-for-ransom and a terrorist hostage-
taking may be nearly identical in the particulars of an incident, the political context of 
the second makes them fundamentally different in terms of understanding: the 
motivations and likely behaviour of the perpetrators; the role played within larger social 
contexts; why such incidents will recur or how they can be deterred; and, the reaction of 
various audiences. Defining terrorism as distinct from strictly criminal behaviour does 
not deny that many specific forms of terrorism are recognized as crimes,54 nor preclude 
understanding the interactions between the two, including the use of criminal 
enterprises to fund terrorism, the resulting tendency of some groups to overtime become 
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more criminal than political (or vice versa), and the potential for general law 
enforcement approaches to benefit counterterrorism.55 
The final feature of terrorism discussed here is whether there should be any 
definitional limit either explicitly including or excluding states as a possible agent using 
tactics of terrorism. Many legal definitions of terrorism implicitly or explicitly exclude 
states. Critics of the concept often point to this as proof of bias and as part of attempts to 
use the rhetorical power of the term to protect established authority and delegitimize 
challengers.56 Such criticisms are reinforced by the often-observed fact that states have 
been responsible for far greater uses of violence against civilians than any individual or 
non-state group.57 As a result many terrorism researchers explicitly recognize the 
greater damage done by states and explicitly include them in their definitions. A 
primary problem with this rhetorical solution is the term is neither generally nor 
regularly actually applied in popular, political, or academic discourse to state violence. 
Instead other terms are used to describe classic examples of state violence – which 
could arguably meet the definition of terrorism – including genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and human rights abuses. These arguably 
carry similar normative condemnation and perhaps greater legal or diplomatic weight. 
That such terms, and the various diplomatic and social enforcement mechanisms behind 
them, do not readily apply to terrorist violence by non-state actors is in turn a 
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justification of the need for the term terrorism. A second and more academic problem 
with including states in the definition of terrorism is that the fundamental differences of 
power, resources, and privilege enjoyed by states as compared to non-state groups or 
individual actors creates two very different phenomena of violence to study. Thus 
research into and academic theories about terrorism would generally need to be specific 
to either “state terrorism” or “sub-state terrorism,” making the combined concept of 
marginal use. As a result many academic researchers recognize a rhetorical convention 
of differentiating “state terror” from sub-state “terrorism” – often again accompanied 
with explicit observations that “state terror” has caused much greater damage – which is 
the pattern I follow for this thesis.58 
Theoretical Approaches to Terrorism 
Terrorism research has frequently been criticized for a failure to make explicit 
and carefully consider the theoretical framework and assumptions used to guide specific 
studies. Theoretical choices, even if subconscious, affect research in many different 
ways from changing what questions or explanations are ever considered to determining 
the focus such that some actors and dynamics are visible (whether important or not) 
while others are concealed. Reviewing the progression of psychological, root cause, and 
rational actor based theories as well as the perspective of critical terrorism studies 
highlights the effects this has had (more often implicitly than explicitly) on informing 
and guiding understanding of the phenomenon. 
Psychological approaches to explaining terrorism dominated much of the earlier 
academic work and continue to play a significant role in much popular writing.59 Such 
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research, often built upon an assumption that anyone who would engage in terrorism 
must be different, has often looked for a “terrorist personality” or other psychoanalytic 
explanation of abnormality or pathology.60 This tradition includes attempts to explain 
that terrorists commit such devastating acts of extra-normal violence because of “self-
destructive urges, fantasies of cleanliness, disturbed emotions combined with problems 
with authority and the Self, and inconsistent mothering,”61 while in the case of female 
terrorists researchers have gone as far as to suggest that they must suffer from fears of 
dependency or autonomy, penis envy, feelings of powerlessness, and propensities for 
self sacrifice.62 Despite its long tradition much of this research has failed to find, or too 
often even to systematically look for, supporting evidence. Meanwhile those studies that 
have made empirical claims often suffer from a wide range of serious methodological 
flaws highlighted in subsequent studies that have failed to replicate original findings or 
otherwise questioned and contradicted their conclusions.63  
One result of this research tradition is the frequently repeated conclusion of 
many experts emphasizing the psychological normalcy of most individuals who engage 
in terrorism.64 While the repeated failures and mistakes have perhaps left many in the 
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field with a predisposition against psychological approaches, others emphasize that 
there remain many ways in which such theories, especially at the level of group and 
social psychology, can help further the understanding of a number of issues including: 
the processes by which individuals and groups become radicalized and decide to 
participate with or support those using violence; the factors influencing decisions to 
separate from or turn against such groups; and, explanations for how groups and 
populations process information and react to influence attempts.65  
A second general approach to understanding terrorism focuses on identifying 
and studying the underlying factors contributing to the emergence and course of such 
violence. Research has focused on a wide range of possible root causes including: 
poverty, repression, alienation, humiliation, weak or failed states, illegitimate or corrupt 
governments, rapid or unequal modernization, social injustice, religious and cultural 
clashes, ethnic separatism and frustrated nationalism, radicalized or extremist 
ideologies, demographic distortions, endemic crime and drug trafficking, and recent 
experiences of norm and society weakening violence (civil wars, occupation, revolution, 
etc).66 A shallow version of this tradition argues that terrorism is largely explained by 
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such causes and that addressing or preventing them should be the principal response, 
while an equally shallow but common refrain in public discussions is that any 
consideration of root causes is obviously flawed and simply an excuse for such 
violence. Deeper research has often raised significant challenges to basic root cause 
explanations noting that of the very large numbers of people and groups who experience 
such underlying problems only a very few resort to tactics of terrorism, and in most 
cases those who participate in acts of terrorism are better off than many of those around 
them (better educated, coming from higher socio-economic sub-groups, and having 
greater opportunities).67 Researchers in turn have put forward a number of more 
sophisticated root cause theories, for example suggesting that while poverty alone may 
not be sufficient to explain terrorism that highly unequal development with frustrated 
rising expectations and greater awareness of relative deprivation may create conditions 
conducive to small mobilized groups violating norms against violence to act on 
grievances with larger popular support.68 While such theories hold some explanatory 
promise (if not predictive ability) researchers have also cautioned that the typical “root 
cause” factors likely play complex, contingent, misleading, and even contradictory roles 
in any specific situation.69 
Because of much explanatory success, and perhaps in some part as a reaction to 
the failures and exaggerations of psychological approaches, many contemporary experts 
in the field tend towards rational actor and strategic choice frameworks for 
understanding terrorism.70 Those who explicitly defend this theoretical perspective 
emphasize the collective and instrumental rationality observable when studying the 
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behaviour of groups using tactics of terrorism.71 For example, highlighting where cost 
benefit decision making is recognizable in the choice to use violence as opposed to 
other available alternatives perceived as less effective, too costly, or unlikely to succeed 
in pursuit of distinct goals the groups believe their tactics will systematically help 
achieve.72 Rationality is also demonstrated in learning behaviours and other indications 
of considered action over time.73 Rational actor approaches have been convincingly 
applied – and supported with empirical data and analysis – to even explain tactics such 
as suicide terrorism, which popular wisdom often portrays as particularly irrational and 
crazy.74 Rational actor assumptions are central to a number of more specific research 
approaches including those: highlighting the essentially communicative nature of the 
terrorism (often emphasizing an intricate relationship to the media);75 studying terrorism 
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as a strategy of insurgency or revolution;76 looking at the tactic as a form of coercive 
bargaining;77 or, applying game-theory or other advanced economic forms of analysis.78 
A rational actor focus on terrorism helps to illuminate a wide range of tactical 
and strategic goals. Because much terrorism research often comes from targeted 
societies, analysis often focuses on how the “terrorizing” violence is meant to either 
directly compel a political actor into changing behaviour or to influence the “larger 
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targeted audience” for leverage on that actor as strategies of coercion, intimidation, or 
attrition.79 Such a focus also includes discussion of how terrorism may intentionally be 
used under a propaganda strategy to generate publicity and attract attention to specific 
grievances perhaps guided by the logic that increased awareness of those issues will 
lead to sympathy and favourable action.80 Assuming terrorism to be rational also helps 
uncover the logic behind the use of violence even in cases where it seems highly 
unlikely to achieve favourable concessions from those targeted including its use as a 
strategy of mobilization to attract new supporters to a cause (or discourage an 
opponent’s supporters) through a number of direct and indirect techniques including: 
showing (and often exaggerating) the strength or potential of an opposition; highlighting 
the inability of a government to ensure security and fulfil its other obligations (in turn 
separating the government from the people); and, triggering an overly repressive 
backlash by a government (generating opposition to the government and sympathy for 
its opponents).81 Coming full circle, examinations of terrorism as a strategic choice 
return to what may also be viewed as psychological motivations in explaining that 
terrorism can have an expressive rationality in fulfilling morale boosting or even purely 
cathartic purposes (whether as retributive violence or simply doing something in 
response to a shared grievance).82 
While very successful and widely adopted by current research into terrorism the 
rational actor approach has a number of limitations.83 As with the study of other 
phenomena, the real behaviour of any actor or group is constrained by limited and 
incorrect information, motivated by values that often do not fit neatly into cost-benefit 
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calculus, and subject to other psychological influences not easily explained or predicted 
as part of a rational decision making process. This is perhaps especially true for groups 
who often must operate clandestinely, under high pressure and mortal threat, and often 
shaped by radicalizing processes of indoctrination.84 Cultural, experiential, and 
ideological differences between the individuals or groups in question and the researcher 
further complicates and limits the application of rational actor approaches. The use of 
other approaches should compliment understanding, and often reveal otherwise 
obscured phenomenon of interest, especially when examining the larger societal context 
in which terrorism occurs. 
A final academic approach to terrorism is represented by a variety of researchers 
who may be identified under the label of critical terrorism studies.85 As with other 
critical approaches to political science these researchers often adopt a critical attitude of 
“questioning the question.”86 They generally focus on the way the concept of terrorism 
is constructed as part of existing power structures and employed to perpetuate those, as 
well as how the phenomenon manifests within current ideologies and systems and what 
influence those have on it and its study. The critical agenda generally is guided by a 
normative goal of making a better world through this study or as Booth explains being 
“concerned with the construction of a world politics in which humanly created terrors 
are progressively marginalized and ultimately eradicated.”87 These researchers 
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frequently highlight the rhetorical abuses of the label through inconsistent and 
politicized application (both by generally ignoring state terror as well as by which sub-
state groups are so labelled), the arguably disproportionate emotive and connotative 
power of the language of terrorism, and how public fears are exploited in the pursuit of 
other political or ideological agenda.88 Researchers in this tradition regularly question 
whether the concept of terrorism is appropriate for academic research, especially 
whether it can be employed as a categorical description of a specific phenomenon in an 
unbiased and methodologically sound manner. Critical terrorism studies advocates have 
emphasized the connections between governments and terrorism focused academics 
warning of “a largely co-opted field of research that is deeply enmeshed with the actual 
practices of counter-terrorism and the exercise of state power.”89 However, researchers 
in the critical terrorism studies tradition do not necessarily advocate abandonment of the 
term, as Jackson explains: 
[T]here is a compelling normative imperative to retain a term that de-legitimises 
particular kinds of violence directed against civilians and which instrumentalises 
human suffering for the purposes of influencing an audience.90 
I similarly advocate that there is an identifiable phenomenon of violence called 
terrorism that should be the subject of academic study, and in this thesis include work 
from critical terrorism researchers for examining the biases created by the dominant 
social construction of terrorism. 
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Responding to Terrorism 
Government responses to terrorism can be divided into three general categories: 
anti-terrorism measures which are “essentially defensive and geared to reducing 
vulnerability of individuals, property and critical infrastructure” from possible attacks; 
consequence management plans and steps to mitigate the effects of an attack; and, 
counterterrorism efforts to proactively deter, disrupt, and otherwise reduce or eliminate 
the potential for future attacks.91 The focus of this thesis, on hearts and minds 
campaigns, falls under the third level of response. 
Counterterrorism discussions often concentrate exclusively on elimination of the 
threat of terrorist violence. But as Pillar emphasizes in his classic work on U.S. 
counterterrorism policy governments always have other interests that will be involved to 
varying levels and will generally require consideration of trade offs in the use of limited 
resources and in the balancing of potentially contradictory priorities. He summarizes 
that the fundamental goal of counterterrorism efforts, and thus the primary measure for 
an effective hearts and minds campaign, “is to save lives (and limbs and property) 
without unduly compromising other national interests and objectives” noting that 
“anything other than saving lives is but a means to that end” and that ultimately the 
“policy must be judged according not only to how many lives it saves but also to how 
little damage it does to those other interests.”92 
In analyzing how democracies respond to terrorism researchers often note two 
contrasting models: a “war model” which places “a stronger emphasis ... on the actual 
restraint of terror than on the maintenance of liberal democratic rights,” and a “criminal 
justice model” where “the preservation of democratic principles is a fundamental 
premise in the fight against terror.”93 Although a wide range of political factors tend to 
push states towards more aggressive responses and the “war model,” many 
commentators have warned that such steps risk sacrificing the very rights states are 
trying to protect while a significant body of terrorism research tends to support the 
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greater efficacy of campaigns which although aggressively pursued do not cross liberal 
democratic boundaries.94 The same influences pushing toward a “war model” similarly 
favour coercive responses (retaliation, punishment, and efforts to destroy groups using 
terrorism) over what can be described as “positive incentives” such as addressing root 
causes, working with non-violent protest groups, and providing pathways out of 
terrorism.95 While some proponents admit a wishful bias that positive approaches more 
compatible with liberal ideals will be more successful, there is significant research 
supporting the conclusion that coercive policies are often ineffective and 
counterproductive. Many experts conclude that although the hardcore may not be 
reachable the best long-term strategy is a carefully balanced mix of approaches.96  
In responding to terrorism states have a wide range of instruments to use 
including “diplomacy, the criminal justice system, interdiction of financial assets, 
military force, and intelligence, as well as possible use of the intelligence apparatus for 
covert action.”97 In most cases the best policy utilizes a mix of these instruments, with 
no particular instrument always being appropriate or effective. When well managed the 
various instruments should be complimentary with the “whole being greater than the 
sum of the parts” – although the history of counterterrorism efforts is full of examples 
of various policies working at cross-purposes and with counterproductive results.98 All 
of the instruments are relevant to hearts and minds efforts whether as mechanisms for 
positively influencing attitudes or because of the precautionary potential of poorly 
considered or carried out operations for losing public support. 
Diplomatic efforts offer an obvious means of pursuing a hearts and minds 
campaign as well as complimenting each of the other counterterrorism instruments. 
Such efforts include bilateral state-to-state diplomacy, initiatives through multilateral 
forums, and public diplomacy aimed directly at foreign populations. Diplomatic efforts 
aimed at influencing the behaviour of other states can help gain greater cooperation on 
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other counterterrorism programs as well as target problems where states may be 
passively or actively enabling terrorism. Historically bilateral diplomacy has proven 
more successful, although even the “mood music” of multilateral diplomacy is often 
helpful to counterterrorism purposes.99 Diplomatic efforts aimed at foreign populations 
can more directly fulfil hearts and minds goals of decreasing support for groups using 
tactics of political violence while increasing cooperation with intelligence, law 
enforcement, military, and other instruments. The principle limits to diplomacy involve 
the constraints posed by other (often more important) national priorities as well as the 
fact that other states may not be willing or able to cooperate sufficiently, or to fulfil 
promises once made. Public diplomacy is further limited by the reality of the “product 
being sold” – even without making mistakes, desirable policies can be deeply unpopular 
with specific populations – as well as by the established perspectives of foreign 
populations framing and limiting any persuasive efforts.100 
While other instruments all have potential for being part of positive hearts and 
minds efforts when carefully planned, targeted, and implemented they more often are 
relevant to the central question of this thesis for their potential of negatively affecting 
popular support. Lists identifying individuals or groups as terrorists are too often 
politicized (undermining their persuasive benefits),101 economic sanctions can fail to 
affect targeted leaders (or lead to desired policy changes) while negatively affecting 
larger populations providing grounds for further radicalization (within targeted states as 
well as amongst other sympathetic communities),102 and military strikes are easily 
framed abroad in a negative light (without considering the greater problems when the 
intelligence on which such actions are based turns out to be wrong).103 Of these 
instruments the use of military force is often seen as a quick popular move at home 
(doing something strong in response to horrible atrocities) and the most likely to have 
counterproductive effects in terms of hearts and minds goals. Pillar observes that 
terrorism is “the quintessential weapon of the weak against the strong” and powerful 
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states are unlikely to prosper by “focusing narrowly on making the weak even 
weaker.”104 Similarly Seger argues military retaliation can have a “catch-22” effect: 
First, the use of military force confirms the terrorists’ self-image as heroic 
warriors and martyrs to the cause. It also reinforces the image of the target of 
their aggression to be an evil enemy and enhances their status with supporters 
and followers. A major military response may result in additional recruits to the 
cause of the terrorist organisation to fight what they perceive as the evil 
aggressor. In addition, large-scale military action may increase demands for 
revenge, not just from the terrorist organisation but from others who identify 
with the cause, and this can result in a spiral of revenge and counter-revenge.105 
The one instrument according to Pillar that when used carefully can minimize the 
negative attitudinal effects (or even create positive side effects) is the use of covert 
action guided by good intelligence. Covert operations can pre-empt, disrupt, and defeat 
terrorist plans and, used in conjunction with other instruments and partners, can help 
dismantle terrorist operations on a cell-by-cell and terrorist-by-terrorist basis.106 But 
even covert operations risk hearts and minds backlashes when revealed or handled 
clumsily, and in turn are especially potent for fuelling the type of conspiracy theories 
often used to place all blame for grievances on powerful states and actors. 
In Pillar’s discussion of the major fronts on which the above counterterrorism 
instruments can be focused three are particularly suitable for hearts and minds efforts: 
addressing the root conditions and issues that give rise to terrorism; manipulating the 
intentions of those whose use terrorism; and, reducing the ability of those to conduct 
such attacks.107 A frequent criticism of counterterrorism policies is they focus too 
heavily on combating the current groups responsible for violent attacks without giving 
sufficient if any attention as to how to decrease future radicalization around the same 
original grievances. Without taking steps to address such root causes, and especially 
with the likely chance of radicalization caused by other counterterrorism efforts, many 
experts argue that states are merely perpetuating a cycle of violence.108 In addressing 
root causes experts council that governments should be careful so as not to be perceived 
as rewarding political violence and should realize that the radicalized hard core will 
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rarely renounce violence. Many grievances may also be largely outside of the control of 
the targeted state or even based on policies that are desirable to maintain (although 
generally there should be other steps which can be taken to address the base strain). 
Research also shows that the effect of grievances is not straightforward with violence 
often arising during periods of reform and being initiated by better off sub-groups.109 
Many grievances are attributed to the United States merely because of its current 
position of global dominance and will not change regardless of U.S. policy, or are part 
of highly complicated problems where changes in any direction may alleviate 
grievances for some groups while creating or increasing them for others.110 
Hearts and minds efforts can also be directed at reducing the capabilities of 
groups using tactics of terrorism. Decreased popular support may directly dry up 
resources (recruitment, financial support, concealment, and target information) while 
aiding counterterrorism efforts by increasing intelligence, patience for reforms, and 
security for government forces. Focusing on the capabilities of groups suffers from both 
problems of too little capability to target (as in the case with very small groups) or “too 
much” capability (as in the case of groups such as Hizballah and Hamas which are 
simply too large to wipe out and too highly integrated into the populations they claim to 
represent where they provide a wide range of other social and political services).111 
Counterterrorism policy can also seek to manipulate the intentions of groups 
through the use of hearts and minds type efforts in a number of ways. Such efforts 
might include communications which aim to deter certain types of attacks,112 creating 
incentives to pursue non-violent paths for reform (such as supporting peace 
processes),113 and working with media organizations to reduce the possible propaganda 
advantages offered by violent attacks.114 The principle limitation for such efforts is the 
even greater difficulty of influencing the attitudes of radicalized elements as compared 
to the difficulties discussed throughout this research for attempts to persuade the larger 
populations potentially sympathetic to such groups. 
                                                
109 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 31-3. 
110 Ibid., 66-9. 
111 Ibid., 33-4. 
112 For example: Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, xvi. 
113 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 140-50. 
114 Frey, Dealing with Terrorism, 120-36. 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  52 
In addition to problems specific to hearts and minds programs discussed in the 
later section on the study of counterinsurgency, there are a wide range of challenges, 
limits, and difficulties that affect counterterrorism efforts in general. Counterterrorism 
efforts are hampered by problems of bureaucratic inertia and turf fighting, as well as the 
difficulties in a democratic system of sustaining interest, commitment, and consistency 
especially with attempts to change or redirect policies. These problems are compounded 
given that counterterrorism efforts, especially those related to hearts and minds 
programs, necessarily involve a wide range of actors on both the domestic and 
international front who are also pursuing other agendas with alternative priorities which 
often work at cross-purposes.115 While information for decision-making is never 
perfect, this problem is compounded in a field where the underground and clandestine 
nature of the opponent’s activities (often in less than friendly foreign countries) 
increases the dependence on ambiguous and uncertain intelligence.116 Further, once 
protest has risen to the use of tactics of terrorism attitudes about the grievances involved 
are usually well entrenched and those who have made the commitment to support or 
join terrorist networks have undergone processes of radicalization which push against 
any moderation and make violence as a “way of life” no longer normatively 
proscribed.117 Finally, recognizing that these conflicts are likely to last a long time,118 
states also must fight the temptation to take short cuts that sacrifice the liberties they 
value.119 As Ignatieff writes, a democracy should “fight with one hand tied behind its 
back.”120 
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Studying Social Movements 
To aid investigation of population dynamics shaping attitudes and actions in 
contested environments where tactics of terrorism and political violence often emerge 
this thesis explores possible contributions from the study of social movements. This 
tradition draws upon a range of academic disciplines including sociology, anthropology, 
psychology, and political science offering a well-established and conceptually rich body 
of literature to help inform terrorism research. The social movement literature examines 
collective action for bringing about social change outside of the normal structures of 
political governance. Although what a social movement specifically is and is not may 
suffer from as much definitional inconsistency as the term terrorism,121 Della Porta and 
Diani provide a typical description of social movements “as (1) informal networks, 
based (2) on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about (3) conflictual issues, 
through (4) the frequent use of various forms of protest.”122 In this thesis I argue that 
our understanding of hearts and minds efforts in counterterrorism campaigns, as well as 
the general study of political violence, can be improved by the use of a social movement 
based theory of terrorism. At the same time the general study of social movements may 
be enriched by more explicitly examining terrorism as part of the larger dynamic of 
collective action and protest politics. 
There are many reasons that the application of social movement theories to 
terrorism research should be promising. In many cases social movement and terrorism 
researchers are studying the same larger phenomenon albeit from different perspectives 
with different foci.123 The differences between the two are exaggerated in part because 
of the tendency of social movement researchers to focus on causes of which they 
approve (either dismissing uses of violence as excesses at the extremes or an 
understandable response to excessive state repression) while terrorism researchers tend 
to study groups of whom they disapprove (often with close connections to democratic 
governments targeted by terrorism).124 
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Although the two research traditions have largely developed separately they 
share many overlapping influences and interesting parallels. Citations between the two 
traditions have historically been rare, but studies in both have often cited the same 
earlier works or drawn upon some of the same theoretical insights from other 
disciplines. Both traditions have followed similar historical patterns of development and 
focus starting with psychological based theories that emphasized the irrational and 
abnormal, root cause theories that gave more mechanistic power to grievances, and then 
rational actor theories that emphasized the normality of participants and their strategic 
decision making.125 That pattern of historical development also included significant 
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social movement work to the study of political violence, Gurr notes three general 
observations from the work he has helped collect: “One is the contextual interpretation 
of political violence: it is a predictable consequence of some kinds of social conditions 
and conflicts. The second is the recognition that the violence generated by social 
movements has patterned consequences that are often recognized, and used, by the 
parties to the conflict. Finally, and more speculatively, the waves of mass violence in 
our past seem to be connected with larger cycles of political change." Gurr, "The 
History of Protest, Rebellion, and Reform in America: An Overview," 13. 
125 Crossley, Making Sense of Social Movements, 11. Horgan, "The Search for the 
Terrorist Personality.". Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism. Morris, 2000, 
"Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals," Contemporary 
Sociology 29 (3), May: 445. Richardson, What Terrorists Want. On the social 
movement side, Gurr specifically addresses this progression with respect to the study of 
violence in movements: “New ways of thinking about group violence have developed 
during the last several decades. An earlier generation of theorists tended to think about 
group violence as social pathology… Disease and breakdown models for understanding 
group violence have largely been abandoned. Most social scientists and historians now 
think of serious episodes of group violence as more or less predictable consequences of 
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parallels in the problems theories in the two traditions encountered: from the lack of 
empirical support for early psychological theories to the same problems of explaining 
why specific groups at specific times became active in response to root causes that 
seemed to be relatively constant and much wider spread as well as why activity did not 
come from the worst off. The use of similar theories facing similar problems also means 
that both traditions often raise the same questions: Under what conditions do 
movements or terrorism arise? What roles do ideology or culture, root causes, state 
repression, and charismatic leadership play? How does radicalization and recruitment 
occur? When do larger societies support the group protesting? What causes activity to 
wane and decrease? What roles do elite allies and opponents, the media, and new 
technologies play? 
Despite the parallels, the social movement literature has in general developed 
deeper theoretical work both within a rational actor approach and subsequently on more 
constructivist approaches responding to the limits of rational actor models than most of 
the terrorism literature.126 In several cases the theoretical issues highlighted in current 
terrorism research have been confronted in more depth (if from a different angle) in 
studies of social movements providing an opportunity to accelerate, compliment, and 
spur better terrorism work. At the same time examining these issues from the different 
case focus of terrorism research promises potential paybacks to improve social 
movement theories.127 
Applying the larger focus of a social movement perspective (bringing different 
actors, mechanisms, concepts, and theories into the spotlight) will help address the 
criticism of much terrorism research for being too focused only on the use of violence to 
the obscurity of the broader context.128 Likewise, a broader focus will help emphasize 
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that groups using terrorism are often part of larger movements and directly or indirectly 
connected to other groups who are making positive contributions to their societies in 
ways which do not involve normatively censured behaviour (helping to address another 
major criticism of terrorism research) while also bringing into social movement research 
a greater focus on the negative potential of movements (helping to address a similar 
criticism of that literature).129 
Although previously rare, terrorism research is increasingly demonstrating the 
productive potential of situating itself within the social movement literature. This 
includes: Della Porta’s work on left-wing terrorist groups in Italy and Germany;130 
Wiktorowicz studies of radical Islamic activism;131 and, Leheny’s application to al-
Qaeda’s influence on Southeast Asian groups.132  
Finally, both bodies of research have produced parallel findings emphasizing the 
potential for cross replication and development of theories. For example, both terrorism 
and social movement research has independently observed that individuals from the 
middle class are more likely to participate in contentious protests or violence.133 
Likewise both research traditions have had theories challenged and then further 
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developed by the observation that social movements and terrorist violence are more 
likely to occur at times of increasing well being,134 emphasized the importance of pre-
existing social networks for recruitment,135 and studied the effects of state violence and 
repression on group activity.136 
Social Movement Approaches and Concepts 
Overviews of the American social movement literature often identify three 
principal approaches to studying the phenomenon: collective behaviour, resource 
mobilization, and political process.137 Of these the collective behaviour approach came 
first and is closely associated with Blumer’s work in the 1950s and 60s.138 From the 
perspective of more recent traditions the collective behaviour approach is characterized 
by an overly reflexive focus on grievances, deprivation, anomie, and structural strain as 
explaining movement emergence where such behaviour was further described as 
irrational, hysterical, or similarly part of “mob psychology” and grouped in with other 
(non-political) collective behaviours including fashions, crazes, and panics.139  
In response to the weaknesses of this previous research the resource 
mobilization approach, typified by McCarthy and Zald in the 1970s, emphasized a view 
based on rational actors reacting to relatively constant grievances but emerging because 
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of changes in available resources or because of the ability of initiators to reorganize 
resources to change the cost benefit equation limiting mobilization.140 Resources 
include “tangible assets such as money, facilities, and means of communication” as well 
as “the intangible or ‘human’ assets” which have included unspecialized labour, 
organizing and legal skills, and other forms of technical expertise.141 Research within 
this approach emphasizes how the distribution and nature of available resources affects 
the tactical choices movements make and the consequences of their action for social and 
political change.  
The resource mobilization approach also argues that individuals exist within 
networks (kinship and friendship as well as professional, educational, and religious 
organizations) and that the strength of and connections within and between these drive 
movement recruitment instead of people being “rootless” and “isolated” as the previous 
collective behaviour research suggested.142 Such networks combined with 
organizational forms and dynamics within movement groups are referred to as 
“mobilizing structures,” defined as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as 
formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”143 Della Porta 
for example discusses the important role that such social networks played for terrorist 
groups when they were driven underground in terms of recruitment and support as well 
as their interpretation of reality,144 while Wiktorowicz highlights the role played by 
mosques and prayer groups, NGOs, and professional and student associations in Islamic 
activism.145 
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The resource mobilization approach has emphasized the role of more formally 
structured “social movement organizations” as subsets of or principle actors in 
movements.146 Given that many different organizations may be active in complimentary 
and competitive roles, the distribution of resources, opportunities, and other factors 
between groups will help shape mobilization dynamics. In applying this research to 
terrorism it is a relatively easy step to consider terrorist groups as a specific type of 
social movement organization, which is what Robinson does in his study of Hamas and 
Leheny does in his study of al-Qaeda’s influence on other groups active in Southeast 
Asia.147 Likewise Della Porta in part studied the comparative influences on radical 
versus more moderate organizations and the effect on the use of political violence 
within a conflict.148  
The political process approach – typified by the work of Tarrow, McAdam, and 
Tilly – also emphasizes a rational actor basis of social movements and the role of 
mobilizing structures. This approach dissents from the emphasis given to formal 
organizations, instead placing more stress on the relationship between institutional 
political actors and protest.149 In this tradition changes in the “political opportunity 
structure” are used to explain and examine the emergence and evolution of 
mobilization.150 Political opportunities have been defined as “consistent – but not 
necessarily formal, permanent, or national – signals to social or political actors which 
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either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social 
movements” where such signals might include:151 
1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system 
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that 
typically undergird a polity 
3. The presence or absence of elite allies 
4. The State’s capacity and propensity for repression.152 
In assessing the potential for social movement research to contribute to the 
understanding of terrorism it is worth noting that each of the above is echoed in studies 
about the use of political violence. Social movement researchers emphasize that in 
addition to responding to changes in their external environment the actions of social 
movement actors (including terrorist groups) may also create opportunities for 
themselves or others (including elites and opponents).153 Della Porta’s application of 
social movement theories to terrorist groups in Germany and Italy for example 
concluded that changes in the openness of the political system coupled with the nature 
of police repression played a significant role in affecting radicalization and the nature of 
violent protest.154  
Proponents of both the resource mobilization and political process approaches 
overtime have come to recognize that each alternative has something important to 
contribute and “instead of debating the relative merits” of each position have 
increasingly turned to new agendas for advancing the study of social movements.155 
Perhaps the most useful development building upon these two traditions is research into 
framing processes started by the work of Snow and his colleagues.156 Drawing upon 
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theories in social psychology, rhetoric and dramaturgy, as well as sociology,157 framing 
processes are seen as “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared 
understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective 
action.”158 This approach argues that while the above concepts (resources, opportunities, 
and networks) are necessary they are not fully sufficient explanations and that in 
addition people must come to perceive themselves as aggrieved and believe that 
collective action can redress their problems.159 As Zald explains, frames fill this gap by 
providing “shorthand interpretations of the world, to locate blame, [and] to suggest lines 
of actions.”160 Others have explained that frames influence our interpretation and 
perception of reality,161 and are part of how culture and ideology are converted into 
action and brought into the study of social movements.162 Frames can pre-exist within a 
movement context as well as be created and competed over by movement groups, the 
media, the government, and other actors.163 Chandler has applied the concept of framing 
processes to help understand political violence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while 
Wiktorowicz studies the framing competition between al-Qaeda and non-violent Islamic 
fundamentalists.164 
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A Social Movement Theory of Terrorism 
By applying theories and ideas developed in the social movement literature to 
the study of hearts and minds efforts in counterterrorism this thesis will contribute to the 
construction of a social movement theory of terrorism. Such a theory will not apply to 
all uses of terrorism and does not seek to reject previous theories, but instead will build 
upon them using key social movement concepts. This theoretical approach involves two 
important shifts in focus: first, recognizing that a group using terrorism is most often 
situated within a larger social movement context; and second, recognizing that violent 
tactics are but a subset of the broad range of protest repertoires and other actions in 
which such groups and movements may engage. Counterterrorism hearts and minds 
efforts should be an especially applicable test case for a social movement approach as 
both focus on a number of common issues including the attitudes of the larger 
population, the role of addressing grievances, how issues are perceived, and how state 
actions can spur or dampen rebellion. 
Although many of the cases studied by terrorism researchers are easily identified 
as a subset of political protest typical of social movements the overlap is not complete. 
Recognizing terrorism as a tactic (which can be used by almost any actor in many 
different context for a wide variety of reasons) underscores that there can be cases 
where political violence is used without any mobilization goal and not as part of a larger 
collective protest dynamic. At the same time, it should be noted that a social movement 
theory of terrorism might be usefully applicable to cases where the actor is not part of 
an existing movement dynamic. For example, terrorism might be intended as an initiator 
action to create awareness or trigger repression and thereby help spur a movement. 
Similarly, even cases of state terror may be usefully examined through a social 
movement perspective given that such tactics are often part of social control efforts to 
prevent, contain, or quell the emergence of collective action outside of carefully 
proscribed social structures. 
The goal of a social movement based theory of terrorism is not to reject current 
theories, but instead to build upon them in a complimentary fashion addressing their 
weaknesses to highlight what they obscure. A social movement theory of terrorism 
would continue to see groups using tactics of political violence as rational actors, 
subject to the same type of limits which social psychology discusses for other rational 
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actors, who are responding to or trying to address grievances (i.e. root causes) or 
achieve other aspirational goals (e.g. social transformation). This approach also 
recognizes that current theoretical formations may be better suited for understanding 
specific cases, such as the strategic thinking of a group using hostage-taking primarily 
as a coercive leverage to achieve specific demands from a state, where the additional 
complexity of a social movement approach carries too much cost without providing 
much (if any) additional explanatory insight. 
A social movement theory of terrorism brings the application of the major 
theoretical constructs currently used in that literature including the role played by 
resources, political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes as tools 
for understanding the emergence and evolution of tactics of political violence. Such 
tools have already been explicitly used by Della Porta to understand terrorist groups in 
Italy and Germany,165 Leheny for studying al-Qaeda,166 and Wiktorowicz in tracing the 
rise of violent Islamic activism.167 Others have essentially used some of the same tools 
such as Stern discussing the role of narratives and cultural histories to understand 
Chechen violence,168 and Ginges in discussing the need to create frames that justify 
extra-normal violence,169 perhaps as Walzer explains through portrayals which 
dehumanize the other.170  
A principal emphasis of a social movement theory of terrorism is that there are 
two important levels of analysis: the group and the larger social movement.171 Too often 
current terrorism theories focus exclusively on the group using terrorism, or on a binary 
interaction between that group and state. When these theories consider other actors the 
group using terrorism remains privileged and largely separated in the analysis. For 
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example, the larger public may be a relatively passive “audience” who at best exerts 
pressure on the state, or whom the state and terrorist group are in competition over. 
Alternatively, when a larger public is seen as potential supporters and sympathizers, the 
group using terrorism is often identified in terms such as being at the top of a pyramid 
with that population as a base.172  
From a social movement perspective a group using terrorism can be considered 
similar to other “social movement organizations”173 providing potentially informative 
and important comparisons to what we know about other groups active within a social 
movement and emphasizing that the group using terrorism is neither necessarily 
representative of the movement nor the most important actor within it. The social 
movement literature discusses how social movement organizations can function as 
initiators of new movements or act to redirect a movement, as well as how the 
distribution of resources and opportunities within a movement can lead to competition 
between social movement organizations (or even counter movements).174 At the same 
time research may explore ways in which groups who choose to use repertoires of 
political violence are unique including for example the effects of needing to operate in 
cell structures or clandestinely.175 A specific movement related question, which Pillar 
for example considers in his discussion of counterterrorism, is the degree to which a 
group using terrorism is representative of and embedded within “something larger than 
itself.”176 An organization such as Hamas which provides a wide range of social 
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services, has a political wing which has successfully taken control of government 
through open popular election, and is tightly integrated into religious and educational 
networks poses a very different challenge for a state’s counterterrorism efforts than a 
group such as Aum Shinrikyo which led a much more isolated existence and was 
considered at best “odd” by most of those who even knew of its existence.177 
Shifting analysis to the level of the social movement highlights a number of 
other important considerations such as the maturity of the movement, 178 the historical 
context in which it has developed, how the state has chosen to respond to it, and 
whether there are any connections to other movements either domestically or 
internationally. This shift of focus reminds the researcher that political violence may 
only have arisen late in a cycle of protest and that many of the most important 
grievances, connections, and frames for understanding the conflict may pre-date the 
existence of a group using terrorism.179 Other actors may continue to be more important 
to the evolution of protest, and the group using violence may be reacting to these other 
movement dynamics more than they are influenced by their targeting of a state or its 
responses to them.180 How a state has chosen to respond to a larger movement (as well 
as to a group using violence) also becomes very important to understanding the 
dynamics of violent protest. For example, much social movement research discusses a 
curvilinear relationship between state repression and radical protest.181 
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The second major shift in focus that a social movement theory of terrorism 
brings is to widen the spotlight from being exclusively on tactics of violence to the 
larger possible protest repertoire and other functions which social movements play. It is 
understandable that the fundamental purpose of counterterrorism is on saving “lives 
(limbs and property)”182 and similarly that terrorism researchers may be most concerned 
with studying the particular manifestation of norm-breaking violent behaviour. But a 
major insight of applying social movement theories is that such behaviour is often 
intricately interrelated in a larger protest context, and to fully understand the use of 
political violence one must also study the alternative types of protest available and how 
choices between these are constrained by and in turn shape the movement dynamic. In 
applying the study of repertoires of contention to terrorism researchers might consider 
questions such as: the temporal nature of cycles of protest;183 when and why violent 
repertoires emerge (especially with relations to political opportunities, resources, and 
frames);184 what transitions of limits in norm breaking behaviour may occur; how 
violent as compared to non-violent repertoires diffuse between groups; and, under what 
conditions violence may trigger a backlash from the larger movement or what 
influences may lead to a return to non-violent repertoires. At the same time the social 
movement literature has recognized that violent protests may have unique attributes,185 
including costs and other negatives inhibiting its use,186 as well as a number of possible 
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benefits such as how violent acts may themselves spur movements,187 serve as framing 
processes,188 or increase chances of group success.189 
Studying Counterinsurgency 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks the media and many public experts 
frequently repeated the conventional wisdom that winning hearts and minds is essential 
to counterterrorism.190 The authority underlying these claims reflects the persuasive 
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prima facie logic about the importance of popular support as well as the perceived 
consensus of more than a half-century of counterinsurgency literature.191 However, 
others caution that there has been a lack of research on efficacy,192 criticize underlying 
analytic flaws,193 highlight historical counterexamples,194 and note that most uses 
appear to be a mere stock phrase giving lip service to a trivialized slogan or clichéd 
formula offering no substantive guidance to those who need it.195 While much of the 
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public discussion of a counterterrorism hearts and minds strategy may be based on at 
best a shallow understanding of the phrase, the post-9/11 period has seen in-depth 
examination of the doctrine of population-centric warfare given the rise of complex, 
violent, and intractable insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as recognition of 
the threat from transnational terrorist groups. As the counterinsurgency literature 
provides the most developed thinking about what a hearts and minds strategy should 
entail, as well as the problems and challenges that will likely be encountered, I examine 
the central question of this thesis by incorporating lessons and insights from classic and 
contemporary studies of insurgencies with the previously discussed research into 
terrorism and social movements. This section examines the idea of a “hearts and minds” 
approach, the lessons of classic mid-20th century counterinsurgencies, and modern 
thinking on the implications of confronting transnational, post-Maoist, and virtual 
insurgents with al-Qaida as the prototype of the new threat. 
Understanding Hearts and Minds 
As a phrase the hearts and minds construction appears in English at least as early 
as 1568 and 1570 as well as in early English translations of the Bible.196 In its general 
usage it captures the dimensions of emotion and logic underlying attitudinal judgements 
and beliefs. Modern usage labelling a strategy for prevailing in a conflict by winning the 
popular support of a contested population is normally attributed to Sir Gerald Templer 
who used it to describe his approach in Malaya where he served as High Commissioner 
from 1952 to 1954.197 Others note that the military principle existed long before 
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Templer’s usage provided the label.198 Of relevance to the current insurgencies in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman for example used the phrase to 
describe his approach for success in keeping the peace and extending British rule over 
Balochistan in 1891.199 However, most agree that Templer was the first modern era 
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military leader to give it real tactical substance while also providing the prototypical 
classic success case.200 
Starting in the Vietnam era, critics from both ends of the political spectrum also 
used the phrase with cynical and ironic connotations.201 Advocates of harder military 
responses used the onomatopoeic acronym WHAM, from “winning hearts and minds,” 
to emphasize that popular support follows from displays of power and military 
victory.202 Opponents of the Vietnam War gave the phrase an Orwellian connotation as 
part of critiquing especially “ruthless” and “repressive military tactics” employed under 
the contradictory logic that the government could win the support of those whom it was 
bombing.203 This critique was represented by protest t-shirts reading, “we will win your 
hearts and minds or we will kill you,”204 and epitomized by the award winning 1974 
documentary film, titled Hearts and Minds, which focused on the dark side of U.S. 
military involvement in Southeast Asia.205 
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While the phrase continues to occasionally be employed in a cynical or ironic 
fashion, a content analysis I conducted for this thesis found that the vast majority of 
current news media usage in the context of terrorism assumed that winning hearts and 
minds was positive and beneficial, and almost half of the cases examined categorized 
references as being “essential” or “very important” to current counterterrorism 
efforts.206 In these cases the phrase was generally employed in the classic 
counterinsurgency manner as meaning attempts to win the support of the population 
from or within which a group using political violence arises or is active. In this content 
analysis I also found: in most cases little or no detail was given for what a hearts and 
minds approach would specifically entail; to the extent that detail was given it covered a 
very wide and diverse range of prescriptions; and, in many cases the phrase seemed to 
be merely employed for politically instrumental reasons or because it would have 
rhetorical power. 
The assumed authority of the phrase comes in part from its intuitive logic, as 
described in Chapter One, for “at first glance it seems a potent prescription.”207 In the 
abstract the successful prosecution of a campaign against an insurgency would sensibly 
seem to depend upon popular support. It seems easy to argue that previous failures are 
explained by their lack of “serious” or “real” attempts to win hearts and minds – or 
because of repressive excesses which actively alienated the population. This logic gains 
credibility because of a generally accurate perception of a current majority consensus 
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amongst military analysts and historians supporting population-centric 
counterinsurgency approaches.208 
The endurance and power of the phrase further comes in part from its clever 
linguistic formation. Like other rhetorical devices, the metaphorical use of related or 
associated parts is more memorable and interesting than simply saying “popular 
support.”209 While the construction may not be as direct in meaning, it is richer by 
capturing some of the underlying complexity of the concept (emotional and rational 
dimensions) that determine not only the simple manifestation of public opinion but also 
its strength, motivation, persistence, and latitude for change. 
Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism – Connotation and Denotation 
In current usage most people associate a population-centric hearts and minds 
approach with counterinsurgency. Similarly, many associate hard line and coercive 
policies of the war on terror with counterterrorism, and especially in academic 
counterinsurgency literature counterterrorism is often connected with aggressive 
enemy-centric disrupt and destroy strategies such as special forces capture/kill 
missions.210 Kilcullen, writing in this context, explains:  
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Counter-terrorism, a discipline dating from the early 1970s, focuses on the 
enemy: the individual terrorist and the network of terrorist operatives. It seeks to 
destroy this network, proceeding from the assumption that removing the network 
removes the problem. In these sense, like most conventional warfare, it is 
‘enemy-centric.’ On the other hand, classical counter-insurgency, a discipline 
that emerged in the 1950s but has much older roots in imperial policing and 
colonial small wars, is ‘population-centric.’ It focuses on the population, seeking 
to protect it from harm by- or interaction with – the insurgent, competing with 
the insurgent for influence and control at the grassroots level. Its basic 
assumption is that insurgency is a mass social phenomenon, that the enemy rides 
and manipulates a social wave consisting of genuine popular grievances, and 
that dealing with this broader social and political dynamic, while gaining time 
for targeted reforms to work by applying a series of tailored, full-spectrum 
security measures, is the most promising path to ultimately resolve the 
problem.211 
However, these connotations do not cover the full range of possible approaches that 
have been or could be pursued as part of either a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism 
strategy.212 For example, during the Vietnam war RAND scholars Nathan Leites and 
Charles Wolfe Jr explicitly criticized the “hearts and minds” approach and advocated 
what they called a “cost benefit” strategy prioritizing coercive tactics to deter the 
population from providing the support insurgents required to continue fighting.213 
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Further, the frequently cited classic counterinsurgency studies (Galula, Kitson, McCuen, 
Townshend, Trinquier, Thomson, etc) contribute to the current consensus by examining 
the failure of counterinsurgents who did not pursue population-centric strategies.214 
Similarly, as the previous section on responding to terrorism emphasized, 
counterterrorism policies can take and have taken many different forms involving a 
much wider range of efforts than a narrow focus on coercive enemy-centric targeting.215  
My focus in the remainder of this thesis will be on counterinsurgency in the 
common current usage as advising population-centric strategies. However, when writing 
about counterterrorism I take a much broader perspective when examining both current 
practices in the war on terror – including efforts justified or informed by hearts and 
minds prescriptions – as well as how an overall counterterrorism strategy could be 
developed better implementing the lessons of contemporary counterinsurgency thinking 
and insights from the study of social movements. Positing that al-Qaida is a global 
insurgent using tactics of terrorism interconnected with many different local violent 
conflicts, I explore how the three areas of literature discussed in this chapter may help 
understand the failures of current efforts as well as help improve analysis and policy 
                                                
of military force against the general population – raising the cost in the population’s 
economic calculus – to cut off aid, comfort, recruits, and other support perceived as key 
to sustaining the insurgency. And in criticizing advocates of a hearts and minds 
approach they ultimately argued on page 128 “that popular preferences simply do not 
matter.” The current consensus of counterinsurgency theorists finds fault with this 
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example: Shafer, 1988a, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency 
Policy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 127-32. 
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making with respect to integrating counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the 
future.216 
The Classic Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
While the hearts and minds approach has its critics there is a fairly widespread 
consensus in the current counterinsurgency literature that focusing on popular support is 
important to prevailing in such conflicts.217 Taillon writes that it has become “virtually 
an article of faith within the body of knowledge which passes for British ‘doctrine’ of 
insurgency and counter-insurgency,”218 while Douglas similarly notes that “the US 
military has almost made a catechism of the idea that if there is an insurgency … then 
the centre of gravity must be the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people.”219 Therefore it is not 
surprising that the generally praised new Counterinsurgency Field Manual explicitly 
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operationalizes a population-centric approach where the “primary objective is to secure 
the civilian population rather than destroy the enemy.”220 
The specifics of what a hearts and minds strategy entails is likely to vary from 
conflict to conflict,221 but the essence remains the same: the centre of gravity is the 
support of the population instead of the traditional military goals of capturing territory 
or destroying enemy forces. The emphasis placed on this is well represented in classic 
counterinsurgency writings drawing on positive and negative lessons from mid-20th 
century conflicts including especially: the British in Palestine, Malaya, Borneo, Kenya, 
and Ireland; the French in Indochina and Algeria; and, the United States in Greece, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam.222 As Mackinlay emphasizes one of the “enduring lessons” 
from the British experience is that: 
The people’s war concept of mobilizing the population was hard to combat 
through military means alone. Once a population had been mobilized 
successfully by insurgency, there was a tipping point in the escalating situation 
after which no lawful counterstrategy was likely to prevail.223 
He proceeds to explain the first of “two essential requirements for success,” which the 
British took from there experiences, is “a political strategy whose outcome related to 
winning the support of the ‘vital’ population.”224 In Malaya Templer emphasized, “the 
shooting side of this business is only 25 per cent of the trouble and the other 75 per cent 
lies in getting the people of this country behind us.”225 In perhaps the seminal classic 
text Kitson wrote, “Wars of subversion and counter-subversion are fought, in the last 
resort, in the minds of the people.”226 Galula’s “first law” was that, “the support of the 
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population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.”227 While 
Mockaitis wrote in his review of counterinsurgencies that, “the real objective is the 
loyalties of disaffected people,”228 and Townsend in his similar volume concluded, “the 
really decisive battle is for public opinion.”229 
The starting logic of much of this literature is that governments must engage the 
strategy of the insurgents to defeat them.230 Because these conflicts are highly 
asymmetrical insurgents have learned to leverage the benefits of popular support and 
the weaknesses governments often exhibit.231 The writings of Mao Tse-Tung are 
frequently put forward as exemplifying insurgent thinking and his advice that the 
guerrilla must rely on the people for support “like fish swimming in the water of the 
population” is probably the most cited (and played with) analogy for explaining 
insurgency and counterinsurgency tactics.232 Shafer quotes Mao as advising: “Guerrillas 
are like fish, and the people are the water they swim in. If the temperature of the water 
is right, the fish will thrive and multiply.”233 In On Guerrilla Warfare, discussing how 
insurgents should treat the general population and even enemy forces with respect and 
compassion, Mao again uses the metaphor advising: 
Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's 
rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should 
exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the 
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latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist 
together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and 
who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.234 
Mao’s precepts were widely embraced by 20th century revolutionaries and, giving a nod 
to Mao, those studying these insurgences have often referred to them as “people’s 
wars.”235 Biddle describes the model of such insurgencies: 
A Maoist people's war is, at bottom, a struggle for good governance between a 
class-based insurgency claiming to represent the interests of the oppressed 
public and a ruling regime portrayed by the insurgents as defending entrenched 
privilege. Using a mix of coercion and inducements, the insurgents and the 
regime compete for the allegiance of a common pool of citizens, who could, in 
principle, take either side. A key requirement for the insurgents' success, 
arguably, is an ideological program – people's wars are wars of ideas as much as 
they are killing competitions – and nationalism is often at the heart of this 
program. Insurgents frame their resistance as an expression of the people's 
sovereign will to overthrow an illegitimate regime that represents only narrow 
class interests or is backed by a foreign government.236 
As Mao understood, popular support provides insurgents with refuge as well as the 
ability to refit, refresh, and recruit, while the counterinsurgent depends upon winning 
popular support in order to deny these benefits.237 Given the ability of insurgents to hide 
and act amongst a supportive population the counterinsurgent also depends upon 
winning hearts and minds in order to generate the intelligence necessary to safely carry 
out military and enforcement operations.238 
In order to win popular support most counterinsurgency doctrine advises that 
government forces must first insure a long term feeling of security as well as provide 
necessities including food, medical care, and similar basic human needs.239 
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Counterinsurgent forces will likely find it beneficial to use information operations to 
insure the government is seen as addressing such problems and to expose the insurgent 
as preventing such solutions.240 Many writers stress that retaining credibility is 
especially important for the counterinsurgent, and note that here too insurgents have an 
asymmetric advantage. Galula provides the classic explanation: 
The asymmetrical situation has important effects on propaganda. The insurgent, 
having no responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can lie, cheat, 
exaggerate. He is not obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises, not by 
what he does. Consequently, propaganda is a powerful weapon for him. With no 
positive policy but with good propaganda, the insurgent may still win. 
The counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and to his past, and for him, 
facts speak louder than words. He is judged on what he does, not on what he 
says. If he lies, cheats, exaggerates, and does not prove, he may achieve some 
temporary successes, but at the price of being discredited for good. And he 
cannot cheat much unless his political structures are monolithic, for the 
legitimate opposition in his own camp would soon disclose his every 
psychological maneuver. For him, propaganda can be no more than a secondary 
weapon, valuable only if intended to inform and not to fool. A counterinsurgent 
can seldom cover bad or nonexistent policy with propaganda.241 
However, Betz amongst others have emphasized that Galula is not entirely right: 
There is much wisdom in the injunction that the counterinsurgent must not lie – 
lest he cause long-term pain to his credibility in return for short-term gain. But 
the insurgent can also be judged by what he does as well as what he says. The 
delta between the two is the target of the counterinsurgent propagandist.242 
Nevertheless, the insurgent still has the advantage of not being responsible for all of the 
difficulties of governance, often including the competing expectations of multiple 
groups and very difficult challenges of delivering observable short term progress. 
Counterinsurgent forces should also recognize that successful insurgencies 
mobilize around concrete grievances whether or not such causes are central to the 
insurgents’ real strategic goals and without a requirement that insurgents remain 
consistent in what grievances they advocate or exploit. Responding to and addressing 
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these is usually necessary for separating the masses from the insurgency.243 At the same 
time the government must be cautious not to create new sources of alienation for the 
public. A classic insurgent tactic is to carry out attacks that trigger overly repressive 
responses with the intent both to sow a general feeling of insecurity as well as to drive a 
deeper wedge between the population and the government. For these reason it is 
especially important that counterinsurgent forces at all levels are well trained and 
disciplined in order to carry out their activities consistent with a population-centric 
strategy in order to maintain government legitimacy while enabling and participating in 
other efforts that respond to grievances.244  
Counterinsurgency doctrine for countries such as the United States and Great 
Britain focuses not on their own domestic populations, but on helping the governments 
of friendly developing states confront insurgencies.245 Shafer summarizes the variety of 
prescriptions to win hearts and minds that made up the core of American and British 
counterinsurgency doctrine at the end of the Cold War: 
All, however, address the problems of improving threatened states’ performance 
in three key areas: physical control of territory and populace; penetration of 
authority throughout the country; and promotion of economic and social 
development. Put differently, the hearts and minds prescriptions amount to three 
great oughts. Governments ought to secure the population from insurgent 
coercion. They ought to provide competent, legal, responsive administration that 
is free from past abuses and broader in domain, scope and vigor. And they ought 
to meet rising expectations with higher living standards.246 
He further notes that hearts and minds approaches generally emphasize that these three 
goals must be approached simultaneously as their success is interdependent.247 To 
achieve all of this most classic counterinsurgency literature advises unitary command 
structures, where military efforts must be subsidiary to and in support of civil efforts, to 
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insure a consistent focus on the ultimate goal of winning hearts and minds.248 Templer 
in Malaya argued that, “any idea that the business of normal civil government and the 
business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all… 
the two activities are completely and utterly interrelated.”249 While Galula similarly 
concluded, “Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, 
its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely 
with the population.”250 According to Mackinlay the second of two “essential lessons” 
which the British took from their experience was that counterinsurgency requires “an 
operational capability that was multiagency and multifunctional, under civil control, and 
capable of implementing a nuanced political strategy.”251 
The final element of the doctrine’s logic is that winning popular support is 
necessary for a lasting victory unless a government is prepared and has the resources to 
permanently rule by overwhelming force. Without winning hearts and minds any 
tactical successes will later simply be washed away by the tide of mass opinion.252 
Victory thus occurs by “drying up the sea” 253 of popular support through establishing 
the local government’s legitimacy and ability to provide security, good governance, and 
economic development which enables it to co-opt more moderate elements of the 
insurgency while degrading, isolating, and ultimately eliminating the rest. 
Criticisms and Limitations of the Classic Doctrine 
Although the majority consensus supports a population-centric approach to 
counterinsurgency, the idea of a hearts and minds strategy is not without its critics. 
Researchers examining the classic cases have put forth arguments about underlying 
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analytic flaws, contended the dominant doctrine is poorly suited to different forms of 
insurgency, and suggested modern liberal democracies are unlikely to have the patience 
or level of commitment required for success. Even supporters stress its limitations and 
recommend against involvement in conflicts requiring its application.  
Shafer’s critical study of U.S. counterinsurgency policy is amongst the better 
work on the subject before the post-9/11 resurgence in interest. He highlights three 
general analytic flaws casting doubt on the wisdom of advocating hearts and minds 
approaches: 
At first glance it seems a potent prescription; on closer examination it is 
transparently flawed. Managerial problems add to the difficulties of course, but 
the deep reasons are analytic. Hearts and minds analysts’ assumptions cloud 
assessment of the three issue areas critical to an outside power contemplating 
support of an insurgency threatened government: the constraints on leverage; 
intragovernmental limits on reform by the would-be ally; and the nature of 
relations between government and populace or, conversely, between insurgents 
and populace. The weaknesses derive from policymakers’ basic assumptions 
about Third World politics and political change. The resulting misanalysis opens 
each of the three great oughts to criticism and vitiates many of their key 
components. Indeed, the prescriptions offered may be irrelevant, impossible, or 
worse.254 
Leverage is the problem of getting the local nation to do what a counterinsurgency 
strategy requires. Shafer explains that many situations where an external power is 
involved with counterinsurgency efforts include perverse dynamics where “the more 
critical the situation, the less leverage the United States can muster” because the 
dangers of failure limit the ability to coerce the local government, while at the same 
time “the more ‘reverse leverage’ nominal clients will exercise.”255 This enables local 
elites to avoid undertaking reforms or pursuing actions they do not perceive to be in 
their interest, while amplifying the temptation to increase dependence on and demand 
for American assistance and resources. The intragovernmental constraint involves 
challenges or limits on the capacity to carry out recommendations as well as willingness 
to do so. In many situations where insurgencies arise the reforms prescribed by classic 
doctrine require changes to the distribution of political power and state resources that 
take away from controlling elites, or the interest groups they represent, as well as 
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potentially threatening those elites continued positions of privilege or even survival.256 
Finally, Shafer notes that because of typical government-population or insurgent-
population relationships in many conflicts the assumptions of counterinsurgency 
prescriptions may be undermined to the degree that the population honestly perceives 
what the insurgent has to offer as a better social order (“often in terms of social 
programs, aspirations for the future, and freedom from corruption”) or that they 
legitimately feel more threatened by the state. In these situations efforts to increase state 
capability to exercise authority may perversely fuel the conflict and further drive the 
population away. This especially may occur when the increases in government security 
capacity outstrip efforts to encourage reform of a government’s past abusive or 
oppressive patterns of behaviour, as well as when there is insufficient time for overall 
economic and social development to expand the pool of resource sufficiently for all 
segments to gain.257 
With the resurgence of interest in counterinsurgency doctrine after September 
11, Biddle has frequently played an important role in doctrine and theoretical 
discussions as a check on overenthusiastic claims about the wisdom and promise of the 
new pursuit of small wars tactics and strategy.258 He has raised a variety of concerns 
and criticisms especially in terms of applying the classic lessons captured by the new 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual to the conflict in Iraq. He presents similar arguments 
to Shafer about assumptions of a local nation’s claims to legitimacy, compatibility of 
U.S. and local nation goals, willingness of local elites to compromise their own 
subgroup’s interest for national well-being, the limits to or lack of guidance for options 
through which the U.S. can coerce necessary reforms, and the dangers of building up 
local capacity before reforms take hold. He emphasizes: 
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The existence of an insurgency in the first place is often a signal of an 
illegitimate government with strong leadership interests in an unrepresentative 
distribution of wealth and power. In many cases, leaders will see U.S.-sponsored 
reforms as a greater threat to their personal well-being – or even survival – than 
the insurgency.259 
Another major criticism Dr Stephen Biddle raises is in the applicability of the lessons 
from mid-20th century “people’s wars,” which he describes as largely based in 
nationalist or ideological conflicts where the support of the people was likely more 
malleable, to current internal wars as communal conflicts involving clashes between 
ethnic and sectarian groups. When these identity divisions define the splits between 
government and insurgent forces, and similarly split the larger population, the value of 
classic counterinsurgency doctrine may be significantly limited, especially as: 
[T]he truly uncommitted fraction of the public can be small – and the fighting 
itself quickly reduces it, as subnational identities harden and frightened civilians 
turn to their co-ethnics or co-religionists for survival.260 
While recognizing that other solutions are also not promising – referencing suggestions 
of negotiated power-sharing, outside peacekeepers, partition, or simply letting the 
strong overpower the weak – he concludes 
But it is far from clear that the manual’s central prescription of drying up an 
insurgent’s support base by persuading an uncommitted population to side with 
the government makes much sense in an identity war where the government’s 
ethnic or sectarian identification means that it will be seen as an existential 
threat to the security of rival internal groups, and where there may be little or no 
supracommunal, national identity to counterpose to the subnational identities 
over which the war is waged by the time the United States becomes involved.261 
In the case of Iraq Biddle believed the best chances for success were in shifting to 
treating it as a civil war, and “not the people’s war we imagine it to be.”262 
Finally, even current supporters of the applicability of classic counterinsurgency 
doctrine to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan raise significant cautions on its limits. 
Dr David Kilcullen, the Australian anthropologist and former army officer who served 
during the Bush administration as a senior advisor to Condoleezza Rice at the 
Department of State and to General David Petraeus in Iraq, describes the classic 
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doctrine as extremely difficult, resource intensive, and taking a long time while bogging 
down international forces and not guaranteeing success.263 This leads him to summarize 
it as “not recommended” and conclude: 
My personal position on counterinsurgency in general, and on Iraq and 
Afghanistan in particular, could therefore be summarized as “Never again, 
but…” That is, we should avoid any future large-scale, unilateral military 
intervention in the Islamic world, for all of the reasons already discussed… And 
should we find ourselves (by error or necessity) in a similar position once again, 
then the best practices we have rediscovered in current campaigns represent an 
effective approach: effective, but not recommended.264 
Kilcullen and other counterinsurgency advocates similarly worry that the time and 
resource commitment – as well as inevitable casualties – required for success in current 
insurgencies may be more than the populations of liberal democracies are willing to 
support and have the patience to sustain.265 
Adapting to Contemporary and Transnational Insurgencies 
Although the initial post-9/11 discussions on counterinsurgency techniques were 
based in lessons from the classic mid-20th century cases, a number of academics and 
military thinkers have recognized that changes in technology, global 
interconnectedness, and the nature of the dynamics driving many conflicts likely affect 
fundamental characteristics of current insurgencies and how best to respond to them.266 
This section discusses important potential differences with the contemporary model 
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being in part transnational and virtual, involving multiple disparate vital populations, 
and featuring insurgent groups interconnected through often relatively unstructured 
networks who may pursue qualitatively different goals than in the past. At the same 
time, it is important to emphasize that this modern form of insurgency encompasses and 
interacts with many different locally focused conflicts that are in important ways still 
very much classical insurgencies.  
The principle changes in technology, travel, exchange, and overall 
interconnectedness transforming the nature of contemporary insurgency are 
encompassed by the wide variety of drivers and forces typically associated with 
globalization.267 As Urry writes, “new technologies are producing ‘global times’ in 
which the distances between places and peoples again seem to be dramatically 
reducing.”268 For example, Lynch describes how the new media and communication 
technologies are connecting Arabic speaking populations across not just the Middle East 
but also immigrants and travellers around the world enabling a vibrant new Arab 
public.269 Emphasizing the complexity of the resulting virtually connected population, 
Lynch believes that this new transnational Arab public is best described by an “image of 
multiple, crosscutting patchworks” rather than “any singular conception of unified 
spatial or temporal locations.”270  
Changes driven by technological advancements influence both social 
mobilization and violent conflict, as Kurth Cronin explains: 
Most important is the 21st century’s levee en masse, a mass networked 
mobilization that emerges from cyber-space with a direct impact on physical 
reality. Individually accessible, ordinary networked communications such as 
personal computers, DVDs, videotapes, and cell phones are altering the nature 
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of human social interaction, thus also affecting the shape and outcome of 
domestic and international conflict. Although still in its early stages, this 
development will not reverse itself and will increasingly influence the conduct 
of war. From the global spread of Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks, to the rapid 
evolution of insurgent tactics in Iraq, to the riots in France, and well beyond, the 
global, non-territorial nature of the information age is having a transformative 
effect on the broad evolution of conflict, and we are missing it. We are entering 
the cyber-mobilization era, but our current course consigns us merely to react to 
its effects.271 
The virtual dimension of modern insurgency facilitates small groups mastering “armed 
theatre” to promote attacks in the classic tradition of “propaganda of the deed” 
facilitated by a plethora of TV, video, DVD, and website outlets “to arouse support and 
foment discord on a global scale.”272 One result of the virtual nature of modern 
insurgencies is that many attacks are “planned for maximum visibility, not for territorial 
or military value” with the goal to keep an issue in the news.273 Exemplifying the 
potential challenges for counterinsurgents is the rapid advancements made by various 
insurgent groups in Iraq and by the Taliban in Afghanistan for publicizing attacks to 
distant audiences allowing them to heighten the coercive impact against targeted 
populations, promote fundraising and other forms of support from sympathetic 
populations, and at the same time share lessons learned spurring tactical innovation with 
compatriots.274 Tatham suggests these changes may explain the observation that 
contemporary insurgents appear to be more successful in asymmetric conflicts than in 
the past.275 
The first significant resulting difference between classic and contemporary 
insurgencies is in the scope of their objectives changing from territorial to transnational. 
Mackinlay characterizes past insurgencies as being “primarily monolithic or national in 
form … working for very specific local goals (like overthrowing a local government)” 
and deriving “most of their power from the local population.” In contrast, “modern 
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insurgent movements are characterized by their complex and global nature” espousing 
“larger thematic goals, like overthrowing the global order” and drawing upon a 
transnational base of population support and operational territory.276 While popularity of 
some classic insurgencies may have extended to distant parts of the world, or the 
conflict’s leaders may have taken inspiration and advice from distant revolutionaries 
pursuing similar ideologies, fighters in the classic model did not primarily seek a shared 
transnational objective. In the classic cases the national territorial aims provided a 
constrained geographic area of operation. For the contemporary cases described by 
Mackinlay’s modern model the insurgent may shift between different territorial areas, 
bringing originally unrelated groups together, and drawing support from disparate 
communities outside of the direct control of either a host nation or supporting external 
power. Further complicating the challenge, the transnational goals of many modern 
insurgents are based in religion and identity which raises the sectarian in-group/out-
group divisions of communal conflicts highlighted by Biddle,277 decreases the 
persuasive credibility of counterinsurgent actors, and arguably increases the violent 
potential especially of terrorist tactics.278 
Where the first shift is from a single to multiple territories of operation because 
of transnational goals, the second significant difference is a shift from primarily 
focusing on a vital population in a locally defined geographic area of operation to a 
contemporary form of insurgency focused on populations from many different parts of 
the world who are often connected in and defined only by virtual spaces. McDonald, 
writing about global social movements, describes how this is a shift from societies 
which use to be bounded geographically – corresponding to the territories of nation-
states – to increasingly global communities whose connections are complex and 
uncertain.279 Betz describes this virtual space as an “informational realm in which 
belligerents contend with words and images to manufacture strategic narratives which 
                                                
276 Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 6-7. 
277 Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.". Biddle, "The New U.S. Army/Marine 
Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis." 
278 Hoffman, "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?," 77-8, 81-2. Mackinlay and Al-
Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 35-6. 
279 McDonald, Global Movements, 9. 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  90 
are more compelling than those of the other side.”280 These new technologies enable 
transnational Islamist movements to communicate to the global Muslim population they 
target – in essence their “virtual ummah”281 – often in a “near-instantaneous” manner 
with increasing sophistication.282 
The shifts from a defined territorial area to a transnational and often virtual 
focus both facilitate modern insurgents interacting with multiple dispersed populations, 
again increasing the complexity of the challenge for counterinsurgents and removing the 
ability to directly manage the vital population that existed in a classical insurgency. 
Mackinlay describes the disparate populations who he emphasizes are still the “vital 
ground” in contemporary transnational insurgency: 
In the prevailing situation, they comprise Muslim populations who live in and 
around spaces that are directly involved in the conflict (so-called operational 
spaces). Further afield there are the concerned populations of Muslim states, the 
coalition states, and Muslim immigrants who live as minorities in foreign 
countries. Each of these populations plays an important role in the insurgent and 
counterinsurgent campaigns. Their support is part of the strategic center of 
gravity of both sides.283 
Consistent with the Chapter One explanation of why global popular support for a 
terrorist group shapes the potential threat that group poses he continues: 
It is not their physical support that largely sustains the campaign, but rather their 
political or emotional support. The Palestinian experience shows that when 
insurgents have strong emotional support, finance and logistics follow. Today, 
emotional and political support is gained and lost through the interpretation of 
events rather than the events themselves.284 
Although in many areas of conflict local access to new technologies such as the internet 
which fuel many of the changes Mackinlay highlights is not widespread and may not be 
for some time, Roy observes that the individuals who have access to these 
communications mediums become key network nodes communicating ideas and 
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information between virtual and local populations. These networked actors potentially 
exercising a significant influence on local mobilization dynamics.285 
The ability of insurgents to exploit a virtual space enabled by disparate 
communities around the globe creates potential “virtual sanctuaries” for carrying out 
key operations that a classical counterinsurgent may have been able to suppress or 
isolate through exercising the local state’s control over its own territory. Kilcullen 
explains: 
Globalized internet communication also enables moral, financial and personnel 
support, creating a strategic hinterland or “virtual sanctuary” for insurgents. 
Classical theory deals with “active” and “passive” sanctuaries, methods to 
quarantine such sanctuaries and their effects on insurgent performance. But it 
treats sanctuary as primarily a geographical space in which insurgents regroup or 
receive external support. However, today’s internet-based virtual sanctuary is 
beyond the reach of counterinsurgent forces or neighboring governments, and its 
effects are difficult to quarantine… Classical counterinsurgency theory has little 
to say about such electronic sanctuary.286 
In addition to leveraging these virtual connections and disparate populations for 
support, insurgent groups can also exploit the globalized nature of contemporary 
conflicts by widening the sphere of violence to target citizens from other countries 
locally or carry out international attacks to affect global audiences: 
If other countries give support to the affected government, the insurgents may 
directly target public opinion there, pressuring them to cease their assistance. 
Such pressure may be exerted from the affected territory through the kidnap, 
torture and murder of intervening civilian nationals, often broadcast 
internationally to reach the population of origin. Alternatively, more direct effect 
may be achieved through terrorist attacks launched within the intervening 
country itself (perhaps facilitated by immigrant or other sympathetic community 
groups).287 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaida in Iraq conducted several terrorist attacks in this 
manner, including the 19 August 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in 
Baghdad which led to a significant reduction in UN reconstruction staff and efforts at a 
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potentially crucial early point of the conflict,288 as well as the highly publicized 
videotaped graphic executions of hostages from several different countries.289 
Another effect of the transnational and virtual nature of contemporary conflicts 
is often an evolution in the insurgents organizational structure. In the classic cases 
insurgent organization was generally top-down with limited connections to external 
actors. In the modern context, although local conflicts may still be organized around 
more traditional structures, the transnational movement and connections between 
groups are often through complex and relatively unstructured networks with a mix of 
bottom-up influences and horizontal linkages.290 Many of the connections between 
groups are virtual and the ability of territorially disparate individuals to use new 
communication technologies to form selective shared communities increases the 
challenge for counterinsurgents to identify, understand, surveil, and communicate 
credibly with key populations. As a result a counterinsurgent must find ways to employ 
the diverse elements of political, security, humanitarian, and economic efforts involved 
with the same virtual “reach and pervasiveness as the forces it seeks to disarm.” 291  
The threat posed by al-Qaida is likely to become the prototypical model for a 
contemporary transnational and virtual insurgency. In his 2005 article “Countering 
Global Insurgency” Kilcullen developed the argument “that the War on Terrorism is 
actually a campaign against a globalized Islamist insurgency” most closely associated 
with al-Qaida. He highlighted bin Ladin and Zawahiri's global strategy, the presence of 
cells linked to the group in at least 40 countries, at least partial responsibility for 
terrorist attacks conducted in many different regions, and ties to active insurgencies 
across much of the historic Muslim world.292 Mackinlay, who labelled bin Ladin as a 
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global insurgent in an October 2001 article in The Observer,293 tracks the development 
of this contemporary form of insurgency as starting with the PLO, noting their use of 
attacks that were intended to mobilize a global audience for support and influence.294 
The response of Muslim foreign fighters who joined the mujahideen against the Soviets 
in Afghanistan, the so called Afghan Arabs, played a significant role in developing the 
transnational call for personal involvement and financial support as exemplified by the 
writings of Abdullah Azzam arguing that jihad in such a case was a personal obligation 
for Muslims from around the world.295 The development of al-Zawahiri’s “far enemy” 
strategy completed this evolution by attempting to refocus insurgencies supported by 
Muslims worldwide on global targets in order to accomplish the original goals of 
overthrowing local regimes.296 Mackinlay observes: 
In more important ways Bin Laden's organisation has moved significantly 
beyond the established template of insurgency. Prior to the end of the Cold War 
a growing number of secular Muslim states were already struggling to contain 
home-grown Islamic insurgencies. In every case these movements still seek to 
overthrow their governments. Bin Laden, by contrast is a global insurgent. 
Spread over more than forty states from Oslo to Jakarta, his support cannot be 
regarded as a national or even a regional phenomenon. 
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The arresting photographs of his attacks, beamed around the world by an 
unwitting but usefully complicit media, have reached a vast audience of 
potential followers. His constituency is the immigrant and dispossessed, the 
internally displaced, second generation migrants, refugees and rural 
communities which have fled from war and famine to unhappy and overcrowded 
metropolitan areas.297 
Kepel suggests that the original success of Operation Enduring Freedom for eliminating 
al-Qaida’s safe haven and territorial base of operation in Afghanistan was a “Pyrrhic 
victory” in that it simply further pushed the organization into a transnational and virtual 
form made up of individuals, cells, and groups around the world connected by the 
technologies and intimacies of globalization without a territorial centre of gravity for 
state power to attack.298 
Although the modern model of insurgency as described by Mackinlay and others 
creates a number of significant changes and new challenges, it is important to 
emphasize that many important related conflicts remain largely “classical” in nature. In 
examining the transnational and virtual evolution of modern insurgency Mackinlay 
himself notes that these new forms do not exclude previous ones. He writes: 
This means that an insurgency, which thrives in a preindustrial society and 
exploits its grievances, can coexist with postindustrial forms. It is also possible 
that several different forms of insurgent violence, arguably representing 
different evolutionary eras, may be manifested in the same state and in the same 
town. This is particularly the case in states that have become proxy war zones in 
the U.S. war on terror.299 
Kilcullen similarly recognizes the same influences creating an international 
environment with a mix of classical and postmodern opponents which he suggests “may 
be part of what gives today’s ‘hybrid wars’ much of their savagery and complexity.”300 
However, while Mackinlay gives considerable emphasis in his recent writing to 
discussing the characteristics of and threat from a transnational, post-Maoist, and virtual 
model of contemporary insurgency, Kilcullen argues that most of those involved in the 
various related conflicts around the world remain local in their focus and thus those 
insurgencies still share important aspects of the classical model. He repeatedly and 
convincingly emphasizes this point based upon both his academic study as well as direct 
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experience working with U.S. and Coalition efforts in examining the principle insurgent 
conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other modern conflicts in Indonesia, 
southern Thailand, and Pakistan all with respect to the influence and interaction with the 
global Islamist insurgency represented by al-Qaida.301 Kilcullen argues that 
transnationally focused Islamist insurgents, although strategically important and the 
cause of our involvement in several conflicts, are “a small, elusive minority” across the 
various cases he examines. Even in those conflicts where Western forces are directly 
intervening because of al-Qaida and the war on terror he concludes that most of the 
local fighters involved are “accidental guerrillas” only “fighting us because we are in 
his space, not because he wishes to invade ours.”302 Roy further emphasizes that most of 
the Islamists movements, despite their transnational rhetoric, continue to follow an 
evolutionary pattern of returning to a local and national focus: 
Despite their claim to be supranational, most Islamist movements have been 
shaped by national particularities. Sooner or later they tend to express national 
interests, even under the pretext of Islamist ideology.303  
He explains how the combination of the substantive grievances they rally around and 
realities of responding to territorially embedded populations ultimately reinforces this 
local state focus, often separating them from the larger movement, and that this is 
especially true for those Islamist movements who actually do gain some level of 
power.304 Throughout this thesis I will emphasize how most of the insurgencies across 
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the Muslim world which both Mackinlay and Kilcullen highlight as well as the related 
and often larger Islamist movements remain focused on local grievances and do not 
necessarily share al-Qaida’s transnational aims or strategic approach. As discussed in 
the next section, contemporary counterinsurgency strategy should not only incorporate 
classic precepts where they apply to local conflicts (informed by contemporary 
developments), but should as a first order strategic concern seek to disaggregate local 
actors and populations from the transnational threat wherever possible. 
Prescriptions for Counterterrorism in Response to a Global Insurgency 
Building upon studies of classic and modern insurgencies, and informed by the 
study of social movements, the final section of this chapter examines four strategic 
precepts for how to confront the transnational threat of contemporary insurgencies, 
concluding that: despite the involvement of geographically disparate vital populations 
the overall strategy should remain population-centric; given the far greater complexity 
for achieving unity of effort and message control, counterinsurgents should emphasize 
unity of understanding; recognizing that the greater transnational danger comes from the 
aggregation of different conflicts and groups, disaggregation should be a guiding 
principle; and, that counterinsurgents should learn to embrace the propaganda of the 
deed, and address the grievances and aspirations as well as engage the framing 
processes related to the potential mobilization of populations to provide or deny support 
to an insurgency. Underlying these prescriptions is recognition that many of the 
conflicts around the world remain to a significant degree locally focused and largely 
classical in nature, although often benefiting from the virtual connections to multiple 
populations as well as to transnational movements and groups active in other conflicts. 
At the same time, it is important to emphasize the uniquely dangerous role that 
transnational insurgents such as al-Qaida may play in the development of local 
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conflicts, in the mobilization of new insurgencies, and in the threat posed by mass 
casualty terrorist attacks carried out in regions near and far from local battles.  
The first and perhaps most important lesson discussed in this section is that 
emphasizing population-centric approaches remains the best strategy for contemporary 
counterinsurgencies. The changes resulting from virtual and transnational aspects of 
modern conflicts may complicate the challenge for counterinsurgents in general, but 
also reinforces the comparative disadvantages of predominantly enemy-centric 
strategies. For example, given that multiple populations in disparate regions can provide 
support from a distance as well as sanctuary in areas that are outside of a state’s control, 
contemporary insurgents will be more resilient and much more difficult to target with 
coercive approaches alone, and therefore able to leverage the underlying grievances an 
enemy-centric strategy leaves unaddressed longer to mobilize greater support from 
many populations. Focusing on an enemy-centric strategy largely concedes the local 
and transnational framing contest to the insurgents and aligned movement actors 
enabling them to portray local and international counterinsurgents as responsible for the 
continued festering of their problems and therefore enemies of the larger transnational 
population with the further potential result of encouraging the dangerous aggregation of 
disparate conflicts. For these reasons and others, researchers examining transnational 
insurgencies emphasize that the vital ground or centre of gravity for contemporary 
conflicts remains over key populations whose support can potentially go or be denied to 
either the insurgent or counterinsurgent forces.305 Mackinlay concludes that, “In a 
global insurgency, the population is still the vital ground, but there is not just one 
population – there are many.”306 Kilcullen similarly recommends that as in “other 
counterinsurgencies, the civilized world’s confrontation with takfiri extremism is 
therefore population-centric.”307 Recognizing that the vital populations are likely to 
differ in more than just geography, contemporary counterinsurgents should seek to 
                                                
305 Alderson, "US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally's Perspective," 35. Hoffman, 
"Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?," 81. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 
612-3. Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 12-3. Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, 
"Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 21, 38. Morgenstein and Vickland, 2008, "The Global 
Counter Insurgency: America's New National Security and Foreign Policy Paradigm," 
Small Wars Journal (February 17), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/the-
global-counter-insurgency/. 
306 Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 21-2. 
307 Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 13. 
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understand the different roles played as well as how best to engage with each 
community.308 For example, Chapter Four will discuss the different significant roles that 
diaspora communities can play and how winning the support of those populations may 
be particularly important to international efforts for recruiting credible intermediaries 
across the identity group divisions of religion and ethnicity.  
Amongst the repeated essential lessons of classic studies is the need for unity of 
effort in order to integrate security, political, economic, and informational initiatives at 
different levels of implementation carried out by military and non-military government 
actors within the local country where an insurgency is being fought.309 Counterinsurgent 
theorists have long recognized the difficulty of doing this even for an outside 
government who has a discretely identifiable collection of military units and non-
military agencies working to support the local state. The global scope of conflict for 
contemporary transnational cases dramatically increasing the involvement of otherwise 
disparate agencies and actors of a government across different areas of the world where 
unity of a command focused only on the counterinsurgency becomes impractical 
without considering the added difficulties of working in coalitions and involving non-
                                                
308 For example, the new U.S. Guide to Counterinsurgency identifies key populations 
playing different roles in the of the locally affected nation, neighbouring countries, 
coalition nations, domestically in the U.S., as well as diaspora communities as a unique 
subset in many regions. "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide," 19-20. 
309 Mackinlay argues that recognizing the need for unity of effort was the “second 
essential” lesson the British took from their experience in classic insurgencies. 
Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 11-2. Echoing Chapter 
Two of FM3-24 on Unity of Effort, General Patreaus emphasizes the importance for 
Afghanistan: “It is also essential that we achieve unity of effort, that we coordinate and 
synchronize the actions of all ISAF and Afghan forces – and those of our Pakistani 
partners across the border – and that we do the same with the actions of our embassy 
and international partners, our Afghan counterparts, local governmental leaders, and 
international and non-governmental organizations. Working to a common purpose is 
essential in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.” Patreaus, 2009, 
"Commander's Remarks at 45th Munich Security Conference," The Future of the 
Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan (February 8), United States Central Command, 
http://www.centcom.mil/en/from-the-commander/commanders-remarks-at-45th-
munich-security-conference.html. United States Army, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 53-77. See also: Crane, Horvath and Nagl, 
"Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," 50. Galula, Counter-
Insurgency Warfare, 63. Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux.". Ladwig, "Managing 
Counterinsurgency.". Smith, "General Templer and Counter-Insurgency in Malaya," 65, 
74-5. Stone, Wars of the Cold War. 132-3 
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governmental actors.310 Therefore I suggest that the second major strategic prescription 
for modern transnational counterinsurgency should be to emphasize unity of 
understanding, where priority is given to establishing a shared conception of the threat 
informed by the fundamental importance of pursuing a population-centric strategy and 
in broad terms what that proactively requires doing and precautionarily advises 
avoiding. Establishing unity of understanding begins with constructing and consistently 
advancing a strategic narrative for the conflict, that accurately captures the essential 
challenges in order to establish the best framework for understanding what is required, 
and logically as well as naturally encourages actions and messages consistent with 
population-centric goals aimed at engaging the dynamics mobilizing vital 
populations.311 Improving the unity of understanding is important at all levels of 
government, from those most publicly visible as recognized leaders to the base of 
military and non-military personnel who ultimately implement many policies and 
interact on a personal scale with individual members of vital populations, as well as 
across governments and non-governmental actors.312 Unity of understanding is the best 
option available to contemporary counterinsurgents for engaging the much more 
complicated communications environment where control over a limited national media 
is no longer meaningful and where every action, from the lowest tactical levels of 
military engagement to seemingly unrelated domestic comments of national leaders, is 
now in Kilcullen’s words 100% political as the pervasive presence of technologies 
enabling global virtual communications magnifies the importance of perception.313 
                                                
310 Kilcullen explains: “This can be achieved in one country: Malaya, Northern Ireland 
and other campaigns demonstrated this. But to achieve this level of integration requires 
excellent governmental stability, unity and restraint. Moreover, it demands extremely 
close coordination and integration between and within police, intelligence, military, 
development, aid, information and administrative agencies… At the global level, no 
world government exists with the power to integrate the actions of independent nations 
to the degree required by traditional counterinsurgency theory; nor can regional 
counterinsurgency programs be closely enough aligned to block all insurgent maneuver. 
This is particularly true when the enemy – as in this case – is not a Maoist-style mass 
rural movement, but an insurgency operating in small cells and teams with low ‘tactical 
signature’ in the urban clutter of globalized societies.” Kilcullen, "Countering Global 
Insurgency," 607.  
311 "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide," 20. 
312 Crane, Horvath and Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of 
Counterinsurgency," 51-2. 
313 Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux.". Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 14. 
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Encouraging a common diagnosis of the problem across actors, including those who are 
not under the command of a counterinsurgent, is also the best option available in the 
contemporary context for approaching the ideals of unity of command or unity of effort 
prescribed by classic recommendations.314 Finally, it is important that the unity of 
understanding advanced creates accurate and realizable expectations for the full range 
of vital populations involved in the conflict from the local population closest to the 
insurgency (in order to avoid backlashes from unmet rising expectations) to the 
domestic population of an international counterinsurgent (to build political support for 
the type of long term population-centric initiatives required).  
The third guiding principle contemporary counterinsurgents should adopt is 
seeking opportunities to disaggregate the global insurgency where possible, while 
avoiding actions, policies, and rhetoric that counterproductively encourage 
aggregation.315 This includes separating transnational militant movements from both 
disparate global populations as well as various local insurgencies. Kilcullen explains the 
importance: 
As described, dozens of local movements, grievances and issues have been 
aggregated (through regional and global players) into a global jihad against the 
West. These regional and global players prey upon, link and exploit local actors 
and issues that are pre-existing. What makes the jihad so dangerous is its global 
nature. Without the ‘series of nested interactions’ … or the ability to aggregate 
dozens of conflicts into a broad movement, the global jihad ceases to exist. It 
becomes simply a series of disparate local conflicts that can be addressed at the 
regional or national level without interference from global enemies such as Al 
Qaeda.316 
Encouraging aggregation plays to al-Qaida’s operational strategy of mobilizing and 
connecting Islamist groups: 
Al Qa’ida acts as “inciter-in-chief,” or as Ayman al-Zawahiri describes it, al 
talia al ummah, the “vanguard of the ummah,” a revolutionary party that seeks 
to build mass consciousness through provocation and spectacular acts of 
“resistance” to the existing world order. It works through regional affiliates (AQ 
in Iraq, AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, AQ-Maghreb, Groupe salafiste pour la 
predication et le combat, Jema’ah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf Group, etc.) to co-opt 
and aggregate the effects of multiple, diverse local actors in more than 60 
                                                
314 Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux.". Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 265-6. 
315 Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency.". Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, 
"Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 50. 
316 Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 608-9. See also: Kilcullen, The 
accidental guerilla, 284-5. 
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countries. It is this ability to aggregate and point all the players in one direction 
(via propaganda, technical assistance, broad strategic direction, and occasional 
direct guidance) that gives AQ its strength.317 
Tatham similarly explains: 
Long-term speaker of the US Congress Tip O'Neil once famously declared that 
all politics is local; this is not a message that suits AQ. For them, all politics 
must be global. If we are to think again about winning the hearts and minds 
battle, a useful start point would be a concerted effort to publicly deconstruct 
this monolith of global jihad.318 
He concludes that instead of playing into al-Qaida’s narrative and framing, we should 
be developing more nuanced and localized messages tailored to what addresses local 
contentions mobilization. While generally endorsing the wisdom of a disaggregation 
strategy, Douglas raises the concern that the “chief weakness” of this approach “may lie 
in its muted effect on domestic and allied audiences” because they may see the 
multitude of little conflicts to be far less dangerous and may forgot or be unaware of the 
potential aggregated threat. Counterinsurgents may therefore need to carefully balance 
what Douglas terms “selective identification” of successes and important fronts in the 
transnational counterinsurgency in order to ensure that key populations remain 
informed.319 However, the approach to these should start from an emphasis on 
disaggregation, highlighting understanding of the local nature of the conflict and 
working to isolate the transnational insurgents, instead of publicly portraying and 
framing strategy around the mobilizing spin that these local conflicts are simply another 
battlefield of the transnational fight. 
Following a population-centric strategy, built upon the study of classical cases 
as well as of social movements, global counterinsurgents should continue to recognize 
the need for and value of addressing the legitimate mobilizing dynamics that potentially 
lead disparate populations to support militant actors. As classic counterinsurgents 
recognized these problems often are based in improving governance, security, and 
development or as a social movement theory approach explains involves addressing 
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grievances and aspirations while being aware of the role played by political 
opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. Mackinlay argues that, “a 
persistent insurgency that arouses popular sympathy, measured in millions of people, 
must have a basis of genuine grievance” and therefore to successfully disengage “the 
sympathetic support of a larger population” requires addressing those problems.320 He 
emphasizes that this must be “more than lip service to “winning the hearts and minds” 
of a population, and that “the West must shed its desire for quick military victories and 
instead engage in the larger, underlying political and social dimensions of this global 
phenomenon.”321 Kilcullen similarly explains: 
Fundamental to counterinsurgency is an ability to undercut the insurgents’ 
appeal by discrediting their propaganda, exposing their motives, and convincing 
at-risk populations to voluntarily reject insurgent cooption and intimidation. In 
the context of a globalized insurgency this translates into diplomatic initiatives 
that undercut AQ credibility on issues like Israel/Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq. This cannot simply be “spin”: it demands genuine 
attempts to address legitimate grievances. This in turn implies political 
initiatives to construct credible and legitimate alternatives for the world’s 
Muslim population, instead of the current limited choice between support for 
AQ or “collaboration with the West.322 
Giving strategic priority to and following through on real actions to address grievances 
has both an ultimate long-term goal of removing the source of contention as well as a 
near-term performative purpose of engaging in framing competitions driving 
mobilization. Betz builds upon this to conclude that to win the war of ideas global 
counterinsurgents must proactively embrace a concept traditionally associated with 
terrorists, that is the “propaganda of the deed.” On the precautionary side he warns that 
the failure to recognize that “deeds speak louder than words,” especially “in a world in 
which digital images emerge from the theatre of operations and propagate worldwide in 
a matter of minutes” leaves counterinsurgents “open to propagandic ‘own goals’ of 
                                                
320 Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 52. He notes: “As 
previously explained, the vital ground for both sides comprises an array of concerned 
populations in the operational space. These populations are the strategic centres of 
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huge significance such as Abu Ghraib.”323 By recognizing at a strategic level the actions 
it takes and how those are perceived are fundamentally important to winning hearts and 
minds will enable international counterinsurgents to better engage the contemporary 
challenges of a multitude of local conflicts potentially connected by multilayered virtual 
transnational networks. 
Mackinlay suggests that failing to appreciate the necessary paradigm shift in 
counterinsurgency and continuing to be guided only by classical objectives risks “short-
term, local victories” that may do “nothing to quell the overarching insurgency” 
allowing the threat to continue to grow globally in strength and intensity.324 At the same 
time, Kilcullen emphasizes the risk of unintentionally aggregating local groups into a 
greater global threat by treating them simultaneously as part of the same 
undifferentiated enemy as well as failing to recognize that the large majority of 
insurgents involved in various modern conflicts are locally focused.325 Learning to 
address the tension between Mackinlay’s and Kilcullen’s warnings, especially 
considering that in significant details they are in agreement, may be the key challenge of 
modern counterinsurgency. There is a significant danger that in seeing transnational and 
virtual insurgency as an entirely new phenomenon that hard earned lessons will be 
forgotten and old mistakes remade, which includes a vital of warning of the Maoist era 
of being too quick to see every local fight and opponent as mobilized by and entirely 
sharing the ideology and aims of the new global enemy. However, there is also a danger 
of ignoring new dynamics and continuing to pursue strategies that make that a self-
fulfilling prophecy by allowing and encouraging such connections to strengthen. 
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Conclusion 
To examine why the United States has performed poorly in the race for Muslim 
hearts and minds this thesis draws broadly from three different research traditions. A 
review of the counterinsurgency literature, with a specific focus on the lessons learned 
from American and British experiences of the past century, explains the importance of 
popular attitudes to counterterrorism efforts as well as what a hearts and minds strategy 
is likely to entail. Terrorism research clarifies the focus on a subset of political violence 
related to and conceptually overlapping the study of insurgencies with a history of 
theoretical development including psychological, root cause, and rational actor 
approaches. An overview to how governments have responded to terrorism introduces 
the range of strategies and tactics important to examining U.S. efforts in the war on 
terror. Finally, adopting a perspective informed by the study of social movements offers 
a theoretical framework with a number of orienting tools especially useful to examining 
the population level dynamics driving attitudes and actions in contentious conflicts.
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CHAPTER THREE: HEARTS AND MINDS EFFORTS 
AND CHANGES IN MUSLIM OPINIONS 
“Simply put, America’s image in much of the Muslim world remains abysmal.” 
–Kohut and Wike, May 20081 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, which killed 2,998 people, fundamentally 
changed American attitudes about the threat posed by terrorism and triggered a war on 
terror that has defined subsequent American foreign policy. While President Bush 
wisely emphasized from the start that this would not be a war on Islam, in practical 
terms, with the exception of the decision to invade Iraq, the war on terror has focused 
almost exclusively on a range of groups linked by their espousal of a particular set of 
shared or similar Islamic beliefs.2 Many have argued that a principal component of the 
war on terror must be a strategy of winning hearts and minds because of the important 
role-played by larger Muslim populations in this conflict. As U.S. counterterrorism 
policy evolved over the seven years after the 9/11 attacks a wide range of specific 
actions and initiatives were justified and allegedly guided by this goal of winning 
popular support. Despite these efforts a steady stream of polls and a wide range of 
expert studies suggest that the United States continued to lose the race for hearts and 
minds as anti-American attitudes became more widespread and deeply held, especially 
in the Muslim world. This chapter establishes the background for the analysis of this 
                                                
1 “Andrew Kohut is the president of the Pew Research Center, the director of the Pew 
Research Center for the People & The Press, and the director of the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project. Richard Wike is the associate director of the Pew Global Attitudes 
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www.pewglobal.org.” Kohut and Wike, 2008, "All the World's a Stage," National 
Interest Online, May 6, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17502. 
2 Bush, 2001a, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," 
(September 20), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
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Narrative Strategy'," Strategic Insights 4 (3), March, 
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thesis by looking at the hearts and minds efforts the United States engaged in during the 
seven years after 2001, how those were prioritized and pursued compared to other 
counterterrorism efforts, and how the conventional wisdom that the U.S. is losing the 
race for hearts and minds was supported by public opinion polls and expert evaluations. 
Hearts and Minds Efforts in the War on Terror 
On September 20, 2001, before a joint session of congress and speaking to the 
American people, President Bush declared that to fight the war on terror: 
We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, 
every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial 
influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the disruption and to the 
defeat of the global terror network.3 
Although rhetorical flourish, this description captures the radical shift in focus of 
American capabilities towards counterterrorism, on a scale not seen before, following 
the 9/11 attacks. The war on terror, leveraging the capabilities of the U.S. government 
and accompanied by a dramatic increase in funding, sought to: defeat terrorists and their 
organizations; deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish the 
underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and, defend U.S. citizens and 
interests at home and abroad.4 These initiatives have involved: the full weight of 
executive influence and authority; a wide range of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic 
efforts; intensive use of overt and covert intelligence activities; the prioritized focus of 
domestic and international law enforcement and financial regulation; and, extensive 
military participation in a wide range of local joint operations in addition to two full-
scale wars. 
Policy leaders, thinkers, and commentators quickly identified that a primary 
element of the war on terror should be a focus on winning popular support amongst 
Muslim populations, whether they called it a battle for hearts and minds, a war of ideas, 
or the ideological centre of gravity for the new long war. The importance of this effort 
was repeatedly emphasized by administration figures from Bush to Rumsfeld, as well as 
                                                
3 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." 
4 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism." 
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by their critics.5 This “race for Muslim hearts and minds” has also been a repeated 
concern emphasized by Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and many others 
supportive of their cause.6 This section introduces many of the major initiatives 
                                                
5 Arkin, 2006b, "Rumsfeld's Incomplete Information War," Early Warning 2006 
(February 21), Washington Post, 
http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/02/rumsfelds_infor.html. Becker, 
2001, "A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds – A Special Report in the War on 
Terrorism, A Battle to Shape Opinion," The New York Times, November 11. Bush, 
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(September 9), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
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Office of the Vice President, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071101-2.html. Hoffman, 2002b, 
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(2), March-April. Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out.". "National Strategy for 
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/2/hi/americas/4725992.stm. Zimbardo, 2004, "A Situationist Perspective on the 
Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People are Transformed into 
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6 Examples include: Zawahiri explaining that “In the absence of this popular support the 
jihadist movement would be crushed in the shadows” in his Knights Under the 
Prophet’s Banner as quoted in Gerges, 2006b, Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim 
Militancy, New York, Harcourt, Inc., 261. A letter from an al-Qaida senior commander 
CHAPTER THREE: HEARTS AND MINDS EFFORTS AND CHANGES IN MUSLIM OPINIONS 108 
undertaken by the Bush administration through Presidential and Department of State 
public diplomacy efforts, targeted U.S. foreign aid programs, actions of the Department 
of Defense, and covert operations. 
Public Diplomacy 
As opposed to traditional diplomacy, consisting principally of interactions 
between governments in order to advance strategic goals, the focus on hearts and minds 
has most commonly led to calls for better public diplomacy, engaging “targeted sectors 
of foreign publics in order to develop support for those same strategic goals.”7 The 
official statements and policy framing of President Bush, as the individual most 
recognized as representing the United States government internationally, plays perhaps 
the most important role in public diplomacy. Despite a few initial missteps, such as 
referring to America’s response as a crusade in the first week after 9/11, President Bush 
quickly took several actions to emphasize that the war on terror was focused only on 
violent extremists and not a clash with Islam in general.8 This included prominently 
appearing with American Muslim leaders, emphasizing respect for and commonalities 
with people of Muslim nations, and repeatedly portraying Islamist terrorists as fringe 
elements who perverted a good and peaceful religion.9 President Bush also frequently 
referenced and gave rhetorical emphasis to his Freedom Agenda, promoting democracy 
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and individual rights as a means to counter terrorism, create a better future for people 
around the world, and improve American credibility internationally.10 
The Department of State is the federal agency most closely associated with 
public diplomacy, with efforts including:  
[C]risis management and daily news operations designed to explain U.S. foreign 
policy positions and actions; strategic information programs designed to more 
broadly engage, inform, and influence target audiences; and long-term activities, 
such as exchanges, to promote relationship building and mutual understanding.11  
During the Cold War many of the efforts associated with informational aspects of public 
diplomacy were carried out by the United States Information Agency. When that was 
consolidated into the State Department during the 1990s, due to the demands of the 
powerful Senate Foreign Relations Chair Jesse Helms who had long opposed the 
agency, President Clinton created a new position of Under Secretary of State for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs.12  
Shortly after the September 11th attacks, President Bush and Secretary of State 
Colin Powell underscored the importance of the war of ideas for the new war on terror 
by appointing Charlotte Beers to this post, the only person to have headed two of the top 
ten worldwide advertising agencies.13 When Beers took over she found that the 
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remaining USIA staffers “were a demoralized lot, spread across a bureaucracy that 
cared little about their work” and with an annual budget equal to what the Pentagon 
spent in a day.14 Her tenure at State “included speeches by diplomats and prominent 
American Muslims to international audiences, a color magazine on Muslim life in 
America, a series of newspaper ads,” and five television ads showcasing the lives of 
Muslim Americans that ran over five weeks in a handful of Muslim countries. 15 She 
resigned from the post after 18 months as U.S. troops headed into Iraq, which was 
dominating attention globally and many believed overwhelming the efforts of her 
limited resources.16  
Nine months later, President Bush appointed former Moroccan Ambassador 
Margaret D. Tutwiler as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. Many believed 
Beers’ difficulties originated from a lack of experience with the institutions and 
traditions of the Department of State and federal bureaucracy, and hoped that Tutwiler’s 
resume would lead to more success. Unfortunately at the end of June 2004, just over six 
months after being appointed, she had also resigned. 
Bush did not appoint a replacement to the post until September 2005 when he 
asked Karen Hughes to return from retirement in Texas. Many viewed the appointment 
of Hughes as an indication that public diplomacy efforts would finally have significant 
support from the top, given that she was a long time close associate and advisor to the 
President since his days as Governor of Texas and had managed the White House’s 
communication efforts in the first year of the war on terror. This proved at least partially 
true as she oversaw a near doubling of the public diplomacy budget, pushed through 
institutional reforms, and was reportedly responsible for changes in Presidential rhetoric 
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thought to better reach out to Muslim audiences. Over the next two years, before 
leaving the post at the end of 2007, Hughes built up instant-response and regional media 
teams to counter misinformation in the Arab media, hired more Arabic speakers to 
appear on media reaching Muslim audiences, sent out guest speakers who were 
(sometimes and somewhat) critical of U.S. policy, promoted cultural and educational 
exchanges, and travelled extensively.17 
In early 2008, Bush nominated James Glassman to replace Hughes. Glassman 
had formerly chaired the Broadcasting Board of Governors, responsible for American 
efforts such as Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa. Supporters argued that the combination of 
his previous experience, including a private sector media and journalism career, made 
him perhaps the most qualified individual nominated to this post. Critics of American 
public diplomacy efforts also welcomed his appointment, given his honest assessments 
that “our enemies are eating our lunch in terms of getting the word out in digital 
technology” and his defence that to have credibility international broadcasting needed to 
objectively and independently report the news rather than espouse desired American 
propaganda messages. However, because of opposition from a Republican senator to 
this perspective, Glassman was not confirmed until June 2008 leaving only a few 
months in President Bush’s second term and little time to make a significant impact.18 
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A final major component of American public diplomacy efforts in the war on 
terror was an expansion, or retargeting, of international broadcasting and media efforts. 
The launch of new U.S. government Arabic broadcasting services in the form of Radio 
Sawa and Alhurra TV are the most notable. Radio Sawa first broadcast on March 23, 
2002 as an attempt to attract new, younger Arabic speaking audiences by featuring pop 
music and lighter programming interspersed with frequent short newscasts. Alhurra 
began broadcasting on February 14, 2004, featuring a news and information format 
similar to BBC or NPR, with the intention of countering the perceived extremist bias 
and incitement of al-Jazeera and other Arabic news networks.19 According to some 
measures, questioned by critics but trumpeted by the U.S. government’s Broadcasting 
Board of Governors responsible for these initiatives, both Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV 
have shown some initial success.20 
Foreign Aid 
While terrorism has been described as “propaganda by the deed,” foreign aid 
efforts have often been called “diplomacy of deeds.” Since 9/11 the efforts of the U.S. 
Agency for International Development have frequently been justified, increased, 
retargeted, and publicized (at home and abroad) as measures to improve perceptions of 
the United States.21 As means to change the basic conditions from which terrorism 
arises, or at least which terrorists often exploit, foreign aid and development programs 
have been emphasized in national security strategies and explicitly highlighted as part 
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of the logic for winning the long war.22 President Bush and other official representatives 
prominently mentioned specific aid programs such as money to combat malaria and 
AIDs, emergency relief in response to the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia and the 2005 
earthquake in Pakistan, providing the most support to the UN World Food Program, 
contributing to a wide variety of educational initiatives, and funding the bulk of 
reconstruction aid for both Iraq and Afghanistan.23 
In the first three years after the September 11 attacks, USAID’s budget nearly 
tripled with more than half of that destined for the Muslim world.24 American backed 
programs specifically targeting Islamic populations and groups included: training for 
moderate activists and mosque leaders; aid supporting the restoration of Muslim holy 
sites and antiquities; an Arabic version of Sesame Street stressing religious tolerance as 
well as providing lessons on literacy; curriculum reform programs reaching from rural 
schools to Islamic universities; book translation projects; and, grants to Islamic think 
tanks supporting research showing the compatibility of Islam with democracy and 
human rights.25 
Given the use of the military in many force oriented elements of the war on 
terror, which both puts American troops in situations where they need the support of 
local populations as well as risks incidents generating much of the negative press 
driving increasing anti-Americanism, the prominent use of military assets in foreign aid 
has been promoted as especially important. According to Marine General Wallace 
Gregson, in a conflict such as this we need to “explain what we’re about here and get it 
into something that is properly categorized and puts us on the side of the angels in 
various areas.” To do that he suggested “providing doctors, engineers, dentists, 
veterinarians and other aid to enhance the lives of people living in very troubled parts of 
the world is ‘often far more important than projecting some type of force.’”26 Indicative 
of the potential benefit of such soft power, studies suggest that after the U.S. response to 
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the Southeast Asia tsunami in 2004, which was largely delivered by military forces, 
local opinion of the U.S. rose significantly.27 American army doctors and naval hospital 
ships, amongst a range of other military humanitarian operations, have continued to 
visit areas in need across Southeast Asia, Africa, South America, and the Caribbean 
often conducting tens of thousands of medical procedures per trip.28 
Both civilian and military foreign aid has also been aimed at a range of capacity 
building programs to help targeted states security and military forces develop 
capabilities and increase professionalism to improve counterterrorism, crime fighting, 
and overall governmental operations.29 While most of these programs, with respect to 
the war on terror, have a primary goal of increasing direct counterterrorism capabilities, 
at the same time they are consistent with and defended as part of the underlying 
counterinsurgency logic of a hearts and minds strategy. Many counterinsurgency 
theorists and practitioners emphasize that to be successful in the battle for hearts and 
minds one of the three principal things a state must do is provide security for its 
citizens, while also warning about the damage done to counterinsurgency goals by 
harsh, repressive, or corrupt government forces. Programs to improve the capabilities 
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and professionalism of security forces may be just as important in the long run to 
winning hearts and minds as initiatives directly aimed at feel good priorities, such as 
fighting disease or responding to disasters.30 
Military Relations with Civilian Populations 
Edward R. Murrow, appointed by John F. Kennedy to head the United States 
Information Agency after a career as an educator and journalist, stressed that the critical 
part of international communication was person to person interactions, or as he 
famously called it “the last three feet.”31 In the war on terror this last three feet is often 
between Americans wearing combat boots and Muslim civilians. In addition to the 
principal conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, American forces are playing active roles 
supporting governments confronting threats of Islamist violence across the Muslim 
world with notable initiatives including the Phase Zero projects in the Sahel and Sahara 
as well as the varied efforts of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and the Joint 
Special Operations Task Force-Philippines.  
Proactively military forces play a central role in support of hearts and minds 
goals through targeted operations, including information or psychological operations, 
stability and capacity building programs, and a wide range of humanitarian projects 
including several mentioned in the previous section on foreign aid.32 Information or 
psychological operations campaigns can directly educate, persuade, and influence local 
populations. Such efforts may involve air dropped flyers warning of impending military 
action or as “leave behinds” to explain why forces took action against local insurgents, 
broadcasting of radio programs to provide news on available services or to counter 
rumours generating tensions between opposing ethnic groups, or even the development 
of comic books as was done in Iraq to raise awareness of the increasing effectiveness of 
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Iraqi special forces and in the Philippines to educate about counterterrorism efforts.33 
Stability and capacity building operations, such as the European Command’s Phase 
Zero programs, seek to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place. These serve 
a basic counterinsurgency hearts and minds goal of aiding local governments to provide 
security while providing the opportunity to address the underlying grievances and root 
causes which contribute to the rise of terrorism and political violence.34 Similarly 
American military forces have been involved in hearts and minds guided efforts in the 
Philippines, primarily targeting the Abu Sayyaf Group by helping the Philippine 
government build long-term local popular support through civil-affairs, humanitarian 
aid, and security programs.35 
Given the very visible presence of American military forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, both to local populations and rebroadcast across the Muslim world, the 
daily interaction of those forces is as important to overall hearts and minds goals as any 
targeted efforts. Perhaps the single most important post-9/11 endeavour with respect to 
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this has been the American military’s relearning of and reorientation towards a doctrine 
grounded in population-centric counterinsurgency traditions. The U.S. Army and 
Marine Corp Counterinsurgency Field Manual published in 2007 and written by 
General David Petraeus, retired Colonel Conrad Crane, and a collection of younger 
military and outside specialists drawing on an especially impressive (for a military 
manual) historical and academic study of counterinsurgency is representative of this 
broad project.36 
Covert Operations 
A necessary blind spot for this thesis is the role of covert operations given the 
desire to analyze recent activity without waiting a quarter of a century or longer for 
projects to be slowly declassified. With the history of previous programs that have come 
to light, and the occasional mention or exposure of current covert initiatives, it is fair to 
assume that many grey and black operations continue. One specific overarching 
program that was officially disclosed to the press, although not in operational detail, is 
allegedly named “Muslim World Outreach” intending to influence the debate within 
Islam itself. A frequent justification for keeping such programs covert is the perception 
of American backing as “radioactive” (as one anonymous U.S. official put it) in the 
Islamic world for many moderate Muslims.37  
While this thesis does not attempt to analyze classified programs supporting 
hearts and minds goals, I believe the general problems discussed in the following 
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chapters are as likely to manifest in covert operations given that they are widespread 
throughout other efforts. The same biases of the current construction of terrorism and 
misconceptions about agency are especially likely to similarly hamper these programs. 
Covert operations may be even more likely to suffer these problems given the 
historically demonstrated dangers of lack of diverse oversight as well as backlashes 
when they are prematurely exposed. However, it is possible that allowing 
knowledgeable experts who can learn from experience to act without politically charged 
and short-attention span public scrutiny might avoid some of the problems discussed 
through out this thesis.  
Assessing Hearts and Minds in Context of the Larger War on Terror 
Although a wide range of government officials have talked about the importance 
of population-centric goals, and a diverse range of initiatives have been launched or 
justified by these as represented in the above discussion, viewed from the larger context 
of overall counterterrorism efforts in the war on terror the U.S. government has given 
inadequate emphasis to hearts and minds.38 Ambassador Dell Daily, admired in the 
military as a Lieutenant General who commanded elite special forces operations to 
capture and kill terrorists, argues that “our most important task in the war on terrorism 
is not the ‘destructive’ task of eradicating enemy networks, but the ‘constructive’ task 
of building legitimacy, good governance, trust, rule of law and tolerance.”39 Based on 
36 years of active duty in the U.S. Army before becoming the Department of State’s 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism under Condoleezza Rice, he suggested that “the 
                                                
38 For example, in 2004 Shibley Telhami observed: “It’s worse than failing. Failing 
means you tried and didn’t get better. But at this point, three years after September 11, 
you can say there wasn’t even much of an attempt, and today Arab and Muslim attitudes 
toward the U.S. and the degree of distrust in the U.S. are far worse than they were three 
years ago. Bin Laden is winning by default.” Wright, 2004, "U.S. Struggles to Win 
Hearts, Minds in the Muslim World: Diplomacy Efforts Lack Funds, Follow-Through," 
The Washington Post, August 20, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A17134-2004Aug19.html. 
39 Stein, 2007, "Who Can You Believe in the Torture Wars?," CQ Politics (December 
14), Congressional Quarterly, 
http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=hsnews-000002643554. See also: 
Wright, 2007, "Dell Dailey: Soldier, Counterterrorism Warrior," The Washington Post, 
August 24, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/08/23/AR2007082302031_pf.html. 
CHAPTER THREE: HEARTS AND MINDS EFFORTS AND CHANGES IN MUSLIM OPINIONS 119 
kinetic aspect of our counterterrorism policy” should represent only about 15% of the 
overall effort while 85% should be dedicated to regional diplomacy, law enforcement, 
and other efforts focused on addressing the grievances and conditions terrorists 
exploit.40 Unfortunately, comparing budgeting in the war on terror and examining the 
lack of follow through, consistency, or priority given to hearts and minds efforts 
suggests that too much of the official rhetoric during the years after 9/11 was political 
lip service meant for domestic audiences. 
Despite claims that long-term American strategy is dependent on changing “the 
conditions that give rise to extremism and terror” and rhetoric about the importance of 
hearts and minds, a budgetary analysis drastically demonstrates different priorities for 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts:  
In recent years, the Pentagon has received a larger share of the counter-terrorism 
budget, whereas “indirect action” programs to win the campaign through 
diplomacy and other nonmilitary means have struggled for funding and 
attention, according to a review of budget documents and interviews with 
dozens of current and former U.S. officials. Nonmilitary counter-terrorism 
programs have budgets that are measured in millions instead of billions, and in 
many cases are seeing their funding remain flat or drop. Even within the 
Pentagon, many “soft power” programs, which don’t include direct military 
action, appear to be getting squeezed out as more money goes to support combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and special forces missions elsewhere. Some 
top counter-terrorism officials, seeing their noncombat programs languishing, 
are leaving the government, including a top Pentagon official. Three at the State 
Department who ran the highly regarded Regional Strategic Initiative are also 
leaving.41 
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Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges," 5, 24. Kosiak, 2007, "The 
Cost of US Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and for the War on Terrorism Through 
Fiscal Year 2007 and Beyond," CSBA, September 12, 
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/U.20070913.The_Cost_of_US_O
pe/U.20070913.The_Cost_of_US_Ope.pdf. Kujawa, 2004, "Panel Urges Renewed 
Public Diplomacy Efforts to Engage Muslim World," Washington File (March 2), 
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As an appointed State Department official, Ambassador Dailey’s public comments 
implied that the government’s efforts were meeting his 15% / 85% split for kinetic 
versus non-kinetic counterterrorism efforts. However, the State Department’s flagship 
Regional Strategic Initiative, which Dailey spotlighted in the speech quoted above, and 
similar programs at the same time suffered from severe budgetary neglect:  
The State Department requested $157.5 million for its major counter-terrorism 
programs this year but received $20 million less than that from Congress... The 
funding squeeze has meant that the State Department’s Regional Strategic 
Initiative, a key counter-terrorism program, nearly ceased operations last year 
for lack of funding just as it was getting off the ground. Its annual budget is 
about $1 million – roughly what the Pentagon spends on counterterrorism in Iraq 
every five minutes. “The fact that they can only get $1 million is criminal. It is 
unconscionable,” said Robert Richer, who retired as associate deputy CIA 
director for operations in 2005. “Most of the war on terrorism should have 
nothing to do with guys with guns. But we have walked away from the hearts-
and-minds campaign.”42 
Noting that total U.S. government spending on public diplomacy from fiscal year 2003 
to fiscal year 2006 only increased from $1.14 billion to $1.36 billion, Stephen Van 
Evera argued that “U.S. public diplomacy is failing because the Bush team has put only 
scant resources into it.”43 Critics alternatively dramatized the comparison by noting that 
the annual public diplomacy budget was equal to or less than either what the United 
States was spending weekly in Iraq or to what the Pentagon spent in a day.44 Even 
                                                
http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/2004/03-02-4.htm. Wright, "U.S. Struggles to 
Win Hearts, Minds in the Muslim World." 
42 Meyer, "In Terrorism Fight, Diplomacy Gets Shortchanged." For further details on 
how the Regional Strategic Initiative attempts to pursue a more population-centric 
counterinsurgency approach to the problem of terrorism as well as discussion of the 
limits placed on its ability to operate because of lack of funds and overall prioritization 
see: Meyer, 2007b, "State Department's Anti-Terror Initiative has Uncertain Future," 
Los Angeles Times, March 18, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-
terrorside18mar18,0,4159049.story?coll=la-home-headlines. 
43 Van Evera, 2006, "The Bush Administration Is Weak on Terror," AlterNet 
(November 3), http://www.alternet.org/story/43537/. A State Department official 
“familiar with public diplomacy efforts who spoke on the condition of anonymity” 
similarly observed “if this is so important, where’s the money?” Wright, "U.S. Struggles 
to Win Hearts, Minds in the Muslim World." 
44 Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." Similarly, at a time when the State Department 
was not allocated money to fill over 1,000 vacancies the U.S. has more musicians in 
military bands than diplomats. Kristof, 2008a, "Make Diplomacy, Not War," The New 
York Times, August 9, 
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focusing on Iraq and Afghanistan, which were the most expensive as well as the top 
priorities for the Bush administration in the war on terror, demonstrates the same 
prioritization. According to James Kunder, the acting deputy of USAID and a former 
marine, in “Iraq and Afghanistan the civilian agencies have received 1.4% of the total 
money,” whereas classical counterinsurgency doctrine suggests 80% should be non-
military.45 Outside of Iraq the total increase in budget allocations for foreign aid and 
diplomatic efforts was less than 1% from 2001 to 2006.46 
Although overall spending on hearts and minds efforts increased during the 
seven years after 9/11, several other limiting factors prevented this from leading to 
proportional increases in effective effort. Political leaders often emphasized total dollar 
amount increases, ignoring that inflation and other new costs limited these increases or 
effectively led to cuts in actual personnel and activity.47 Perhaps the greatest limiting 
factor post-9/11 has been significant increases in security concerns and costs, which 
limit what personnel are able to do as well as often led to net decreases in activity.48 The 
challenges of deploying personnel to combat zones and other hardship posts, as well as 
the need to develop new language expertise, has similarly constrained overall efforts. 
Further demonstrating that hearts and minds goals were not actually a priority 
for overall war on terror efforts, those initiatives that were funded and launched suffered 
from a lack of follow through and high level involvement. An in-depth investigation 
into the overall efforts to win hearts and minds in the Muslim world by U.S. News and 
                                                
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/opinion/10kristof.html?ex=1219032000&en=3aa3
c49f7181cb6a&ei=5070&emc=eta1. 
45 Packer, 2006, "Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the 'War on 
Terror'?," The New Yorker, December 18, 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2. Packer continues: 
“During Vietnam, his agency had fifteen thousand employees; it now has two thousand. 
After the end of the Cold War, foreign service and aid budgets were sharply cut. ‘Size 
matters,’ Kunder said, noting that throughout the civilian agencies there are shortages of 
money and personnel.” On Iraq, see also: Baker, 2006a, "Democracy in Iraq Not a 
Priority in U.S. Budget," Washington Post, April 5, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/04/04/AR2006040401626_pf.html. 
46 Kaplan, 2006a, "The Cost Since 9/11," U.S. News and World Report, October 25, 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/badguys/061025/the_cost_since_911_1.htm. 
47 GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim 
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges," 3.  
48 Ibid., 4-5, 30-3. 
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World Report in 2005 found that “staffers on the White House National Security 
Council [had] drafted over a hundred papers proposing action against Islamist 
propaganda and political activity, sources say, yet almost none [had] been acted 
upon.”49 A 2006 Government Accountability Office report – looking back on their own 
recommendations from the preceding years after 9/11 as well as the reports of other 
government bodies – found that the White House, National Security Council, and State 
Department had consistently failed to implement or follow through on communication 
strategies and outreach efforts.50 Meanwhile several experts noted that public diplomacy 
goals were not integrated with or considered in the process of developing other policies, 
were too often not given significant attention by senior political leaders, and showed the 
least signs of progress or development as compared to other counterterrorism 
priorities.51 
Examining hearts and minds efforts overall through 2008 leads to three 
conclusions. First, the rhetoric of politicians and policy leaders about the importance of 
hearts and minds goals too often was meant more for domestic consumption, with the 
unfortunate effect of satiating calls for change without corresponding action.52 Second, 
those efforts that were seriously pursued faced significantly greater challenges than 
other aspects of the war on terror because of limited resources and the lack of consistent 
                                                
49 Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." 
50 GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim 
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges," 
27-8. 
51 Defense Science Board, 2008, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Strategic Communication," Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, January, 4-9, Lynch, 2006 #880, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-01-Strategic_Communication.pdf. Martinage, 
2008, "The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment," Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 23, 
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20080223.The_Global_War_on
_/R.20080223.The_Global_War_on_.pdf. 
52 Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." For example, John Brown with over 20 years 
of foreign service public diplomacy experience argues that Karen Hughes’s rhetoric was 
often intended for domestic audiences: Brown, 2006, "Willie Horton Redux: Karen 
Hughes Breaks Her Silence," John H. Brown's Blog (September 15), PRWatch.org, 
http://www.prwatch.org/node/5176. Similarly, Mark Lynch argues that the “worst part 
about [Alhurra] was that its existence misled Congress and many Americans into 
mistakenly thinking that the US was ‘doing something’ on public diplomacy.” Lynch, 
2007b, "Wow, is al-Hurra Doing Something Right?," Abu Aardvark (March 14), 
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2007/03/wow_is_alhurra_.html. 
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high-level political support. And third, while there was a wide range of post-9/11 
initiatives consistent with population-centric strategies, the resource and political 
balance with coercive or hard counterterrorism efforts was reversed from classic 
counterinsurgency recommendations. The later chapters of this thesis explain not only 
why those hearts and minds efforts that were pursued were ineffective, but also why too 
often the overall strategy of winning popular support was not given the degree of effort 
many argue that it should.  
Indications of Failure: Muslim Attitudes Since 9/11 
Steven Kull, the Director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes 
(PIPA) at the University of Maryland, testified to Congress in 2007 that: 
[I]n the world as a whole negative views of the United States have increased 
sharply in recent years…. Clearly the Muslim world is of particular interest as it 
is a major source of violence against the US. As you have already heard, it is 
also an area of the world with particularly negative feelings toward the United 
States.53 
In November 2007, when Karen Hughes announced that she would be stepping down as 
President Bush’s third Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Washington 
Post reported: 
Public opinion polls show that the image of the United States has declined 
dramatically in the Muslim world, and elsewhere overseas, during Bush’s 
presidency. The numbers have not improved during Hughes’s two-year stint – 
and in some cases have gotten worse.54 
The steady reporting of such polls and studies, coupled with similar conclusions from a 
stream of academic and policy experts, government appointed panels, and media 
commentators has led to a conventional wisdom that the United States is losing the race 
for Muslim hearts and minds. This section takes a closer look at this presumptive 
judgment by first looking at the general findings of major polling efforts and expert 
studies, and then examining the more complicated, sometimes good but also often 
troubling picture that is exposed by the break out of more specific Muslim attitudes 
towards the United States, militant Islamist goals, and the use of violence.  
                                                
53 Kull, "Negative Attitudes Toward the United States in the Muslim World: Do They 
Matter?." 
54 Kessler and Wright, "Hughes to Leave State Dept. After Mixed Results in Outreach 
Post." 
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The Presumptive Argument: We are Losing 
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 the question of “why do they 
hate us” appeared frequently in American conversations and media commentary.55 The 
same underlying drive to understand the sources of Islamist terrorism triggered a 
significant increase in public opinion research focused on global attitudes especially in 
the Muslim world.56 Establishing a base-line comparison, research on this question from 
the 1990s, although limited, generally found predominantly positive views of the United 
States.57 As of early 2008, Marwan Kraidy summarized that since 2001 “numerous polls 
and surveys have underscored that the image of the United States in the Middle East has 
                                                
55Aslan, 2007, "Why Do They Hate Us? Strange Answers Lie in al-Qaida's Writings," 
Slate, August 6, http://www.slate.com/id/2171752/. Ford, 2001b, "Why Do They Hate 
Us?," The Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0927/p1s1-wogi.html. Hamid, 2007, "Why Do They 
Hate Us?," Washington Post, July 22, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/07/20/AR2007072001806.html. Kristof, 2002, "Why Do They 
Hate us?," The New York Times, January 15, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F05E0D71538F936A25752C0A9649
C8B63. Nye, 2006b, "Why Do They Hate Us?," Washington Post, June 25, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/22/AR2006062200972.html. Roy, 2005, "Why Do They 
Hate Us? Not Because of Iraq," The New York Times, July 22, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/22/opinion/22roy.html. Zakaria, 2001, "The Politics 
of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us," Newsweek, October 15, 
http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/newsweek/101501_why.html. 
56 While a wide variety of researchers and organizations have contributed to the study of 
Muslim attitudes, this thesis draws primarily on the work of three academic and polling 
groups that have done significant in depth and repeated work. As of early 2008, the Pew 
Global Attitudes Project, part of the Pew Research Center, had conducted more than 
150,000 interviews in 54 countries, with a significant focus on Muslim populations. 
Leading up to the March 2008 publication of Who Speaks for Islam by John L. Esposito 
and Dalia Mogahed, the Gallup organization had conducted “50,000 hour-long, face-to-
face interviews with residents of more than 35 nations that are predominantly Muslim or 
have substantial Muslim populations … representing the voices of more than 90 percent 
of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, young and old, educated and illiterate, female and 
male, living in urban and rural settings.” Finally the Program on International Policy 
Attitudes (PIPA) has conducted a series of in-depth studies of public opinion in Muslim 
populations using polls, focus groups, and interviews. 
57 Kull, 2007a, "America's Image in the World: Testimony Before House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and 
Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives," World Public Opinion (March 4), 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/326.ph
p?lb=btvoc&pnt=326&nid=&id=. 
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steadily deteriorated,”58 while at the same time the “Voice of America reported that 
international approval of the United States is at an all-time low.”59 
The Pew Global Attitudes Project, which began in June 2001, is one of the 
largest and most exhaustive research efforts focusing on attitudes towards the United 
States. When Andrew Kohut, President of Pew Research, testified before the U.S. 
House of Representatives in March of 2007, Pew had carried out in-depth interviews of 
about 110,000 people in 50 countries. His testimony highlighted that global opinion of 
the United States began to slip in December 2002 with the initial efforts of the war on 
terror, plunged in June 2003 in the wake of the Iraq war, and then became increasingly 
entrenched in following years. Kohut emphasized that “while anti-Americanism is a 
global phenomenon, it is clearly strongest in the Muslim world.” 60 
Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, wrote in January 2008: 
It’s a truism among foreign policy wonks that during the Bush administration 
America has seen an erosion of its ability to persuade other countries to do what 
it wants them to do... [A]s poll after poll shows, the attitudes of people in other 
countries toward the United States have declined precipitously.61 
                                                
58 Kraidy, 2008, "Arab Media and US Policy: A Public Diplomacy Reset," In Policy 
Analysis Brief: The Stanley Foundation, January, 2, 
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/PAB08Kraidy.pdf. 
59 "Report: U.S. Image Tarnished by Iraq," 2008, United Press International, March 17, 
http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Top_News/2008/03/17/report_us_image_tarnished_by
_iraq/6609/. The United States Government Accountability Office similarly referenced 
Department of State reports documenting negative trends amongst Muslim populations 
in attitudes towards the United States. GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department 
Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face 
Significant Challenges," 1. 
60 U.S. House of Representatives, 2007b, Subcommittee on International Organizations, 
Human Rights, and Oversight, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Testimony of Andrew 
Kohut, March 14, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/koh031407.pdf. Illustrating the 
decline he reported that based on 1999 and 2000 polling the U.S. was viewed 
favourably by 75% of the population in Indonesia, 52% in Turkey, 83% in the United 
Kingdom, and 78% in Germany. Despite an initial outpouring of public sympathy 
following the 9/11 attacks, by March 2007 those numbers had fallen to 30%, 12%, 56%, 
and 37% respectively. 
61 Drezner, 2008, "Projecting Power," Newsweek Web Exclusive, January 15, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/94613/output/print. The quotation was shortened above 
to place the emphasis on the widespread perception of those who study the issue that 
attitudes have declined. The full quotation from Drezner places the blame for this on the 
approach of the Bush administration. The excerpted part is: “The unilateralism, the 
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While one may suspect such criticisms are tainted by partisan political preferences, 
others have noted a bipartisan consensus, as Krebs wrote “the Bush administration, 
Republican presidential candidates, and their Democratic counterparts all agree on the 
problem – the United States is losing the battle of ideas…”62 Former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for example, has said that the United States is losing the 
media war to al-Qaida,63 is “sitting on the sidelines,”64 and if graded for efforts in the 
battle of ideas only “deserves a ‘D’ or a ‘D-plus’.”65 Rumsfeld’s successor, Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates, has made similar criticisms, while calling for a “dramatic 
increase” in non-defence spending for U.S. diplomacy, stating: 
We are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as 
a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and 
our goals… It is just plain embarrassing that Al Qaeda is better at 
communicating its message on the Internet than America.66 
A long list of government, think tank, and academic panels and reports similarly 
observed that through the end of 2008 anti-American attitudes increased to 
unprecedented levels while making a variety of proposals for what should be done.67 As 
a final measure of the conventional wisdom a 2008 Gallup poll found:  
                                                
blunders in the Middle East, and the Manichean view of the rest of the world have been 
so off-putting that…” 
62 Krebs, 2008, "Cruel to be Kind: Why Washington Should Not Reach Out to Muslim 
Moderates," Slate, January 3, http://www.slate.com/id/2181263/. 
63 Rumsfeld, "New Realities in the Media Age." 
64 Arkin, 2008, "In the Ideological War Against Terrorism, the Military Has No 
Mission," Washington Post Online, January 24, 
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2008/01/in_the_ideological_war_against.
html?nav=rss_blog. 
65 Associated Press, 2006a, "Rumsfeld: U.S. Losing War of Ideas," CBS News, March 
27, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/27/terror/main1442811.shtml. 
66 Shanker, 2007, "Defense Secretary Urges More Spending for U.S. Diplomacy," The 
New York Times, November 27, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/washington/27gates.html?_r=3&adxnnl=1&oref=s
login&adxnnlx=1206332269-OReyCU6CLXAwlW76yuHoOA&oref=slogin. 
67 Armitage and Nye, 2007, "A Smarter, More Secure America," In Report of the CSIS 
Commission on Smart Power, Washington, DC: CSIS: Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, November 6, 
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4156/type,1/. 
"Building America's Public Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and Additional 
Resources," 2002: A Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 
September 18, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13622.pdf. Defense 
Science Board, 2004, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic 
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Americans’ view of the United States’ position in the world has undergone a 
complete reversal… Since February 2001, American’s dissatisfaction with the 
country’s position in the world has more than doubled… The percentage of 
Americans saying the United States rates favorably in the eyes of the world has 
declined from 75% in February 2001 to 43% today.68 
The internal data of the report notes that the trend lines for both self-identified 
Republicans and Democrats followed the same pattern. 
The More Complicated Picture: Both Good and Bad News 
Because general measures of popularity and favourability are relatively common 
in these studies they serve a useful purpose for longitudinal and transnational 
comparisons. Although one recent quantative study reports that terrorist attacks 
correlate with changes in general public approval,69 such generic measures are only a 
                                                
Communication," Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf. Defense 
Science Board, "Strategic Communication.". Djerejian, 2003, "Changing Minds 
Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & 
Muslim World," Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and 
Muslim World, October 1, 15. GAO, 2006b, "U.S. International Broadcasting: 
Management of Middle East Broadcasting Services Could Be Improved," Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, August, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06762.pdf. GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State 
Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication 
Elements and Face Significant Challenges.". Johnson and Dale, 2003, "How to 
Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy," Heritage Foundation, April 23, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/PublicDiplomacy/bg1645.cfm. Peterson, 
Bloomgarden, Morey, Sieg and Herbstman, 2003, "Finding America's Voice: A 
Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy," Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/pdf/public_diplomacy.pdf. 
68 Saad, 2008, "Discontent with U.S. global Position Hits Record High," Gallup, March 
5, http://www.gallup.com/poll/104782/Discontent-US-Global-Position-Hits-Record-
High.aspx#1. This conventional wisdom arguably is a reflection of the “wisdom of 
crowds.” Surowiecki, 2004, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many are Smarter than 
the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and 
Nations, Doubleday. 
69 Krueger and Maleckova, 2009, "Attitudes and Action: Public Opinion and the 
Occurrence of International Terrorism," Science 325 (4957), September 18. 
Summarizing their work: “This paper examines the effect of public opinion in one 
country toward another country on the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by people 
or groups from the former country against targets in the latter country. Public opinion 
was measured by the percentage of people in Middle Eastern and North African 
countries who disapprove of the leadership of nine world powers. Count models for 143 
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rough indication of the cluster of attitudes that determine whether specific populations 
perceive themselves as similarly aggrieved, share long term objectives, agree on the 
best tactics to address those grievances, are motivated to take collective action, and are 
willing to support specific actors pursuing those goals. Further, as the 
counterinsurgency literature emphasizes, the crucial choice is who the population 
chooses to support, and not necessarily who they like or don’t like. More in-depth 
survey work conducted by a number of organizations, especially after the 9/11 attacks, 
provides some insight on these questions. The rest of this section examines the more 
complicated, sometimes good, but often troubling picture that emerges from these 
studies for the United States and its efforts to win popular support in the Muslim world. 
Most of the top-level polls commonly referenced as showing increasing anti-
Americanism in the Muslim world specifically ask about perceptions of the U.S. 
government. One alternative suggestion is that Muslim anger is really directed against 
the current global system as a whole and not specifically against the United States. 
However, in-depth polling in countries across the Middle East and North Africa by 
Gallup in 2007 found that the United States and United Kingdom were viewed 
significantly more negatively than Russia, Germany, France, China, and Japan. What 
positive attitudes were expressed towards those two countries came largely from Israel 
and Christian segments of Lebanon.70 A study conducted for the BBC World Service by 
PIPA and GlobeScan interviewing 26,000 people across 25 different countries found 
that views of U.S. influence had increasingly grown to be mainly negative at the start of 
2007 as compared to data from 2005 and 2006. The strongest attitudes expressed in the 
BBC study were against the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, viewed by 
majorities in 23 of 25 countries as provoking more conflict than it prevents.71 
                                                
pairs of countries were used to estimate the effect of public opinion on terrorist 
incidents, controlling for other relevant variables and origin-country fixed effects. We 
found a greater incidence of international terrorism when people of one country 
disapprove of the leadership of another country.” 
70 English, 2007, "In Mideast, North Africa, Views of Powerful Nations Differ," Gallup, 
November 13, http://www.gallup.com/poll/102694/Mideast-North-Africa-Views-
Powerful-Nations-Differ.aspx.  
71 "World View of US Role Goes from Bad to Worse," 2007: BBC World Service, 
January 23, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23_01_07_us_poll.pdf. Andrew 
Kohut, President of Pew Research, testified in March 2007 based upon analysis of 
Pew’s Global Attitudes Project as well as the polling by Gallup and the BBC, that while 
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Analyzing polls specifically asking about attitudes towards the American people 
as well as the U.S. government shows another disturbing trend. Historically researchers 
noted that populations in Muslim majority countries tended to report that they “like 
Americans, but dislike the government.” Polling in recent years, especially following 
the 2004 U.S. presidential election, has shown what Kohut has called a “qualitatively 
different” anti-Americanism as negative perceptions are becoming deeper, more 
entrenched, and increasingly of the American people as well as of the government.72 
Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the 
University of Maryland, explains another problematic development noting “Americans 
should also be troubled that most Arabs surveyed now see the United States as one of 
the greatest threats to them (second only to Israel).”73 Kull, calling this “the most 
important dynamic in the Muslim world today,” testified in 2007: 
But now there is also a new feeling about the US that has emerged in the wake 
of 9-11. This is not so much an intensification of negative feelings toward the 
US as much as a new perception of American intentions. There now seems to be 
a perception that the US has entered into a war against Islam itself. I think 
perhaps the most significant finding of our study is that across the four 
countries, 8 in 10 believe that the US seeks to “weaken and divide the Islamic 
world.” We do not have trend-line data to demonstrate that this is something 
new. But in the focus groups this was described as something that has arisen 
recently from American anger about 9-11. America is perceived as believing 
that it was attacked by Islam itself and as having declared war on Islam.74 
In the 2007 PIPA study, most respondents in all four countries where in-depth surveys 
were conducted (Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, and Pakistan) agreed that, “America 
                                                
increasing negative attitudes towards the United States are a global phenomenon, these 
are “clearly strongest in the Muslim world.” U.S. Congress, 2007a, U.S. House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs; Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human 
Rights, and Oversight, America's Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project, March 14, 
http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019. 
72 America's Image in the World. Kohut and Stokes, America Against the World, xviii. 
Some researchers have suggested that this reflects a belief that the American people by 
re-electing George Bush endorsed his policies, especially the Iraq war, or that through 
the process of the election media coverage foreign publics became more aware that a 
majority of Americans at the time supported the war. 
73 Telhami, 2006b, "Hezbollah's Popularity Exposes al-Qaeda's Failure to Win the 
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pretends to be helpful to Muslim countries, but in fact everything it does is really part of 
a scheme to take advantage of people in the Middle East and steal their oil.”75 Both Pew 
and Gallup surveys have repeatedly found the same results.76 This perception plays into 
al-Qaida’s “far enemy” logic, making the arguments of violent Islamists seem more 
credible to Muslim populations, strengthening a sense of besieged group identity, and 
serving to justify violent actions against the United States. Dalia Mogahed, Executive 
Director of The Center for Muslim Studies at The Gallup Organization, writes that 
framing the current conflict in this manner “energizes the very perception that fuels 
sympathy” for terrorism and violent radicals.77 
The one hearts and minds effort conducted by the United States which has 
repeatedly generated a few signs of positive progress for attitudes within specific 
Muslim countries has been foreign aid. Most frequently referenced are studies 
suggesting that the relatively sizeable response to the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia 
led to significantly more positive attitudes of the United States in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
and Bangladesh.78 Pew’s surveying suggests a similar, albeit smaller effect to the 
smaller American emergency response to the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan as 
well as to American HIV/AIDS funding for projects in sub-Sahara Africa.79 One of the 
studies of changes in Indonesian attitudes after U.S. tsunami aid also suggested a drop 
                                                
75 Kull, 2007b, "Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al 
Qaeda," Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, April 
24, 6, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf. 
76 Esposito and Mogahed, 2007, Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really 
Think, New York, Gallup Press. America's Image in the World.  
77 Mogahed, 2007, "Framing the War on Terror," Gallup, September 11, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/28678/Framing-War-Terror.aspx. 
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America Against the World., p28, 31. Rajapakasa and Dundes, "Can Humanitarianism 
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aid, including significant logistical and delivery support from the American military. 
Coupled with private donations, Americans pledged over $2.8 billion. In comparison, 
the Saudi government initially pledged only $10 million, which was increased to $30 
million after an international media outcry and coupled with another nearly $70 million 
in private donations. 
79 "A Global Look at Public Perceptions of Health Problems, Priorities, and Donors: 
The Kaiser/Pew Global Health Survey.". Defense Science Board, "Strategic 
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in support for Usama bin Ladin occurring at the same time.80 Showing promise for 
future significant humanitarian efforts, surveys suggest that effective “foreign aid 
resonates” with local populations,81 and that a common criticism in global polling is a 
perception the United States is “doing too little to help solve the world’s problems.”82 
Despite the positive indications of these studies, Andrew Kohut warns: 
Of course, the impact of this humanitarian assistance should not be overstated – 
most of the same misgivings about America seen throughout the Muslim world 
can be found in Indonesia and Pakistan, and solid majorities in both countries 
continue to have a negative impression of the U.S.83 
He argues that the only way for America’s image to improve is from similar reactions to 
major American policy changes.  
Examining polling of Muslim attitudes towards Islamist framing, goals, and 
tactics shows a similar complicated picture of potential good and bad news for U.S. 
efforts. Polling since 9/11 suggests Islamists broadly have been successful as majorities 
across the Muslim world are more likely to identify themselves as Muslims first, share 
common perceptions of grievances, and would like to see Islam play a larger role in 
government. With respect to specific violent Islamists groups and leaders, significant 
numbers of Muslims report admiration for al-Qaida and Usama bin Ladin for “standing 
up” to the United States, but neither fully approve of al-Qaida’s goals nor respond that 
they wish to live under a regime following al-Qaida’s strict interpretation of Islam.84 
Research on support for violent tactics has been mixed, with possible trends suggesting 
populations in countries that have directly experienced increased violence may be more 
inclined to turn against its use,85 and that majorities across the Muslim world oppose 
attacks on civilians although they support attacks on occupying forces. 
Surveys by Pew, PIPA, and Gallup all reported increases, sometimes dramatic, 
in individuals self-identifying first as Muslim over their respective nationalities 
                                                
80 Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." 
81 "A Global Look at Public Perceptions of Health Problems, Priorities, and Donors: 
The Kaiser/Pew Global Health Survey." 
82 America's Image in the World. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Telhami, "Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll." 
85 This effect highlighted in the polls below is consistent with Gerges reporting on 
changes in attitudes in Egypt and Algeria after the domestic experiences of significant 
Islamist violence during the 1990s. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 91. 
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especially following 2003 and the Iraq war.86 Related to views that the United States 
and other powers have negative intentions towards Muslim countries, Kull reports that 
respondents in their focus groups indicate the “sense of Islam as being under siege has 
enhanced people’s identification with Islam.”87 This resurgence of a stronger Islamic 
identity contributes to the success and spread of political Islam. The shared perception 
of identity across borders plays a role in the likelihood that individuals may support 
groups and actions involved in distant struggles. However, some subsequent polling has 
found a decrease in such identification coupled with the success of local national based 
Islamists groups, leading Shibley Telhami to propose: 
Arabs probably identified themselves after the fall of Baghdad as Muslims first 
in part because the ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq War were seen to be aimed at 
weakening the Muslim world, not because they wanted to join together under 
one government with other Muslims or because they embraced al-Qaeda.88 
Because the sense of shared identity may increase the likelihood for supporting 
struggles carried out in other countries, or potentially extremist tactics locally to support 
those causes, the rise of Muslim first self-identification in Western countries has been a 
cause of concern. A 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey found similar high levels 
of Muslims in many European countries increasingly identifying themselves primarily 
by religion rather than by nationality. However, this research also found that the 
concerns of Muslims in Europe were more economic than religious or cultural.89 A 
2007 Pew poll focused on Muslims in the United States found that they were “highly 
assimilated” with American culture, and no more likely to identify with their religion 
first over nationality than U.S. Christians.90 
Similar to the rise in Muslim identity, recent polling has found large majorities 
of Muslims supporting many common goals associated with Islamist movements 
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including extremists groups such as al-Qaida. For example, the PIPA study of Egypt, 
Morocco, Indonesia, and Pakistan reports:  
Most significantly, large majorities approve of many of al Qaeda’s principal 
goals. Large majorities in all countries (average 70 percent or higher) support 
such goals as: “stand up to Americans and affirm the dignity of the Islamic 
people,” “push the US to remove its bases and its military forces from all 
Islamic countries,” and “pressure the United States to not favor Israel.” 
Equally large majorities agree with goals that involve expanding the role of 
Islam in their society. On average, about three out of four agree with seeking to 
“require Islamic countries to impose a strict application of sharia,” and to “keep 
Western values out of Islamic countries.” Two-thirds would even like to “unify 
all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state or caliphate.”91 
Mark Lynch notes that such survey results “represent considerable success” for what he 
labels “al-Qaeda’s constructivist strategy.”92 Social movement theorists explain this 
success as persuading the larger population to increasingly adopt a shared narrative 
frame for grievances and aspirations necessary to facilitate collective action. Polls 
conducted for the Pew Global Attitudes Project similarly find large majorities in 
Muslim countries welcoming “the idea of Islam playing a greater roll in political life.”93  
However, both the PIPA and Pew polls report that even amongst those who 
share this view, large majorities still view Islamist extremism as a threat to their 
countries.94 Consistent with these findings, Telhami reports, “when asked what aspects 
of al-Qaida they sympathized with most, if any, only 6 percent of Arabs polled 
identified its advocacy of a puritanical Islamic state” and only 7 percent chose “its 
methods of operation.” In comparison, 36% chose “confronts the United States” and 
20% “stands up for Muslim causes such as the Palestinian issue.” He concludes, “if al-
Qaida’s imagined world is Taliban-like and virulently anti-Western, the vision is not 
shared by most in the Arab world.” Telhami highlights that majorities believe women 
should have the right to work outside the home and identify Western European 
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countries or the United States as places where they would want to live or have a family 
member study.95 Furthermore, several recent surveys, elections, and some anecdotal 
reporting suggest that Usama bin Ladin, al-Qaida, and others associated with militant 
Islamist groups are losing popularity in Muslim countries, although some radical local 
Islamist groups such as Hamas and Hizballah have had notable success in national 
elections.96 
Research on Muslim public opinion also shows declining support for terrorist 
violence, notably including suicide bombings, especially in countries that have direct 
experience of such attacks. Some studies conducted in the first few years after the 
September 11 attacks found majorities or near majorities who supported attacks on 
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civilians including suicide attacks. In contrast, several more recent surveys found 
substantial drops in support for suicide bombings and show that “overwhelming 
majorities” of Muslims worldwide disapprove of attacks against civilians, including 
specifically attacks by al-Qaida. However, these surveys often find majority support for 
attacks, including suicide bombings, against U.S. and Western forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, who are “widely perceived as occupiers,” as well as against Israel.97 
How often are suicide attacks justified? 
 
Pew Global Attitudes Project98 
The surveys discussed in this section in part represent an effort to infer the 
likelihood and number of people who may be willing to support or turn against terrorist 
activity. The PIPA study of attitudes in Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia 
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attempted to more directly measure this by asking during their in-depth surveys three 
specific questions related to active support for groups that attack Americans:99 
Sometimes speak favorably to your family or friends about groups that attack 
Americans? Morocco 12%, Egypt 24%, Pakistan 6%, Indonesia 16% 
Would consider contributing money to an organization that may send some of its 
funds to a group that attacks Americans? Morocco 5%, Pakistan 7%, Indonesia 
8% 
Would approve or have mixed feelings if a member of your family were to join 
such a group? Morocco 3% and 12%, Pakistan 4% and 9%, Indonesia 6% and 
5%100 
The small percentages answering positively to these questions, shown in the figure 
above, may be interpreted as good news. These results suggest that very large majorities 
do not speak favourably of, would not contribute money to, and would be opposed to a 
family member joining groups that attack Americans. However, if these findings are not 
merely a result of survey error or similar results found amongst the general American 
population,101 they potentially still represent millions of people across just the four 
countries covered in this survey.102 While it is possible and perhaps likely that 
individuals responding to these questions were often thinking of groups who attack U.S. 
troops in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and that therefore the numbers willing to support 
groups who attack American civilians would be much smaller based on the repeated 
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findings of other surveys, the numbers involved still represent a potentially large 
radicalized population. 
Consistent with these findings, experts from American intelligence agencies 
continue to publicly state their assessment that recruitment by militant groups is 
outpacing current counterterrorism efforts. Russell Travers, from the Defense 
Intelligence Agency and a Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, 
wrote in 2005: 
There is no question that the extraordinary efforts of the CIA’s Counterterrorism 
Center, coupled with those of the U.S. military and other USG elements 
involved in the offensive war against terrorism, have inflicted huge losses on Al 
Qaeda. But global conditions are a veritable petri dish for jihadists, and we are 
not going to succeed by killing these people until they like us. The smart money 
almost certainly says that terrorists are being created faster than we are killing or 
capturing them.103 
More recently the CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence, John A. Kringen, reported to 
the House Armed Services Committee that while the United States and its allies have 
succeeded in “disrupting and dismantling terrorist organizations … the supply of people 
wanting to join those organizations continues and in some areas continues to grow.”104 
Mixed Judgment: Is it Possible both are Losing? 
The complex, sometimes contradictory, picture of attitudes across Muslim 
populations depicted by survey research over the last several years suggests mixed news 
for the United States. The bad news is that throughout the Muslim world negative 
perceptions and anti-American attitudes are very common and becoming entrenched. 
Perhaps most troubling, large majorities perceive the United States as attacking Islam 
and seeking to exploit the Muslim world. Many Muslims in North Africa, the Middle 
East, and Asia as well as in many European countries are more likely than in the past to 
identify themselves by their religion first instead of by their nationality. They also agree 
with many Islamist goals, even those of extremist groups such as al-Qaida. For most, 
the war on terror is perceived as a war on Islam, and the U.S. led invasion of Iraq its 
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most dramatic and detested manifestation. Majorities in many countries continue to 
support attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, including suicide bombings. 
Small percentages, but still representing numerically significant numbers, are willing to 
state that they do or would consider offering more direct support to groups generally 
carrying out attacks on Americans. 
The good news is that research on responses to foreign aid shows that targeted 
efforts can work. Most promising, Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida are also increasingly 
unpopular, majorities see militant Islam as a threat, and very few desire to live under the 
type of puritanical Islamist state espoused by the extremists. Large majorities across the 
Muslim world generally oppose attacks on civilians, including in many countries 
dramatic declines in the numbers who once expressed support for suicide bombings. 
The problem, as Shibley Telhami explains, is that “seen from this perspective, 
al-Qaida’s failure does not translate into an American success.”105 Bin Ladin and al-
Qaida are still respected for at least standing up to the United States and affirming the 
“dignity of the Islamic people.” 106 Given that “America is seen as the greater threat,”107 
when pushed, too many Muslims still side with militants. This is highlighted by the 
widespread reluctance, noted in even recent surveys, of many Muslims to state that al-
Qaida was responsible for the September 11 attacks.108  
Opportunities continue to exist for U.S. efforts to make a difference, for 
domestic leaders to make necessary improvements, and for moderate or reformist 
Islamist movements to win out over violent extremists. However, the mix of continuing 
real grievances across the Muslim world, the lack too often of more promising 
alternatives, and a hardening perception that the United States is at war with Islam poses 
a significant threat that larger numbers of people will decide that their best option is 
supporting radical Islamists who are at least doing something. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
PERSPECTIVE ON POLITICAL ISLAM  
AND MILITANT ISLAMISTS 
“A role in search of an Actor.” 
–Gamal Abdel Nasser, 19541 
Understanding the rise of political Islam as a popular social movement across 
the Muslim world is beneficial to the analysis of whether, why, and when Muslim 
populations will choose to support or turn against the use of political violence by some 
Islamist groups. The context of accumulated and perceived grievances and aspirations, 
the histories of previous attempts to address these, and the dynamics shaping current 
popular movements in turn aid analysis of why hearts and minds efforts aimed at these 
populations today succeed or fail. This chapter examines why the Muslim world is 
currently fertile ground for contentious mobilization, how the failure of previous 
solutions and perceived Islamist successes contribute to the current rise of political 
Islam as the new alternative, the unique role played by immigrant and diaspora Muslim 
communities in the West, and how militant groups fit within this context and potentially 
relate to larger Muslim populations. 
Three initial observations are important to emphasize. First, while a shared 
Islamist ideology unites the primary groups targeted by the current U.S. war on terror, 
many of the core grievances mobilizing political Islam are non-religious in nature. 
Groups not motivated by Islamic ideals contested, often violently, many of the same 
issues well before today’s Islamist groups became significant actors.2 Understanding 
                                                
1 Gamal Abdel Nasser in Falsafat al-Thawra, 1954 cited in: Fuller, 2003, The Future of 
Political Islam, New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillan, 13. “In the early 1950s Gamal 
Abdel Nasser remarked that Egypt’s vigorous activism in the Middle East was in 
response to ‘a role in search of an actor’ – the existence of certain needs and aspirations 
in the region, a role not being filled.” Although Nasser was referring to himself and 
Arab nationalism as the actor emerging to take the unfulfilled role, Graham Fuller and 
others have suggested that political Islam has since emerged to fill the same void to 
address the still unsolved problems of the Middle East that generated the similar 
previous mobilizing potential fuelling Nasser’s rise. 
2 Emphasizing this, an extensive series of surveys of Muslim populations by Gallup 
found that militant Islamists are much more likely to give political, instead of religious, 
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and engaging the Islamic cultural and ideational aspects are important to analyzing the 
current conflicts, but it remains likely that similar conflicts would still exist had 
Mohammad never established the Muslim faith.3 Second, political Islam as an 
overarching movement includes a wide diversity of groups, with very different opinions 
on and approaches to the use of violence or electoral politics. These groups 
descriptively span ideological labels such as liberal, conservative, modernizing, 
reformist, and fundamentalist. Larger Muslim populations have different opinions about 
and connections to these various groups, and significant local and regional differences 
exist between groups often associated with the label. More generally, analysts should 
remember the common biasing predisposition to see other groups and cultures as more 
homogenous because of a lack of familiarity, which is likely to occur when making 
claims about a community including one-fifth of the world’s population. This guidance 
cautions paying careful attention to the warnings of those with more direct experience 
about the diversity and pluralism within the Muslim world, without at the same time 
allowing this to obscure the commonalities and connections that do exist between 
                                                
reasons for condoning attacks, while the large majorities of Muslims who oppose 
attacks on civilians more often give religious reasons. Esposito and Mogahed, Who 
Speaks for Islam. Fawaz Gerges reports similar experience from his personal interaction 
and interviews with jihadists around the world. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 11. 
Finally, Olivier Roy explains that in many cases "[T]he key to understanding the 
contemporary 'territorial' struggle is nationalism and ethnicity, not religion. Two factors 
give Islam a post hoc importance; the reciprocal rationalization of some conflicts in 
religious or civilisational terms, and the growing deterritorialisation of Islam, which 
leads to the political reformulation of an imaginary ummah" Roy, Globalized Islam, 44.  
3 Fuller, 2008, "A World Without Islam," Foreign Policy, January/February, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4094. Olivier Roy emphasized 
this writing in 1994: “[F]rom Cairo to Tehran, the crowds that in the 1950s 
demonstrated under the red or national flag now march beneath the green banner. The 
targets are the same: foreign banks, nightclubs, local governments accused of 
complacency toward the West. The continuity is apparent not only in these targets but 
also the participants: the same individuals who followed Nasser or Marx in the 1960s 
are Islamists today.” Roy, 1994, The Failure of Political Islam, Translated by Volk, 
Harvard University Press, 4. Roy also emphasizes that when proper comparisons are 
done (between parallel Muslim and non-Muslim majority countries) many of the current 
problems often attributed to Islam disappear. Roy, Globalized Islam, 13-4. See also: 
Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 70, 145. Smith, 2004a, "Collective Action with 
and without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in Iran," In Islamic Activism: A Social 
Movement Theory Approach, ed. Wiktorowicz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
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various groups.4 Third, although this discussion will focus on many of the common 
aspects to the rise and manifestation of political Islam across Muslim populations, one 
should not forget or ignore that there are significant local and regional variations.5 Most 
Islamist groups and the populations potentially supportive of them focus foremost on 
local circumstances.6 One of the problems of the current approach to the war on terror 
has been a tendency to aggregate groups into a unified global threat, playing into the 
“far enemy” logic of a few truly transnationally focused Islamists, and 
counterproductively encouraging linkages and alliances between them.7 
With respect to the focus of this thesis, the primary audience for U.S. hearts and 
minds efforts is the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, often referred to as the Ummah or 
“community of believers.”8 It is this population which Islamist groups seek to represent 
and claim to be fighting for, and it is first and foremost this population whose support 
can either enable militants by providing resources, recruits, and encouragement, or 
inhibit them by aiding governments in tracking, disrupting, and deterring.  
                                                
4 Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 16-7. Roy, Globalized Islam, 126-37. 
5 Esposito, 1994, "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace," Current History, 
January. 
6 For example: Roy, 2008, "Iraq will not be a Qaedistan," International Herald Tribune, 
March 7. 
7 For example: Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency." 
8 Esposito and Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam. Estimates on the world Muslim 
population vary significantly, but are often between 1 and 1.5 billion people. 
Mandaville similarly uses a figure of 1.25 billion. Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 4.  
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The Muslim World 
Showing the percentage of population that is Muslim.9 
Although the actions and attitudes of Muslims around the world are important to 
the current conflict, to understand the rise of political Islam I will start by focusing on 
the geographic “Muslim world” – that is those nations with either majority Muslim 
populations or potentially autonomous majority Muslim regions. These nations are 
largely found in the area over which various historic Islamic empires ruled, or in 
neighbouring states that now have majority or near-majority Muslim populations 
through influence of power, migration, and conversion. This historical zone stretches 
from North Africa, across the Middle East, up into South and Central Asia, as well as 
parts of Southeast Asia.10 It is in these countries where the vast majority of militant 
Islamist groups employing terrorism are based, nearly all of whom are focused on 
taking or influencing local power, with several of these conflicts of sufficient intensity 
to qualify as full scale insurgencies. Finally, although Muslim immigrant communities 
are of special concern to Western counterterrorism, the large majority of militant 
                                                
9 Public domain image based primarily upon CIA World Factbook data. Retrieved 20 
September 2009 from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:World_Muslim_Population_Map.png 
10 Jackson and Fealy, 2003, Introduction, Paper read at Political Islam in Southeast 
Asia, March 25, at Washington, DC, http://www.sais-
jhu.edu/programs/asia/sea/sea_publications/southeast_asia/political_islam_report.pdf. 
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Islamists involved at a transnational level continue to originate from countries in the 
Muslim world itself.11 
Muslim populations living in other parts of the world also play important roles 
in current conflicts, but in significant ways their politicization and recruitment into 
Islamist movements is often driven by the grievances and aspirations of populations in 
the historic Muslim world.12 While local grievances and goals are important to the 
decisions of many to become politically active, whether within or outside of traditional 
political structures, perceptions of events in former home countries as well as in the 
Muslim world in general are often more significant for those who support militant 
movements.13 As diaspora communities they may provide funding and other resources 
or be sources of recruitment for violent and nonviolent Islamist movements. Muslims 
living in the United States and Europe may play important roles in influencing the 
                                                
11 One measure of the comparative threat is the nationality of Islamist militants who 
were motivated to travel to fight against Coalition forces in Iraq. The Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point published a study in 2007 exploiting a collection of 
captured al-Qaida in Iraq administrative records, known as the Sinjar documents, which 
included details on the nationalities of foreign fighters who had joined the organization. 
Of the 595 records analyzed which included nationality information only 1% (6) were 
from Western countries (including two from France and one each from Bosnia, 
Belgium, England, and Sweden). In comparison, about 40% were fighters from North 
African countries who had to travel as far as their European counterparts and likely at 
much greater relative personal expense. Felter and Fishman, 2007, "Al-Qa'ida's Foreign 
Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records," West Point, New York: 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 19, 6-7, 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf. Hafez’s 
analysis of suicide terrorism in Iraq identified up to 7% of the cases studied (7 or 94) as 
being Europeans, however he was relying on media reports of nationality and given the 
propaganda the nationality of European suicide bombers is much more likely to have 
been highlighted in insurgent propaganda and reported to Western media. Hafez, 2006, 
"Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data and 
Documentary Evidence," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (6). 
12 Kepel, 2002, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Translated by Roberts, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 193. Mandaville, 
Global Political Islam, 298. 
13 Several authors focusing on Islamist movements in Europe emphasize the same 
changes related to globalization discussed in Chapter Two with respect to the evolving 
transnational and virtual nature of insurgency are responsible for linking Western 
Muslim communities more tightly with the historic Muslim world and especially 
Muslim communities from their countries of origin. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist. 
Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds. Mandaville, Global Political Islam. Roy, Globalized 
Islam. 
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perception of Western nations by Muslims elsewhere. At the same time radicalization 
amongst these populations has often been a special concern to counterterrorism efforts 
out of the fear that they pose a greater threat for international attacks because of their 
ability to pass unnoticed given language skills, cultural familiarity, and nationality or 
residence status.14 
Fertile Ground for Contentious Politics  
and Collective Action 
The idea that the Muslim world is a “role in search of an actor” can be seen in 
the wide range of social, economic, political, and cultural challenges and problems that 
have persisted despite the repeated efforts of a succession of governments and 
ideologies. Albeit with some significant regional variation, large parts of quickly 
growing Muslim populations across North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia live in 
relative poverty or economic stagnation with usually limited or stalled prospects for 
advancement and development, under governments that are generally authoritarian, 
frequently repressive, and often corrupt.15 These conditions are exacerbated by 
recognition of falling further behind other parts of the world, as well as the excesses 
often enjoyed by privileged minorities at home including oil wealth which 
disproportionately benefits a few states with small populations, and by the perception of 
vulnerability to the forces of globalization driven by a historically antagonistic and 
currently dominant West threatening to entrench outside exploitation and control. 
Although these conditions are not unique to Muslim areas of the developing world, and 
on a number of measures Muslim states do better than others, the frustrations and 
                                                
14 Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 244-61. Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking 
Counterinsurgency," 25-6. Roy, Globalized Islam, 302-4. 
15 "Between Fitna, Fawda and the Deep Blue Sea," 2008, The Economist, January 10, 
http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-
africa/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=10499063. "MENA Population: 1950, Now, 2050," 
2008, Middle East Strategy at Harvard (March 14), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/03/mena_population/. Roudi-Fahimi and Kent, 
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grievances experienced provide a strong motivational potential for contentious 
collective action.16 
The Arab Human Development Report, first compiled in 2002 for the United 
Nations Development Program by a distinguished group of Arab intellectuals in order to 
increase credibility for its primary Arab target audiences, highlights a wide range of 
economic and social development challenges facing that core part of the Muslim world. 
The report notes that one in five people in the nations covered lived on less than $2/day. 
The GDP of all Arab countries combined ($531.2 billion in 1999) was less than that of a 
single middle-size European country (Spain at $595.5 billion), while real GDP growth 
over the period of 1975 to 1998 had been close to stagnant averaging 0.5% per year 
compared to the global average of 1.3% per year. Highlighting relative deprivation, 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in real GDP per capita fell in the Arab world from 
21.3% to 13.9% of the average OECD citizen during the same time frame. Noting that 
illiteracy rates remain higher in Arab countries than the rest of the developing world, the 
study captured in one frequently cited anecdote many other observed problems and 
challenges by reporting that the Arab world translates about 330 books annually, one 
fifth of the number that Greece translates.17  
Aggravating the development problems facing much of the Muslim world is a 
cultural memory of historical greatness. Martin Kramer, frequent antagonist of many 
scholars focusing on the Middle East, wrote at the end of 1999: 
In the year 1000, the Middle East was the crucible of world civilization. One 
could not lay a claim to true learning if one did not know Arabic, the language 
of science and philosophy. One could not claim to have seen the world’s greatest 
cities if one had not set eyes upon Baghdad and Cordoba, Cairo and Bukhara. 
Global trade flourished in the fabulous marketplaces of the Middle East as 
nowhere else. The scientific scholarship cultivated in its academies was 
unrivalled. An Islamic empire, established by conquest four centuries earlier, 
had spawned an Islamic civilization, maintained by the free will of the world’s 
most creative and enterprising spirits… This supremely urbane civilization 
cultivated genius. Had there been Nobel Prizes in 1000, they would have gone 
almost exclusively to Moslems.18 
                                                
16 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 12, 81. Wiktorowicz, "A New Approach to the 
Study of Islamic Activism," 33. 
17 "How the Arabs Compare: Arab Human Development Report 2002," 2002, The 
Middle East Quarterly 9 (4), Fall, http://www.meforum.org/article/513. 
18 Kramer, 1999, "Islam's Sober Millennium," Jerusalem post, December 31, 
http://sandbox.blog-city.com/islams_sober_millennium.htm. 
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Graham Fuller describes the effect this memory has today: 
The deepest underlying source of Muslim anguish and frustration today lies in 
the dramatic decline of the Muslim world, in over just a few centuries, from the 
leading civilization in the world for over one thousand years into a lagging, 
impotent, and marginalized region of the world. This stunning reversal of 
fortune obsessively shapes the impulses underlying much contemporary Islamist 
rhetoric.19 
A variety of factors make a good claim to partially explaining the shift in historical 
balances of power, including: the decline of the traditional land based silk route to 
seafaring trade better exploited by rising European nations and fuelled by their 
colonization of the new world; Mongol conquests and the emergence of divides within 
the old Islamic territories; environmental changes affecting the fertile crescent and 
favouring industrialization elsewhere; and, ultimately the emergence of European 
economic and colonial control over much of the Muslim world.20 
All of which saw the states of the Muslim world arrive late to industrialization 
and thus suffer the steep challenges frequently discussed for modern developing 
economies on the periphery of the world capitalist system, struggling to develop 
industry and find niches in the world market in the face of often overwhelming 
competition from those who got their first.21 Relative to when Western countries 
industrialized, the Muslim world must catch up with significantly larger and still 
quickly growing populations that often outstrip marginal gains. Disproportionately 
young populations, dislocated from traditional support networks having moved to urban 
areas seeking opportunities promised by the modern era, remain unemployed or 
underemployed further breeding discontent. 
The magnitude of the development problems across the Muslim world is 
complicated and obscured by significant oil and resource wealth in several states, with 
Muslim majority nations accounting for seven of the top ten countries with the largest 
proven oil reserves and all but three members of OPEC.22 While domestic production 
and some transfers to other Muslim nations have helped raise living standards, what 
                                                
19 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 1. 
20 Ibid., 4-12. 
21 Hinnebusch, 2002, Syria: Revolution From Above, London, Routledge, 2, Owen, 
1998 #269.  
22 Radler, 2006, "Oil Production, Reserves Increase Slightly in 2006," Oil & Gas 
Journal 104 (47), December 18. 
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many call the resource or oil curse has contributed to stunted development and further 
aggravated grievances.23 Economists argue that many oil rich states tend to suffer from 
“Dutch disease” where other productive sectors of the domestic economy are put at a 
significant disadvantage by increasing the real exchange rate and comparative wage 
markets, disproportionately attracting talent and investment into oil production, while 
making other tradable sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing even less 
competitive in global markets. Through the rentier state effect, the easy stream of oil 
wealth decreases the incentives that exist in states dependent upon taxation for 
governments to be more efficient and responsive, enabling regimes to at least 
temporarily buy off calls for reform.24 This has led a number of observers to note that 
international oil prices and progress towards civil and political freedom in these 
countries often appear to move in opposite directions.25 In nations without strongly 
established accountability structures, the frequent result is elite corruption stealing much 
of the nation’s resource wealth, which likewise undermines incentives that exist 
elsewhere to invest in broader human development. Dependency on resource wealth 
also exposes such countries to revenue volatility, driving domestic boom and bust 
cycles that increase perception and experience of relative deprivation.26 The timing of 
the discovery and economic profitability of oil was particularly unfortunate for many 
Muslim countries, undermining the early stages of other development paths and coming 
only after Western colonialism and economic penetration had established social, 
economic, and political structures more susceptible to the negative effects of the 
                                                
23 Other Muslim states are affected by similar resource rents, including phosphate for 
Jordan and Morocco, super-power aid for many key countries especially during the 
Cold War, or indirect oil rents in the form of regional donor aid. Hinnebusch, Syria, 7, 
65. Richards and Waterbury, 1998, A Political Economy of the Middle East, Westview 
Press, 195-7, 229. 
24 Ayubi, 1995, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, 
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25 Friedman, 2006, "The First Law of Petropolitics," Foreign Policy, May/June, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3426. 
26 The boom of high oil prices in the 1970’s for example increased expectations but also 
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resource curse along with state borders that concentrated much of that wealth away 
from large Muslim populations.27 
On top of the economic problems and development challenges facing Muslim 
populations, the potential for contentious conflict is further cultivated by domestic 
politics frequently characterized by authoritarian, corrupt, repressive, and incompetent 
governments. The leaders who took over during the mid-20th century looked back on at 
least 100 years of Western domination and in many cases recent direct rule.28 Colonial 
powers had shaped the area for their own benefit, often excessively oppressing local 
populations, and to a large extent had failed to “establish responsible local government 
institutions because they were too busy competing with each other.”29 From the start the 
newly independent states inherited the same problems as their colonial predecessors 
including a lack of legitimacy often exacerbated by artificial and arbitrarily drawn 
borders, poverty, illiteracy, cultural divisions, and scarce money to fund development.30 
Unfortunately for even the best-intentioned leaders who came to power under these 
conditions, history has shown no quick or painless paths to universal prosperity. 
Governments often increasingly shifted resources to maintain power in the face of 
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disappointed populations.31 Many of the resulting governments in power today have 
learned to carefully guard their positions of authority by stage-managing the appearance 
of democratization when needed,32 as well as routinely suppressing, jailing, torturing, 
and executing those who would challenge them – which in turn often gives rise to 
opposition groups who are more secretive, conspiratorial, and willing to use or endorse 
violence.33 
External power politics over the past century has not been kinder to the Muslim 
world, with political and social dynamics often shaped by hot and cold wars, as well as 
the martial socio-political structures resulting from and preceding such conflicts.34 
World War One saw the final act of the old Islamic caliphate with the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, which had sided with Germany, and the end of the war leaving large 
parts of the Middle East under European control.35 World War Two, principally fought 
by European protagonists, again played out in part with fighting across North and East 
Africa as well as in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The end of the Second World War, and 
along with it an accelerating end to the era of colonialism, saw the conception of two 
particularly lasting conflicts in the Muslim world with the partition of India creating a 
divided Muslim Pakistan and the clash over Kashmir, and the implementation of the 
                                                
31 Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, 200-1, 56, 66-9. Beinin, 2001, Workers and 
Peasants in the Modern Middle East, Cambridge University Press, 139-40. Fuller, The 
Future of Political Islam, 8-9. Hinnebusch, Syria, 6-7, 41, 7, 55, 88. Owen, State, 
Power and Politics, 31. Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle 
East, 188. 
32 Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 103. 
33 Ayoob, 2007, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim 
World, University of Michigan Press. Fuller, 2002, "The Future of Political Islam," 
Foreign Affairs 81 (2), March/April. Hafez, 2004, "From Marginalization to Massacres: 
A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria," In Islamic Activism: A 
Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Wiktorowicz, Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. Hafez and Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic 
Movement.". Hegghammer, 2006, "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi 
Arabia," Middle East Policy 13 (4), December. 
34 Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, 256, 66-9. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 
8-9. Hinnebusch, Syria, 7. Hinnebusch, 2003, The International Politics of the Middle 
East, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 154. Richards and Waterbury, A 
Political Economy of the Middle East, 242. Singerman, 2004, "The Networked World of 
Islamist Social Movements," In Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, 
ed. Wiktorowicz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 146-8. 
35 Woodward, 2006, Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East, University 
Press of Kentucky. 
CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL ISLAM AND MILITANT ISLAMISTS 150 
Balfour Agreement creating the modern state of Israel and with it the continuing 
Palestinian crisis. The Cold War saw Muslim nations caught between and as minor 
actors in super-power confrontations, with neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union truly 
concerned about domestic conditions over the priorities of international balancing when 
deciding where to give or withhold aid and favours. During this time the Muslim world 
saw more than its share of hot wars, including: various Arab-Israeli conflicts; wars for 
independence such as in Algeria; civil wars and similar levels of violence over 
secession such as in Somalia, Bosnia, Lebanon, and East Timor; and, wars between 
regional powers such as Iran and Iraq, or Eritrea and Ethiopia. The region has 
repeatedly seen outside large-scale military intervention, such as the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the two gulf wars led by the United States against Iraq, as well as 
numerous smaller military actions by outside forces.36 
Finally, international economic forces after the age of colonialism often 
associated with or described as globalization have created as much economic disruption 
and discontent in the Muslim world as in other developing regions.37 Given ancient and 
recent perceptions of antagonism with Western powers seen as the dominant forces of 
economic and cultural globalization the perception of threat and feeling of resentment 
within many Muslim populations is especially strong, and as likely to be aimed at 
Western powers as at often wealthy and corrupt domestic elites. This perception is fed 
by regional elites who rightly or wrongly blame a wide range of domestic problems on 
traditional Western adversaries.38 For many in the Muslim world the impact of this is 
magnified by a cultural memory that the great Islamic empire has given way to a period 
of Western domination.39 As Graham Fuller notes, the irony is “even as Westerners feel 
threatened by Islam, most in the Muslim world feel themselves besieged by the West.”40  
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The Failure of Previous Solutions and  
Perceived Islamist Successes 
Further shaping the current environment for collective action, and especially 
what alternatives are likely to gain popular support, is the failure of previous popular 
movements leaving a variety of discredited ideologies in their wake. As the end of the 
colonial era swept across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa the promise of 
independence led many to believe that they would soon participate in the prosperity 
they had seen exported and enjoyed in Western nations. Contemporaneous Islamist 
thinkers – such as Rashid Rida, Ali Abd al-Raziq, Sayyid Abul-A’la Mawdudi, and 
Hassan al-Banna – debated the possible role of a renewed Islamic political order as 
opposed to nationalist approaches.41 However, while these theorists established 
ideological groundwork for later Islamist activists, for most Muslims the political 
dimensions of Islam were not of paramount importance and nationalism proved far 
more attractive as an organizing force as the new Muslim states achieved independence 
from European colonial rule.42 The failures of these newly independent governments to 
deliver quickly – because the development challenges they faced were great, the world 
economy started many of them off in a time of economic depression, and too often 
domestic elite corruption simply replaced foreign extraction – led in many countries to a 
perceived need for more authoritarian solutions and a further discrediting of ideologies 
associated with Western powers.43  
Across large parts of the Middle East and North Africa political leaders turned to 
and promoted Arab Nationalism as a unifying solution, often with socialist ideals 
replacing the economic liberalism and belief in private property espoused by former 
Western powers as with Nasser and the other Free Officers who came to power in Egypt 
and with the Baath party’s ascendency in Syria and Iraq.44 Cold War dynamics led to 
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socialist ideals influencing Arab intellectuals and elites as many Arab nations aligned 
with and received aid and advisors from the Soviet Union given American support of 
Israel.45 Three principle factors caused the alternative of Arab nationalism to begin to 
lose its appeal: the failure of new development polices to deliver significant economic 
improvements;46 the tendency of these centralized authoritarian governments to close 
off avenues of political dissent; and, a series of significant foreign policy defeats. The 
1967 Arab-Israeli conflict is perhaps the single most important of these, as Arab 
Nationalist leaders had exploited the Palestinian crises to redirect internal discontent 
and built up a perception that they would once and for all avenge earlier defeats by 
vanquishing Israel, only to be stunned by the perceptually crushing defeat of the Six-
Day War.47 While authoritarian governments have remained in power across much of 
the Muslim world, similar local failures have increasingly delegitimized their rule and 
encouraged many to look outside current political structures for new hope to address 
perceived grievances.48 
Many Islamic activists also criticize the Western dominated global system for 
failing to protect or equally show concern for Muslims over these years. Foremost is the 
perceived failure to support the Palestinian people in their grievances against Israel, but 
Islamists are also quick to list suffering and international inaction to aid primarily 
Muslim populations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
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Chechnya, Eritrea, Kashmir, Darfur, and the various Central Asian Republics.49 In 
many cases these conflicts are portrayed as Christian or Western powers actively 
oppressing Muslim populations, while the world turns a blind eye exercising a double 
standard as compared to other conflicts where the international community was quick to 
intervene. When Western actors have intervened many Muslims claim that these actions 
came too late or were motivated by other reasons.50 
At the same time other alternatives were being discredited, a building list of 
perceived successes have increased popular support for Islamic alternatives. The 
Ramadan war of 1973, fought under the military slogan “God is Great,” was seen at 
least as redemption if not an Israeli defeat. The 1979 revolution in Iran brought to 
power what many view as the first truly Islamic state in the modern era, associated with 
the charismatic leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iranian revolution and 
resulting American hostage crisis were also seen as striking a humiliating blow against 
Western powers who had backed the Shah’s return to power over the popular Mosaddeq 
in 1953. At the same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began a decade long war 
ending with the defeat of a superpower attributed by many in the Muslim world to the 
strength of Muslim fighters who had travelled to fight from across the world.51 Islamist 
groups in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon have gained in regional popularity for 
standing up to Israel with some regionally celebrated successes, including in the case of 
Hizballah being seen as responsible for ending Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon 
in 2000 and then fighting with surprising resilience and possibly strategic success 
against Israeli forces in the summer of 2006. Finally, at a local level many Islamist 
movements have proven very successful at effectively delivering social services free of 
corruption. 
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Political Islam Emerging as the New Movement 
With the continued grievances across the Muslim world, and the failure of 
previous alternatives, increasingly a variety of movements have emerged around the 
shared ideological focus that – al-Islam, huwa al-hall – “Islam is the solution.”52 
Understanding how and why political Islam appeals to and shapes the opinions of large 
populations across the Muslim world is important to understanding the potential appeal 
of those particular militant Islamists who espouse terrorist tactics against both near and 
far enemies. Examining political Islam from a social movement theory perspective – 
analyzing the grievances and hopes, mobilizing networks, political opportunity 
structures, and framing processes – in turn better enables us to understand why hearts 
and minds strategies targeting these populations may succeed or fail. 
Throughout this work, I define political Islam or Islamism synonymously in the 
same way as Graham Fuller, where “an Islamist is one who believes that Islam as a 
body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be 
ordered in the contemporary Muslim World and who seeks to implement this idea in 
some fashion.”53 In this manner, the terms political Islam or Islamist are neutral in 
character, and explicitly capture a diverse range of groups and ideologies active today 
that reject or endorse violence, seek to work within or outside of existing political 
structures, and take what might be characterized as liberal, conservative, modernizing, 
reformist, or fundamentalist approaches to the interpretation of Islamic ideals and 
traditions.54 Islamist convictions also cover “a broad spectrum” from “those who merely 
like to see Islam accorded proper recognition in national life and in terms of national 
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symbols” to “those who want to see the radical transformation of society and politics, 
by whatever means, into an absolute theocracy.”55 In many cases these variations are 
accentuated by discrete regional and national versions of or approaches to Islamic 
faith.56 This is to emphasize that Islamism itself is not a single ideology, “but a 
religious-cultural-political framework for engagement on issues that most concern 
politically engaged Muslims.”57 
With the focus of this work, as many others, on the use of violent tactics by 
transnational militant Islamist groups it is important to reinforce that political Islam is 
not a monolithic movement and that the majority of Islamist groups are non-violent, 
locally focused, and motivated by improving the condition of Muslim populations.58 
Islamist groups include locally focused and transnational dawa movements, such as the 
essentially non-political Tablighi Jamaat strongest is South Asia and the Nur movement 
in Turkey, who argue that the solution to many social and political problems in the 
Muslim world is in the return of individuals to an embrace of Islamic ideals, often 
promoted through study groups, education, spiritual development, and social good 
works.59 Islamists also include a wide range of political parties across the Muslim 
world, who variously oppose, have renounced, or support the limited use of violence, 
including the Turkish Justice and Development Party, Hizb al-Wasat in Egypt as well as 
similar Wasatiyya parties in other countries, many local branches of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood, and Jamaat-I Islami.60 For many Muslims the appeal of Islamist groups 
often centres on their calls for reform, justice, and social change including the good 
works they do, the social welfare services they provide, and their stands against 
corruption as well as actual lack of corruption in practice.61 While anti-state Islamist 
groups across the Muslim world have frequently adopted violent repertoires, including 
tactics of terrorism, it is also important to emphasize that this is equally true of non-
Islamic groups in the same contexts, and that there are significant debates and 
differences over the use of violence with many Islamists rejecting or renouncing its 
use.62 Finally, even within the sub-category of militant Islamist groups using tactics of 
terrorism “the primary goal of the modern jihadist movement is and always has been the 
destruction of the secular political and social order in the activists’ home countries and 
its replacement with authentic Islamic states.”63 
Most of the violent Islamist groups associated with tactics of terrorism today are 
best described in this manner as Islamic fundamentalists, in that they “follow a literal 
and narrow reading of the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet” and “believe that 
they have a monopoly on the sole correct understanding of Islam and demonstrate 
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intolerance toward those who differ.” While they may not agree on details of strategies 
and tactics, the fundamentalists largely seek “to re-create a future based on their 
conceptions of the golden age of early Islam, they share the yearning to ‘go back to the 
future’ by reimagining the past based on their readings of the fundamental scripts.”64 
Fundamentalism is not the same as traditionalism, and as Fuller emphasizes while “all 
fundamentalists are Islamists” not all “Islamists are fundamentalists.”65 
Most of the grievances and hopes that make political Islam appealing to many 
across the Muslim world, are rooted in the same conditions or are even precisely the 
same as those that energized previous waves of mobilization under secular ideologies. 
Many of these grievances and hopes are not unique to the Muslim world at all, but are 
shared across the developing world and in large parts of the developed world as 
responses to feelings of hopelessness, oppression, and injustice as well as aspirations for 
a better future.66 Fuller observes that “political Islam is not an exotic and distant 
phenomenon, but one intimately linked to contemporary political, social, economic and 
moral issues of near universal concern.”67 What is often unique, is that Islamists frame 
these grievances and aspirations in a religious historical and cultural narrative, 
suggesting that the origins of many problems result from leaving the true path of Islam, 
and that the solution can be found through the application of practices and policies 
specifically informed and shaped by Islamic ideals. The depth of these religious social 
and ideological roots is one of the reasons that the framing of “Islam is the solution” 
resonates more strongly than alternatives.68 
Current political structures across much of the Muslim world favour the 
emergence of political Islam as a mobilizing force given the closure of other venues of 
political expression, the support of key elites whether out of genuine belief or 
instrumental convenience, and the capacity of many states for repression which is often 
relatively tempered in application to religion. In order to protect their power, many 
governments across Africa, the Middle East, and Muslim Asia either greatly constrained 
or outright banned alternative political expression and activity that they saw as 
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threatening. Many observers have noted that this favoured the rise of political Islam, as 
the Mosque remained one of the few venues where people could gather, exchange ideas, 
and ultimately organize.69 As Fuller notes, “The state can close the nationalist or 
socialist party headquarters, but it cannot really close the mosques, which serve as 
operations centers for Islamist movements.”70 In many places the resulting mobilization 
first built up around providing social services, which may have seemed non-threatening 
to political elites and was in part driven by the failure of the state or “retreat of the 
state” from fulfilling these needs.71 This established strong and credible movement 
structures before often evolving or expanding into more explicitly political directions. 
Ruling elites often encouraged such Islamic organization as a balance or alternative 
outlet to existing politically directed groups those elites perceived as threatening.72 At 
the same time, endorsement of Islamic causes (a “wrap in the flag” effect) as well as 
exploitation of distant Muslim suffering (arguably as a distraction) gave many leaders a 
new source for re-establishing or affirming their legitimacy despite previous failures 
and frustrations.73 Such elite alignment with and use of Islam further encouraged the 
development of Islamic movements. In a number of cases, once ruling elites began to 
perceive groups associated with political Islam as a threat to their power they chose to 
“out-Islam the Islamists.”74 For example, the Saudis reacted to the 1979 siege of the 
Great Mosque in Mecca by increasing support to Wahhabist elements domestically and 
Islamic causes internationally, including funding Sunni missionary work and 
encouraging jihadists to travel to Afghanistan.75 Where states have brought their full 
repressive capability to bear on Islamist movements, as in Egypt’s suppression of the 
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Muslim Brotherhood, the result was in part to encourage a more violent and clandestine 
radicalized movement.76 
Mobilizing networks have similarly aided the emergence of transnational 
Islamists politics. While the mosque – and similar religious study groups, university 
organizations, and social welfare providers – served as a domestic network for 
mobilization, the reaction to and use of political Islam by many governments has served 
to strengthen interstate movement ties. By playing up international Islamic identity 
through the focus on the plight of coreligionists in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and 
Palestine many governments in the Muslim world have facilitated a sense of 
transnational Islamist identity. These connections have been strengthened as Islamists 
were sent into exile or encouraged to go on jihad by states simply happy to have 
potential troublemakers out of the country. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood, for 
example, when pushed out of Egypt during the late 50s, 60s, and 70s established 
connections to, and ideologically cross-pollinated with, emerging Islamist groups across 
the Middle East.77 Likewise, while the Afghan jihad of the 1980s may have temporarily 
released domestic pressures for change, it established strong international connections 
amongst radicalized, militarily experienced Islamists emboldened by their success 
against a superpower.78 Kamal el-Said Habib, who was a leading figure during the first 
generation of Egyptian Islamist radicalization, critically explained that the Afghan jihad 
“internationalized and militarized the jihadist movement further” putting “religion at the 
service of war rather than the other way around” with violence replacing “politics as a 
means of interaction.”79 This network of jihadists – who often trained together, shared a 
common ideological evolution, and fought in places such as Afghanistan, Kashmir, 
Bosnia, Southeast Asia, and North Africa – plays a powerful role in biasing the 
development of many Islamic movements across the Muslim world towards a more 
radical and violent extreme. Success for these militants is associated with taking full 
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control of state power and many have a personal memory of their ability to defeat even 
a superpower.80 In other cases, differences emerged between various Islamist 
movements because of religious divides (as with Sunni versus Shia, or Deobandi versus 
Barelvi),81 more strongly nationalist local conflicts with competition for local popular 
support against previous secular nationalist groups (as with Hamas and Hizballah), or 
the result of being an ethnic minority population fighting for autonomy and 
independence in several countries on the edge of the historical Muslim world. 82 
While secular movements have previously mobilized around the same or similar 
grievances and aspirations across the Muslim world, the dynamics of the current context 
are significantly driven by the unique potency of the long historical, cultural, and 
intellectual traditions of Islam.83 The strength of political Islam is that it deeply 
resonates with Muslim populations providing an explanation for past achievements and 
the durability of Islamic civilization as well as current problems in the failure to remain 
true to their faith.84 Militant Islamists for example draw on a long intellectual history of 
Muslim thinkers including such frequently cited scholars as Ibn Taymiyyah, 
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, Jamal al-din Afghani, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, 
Sayyid Abul-A’la Mawdudi, Abdallah Azzam, and the Ayatollah Khomeini. In large 
parts of the Muslim world, Islamism has become the primary vehicle and vocabulary for 
political discourse, in the same way that Westerners talk about the Magna Carta, the 
American and French Revolutions, or Hobbes and Locke.85 Whereas a previous 
generation of movement leaders struggled to adapt the ideas of Marx and Engels, the 
current movement discourse draws from the Quran, the hadith, and larger common 
Islamic cultural and historic traditions.  
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One of the uniquely powerful aspects of the Islamic nature of the current 
mobilization is that it creates under the authority of religious mandate a shared identity 
transcending state and ethnic boundaries, encouraging Muslims across the world to 
perceive the experiences of Muslims in other places as also their own. This framing 
plays an important role in shaping the mobilization of Muslims living in non-Muslim 
majority countries, such as second and third generation immigrant communities in 
Western nations.  
Finally the narrative framing of the current mobilization in a religious tradition 
links the political prescriptions and arguments, as well as justifications for mandates to 
act, with the normative power inherent in the divine.86 Many theorists and analysts have 
suggested that religious sanctification, especially combined with other politically 
mobilizing forces such as nationalism, poses both an especially powerful narrative as 
well as an escalated danger for more violent repertoires.87 It is no longer that Marx 
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explained our economic position and need to overthrow the current political system, 
instead now God has commanded it. 
Muslim Diaspora Communities in the West 
This chapter has focused on how dynamics across the geographic Muslim world, 
defined by countries or regions with Muslim majority populations, are important for 
understanding the development and drivers of political Islam. This section now focuses 
on the unique role played by diaspora and immigrant Muslim communities living in 
Western Europe and the United States. Islamist mobilization occurs in these 
communities for a combination of reasons related to local conditions as well as the 
transnational dynamics discussed in the previous sections. From an international 
counterterrorism perspective Western Muslim communities are of particular importance 
because of the threat of attacks carried out by local actors as well as because of the 
promising potential for Muslim communities in the West to act as credible 
intermediaries with the larger Muslim world.88 
 Although there have been Muslims living in the West for centuries the large 
post-colonial era migrations beginning in the late 1950s and peaking in the 1970s, 
followed by the second and third generation Muslims who have come of age in the West 
over the last two decades, account for the majority of Western Muslim populations and 
are of particular importance to this analysis.89 Estimates of the number of Muslims 
living in the West vary from 8 to over 20 million in Western Europe and from 2 to 7 
million in the United States (making them a small percentage of either the global 
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Muslim population or the overall population of the West).90 As with looking at the 
Muslim world as a whole, it is important to emphasize the diversity within and between 
Muslim populations across Western Europe and the United States coming from very 
different countries, at different times, for different reasons, and retaining different 
approaches to Islam and levels of religiosity, varying degrees of assimilation in their 
new countries, and varied connections to Muslim communities globally.  
Grievances and aspirations typical of immigrant experiences are a significant 
factor in understanding dynamics and attitudes within Muslim communities in the West 
today. For many Muslims the challenges of this experience were heightened by 
significant language barriers with the general populations of their new countries as well 
as differences in skin colour, religious practices, and cultural traditions that heightened 
barriers to integration. These influences also reinforced immigrant ghettoization as 
newer arrivals tended to settle around specific large urban areas with those who had 
come earlier. As economic pressures at home drove many of these migrations, Muslim 
immigrants tended to start from disadvantaged positions at the bottom of the labour 
chain. These new immigrants often experienced relatively limited prospects for 
advancement as well as stalled or failed assimilation efforts, too frequently leaving them 
“disenfranchised, unemployed, and alienated.”91 Differences between how Western 
countries have approached Muslim immigration further shapes the challenges and 
opportunities faced, with European observers emphasizing: France’s particular 
problems from the interaction of its aggressively secular tradition of laicism with 
traditional Muslim public displays of religious faith; backlashes and isolation arising 
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from Britain’s very different approach of focusing on multi-faith tolerance; as well as, 
the structural difficulties created by Germany’s legal assumptions that many immigrants 
are only temporary “guest workers” who will return to their home countries.92 
Second and third generation Muslims in the West have also faced similar 
challenges as previous immigrant communities of rediscovering and shaping their 
identity, as well as handling adversity and conflict. Constrained by community 
isolation, and facing reactionary pressures from other populations who often perceive 
them as culturally and economically threatening, these new generations of Muslims in 
the West have struggled to overcome obstacles and assert their own sense of community 
pride, while responding to real and perceived humiliations or experiences of racism.93 
Disproportionately in comparison to other populations, and including even those 
Muslim immigrants who have obtained higher education in their new homes, the new 
younger generation often suffers from much higher unemployment and perceived 
limited prospects contributing to social unrest, delinquency, and at the extreme 
recruitment into radical and militant groups.94 Echoing the experience of populations 
across much of the Muslim world, many Muslim diaspora communities in the West 
experienced the raised hopes and then failures of previous liberal state endorsed 
solutions. Discussing France as an example, Kepel observes: 
The success of Islamist ideology among this new generation also benefited from 
disappointed hopes in the great cause of the 1980s. In France, the SOS-Racisme 
movement had sought to bring all young people together, regardless of creed or 
color, in a great groundswell of protest against racism… but in the end had 
petered out, leaving memories of spectacular initiatives that had had no real 
effect on society.95 
Congruent with a religious reawakening noted amongst other faiths as well as with the 
rise of political Islam across the Muslim world, many of these immigrant communities 
saw resurgence in Islamic identity especially amongst second and third generation 
Muslims. Frequently this rediscovered, or in significant ways reconstructed Islamic 
faith is detached from the unique historical and local cultural traditions of their parents’ 
generation and home countries, creating a more universal Islamic self-identity which 
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some suggest is predisposed towards affiliation with transnational Islamic causes and 
Islamist movements.96 
To understand Islamist mobilization, especially amongst Muslim Europeans, it is 
important to recognize the often-antagonistic connections between countries of origin 
and destination for specific Muslim immigrant communities. For a variety of reasons 
related to established patterns of migration and commerce, as well as geography, shared 
second languages, and inter-government relations many waves of immigration have 
been between specific nations and their former colonial rulers (for example, from North 
Africa and the Levant to France; and from Egypt, Palestine, and South Asia to Great 
Britain). While several of the factors encouraging this phenomenon ease the immigrant 
experience, the complicated legacy dynamics involved create many stresses driving 
contentious mobilization. Continued grievances and frustrations experienced by identity 
communities “back home” serve as an important additional source of conflict. At the 
same time the distance shrinking or freeing effects of globalization and especially 
communications technologies – from satellite TV programs which diaspora 
communities can watch and call into live to the multitude of connections created by the 
internet – enable Muslims around the world to remain intimately aware of and 
connected to events and communities in their countries of origin.97 
The French and Algerian experience exemplifies this dynamic. After gaining 
independence following a particularly painful war, often studied by counterinsurgents 
for what not to do, many Algerians migrated to France because of the lack of economic 
opportunities and continuing violent conflict at home. Lingering resentments on both 
sides, coupled with the multitude of other challenges faced by immigrants, has 
generated continuing discord and undermined assimilation efforts. Pecastaing explains 
how this mix creates conditions on which militant Islamist groups have fed writing 
about an al-Qaida affiliated cell of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
(GSPC) in France:98 
The roots of the GSPC lie in the several million economic immigrants who 
began to leave northern Africa for Europe when decolonization began in the 
1960s. Islamism came to France with this diaspora, but its current virulence 
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cannot be explained by uprootedness alone. The GSPC gets its edge from the 
trauma of the Algerian civil war, which has pitted a repressive military regime 
against religious radicals and has accounted for more than 100,000 deaths since 
the early 1990s. Some of those who fled the violence brought its baggage with 
them. The intolerance they encountered in France fed their rage, while the 
peaceful majority in their new communities looked the other way and condoned 
the radicals' tactics. State terror and exile defined the basic matrix that bred 
Bourti's cell.99 
Emphasizing the observation made by others that Islamist doctrine is often an 
afterthought for groups like this, she notes that “the militants’ anger seems to have no 
deeper eschatological root” and that their “ideological chatter” consisted of little more 
than “gossip about Osama bin Laden and sound bites from Ibn Taymiyya and 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, radical Muslim theologians from ages past” caring 
more about shallow symbolism than ideological depth.100 
Political Islam has a more direct relationship with many more recent arrivals to 
Muslim diaspora communities in the West. While the failure of previous movements 
and government solutions across the Muslim world often contributed to the economic 
and security conditions driving much immigration, later immigrants were often part of 
the Islamic revival in their home countries who were then effectively exiled by 
subsequent authoritarian repression of threatening Islamist movements. These more 
politicized immigrants, well versed in Islamist ideology and motivated to continue 
pursuing their cause, found conditions in many Muslim diaspora communities ripe for 
mobilization and receptive to the sense of pride as well as aspirations for a better future 
created by a rediscovery of an Islamic identity and mission.101 While these activists 
reinforce a Muslim-first self-identity and focus on grievances tied to the geographic 
Muslim world, they also transplanted the Islamist explanation that many of the 
problems of immigrant communities stemmed from a failure to follow a pure form of 
Islam which was particularly amenable to the deterritorialized and reconstructed faith 
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that many second and third generation Muslims were already embracing.102 While many 
of the movements that took hold were non-violent, especially with respect to the 
Western countries in which they lived, some of the Islamist activists were associated 
with militant groups with an evolving transnational focus.103 
The potential militant Islamist mobilization of Muslims living in Europe and the 
United States poses a number of significant dangers – while these communities also 
often play vital roles for countering such threats – which can be described in three sets 
including: conflicts in other parts of the world; terrorist attacks at home; and, the role 
played by radicalized Western militants returning after participating in foreign 
conflicts.104 For conflicts around the world, including those in which Western states are 
directly involved, diaspora communities can be important sources of funding, 
recruitment, technical assistance, and popular support for insurgents. Alternatively, they 
may be a source of legitimacy for state actors and encouragement for local populations 
to exercise patience waiting for reforms and other initiatives to take hold. Building on 
the technological advancements that facilitate communication, commerce, and travel 
disparate distant communities can enable smaller militant groups to persist longer with 
greater effect (or discourage them) as well as amplify (or counter) propaganda and 
ideological efforts to gain the support of other vital populations. Activists recruited from 
Western communities often bring advantages of better education, relatively greater 
financial resources, as well as better access to and expertise with global media and 
communication technologies, while at the same time the involvement of individuals 
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from these communities in counterinsurgent and counterterrorism efforts can bring 
greater cultural familiarity, crucial language skills, and a more recognizable “in-group 
face” to help promote official efforts.105  
At home militants mobilized from Western Muslim communities pose a 
particularly dangerous threat for conducting domestic terrorist attacks.106 As native or 
long-time residents they generally speak Western languages, arouse much less suspicion 
knowing how to culturally pass, and can move between Western countries without 
concerns for visas or other more extensive identity checks. Militants recruited or 
radicalized from Western Muslim communities are more familiar with security practices 
and potential vulnerabilities, and may be able to take longer to prepare for attacks 
without arousing suspicion. Homegrown terrorists who have not had direct connections 
with transnational groups are harder for counterterrorism agencies to discover, as they 
have not raised suspicions because of their travel to visit or other communication 
contacts with known terrorist networks. Whereas radicalized militants who have made 
contact with transnational networks pose greater dangers in terms of the potential 
training they have received, improved access to information about how to better carry 
out an attack, potential guidance for overcoming the mistakes learned from previous 
attempts, connections to key enablers or others willing to assist in an attack, and 
possible financial or other resource support.107 Offsetting the danger of domestic 
Islamist terrorist attacks, many threats and planned attacks over the last several years 
have been disrupted by the actions of members of Muslim communities who discovered 
plots or identified suspicious behaviour and then worked with authorities. Proactively 
the most credible influences discouraging radicalization or encouraging individuals to 
disengage from militant groups are other members of the same community bound by 
kinship and friendship, or exercising the authority of parents and respected community 
or religious leaders.108 
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Radicalized Westerners who participated in distant conflicts, including those 
who travelled to fight against Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, pose a final 
unique threat upon their return having gained experience and knowledge as well as 
making transnational connections to militant groups.109 Based upon the experiences of 
previous generations of foreign fighters some of these individuals may return more 
radicalized to a cause, inspired by a belief that violent tactics can bring about local 
change, and better able to either carry out attacks themselves or perhaps even more 
dangerous having prestige and credibility within radical networks based upon their 
foreign experience enabling them to become leaders and recruiters creating an expanded 
terrorist threat.110 Alternatively, the negative experiences of disillusioned foreign 
fighters who discovered that jihadist propaganda did not accurately portray conditions 
or grievances may be especially convincing intermediaries as they more intimately 
know and understand the thinking and language of radicalized groups, and have the 
credibility of someone whose been there and done that.  
Although most of the concern about immigrant Muslim communities in the West 
has focused on the potential threat violent radicalization may pose as well as how to 
counter that threat often with the help of these communities, less work has discussed the 
positive potential for Western Muslim communities to play as credible communicators 
between the West and the larger Muslim world. Discussing this potential Kepel writes: 
The most important battle in the war for Muslim minds during the next decade 
will be fought not in Palestine or Iraq but in these communities of believers on 
the outskirts of London, Paris, and other European cities, where Islam is already 
a growing part of the West. If European societies are able to integrate these 
Muslim populations, handicapped as they are by dispossession, and steer them 
toward prosperity, this new generation of Muslims may become the Islamic 
vanguard of the next decade, offering their co-religionists a new vision of the 
faith and a way out of the dead-end politics that has paralyzed their countries of 
origin.111 
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As Kepel explains this may be a slow process, but it is also one that in many ways is 
already occurring as Muslims from immigrant communities in the West begin to take 
positions of political power demonstrating the potential promise of the Western liberal 
approach especially in comparison to the opportunities that remain forbidden across 
large parts of the Muslim world. Kepel calls this an Andalusia in reverse, playing on 
contemporary Islamist calls for retaking Spanish territory that was once part of the 
historic Islamic caliphate at a time when “intellectual influence came from the Muslim 
Orient” to medieval Spain, as compared to a new possibility where Western Muslim 
populations serve as conduit for constructive innovation back to the historic Muslim 
world.112 The influence of disparate Muslim communities in the West is likely to be 
complex and not easily swayed by Western governments who have long contentious 
histories and structural problems to overcome as well as other potentially reactionary 
communities to serve at the same time. Mackinlay summarizes the dangers, difficulties, 
and opportunities writing: 
A global Muslim community that asserts its personality in the world arena and 
challenges the U.S. strategic concept of a war against terror (which narrowly 
seeks military outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan and eschews the larger Muslim 
dimension) represents a potentially hostile community that is established in 
every concerned state and region. At the same time, the global Muslim 
community is an intuitive actor that cannot be addressed or threatened, cannot 
negotiate, and can only be reached from within through the same informal 
systems that animate it and hold it together. It would be impossible for non-
Muslim actors to enter the community’s consciousness along its internal nervous 
systems. Change has to come from within, and will be led by Muslims. The 
West needs the support of the Muslim community. The strategic challenge is to 
change core Muslim attitudes toward the West in harmony with other Western 
interests and objectives.113 
Muslims in the West include many different populations, living in different countries, 
with unique concerns and problems as well as different connections and histories with 
potentially radicalized Muslims around the world all of which complicates the challenge 
for Western states of motivating these communities as credible intermediaries. 
However, at a simplified level, it is likely that the more supportive and positive Muslim 
communities in the West are about their experiences and perceptions of Western 
governments the more positive leverage they will exert through transnational networks 
                                                
112 Ibid., 294-5. 
113 Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," 41-2. 
CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL ISLAM AND MILITANT ISLAMISTS 171 
congruent with Western hearts and minds goals, while the more negative their 
experience and the more they perceive Western states as hypocritically exploiting or 
threatening the Muslim world the more their influence will manifest in increased 
support for more dangerous militant radicalization. 
Revisiting Militant Islam and Potential Popular Support 
The logic of a hearts and minds strategy indicates that a top-level focus of 
counterterrorism planning and efforts should be on the larger vital populations whose 
potential support for or opposition to terrorist groups plays a significant role in the 
dynamics of these conflicts.114 This includes already mobilized elements of those 
populations sympathetic to actors using terrorism (what Waldmann calls the “radical 
milieu”),115 mobilized but unsympathetic elements (social movement participants who 
do not support violent tactics), and the generally larger populations who could become 
mobilized. Whether American rhetoric and action influences the evolution of movement 
dynamics in such a way that these populations shift towards or away from groups using 
tactics of terrorism is a measure of the success or failure of population-centric goals.116 
Evaluation of this is aided by examining the grievances and aspirations of a population 
as well as the mobilizing networks, political opportunity structures, and framing 
processes that influence the dynamics of collective and contentious action. 
The previous sections of this chapter have explored the grievances underlying 
mobilization across much of the Muslim world. One of the observations worth re-
emphasizing is that individuals often do not choose to support Islamist movements 
because of obscure long-term goals or in-depth ideological justifications, but instead 
because they perceive that these groups will better help address grievances and achieve 
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other shared short-term aspirations.117 However, the study of social movements also 
suggests that as individuals adopt the identity and perspective of a movement they are 
likely to begin to embrace other attitudes and values.118 
A focus on mobilizing structures reinforces the importance of kinship and 
friendship as well as other formal and informal networks.119 Examination of mobilizing 
structures also places emphasis on the role of social movement organizations in shaping, 
mobilizing, and directing the evolution of a larger movement. Militant Islamist groups 
can be usefully understood as social movement organizations who are often in 
competition with other aspects of the larger movement as well as state and counter-
movement actors over resources, networks, and framing contests.120 Later chapters of 
this thesis will return to the argument that a potential failure of U.S. hearts and minds 
objectives is seen in strengthening or encouraging aggregation and networking both of 
militants with non-militant Islamist actors locally as well as of different militant 
Islamist groups internationally contrary to the strategic principles derived from studies 
of contemporary counterinsurgency.121 
Analyzing political opportunity structures highlights the role played by the 
relative openness of the political system, elite alignments and allies, and state 
repression. The evolution of movement dynamics across the Muslim world have been 
significantly guided by governments that severely restrict political access, elites who 
have sought to maintain their own positions of privilege, as well as widespread and 
violent authoritarian oppression of any challengers including non-violent moderates. 
Hearts and minds goals are affected to the degree that American rhetoric or policy 
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encourages or discourages such moves, and to the degree that local populations perceive 
or attribute responsibility for these to the United States.122 
Highlighting framing processes with respect to hearts and minds objectives may 
be considered a means of evaluating the war of ideas from a social movement 
perspective. Framing processes play three important roles in the evolution of movement 
dynamics: diagnosing problems in need of redress, including attributing responsibility 
and targets of blame; offering specific strategies and tactics as solutions that will 
remedy grievances and achieve aspirations; and, providing a motivational rationale for 
individuals and groups to support and participate in mobilization.123 Evaluation of the 
relationship between U.S. policies and rhetoric with movement evolution respecting the 
support of militant Islamists occurs along three further dimensions of the degree to 
which Muslim populations: adopt Islamist narratives about grievances and aspirations; 
attribute blame and intentionality to the United States or Western actors; and, support 
individual calls for and justifications of the use of violent tactics. It is especially the mix 
of these three that determines the threat to the United States. For example, adoption of 
an overarching “Islam is the solution” frame and acceptance of an individual, 
nonviolent duty of dawa (or a “call to God”) does not increase the threat of violence, 
and may arguably decrease it.124 However, increased attribution of Muslim grievances 
to Western influences, coupled with perceptions that these were intentional actions as 
part of a historic “Jewish-Crusader” war on Islam, and acceptance of particular militant 
Islamist arguments for an individual obligation of defensive jihad significantly increase 
the threat of violence.125 Similarly, while changes in local violence are relevant to U.S. 
humanitarian or local security goals, increased support for violence as part of al-Qaida’s 
far enemy logic, because of stronger perceptions that the United States is supporting 
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apostate regimes and thus an impediment to local militant Islamist goals, is a significant 
concern.126 
In situating political Islam within a social movement framework this chapter 
repeatedly emphasizes that Islamist groups are not monolithic and that the majority are 
locally focused and non-violent. At the same time, emphasizing the diversity within 
political Islam should not excuse or marginalize the importance of those Islamists who 
employ and sanctify the use of terrorist tactics. The use of political violence, including 
terrorism, against both domestic and foreign enemies, plays a significant role in 
conflicts across the Muslim world. Groups using terrorism may only represent “a thin 
wedge of the overall Islamic political spectrum” but they have the power to set or 
significantly influence the broader agenda, and in the process are responsible for much 
death and suffering.127
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION  
OF TERRORISM 
“America is not winning its war on terrorism.  
We are not even discussing it intelligently.” 
–Joseph Nye, November 20061 
Simply identifying groups as terrorists and acts as terrorism serves a beneficial 
function of helping to enforce a societal norm to protect the public against the use of 
coercive violence by raising opportunity costs, deterring others from choosing similar 
tactics, and enabling government action. However, the same normative and connotative 
power of the language of terrorism has also long been criticized as the source of much 
trouble.2 This chapter argues that problematic elements of how Americans in general 
have come to talk and think about terrorism after 9/11 – that is the social construction of 
terrorism – contribute to the difficulties the United States has winning hearts and minds 
in the Muslim world. Particular attention is given in this analysis to the strategic 
narrative the Bush administration advanced for the war on terror, which played a 
significant role in shaping the overall changes to the public’s social construction, but 
was also constrained by that same public as well as influenced by the media and other 
opinion leaders. Contrary to the recommendations for contemporary 
counterinsurgencies discussed in Chapter Two, these changes encouraged highly 
normative analysis favouring an enemy-centric instead of population-centric approach 
and promoting a public understanding that counterproductively constrained the pursuit 
of hearts and minds goals. The resulting rhetoric and policies encouraged aggregation of 
otherwise disparate conflicts, undermined the strong pursuit of policies to address 
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mobilizing grievances and aspirations, and damaged efforts to productively engage in 
the framing competition of the war of ideas. The chapter begins with an analysis of the 
post 9/11 social construction of terrorism, emphasizing the Bush administration’s 
strategic narrative, and then examines how in combination the elements of this 
construction undermine understanding of population-centric dynamics and adversely 
affect the implementation of hearts and minds efforts. 
Thinking About Terrorism After 9/11 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 triggered changes in how the public, 
government officials, and political leaders in America think and talk about terrorism, 
discussed here as the social construction of terrorism.3 These changes include: the 
framing of a war on terror as the most appropriate response; the focus on an amorphous 
and aggregated Islamic enemy; the presumption that this terrorist enemy primarily 
targets the United States, threatening especially devastating attacks; and, the intensity of 
related moral judgments. In turn this altered the frames of references, constraints on 
what was and was not appropriate to consider, and presumptions for decision-making.4 
Much of this occurred without debate or conscious consideration through a complex 
dialectic process between political elites, more attentive members of the public, and the 
general public at large. At first the emotional response and unfolding drama of the 
attacks themselves and fears about what was coming next largely drove the evolution in 
thinking. Over time, the strategic narrative employed by political leaders and the 
resulting policy choices – reacting to the same influences and constrained by the public 
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mood – further shaped this transformation. Intermixed, the news and entertainment 
media reflected and reinforced as well as nudged and focused the new thinking.  
Creating the Post 9/11 Construction and Strategic Narrative 
How the public thinks and talks about terrorism plays a significant role in 
influencing and constraining the selection, formation, implementation, and analysis of 
national policy and strategy. As an interactively produced and complex construct, with 
emotional and rational dimensions, as well as a variety of positively and negatively 
associated concepts, how the public thinks about terrorism is not easily determined 
through opinion polls or surveys. Instead, following a methodology established by 
constructivist academic works, I argue the public’s understanding can be evaluated as it 
is reflected in the statements of political leaders, government officials, opinion makers, 
and other members of the public who are highly involved in or attentive to political and 
security issues as well as through the related content of news and entertainment media.5 
At the same time all of these actors also play a significant interactive role in the creation 
and shaping of the larger public’s understanding, confounding the separation of 
reflection from catalyst and instigator.6 
The strategic narrative for the war on terrorism advanced by the Bush 
administration after 9/11 not only guided decision making and policy implementation 
for the vast national security apparatus directly under the President’s command, but also 
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played a central role in shaping the public’s understanding of terrorism, the threat faced, 
and how best to respond. Freedman explains that strategic narratives in this context are 
“compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which 
inferences can be drawn.” 7 He observes that these narratives are strategic in that “they 
do not arise spontaneously but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas 
and thoughts that are already current.”8 These narratives evolve from the rhetorical 
framing policy leaders use to describe a threat and justify a related cluster of responses 
as well as the significant actions they take which have their own performative aspects. 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt explain that “stories communicate a sense of cause, purpose, and 
mission” and “express aims and methods as well as cultural dispositions – what ‘we’ 
believe in, and what we mean to do, and how.”9 Social movement theory approaches 
narratives from the perspective of examining framing processes and the formation of 
shared meaning built on language and symbolism that resonates with particular 
audiences to drive mobilization.10 In a similar manner Vlahos stresses the importance of 
strategic narratives in the context of national security for compelling subsequent action: 
In war, narrative is much more than just a story. Narrative may sound like a 
fancy literary word, but it is actually the foundation of all strategy, upon which 
all else – policy, rhetoric, and action – is built. War narratives need to be 
identified and critically examined on their own terms, for they can illuminate the 
inner nature of the war itself.11 
                                                
7 Freedman, 2006, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, The International Institute 
for Strategic Affairs, 22. Arquilla and Ronfeldt similarly write: “[S]tories communicate 
a sense of cause, purpose, and mission. They express aims and methods as well as 
cultural dispositions – what “we” believe in, and what we mean to do, and how.” 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy, RAND Corporation, 328. 
8 Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 22. 
9 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 328. 
10 Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization.". 
Snow and Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.". Snow, Rochford, Worden 
and Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation." McAdam et al, as quoted in Chapter Two, define framing processes as, 
“conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the 
world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.” McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald, "Introduction," 5-6. Echoing social movement language, Freedman 
writes, “Narratives are about the ways that issues are framed and responses suggested.” 
Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 23. 
11 Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and 
Defeat." 
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He further explains that the strategic narrative becomes an “organizing framework for 
policy” which makes specific important assumptions “appear to be self-evident and 
undeniable,” in turn constraining the ability to criticize the resulting policy choices and 
serving as a guide for how “the war is to be argued and described.”12 As Freedman 
cautions, strategic narratives “are not necessarily analytical” and “may rely on appeals 
to emotion, or on suspect metaphors and dubious historical analogies.”13 Given its 
privileged position and powerful public advocates, when successful a strategic narrative 
exercises significant influence on the overall public construction of a threat. Because 
this narrative and the larger construction play a considerable role in public rhetoric as 
well as how strategies are pursued and individual actions carried out by actors at all 
levels of implementation they exercise significant influence on the pursuit of 
population-centric strategies. Freedman remarks that the importance of strategic 
narratives “is implied with every reference to a battle for ‘hearts and minds’,”14 
recognizing that the overarching narrative establishes the framework for how a 
government engages in the war of ideas and shapes the individual messages and actions 
involved in the framing competitions driving contested mobilization.15 
Focusing on the Bush Administrationʼs Strategic Narrative for the War on Terror 
In order to analyze how the American public came to understand the terrorist 
threat following 9/11 this chapter gives the most weight to exploring the strategic 
narrative employed by President Bush and leading members of his team responsible for 
                                                
12 Ibid. See also: Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 328. Barry and Elmes, 
1997, "Strategy Retold: Towards a Narrative View of Strategic Discourse," Academy of 
Management Review 22 (2). Casebeer and Russell, "Storytelling and Terrorism.". 
Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 22-3. 
13 Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 23. 
14 Ibid., 24. 
15 The new U.S. Guide to Counterinsurgency recognizes the importance of this: “The 
influence strategy must cascade down from a set of strategic narratives from which all 
messages and actions should be derived. The narratives of the affected government and 
supporting nations will be different but complimentary. Messages and actions must 
address ideological, social, cultural, political, and religious motivations that influence or 
engender a sense of common interest and identity among the affected population and 
international stakeholders. They should also counter insurgents’ ideology in order to 
undermine their motivation and deny them popular support and sanctuary (both physical 
and virtual). In doing so, counterinsurgents should seek to expose the tensions in 
motivation (between different ideologies or between ideology and self-interest) that 
exist across insurgent networks.” "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide," 20. 
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policy related to terrorism and national security. As the elected executive, directly 
responsible for the national response, the Bush administration was central to shaping the 
evolving construction through official statements and actions. Given the realities of 
partisan politics and political benefits stemming from broader public approval, they 
were also very attentive to the national mood. The success of the administration in this 
regard is supported by consistently high approval ratings with respect to the handling of 
terrorism,16 victories in the 2002 and 2004 elections as well as on related legislative 
issues,17 and the observation that their principle partisan opponents largely echoed or 
made similar statements when talking about terrorism.18 Focusing on the Bush 
administration’s strategic narrative further enables this chapter to examine how the 
problems discussed directly undermined hearts and minds goals and the pursuit of a 
population-centric approach given that this narrative represents President Bush’s 
                                                
16 I conducted a simple statistical analysis for this thesis finding that President Bush 
consistently has been rated significantly higher for his handling of terrorism than his 
overall job approval rating. Details of this analysis are in the following paragraph and 
related footnotes. 
17 Republican gains in the 2002 mid-term election ran against historical trends: “[T]he 
President’s party had lost House seats in 32 of 33 midterms from 1866 to 1994.” 
Campbell, 2003, "The 2002 Midterm Election: A Typical or an Atypical Midterm?," 
PS: Political Science and Politics 36 (2), April. 
18 For example, during the 2004 presidential campaign, a Washington Times article 
described Democratic nominee John Kerry’s rhetoric related to the war on terror 
writing, “But in speeches so far, the Massachusetts Democrat sounds like President 
Bush when discussing his strategy for the war on terrorism and a military of the future. 
Mr. Kerry even attempts to sound tougher than the hawkish president.” "Clinton's Team 
Aids Kerry on Military," 2004, The Washington Times, June 3, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/jun/03/20040603-122407-4374r/. Jim 
Geraghty similarly reported, “But Kerry's policy addresses have generated zero buzz 
and garnered little beyond perfunctory news coverage, mostly because they're so vague 
as to be indistinguishable from Bush policies, or propose only minor changes from 
current actions… The end result is that Kerry has ended up selling himself as what John 
Hillen, director of the Program on National Security at the Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, calls, ‘Bush Lite...a set of light, stylistic differences.’” Geraghty, 2004, "Me 
Too, Me Too!," National Review Online (June 3), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/kerry/kerry200406030901.asp. See also: Navarrette, 
2004, "Kerry's Dillemma: Criticizing a War He Helped Start," The Seattle Times, June 
2, 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20040602&slug=navarrette
02. Sanger and Wilgoren, 2004, "Kerry Says War in Iraq has Allowed Bigger Threats to 
Grow," San Francisco Chronicle, May 30, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/05/30/MNGN76U7LE1.DTL. 
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priorities, policy choices, and public rhetoric while serving as guidance to key members 
of his national security team. 
The methodological approach of this chapter for studying the public’s social 
construction of terrorism posits that the complex nature of this construct can be 
understood to a significant degree by examining it through the reflection found in the 
public statements of opinion leaders. In order to empirically test confidence in the 
assessment that the Bush administration’s rhetorical framing of terrorism after 9/11 
accurately represented how the larger public came to think about terrorism during this 
time I conducted a simple statistical analysis comparing President Bush’s overall job 
approval rating to public approval for his handling of terrorism. I examined six years of 
data from two different national polling firms using 111 surveys where both questions 
were asked in the same survey and with the questions remaining consistent over the full 
time period for longitudinal comparisons.19 Suggesting that the public particularly 
identified with his approach to terrorism, as opposed to simply having a favourable or 
unfavourable opinion of his performance in general, approval for President Bush’s 
handling of terrorism was usually significantly higher – and never lower – than his 
overall job approval.20 Further, comparing fluctuations between the two questions 
demonstrates that increases in the relatively higher approval for his handling of 
terrorism came at times corresponding to periods where he focused on terrorism in 
repeated public statements.21 
                                                
19 This analysis was based on six years of CBS News/New York Times data (77 polls 
from November 2001 to October 2007, 26 of which included their specific terrorism 
question) and three and a half years of USA Today/Gallup Poll data (38 polls from 
January 2003 to May 2007 all of which included both their general and terrorism 
approval questions). Archival polling data available on the PollingReport.com website. 
20 Approval of President Bush’s handling of terrorism was never lower in either poll 
than his overall approval rating, in the CBS/NYT Poll approval of his handling of 
terrorism averaged 15.8 percentage points higher than his overall favourability rating 
and in the USA/Gallup Poll the net difference averaged 9.0 points. In both polls 
President Bush had a generally net positive post-9/11 overall approval rating into 2005, 
with some exceptions during the 2004 Presidential election in the CBS/NYT poll. Both 
polls also only begin to show regular net negative ratings of his handling of terrorism 
from mid-2006 on, and then by only an average of 2 points over the last year of 
available USA/Gallup data (through 6 May 2007) and an average of 9 points over the 
last year of available CBS/NYT data (through 16 October 2007). 
21 For example, and of significant note to the analysis of speeches later in this chapter, 
during the three months leading in to the 2006 elections both polls show up turns with 
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In order to examine the Bush administration’s strategic narrative I focus in this 
chapter on the public statements made by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretaries of State Colin Powell and 
Condoleezza Rice.22 This chapter includes specific reference to 63 different speeches 
given over seven years after reviewing the complete set of official transcripts for those 
officials published during the Bush administration by the White House, Department of 
Defense, and Department of State for references to or discussions of the war on terror. 
My analysis of those statements in conjunction with other texts representing or giving 
insight into the larger public construction looked for recurring themes, how arguments 
developed over time, indications of how the resulting narrative was enforced and 
employed, and how the core elements of the administration’s strategic narrative were 
represented in the public discourse of other opinion leaders, experts, and the news and 
entertainment media. 
                                                
net positive ratings for President Bush’s handling of terrorism (an average of +6.6 in the 
CBS/NYT polls, and +4.5 in the USA/Gallup polls). This is important as it was during 
this time that President Bush made several public speeches specifically focused on the 
war on terror and threat of terrorism that are included in the analysis of this thesis. It is 
likely that to some degree the positive reaction shown in these polls is indicative that 
these speeches (and related messaging efforts) were consistent with and positively 
received by the general public. During the same period of time his overall favourability 
or approval ratings in these polls changed much less. Further, while earlier increases in 
his approval ratings correlated with general success by the Republican Party, in the fall 
of 2006 while approval of President Bush’s handling of terrorism went up at a time 
when he gave several highly publicized speeches on the topic, the Democratic Party 
achieved significant mit-term election victories capturing control of the U.S. Senate and 
House of Representatives. 
22 Vlahos’s analysis of strategic narratives in the post-9/11 war on terror similarly 
focuses on the public statements of political leaders. Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-
Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and Defeat." The principle public national 
security documents were also part of this analysis, and are not inconsistent with the 
discussion in this chapter, but their influence on the public construction is insignificant 
given how infrequently they are referenced. "National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism.". "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.". "The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America," 2002, Washington, DC: The White House, 
September, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. "The National Security Strategy of 
the United States of America." As Marc Lynch argues, “The methodological argument 
encoded in this book is that what people say in public matters more for shaping political 
identities and strategies than their private beliefs or internal deliberations.” Lynch, 
Voices of the New Arab Public, 27, 72. Arquilla and Ronfeldt similarly distinguish 
narrative from doctrine, emphasizing the pervasive power that narrative has for shaping 
what we actually do. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 328-33. 
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The Trauma of 9/11 as a Catalyst for Change 
The September 11 attacks may not have “changed everything,” however with 
respect to the American experience and approach to terrorism they changed a lot.23 
Many followed and virtually experienced the attacks and their aftermath unfold, with 
horrifying visual imagery, through the immediacy of live news coverage. These images 
were then repeated on seemingly endless loops in the background over the following 
weeks when almost nothing unrelated was discussed. For most Americans the attacks 
were a generational trauma and powerful catalyst for rethinking as George Lakoff 
describes: 
The people who did this got into my brain, even three thousand miles away. All 
those symbols were connected to more of my identity than I could have realized. 
To make sense of this, my very brain had to change. And change it did, 
painfully. Day and night. By day, the consequences flooded my mind; by night, 
the images had me breathing heavily, nightmares keeping me awake. Those 
symbols lived in the emotional centers of my brain. As their meanings changed, 
I felt emotional pain. It was not just me. It was everyone in this country, and 
many in other countries. The assassins managed not only to kill thousands of 
people but to reach in and change the brains of people all over America. It is 
remarkable to know that two hundred million of my countrymen feel as 
wrenched as I do.24 
                                                
23 For examples of “9/11 changed everything” see: Bush, 2004a, "President Bush and 
Prime Minister Allawi Press Conference," (September 23), The White House Office of 
the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040923-
8.html. Cheney, 2003a, "Meet the Press: Transcript for September 14, 2003, Guest: 
Dick Cheney, Vice President, Moderator: Tim Russert," NBC News, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244/. Cheney, 2008, "Vice President's Remarks to 
the Manhattan Institute, Manhattan Institute, New York, New York," (April 21), The 
White House Office of the Vice President, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080421-3.html. McClellan, 2004, 
"Press Gaggle with Scott McClellan, Aboard Air Force One, En Route Allentown, 
Pennsylvania," Washington, DC: The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
October 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041001-8.html. Louise 
Richardson argues that the biggest change was the U.S. approach to counterterrorism. 
Richardson, What Terrorists Want, xxii. Endlers and Sandlers have articulated several 
significant changes accompanying 9/11 with respect to terrorism and U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts. Enders and Sandler, 2005, "After 9/11: Is It All Different 
Now?," Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2), 
http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2005/0109_1300_0402.pdf 
http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/49/2/259. See also: Boyle, 2008, "The War 
on Terror in American Grand Strategy," International Affairs 84 (2): 191. 
24 Lakoff, 2001, "Metaphors of Terror," (September 16), The University of Chicago 
Press, http://www.press.uchicago.edu/News/911lakoff.html. 
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The traumatic nature of the attacks triggered the potential of a shared national identity 
to bring people together through generosity of spirit at a time of need as well as 
collective demand for revenge on a grand scale.25 
The Constraining Influence of the General Public 
The contribution of the general public to the process of social construction is 
blunt. It does not provide specific direction on choices between policy options or 
engage in discernable nuanced argument over optimal framing. Instead, the public’s 
reaction shaped the evolving construction of terrorism after 9/11 by setting and 
enforcing expectations as to what type of general response would be appropriate or 
inappropriate. The American public reacted angrily and quickly to denounce anyone 
perceived as sympathetic to or insufficiently outraged by those responsible for the 
attacks.26 Despite a few calls for patience and a rethinking of policy, or restraint on 
overseas military actions, for most in the United States: 
[T]he attacks were outrages against the people of America, far surpassing in 
infamy even the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Such an insult to American 
honor… cried for immediate and spectacular vengeance to be inflicted by 
America’s own armed forces.27 
                                                
25 Vlahos, 2007b, "The Fall of Modernity: Has the American Narrative Authored its 
own Undoing?," The American Conservative, February 26, 
http://www.amconmag.com/2007/2007_02_12/feature.html. Kepel writes: “The attack 
seemed to be both a terminal and a founding explosion, a sort of Big Bang that ended a 
familiar chapter of history and inaugurated the return of barbarism – a senseless, 
incomprehensible apocalypse requiring an unprecedented response.” Kepel, The War 
for Muslim Minds, 70. 
26 For example: “In what was perhaps the most widely reported case of a media 
personality recanting remarks on the attacks, Bill Maher, host of ABC’s late-night 
discussion program Politically Incorrect, reacted to the White House’s characterization 
of the hijackers of the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
as ‘cowardly.’ Maher paid for his candor: stations pulled his program, advertisers 
cancelled, the White House criticized his comments, and ultimately, his program was 
cancelled. Maher’s case was the most visible example, but hardly the only one, of the 
media company executives censoring themselves or their employees in the months and 
years following the September 11 attacks.” Drushel, 2006, "Politically (In)corrected: 
Electronic Media Self-Censorship Since the 9/11 Attacks," In Language, Symbols, and 
the Media: Communication in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Attack, ed. 
Denton: Transaction Publishers. p204-5 
27 Speaking to a British audience, Howard continued: “And who can blame Americans? 
In their position the British would have felt exactly the same way.” Howard, 2002, 
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Had the Bush administration chosen a path perceived as falling short of a grand 
response, the power of the public would have found voice and been exercised through 
competing political elites to force a change of course. 
The general attitude of the American public has continued to demand that the 
government prioritize efforts to insure a sense of security against future threats. CIA 
counterterrorism expert Paul Pillar wrote: 
Regardless of the actual level of jihadist strength overseas, one of the main 
reasons U.S. leaders will continue to have to give high priority to 
counterterrorism is that most Americans… will almost certainly continue to 
place far more emphasis on deaths due to terrorism than on drownings in 
bathtubs or the like – and they will expect their leaders to formulate policy 
accordingly.28 
Security expert Bruce Schneier similarly observes, the “problem is that our nation’s 
leaders are giving us what we want. Party affiliation notwithstanding, appearing tough 
on terrorism is important.”29 
Whomever Was in Power Would Lead 
While the public at large exercises general influence, the attitudes and 
predispositions of whoever happened to be in political power at the time would play an 
especially significant role in shaping the specific framing and understanding of 
terrorism. The 2000 U.S. presidential elections, the closest in American history, brought 
to power a national security team that included dominant individuals who long 
advocated a more aggressive American posture.30 Given popular receptivity the 
statements, framing, and policies of these individuals had substantial influence on the 
emerging new social construction of terrorism. Many have argued that whoever held 
                                                
"What's in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism," Foreign Affairs 81 (1), January/February: 
8. 
28 Mueller, 2006a, "Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent 
Enemy," Ibid., September/October, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-
terrorist-threat.html. Mueller, 2006b, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism 
Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them, New York, Free 
Press. Pillar, 2006, "Even Hyped Threats Can Be Real: Responses to 'Is There Still a 
Terrorist Threat?', Round 1 (posted September 7, 2006)," Foreign Affairs, September 7, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/special/9-11_roundtable/9-11_roundtable_pillar. 
29 Schneier, 2005, "Terrorists Don't Do Movie Plots," Wired, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2005/09/68789. 
30 Boyle, "The War on Terror in American Grand Strategy," 195. 
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office would have responded in the short-term on a similarly aggressive scale.31 
However, the choices to pursue a generalized war on terror against an undifferentiated 
global terrorist enemy, involving a with us or against us American diplomacy, and 
including the invasion of Iraq were not, and instead are reflective of the perspectives of 
key members of the Bush team.32 
The Media Reinforced, Reflected, and Reified  
The primary influence of the news media immediately following the attacks was 
in saturation coverage, highlighting every minor development, and often replaying the 
attacks themselves. Several critics have suggested that the extent and focus of this 
coverage, especially the repetitive attack footage, contributed to a national feeling of 
fear and a predisposition for harder, more aggressive counterterrorism policies.33 Others 
observed that the coverage also frequently followed long established patterns for 
covering the Muslim world reinforcing associations between Islam and militant images 
of gun-toting bearded terrorists, heavily veiled women, angry crowds, and “death to 
America” chants.34 
At the time some coverage also focused on the very questions that many critics 
have since raised, including detailed discussions of why many in Muslim majority 
countries express grievances with the United States as well as on the arguments of 
Usama bin Ladin. A 27 September 2001 Christian Science Monitor piece, typical of the 
“why do they hate us” stories, informed: 
                                                
31 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 68. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Grupp, 2003, "Political Implications of a Discourse of Fear: The Mass Mediated 
Discourse of Fear in the Aftermath of 9/11," In Ideas, knowledge, and discourse: New 
concepts in International Relations Theory Workshop at the annual conference of the 
International Ph.D. Center for Social Sciences (IPC), J.W. Goethe University of 
Frankfurt/Main, October 16-18. 
34 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 67. Said, 1997, Covering Islam: How the Media 
and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, Revised ed, New York, 
Vintage Books. Walid Phares, who later sections of this chapter will highlight as a 
public expert who frequently appeared on news programs after 9/11 and espouses views 
consistent with the dominant construction critically analyzed in this chapter, argues that 
the media after 9/11 helped to shift public opinion and attitudes about the danger of 
jihadist terrorism in line with what he perceives. Phares, 2008, The Confrontation: 
Winning the War Against Future Jihad, Palgrave Macmillan, 49.  
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Most Arabs and Muslims knew the answer, even before they considered who 
was responsible… And voices across the Muslim world are warning that if 
America doesn’t wage its war on terrorism in a way that the Muslim world 
considers just, America risks creating even greater animosity… And they do not 
share Mr. Bush’s view that the perpetrators did what they did because “they hate 
our freedoms.” Rather, they say, a mood of resentment toward America and its 
behavior around the world has become so commonplace in their countries that it 
was bound to breed hostility, and even hatred. And the buttons that Mr. bin 
Laden pushes in his statements and interviews – the injustice done to the 
Palestinians, the cruelty of continued sanctions against Iraq, the presence of US 
troops in Saudi Arabia, the repressive and corrupt nature of US-backed Gulf 
governments – win a good deal of popular sympathy.35 
Although political elites and attentive members of the public were or generally became 
familiar with these arguments, relatively they did not have much influence on shaping 
emerging changes to the construction.36 Key opinion shapers dismissed them as 
inappropriate or wrong, while the far greater attention given to re-playing the attacks 
and discussing possible future threats had a larger effect. This is consistent with 
previous research and observations that the media is better at telling the public what to 
worry about, through its coverage of potentially fear-raising topics, than it has proven to 
be in telling people what to think about those issues.37  
                                                
35 Ford, "Why Do They Hate Us?." See also: Zakaria, "The Politics of Rage." 
36 For example, discussing Said’s criticisms of Western prejudices and essentializing 
attitudes towards the Muslim world, Matthew Yglesias argues: “I’m skeptical that … 
more widespread knowledge of Edward Said’s work would have posed some kind of 
substantial stumbling block to the effort to sell the country on the Iraq War. The main 
intellectual drivers behind America’s post-9/11 approach to the Middle East were, if not 
Said experts, at least broadly familiar with the general thrust of his work (I’d put myself 
in that category as well) which is precisely why you see things like The Weekly 
Standard publishing an Edward Said takedown piece by Stanley Kurtz on their October 
8, 2001 issue. Then they took another whack at Said in their November 12, 2001 issue. 
And Frank Foer offered a sweeping dismissal of Middle East Studies as a discipline in 
the December 3, 2001 issue of The New Republic tracing the field’s flaws to none other 
than Said. In general, this was a period when ‘Arabist’ became a term of disapprobation 
and it temporarily became conventional wisdom that foreign service professionals’ 
judgment was mostly corrupted by excessive solicitousness of the opinions of foreign 
governments. Elites were generally familiar with the broad set of ideas that called the 
wisdom of invading Iraq into question – from Middle East studies thinking to the realist 
tradition of international relations analysis to the mainstream opinion of the U.S. Army 
officer’s corps – it just came to be generally accepted that these strands of thought were 
mistaken.” Yglesias, 2008b, "The Said Factor," The Atlantic (September 11), 
http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/05/the_said_factor.php. 
37 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 102. Tatham, "Hearts and Minds," 333. 
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Media coverage following 9/11 was also largely a response to what the public 
was willing to consume.38 Detractors of the war in Iraq have argued that for at least a 
year “Bush was off limits for criticism, even satire and humor,”39 with some suggesting 
this represents manipulation or a failure of the media to do their job. While a subdued 
level of critical coverage increased the influence of the administration on shaping the 
public understanding, a simpler explanation is that during a time of national crisis the 
American public itself constrained reporting through a preference for a more unified 
and nationally supportive tone of coverage.40 
The entertainment media also serves as a proxy for the public’s mood and 
thinking, especially as it is directly profit sensitive and “responds to public beliefs, 
prejudices, worries, and fascinations by incorporating them into the narratives offered in 
television shows, films, novels, and feature articles.”41 After an initial reluctance to 
release already produced content thought to be too closely related to the attacks out of 
concerns for public sensitivity, the industry “lunged aggressively into the preparation 
and distribution of films and television dramas depicting threats of catastrophic 
terrorism against the United States” having determined that was what the public desired. 
This included frequent special episodes of long-running television series and several 
new shows specifically about terrorism or agencies fighting terrorists including The 
                                                
38 This is consistent with previous media studies about an observable “rally around the 
flag” effect. For example: Edwards and Swenson, 1997, "Who Rallies? The Anatomy of 
a Rally Event," Journal of Politics 59 (1), February. Kernell, 1978, "Explaining 
Presidential Popularity: How Ad Hoc theorizing, Misplaced Emphasis, and Insufficient 
Care in Measuring One's Variables Refuted Common Sense and Led Conventional 
Wisdom Down the Path of Anomalies," The American Political Science Review 27 (2), 
June. Ladd, 2007, "Predispositions and Public Support for the President During the War 
on Terrorism," Public Opinion Quarterly 71 (4), Winter: 512-3. Mueller, 1970, 
"Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson," The American Political Science 
Review 64 (1), March. In discussing Arab media coverage after 9/11 Lynch makes a 
similar argument about how “market competition” encourages the media to “follow 
mass opinion as much as they shape it.” Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 25. 
39 Marder, 2006, "What About Anti-American Views After Bush and Iraq," Nieman 
Watchdog (July 7), Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University, 
http://niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=00
99. 
40 Tatham, 2006, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera and Muslim 
Public Opinion, Rcokville Centre, New York, Front Street Press, 38. 
41 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 24-6. See also: Carter, 2007, "Hollywood and 
the War," Intel Dump (July 9), 
http://inteldump.powerblogs.com/posts/1183995451.shtml. 
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Agency, NCIS, Threat Matrix, Alias, and “most popular of all 24.”42 Fox’s highly 
successful 24 has also become an icon of media criticism with detractors suggesting that 
frequent use of “coercive” interrogation tactics (including murder and self-labelled acts 
of torture) by the show’s protagonist has helped create support for the United States’ 
use of more aggressive “enhanced” approaches.43 Media critics have also focused on 
perceived Muslim stereotyping in 24 as well as in other TV drams, films, and 
entertainment fiction.44 The approach of many of these storylines was captured in the 
statement of the star of one 2005 mini-series about Islamist sleeper cells in the United 
States who said, “This show is about the reality of the Beast that we’re fighting right 
now.”45  
Film and TV production has also cast a more critical perspective on the war on 
terror. Michael Moore’s Oscar winning documentary Fahrenheit 9/11 is one of the most 
prominent examples, as well as films such as Syriana, Munich, and Rendition. 
Television programming has also portrayed stories critical or at least more nuanced to 
                                                
42 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 26. The highly successful Fox series, whose 
initial episodes had already been produced before 9/11 and first aired on 6 November 
2001, details in each season 24 hours during which Jack Bauer, the shows star and head 
of a special Los Angeles based “Counter Terrorist Unit,” saves the country in 
continuous running “real time” from some generally terrorism related crises. Jane 
Mayer argues that the success of 24 is to a significant degree based in how well it 
reflects current American attitudes towards the war on terror. Mayer, 2007, "Whatever 
It Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind '24'," The New Yorker, February 19, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/070219fa_fact_mayer. 
43 Dougherty, 2007, "What Would Jack Bauer Do?," The American Conservative, 
March 12, http://www.amconmag.com/2007/2007_03_12/cover.html. Dreher, 2007, 
"The Right's Jack Bauer Fetish," Crunchy Con 2008 (March 16), BeliefNet.com, 
http://jesus.beliefnet.com/blogs/crunchycon/2007/03/rights-jack-bauer-fetish.html. 
Mayer, "Whatever It Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind '24'.". Sands, 2008a, 
"Stress, Hooding, Noise, Nudity, Dogs," The Guardian, April 19, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/19/humanrights.interrogationtechniques. 
44 Abdelkader, 2007, "FOX TV Show '24' Angers Arab/Muslim Fans in the United 
States and Abroad," Arabisto.com (January 19), 
http://www.arabisto.com/p_blogEntry.cfm?blogEntryID=309. Brzezinksi, 2007, 
"Terrorized by 'War on Terror'," The Washington Post, March 25, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/23/AR2007032301613_pf.html. Perry, 2008, "Critic 
Accuse Hollywood of Vilifying Arabs," Reuters, May 1, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/industryNews/idUSL0132230620080502?sp=true. 
Shaheen, 2008, Guilty: Hollywood's Verdict on Arabs After 9/11, Interlink Pub Group 
Inc. 
45 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 24-6. 
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the dominant narrative.46 Because films, television programs, and novels are open to 
consumer selection (not many conservatives went to Michael Moore’s film to be 
persuaded) observation of what is produced is often a better measure of what segments 
of the public are already thinking as well of changes in the public mood over time. 
Similar to news media, the contribution to shaping attitudes and beliefs may be more at 
the margins by providing others material and ideas to pass on to friends or highlight 
when considering arguments, than in directly shaping or setting attitudes. 
The Shift to a War on Terror 
The most significant change in American thinking about terrorism after 9/11 is 
represented by a shift to an overall war on terror approach to counterterrorism.47 For 
                                                
46 Although without the mass market reach of 24, a particularly subversive storyline was 
featured in the third season of the new Battlestar Galactica, portraying the good guys 
with whom the audience identifies as insurgents fighting an occupation, suffering 
torture, and “willing to blow themselves up in their fight for freedom.” Falconer, 2006, 
"Galactica Continues to Assault Comfortable Sensibilities," (November 21), 
HollywoodNorthReport.com, 
http://www.hollywoodnorthreport.com/article.php?Article=3834. Solove, 2008, 
"Battlestar Galactica Interview Transcript (Part 1)," (March 2), Concurring Opinions, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/03/battlestar_gala_4.html. 
47 President Ronald Reagan may have been the first U.S. president to declare a war on 
terrorism, however given the dramatic change in prioritization, global focus, and public 
understanding post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism policies are best understood as a discrete 
and new approach. Davis, 2005, "New Name for 'War on Terror'," BBC News, July 27, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4719169.stm. Levenson, 2004, "The War on What, 
Exactly? Why the Press Must be Precise," Columbia Journalism Review (6), 
November/December, http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2004/6/voices-levenson.asp. A 
comparison of statements by former New York City mayor Rudy Guiliani illustrates the 
dramatic nature of the shift. After the convictions were announced for those tried for the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing Mayor Giuliani declared that the verdict 
“demonstrates that New Yorkers won’t meet violence with violence, but with a far 
greater weapon – the law.” Kleinfield, 1994, "Explosion at the Twin Towers: The 
Reaction; Convictions Greeted with Jubilation and Big Sighs," The New York Times, 
March 5, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B02E4DB113AF936A35750C0A9629
58260. By the time he was a primary candidate for the Republican Presidential 
nomination, Guiliani spoke so often about the need to pursue a very aggressive war on 
terror that Democratic Senator Joseph Biden joked there are only three things in a 
Giuliani sentence, “a noun and a verb and 9/11.” Associated Press, 2007, "Democratic 
Rivals Target Hillary Rodham Clinton in Debate as she Strengthens her Lead," 
International Herald Tribune, October 30, 
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large segments of the general public, framing the American response as a “war” made 
immediate sense given the perceived magnitude of the attack by foreign actors who, 
many Americans learned for the first time, had already publicly declared war on the 
United States and were behind previous significant terrorist attacks and plots against 
American interest abroad.48 
From the administration’s perspective a war response made most sense as they 
quickly expected to take military action not only against al-Qaida and the government 
hosting them in Afghanistan, but also in other countries as part of their rapidly 
developing grand strategy to go on the offensive against terrorism and states who 
support terrorist groups or pose a threat of supplying them with weapons of mass 
destruction. Levenson summarizes Bush’s declaration of a war on terror, its expansive 
goals, and the immediately following media reinforcement and adoption of this frame: 
Then on September 20, 2001, President Bush, in his defining address to 
Congress, recast the metaphor as a literal war. He painted in broad strokes. “Our 
war on terror begins with Al Qaeda,” he said, “but it does not end there. It will 
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and 
defeated.” The enemy he described was as amorphous as the war’s scope. They 
were, he said, the heirs of Nazism and totalitarianism whose murderous ideology 
valued only power. They hated the American way of life, freedom, elections, 
and the press, and they intended to purge vast regions of the Middle East and 
Asia of Jews and Christians. He then bifurcated the world into two camps: those 
who were with the United States, and those who were with the terrorists. 
Beginning the following day, the American press wove “war on terror” into tens 
of thousands of news reports, features, and editorials to describe the logic for 
policies ranging from the Homeland Security Act to the Iraq war.49 
The war on terror framing became the central and defining logic and rhetoric of the 
Bush administration’s strategic narrative, and promptly entered into the common 
discourse not just in the United States but also around the world. Jackson argued in 
2005: 
                                                
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/31/america/NA-POL-US-Democrats-
Debate.php. 
48 For example, R. W. Apple Jr. wrote on September 11 for The New York Times, 
“Today's devastating and astonishingly well-coordinated attacks on the World Trade 
Center towers in New York and on the Pentagon outside of Washington plunged the 
nation into a warlike struggle against an enemy that will be hard to identify with 
certainty and hard to punish with precision.” Apple, 2001, "Nation Plunges Into Fight 
with Enemy Hard to Identify," The New York Times, September 12, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/national/12ASSE.html.  
49 Levenson, "The War on What, Exactly?." 
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[T]o a great extent, this project of rhetorically constructing a massive counter-
terrorism campaign has been highly successful; the ‘war on terrorism’ is now the 
dominant political narrative in America, enjoying widespread bipartisan and 
public support. Individuals and social actors from across the spectrum now 
speak the language of the ‘war on terrorism’ and accept its assumptions, its 
forms of knowledge and its policy prescriptions; and those who oppose it are 
largely ignored, silenced and excluded from the policy debate. Even more 
critically, the ‘war on terrorism’ is embedded into the institutions and practice of 
national security and law enforcement, the legal system, the legislative and 
executive processes and increasingly, the wider political culture; it is now fully 
institutionalised and normalised.50 
For the next seven years the war on terror and the larger strategic narrative employed by 
President Bush continued to shape public and political thinking. 
The Bush administration had choices in how to frame their response to 9/11, 
including: continuing to use a criminality framework emphasizing law enforcement and 
intelligence work;51 defining the challenge as an emergency as the British had done in 
Palestine, Ireland, Cyprus, and Malaya or as a confrontation as described by General Sir 
Rupert Smith;52 or, declaring a more narrow war on al-Qaida.53 These alternatives 
would have emphasized other priorities and response options, composing a different 
strategic narrative, and leading the emerging social construction down a different path. 
However, the magnitude of the terrorist attacks and effect on the American public 
                                                
50 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 2-3. Jackson’s conclusion that the discourse 
of the war on terror “is now fully institutionalised and normalised” echoes Peter Berger 
and Thomas Luckmann’s original work in The Social Construction of Reality. One of 
the dramatic elements of the American response to 9/11 and changes to the social 
construction of terrorism is how quickly these changes occurred. Berger and Luckmann, 
The Social Construction of Reality. 
51 In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks then Secretary of State Colin Powell 
reportedly argued within the administration that this be treated as a crime, while during 
the first few hours of that day administration spokesmen referred to it as a crime. Lakoff 
and Frisch, 2006, "Five Years After 9/11: Drop the War Metaphor," 
CommonDreams.org, September 11, http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0911-
20.htm. 
52 Howard, "What's in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism," 8. Howard, 2006-07, "A Long 
War?," Survival 48 (4), Winter: 8-9. 
53 Sulmasy, 2007, "War on al Qaeda," San Francisco Chronicle, February 20, 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2007/02/20/EDGRJN77E51.DTL. 
 CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TERRORISM 193 
 
created pressures favouring a relatively expansive response, with which the Bush 
administration’s preference was easily compatible.54 
The War on Terror as a Real War, Not a Metaphor 
Another question that has arisen about the administration’s framing, providing 
insight into how the public thinks about the overall problem, is whether the war on 
terror is meant as a metaphor or a real war. Several commentators and critics have 
treated it metaphorically, similar to the “war on drugs” or the “war on poverty,”55 
assuming it is merely meant to indicate a high level of commitment, an aggressive 
approach, and the mobilizing idea of an “us” and a “them.”56 Some of those making this 
assumption presuppose it is nonsensical to declare war on a noun or an emotional 
state,57 while others intentionally cast it as a metaphor with the goal of facilitating a 
shift in public thinking under a different framing.58  
                                                
54 Vlahos, "The Fall of Modernity: Has the American Narrative Authored its own 
Undoing?." In late summer 2005 the Department of Defense briefly decided to recast 
the war on terror as the “global struggle against violent extremism.” The quick speed 
with which administration officials publicly repudiated this change is an example 
emphasizing the power of public opinion for constraining the pursuit of U.S. strategy. 
This rhetorical roll back included emphatic statements from the President and others 
that there had been no change in strategy and reassurance that it still was the war on 
terror. Froomkin, 2005, "War: The Metaphor," The Washington Post, August 4. 
Stevenson, 2005, "President Makes It Clear: Phrase Is 'War on Terror'," The New York 
Times, August 4, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/politics/04bush.html. 
55 In this tradition, Guy Raz notes: “In fact, on Sept. 10, 2001, President Bush declared a 
new ‘war on illiteracy for the young’ at a Florida elementary school.” Raz, 2006, 
"Defining the War on Terror," NPR: All Things Considered, November 1, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6416780. 
56 Levenson, "The War on What, Exactly?." 
57 Part of this stream of commentary is the belief that it is impossible to achieve victory 
over a tactic. Howard explains that even if the phrase was not meant rhetorically (as in 
the war on crime) “’terror’ as such could not be an adversary. We cannot be at war with 
an abstract noun. This was not a pedantic quibble: as any scientist can tell us, if we 
misdiagnose the problem we are not likely to come up with a solution.” Howard, "A 
Long War?," 7-8, 11-2. However both President Bush and Vice President Cheney, for 
example, have explicitly stated that victory over terror is the end goal they envision. 
Cheney, "Vice President's Remarks to the Manhattan Institute, Manhattan Institute, 
New York, New York.". "There Is No Doubt in My Mind. Not One Doubt: Excerpts 
From an Interview with President Bush on Dec. 20, 2001," 2002, Washington Post, 
February 3, http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2002nn/0202nn/020203nn.htm#160. 
58 Lakoff and Frisch, "Five Years After 9/11." 
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President Bush, other members of his administration, and many public advocates 
have made clear from the start they believe and perceive this as a very real war even if 
there is not a traditional battlefield or other familiar classic elements.59 During his 2004 
re-election campaign, President Bush directly addressed this issue while comparing his 
approach to his opponents: 
And [Senator Kerry’s] policies make that clear. He says the war on terror is 
primarily a law enforcement and intelligence-gathering operation. His top 
foreign policy advisor says the war is just a metaphor, like the war on poverty… 
My outlook was changed on September the 11th… I’ll never forget the evil of 
the enemy and the suffering of our people. I know we’re not fighting a 
metaphor.60 
Secretary Rumsfeld similarly emphasized that this is a real war in 2005: 
Let there be no mistake, we are a nation at war, against terrorist enemies who are 
seeking our surrender or our retreat. It is a war. The President properly 
determined after September 11th that the United States no longer could deal 
with terrorists killing our people as we had in the past in the traditional law 
enforcement sense. Indeed, the only way to defeat terrorism is to go on the 
attack. That’s exactly what our coalition has done and is doing in Afghanistan, 
Iraq and elsewhere around the world… We need all elements of national power 
to win this war, but make no mistake, it is a war.61 
                                                
59 Garton Ash, 2006, "Stop calling it the 'war on terror', The term was wrong from the 
start, and now it's linked with a disastrous real war in Iraq," Los Angeles Times, 
November 2, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-
ash2nov02,0,174776.story?coll=la-opinion-center. 
60 Bush, 2004c, "President's Remarks in Greeley, Colorado," (October 25), The White 
House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041025-4.html. In their content 
analysis of his 2006 speeches, Hess and Justus observe that the President’s overall 
language also tracks very closely with rhetorical analysis of 150 years of (real) war 
rhetoric by previous American presidents. Hess and Justus, 2007, "(Re)Defining the 
Long War: Toward a New Vocabulary of International Terrorism," Consortium for 
Strategic Communication at Arizona State University, April 25, 4, 
http://comops.org/article/112.pdf. 
61 Rumsfeld, 2005, "Remarks at Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce," (August 2), 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3856. Adding an 
element of irony to these remarks, after resigning as Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld 
reportedly said: “I don’t think I would have called it the war on terror. I don’t mean to 
be critical of those who have. Certainly, I have used the phrase frequently. Why do I say 
that? Because the word ‘war’ conjures up World War II more than it does the Cold War. 
It creates a level of expectation of victory and an ending within 30 or 60 minutes of a 
soap opera. It isn’t going to happen that way. Furthermore, it is not a ‘war on terror.’ 
Terror is a weapon of choice for extremists who are trying to destabilize regimes and 
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The view that the war on terror is a real war strengthens the framing and association 
effects of the public construction of terrorism. How strongly individuals hold this 
perception is one of the better measures of how strongly they have adopted the full 
construction as described in this chapter.62 
Much More Threatening and Primarily Targeting the United States 
The second major shift in American thinking about terrorism came with the 
perception that terrorists are primarily focused on targeting the United States and pose 
an especially grave threat.63 Before 9/11 most Americans saw terrorism as a tactic used 
by a variety of diverse groups, sometimes against the United States overseas by foreign 
actors and on rare occasions within the United States by generally isolated domestic 
extremists, but much more often a threat to other countries and other people. In 
comparison to the Cold War threats of nuclear war, or even a conventional military 
confrontation, terrorism was simply not a national security priority. After 9/11 the 
perception of terrorism changed dramatically. Now, when Americans talk about 
terrorism, they almost always think of a foreign enemy whose major targets at least 
include – if not primarily focus on – the United States,64 and who are perceived as 
posing the greatest security threat both at home and abroad. For most Americans a war 
on terror simply made sense having collectively come to a recognition that the United 
                                                
(through) a small group of clerics, impose their dark vision on all the people they can 
control. So ‘war on terror’ is a problem for me.” Thomas, 2006b, "Donald Rumsfeld w/ 
Cal Thomas: Transcript," (December 11), Townhall.com, 
http://www.townhall.com/Columnists/CalThomas/2006/12/11/donald_rumfeld_w_cal_t
homas_transcript. On the other hand, see Phares for making a conservative critique of 
the phrase war on terror for not being encompassing enough: Phares, The 
Confrontation, 255. 
62 Rumsfeld, 2006c, "Remarks by Secretary Rumsfeld at the Army War College," 
(March 27), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1206. 
63 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 11. 
64 It should be noted this is largely a change in degree and not a fundamental shift. 
Terrorism was abstract to many Americans before 9/11 because they were generally not 
the ones targeted. When they were targeted the other was similarly seen as an enemy – 
the major difference is that after 9/11 terrorism has come to represent an aggregated 
Islamic enemy. Talking about how terrorism implied an enemy in its traditional usage 
see: Kapitan, 2003, "The Terrorism of 'Terrorism'," In Terrorism and International 
Justice, ed. Sterba: Oxford, 4.  
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States faced a global enemy intent on killing as many Americans and other Westerners 
as possible as part of a larger clash of cultures. 
The United States is the Primary Target 
Following 9/11 the stream of news articles addressing the question of “why do 
they hate us” was one signal of the widespread perception that those responsible were 
focused on the United States. While rhetoric immediately following the attacks 
understandably centred on the threat to America, the degree to which the administration 
and the larger public came to see the conflict as one in which the United States was the 
core target is emphasized by later political and public statements.65 For example, Vice 
President Cheney regularly described the “United States and the American people” as 
the terrorists’ “primary target,” as in an August 2005 speech: 
At this moment, all branches of the armed services are fighting the new war 
against one of our most ruthless enemies. Those who attacked America have 
proven their eagerness to kill innocent men, women, and children by the 
thousands. They are looking to obtain weapons of mass destruction by any 
means they can find. They would not hesitate to use such weapons at the first 
opportunity. And their prime target is our country.66 
Emphasizing that their focus is on the United States and Americans, President Bush 
stated in 2004 the U.S. was in a global war with an enemy “determined to … make our 
country into a battlefield.”67 A week later he added, “we are dealing with killers who 
have made the death of Americans the calling of their lives” and that Americans were 
“fighting these terrorists … in Afghanistan and Iraq and beyond so we do not have to 
                                                
65 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.". Bush, 
2006d, "President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror," (September 29), The White 
House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060929-3.html. 
66 Cheney, 2005b, "Vice President's Remarks at the 73rd National Convention of the 
Military Order of the Purple Heart," (August 18), Office of the Vice President, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050818-4.html. Vice President 
Cheney frequently also explains that terrorists seek to establish a regional caliphate so 
they can “eventually carry out devastating attacks against the United States and others.” 
Cheney, 2007c, "Vice President’s Remarks at a Rally for the Troops," (May 11), The 
White House Office of the Vice President, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070511-5.html. 
67 Bush, 2004f, "President’s Remarks on Homeland Security in New Jersey," (October 
18), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041018-11.html. 
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face them in the streets of our own cities.”68 Secretary Rumsfeld similarly framed the 
conflict as a war between the United States and terrorist enemies seeking “our surrender 
or our retreat.”69 That this is their ultimate aim is reinforced by political language 
describing other goals merely as stepping stones enabling further attacks against 
America, as President Bush explained in September 2006, “At this moment, terrorists 
and extremists are fighting to overthrow moderate governments in the region, so they 
can take control of countries and use them as bases from which to attack America.”70  
With Us or Against Us 
Accompanying the post 9/11 view that the United States is the central actor is 
the explicit framing that everyone must choose sides, you are either supportive of the 
current U.S. war on terror or you are with the terrorists. In his 20 September 2001 
address President Bush cast the conflict in these direct terms: “Every nation, in every 
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists.”71 Secretary of State Powell echoed this the following year, “In this global 
campaign against terrorism, no country has the luxury of remaining on the sidelines. 
There are no sidelines.”72 Such statements could have been viewed at the time as simply 
part of expected rhetorical rallying cries for domestic audiences or high-pressure 
diplomatic efforts to encourage other nations to support expected military action. 
However, the Bush administration approach to diplomacy after 9/11 has been widely 
seen as embracing this stark choice as an intentional contrast to the style of preceding 
U.S. administrations.73 In the following years key members of the administration have 
                                                
68 Bush, "President's Remarks in Greeley, Colorado." The resonance of the fighting 
“terrorists abroad so we do not have to face them here at home” framing with the 
general public is emphasized by its frequent repetition. Bush, 2004e, "President’s 
Remarks in Des Moines, Iowa," (November 1), The White House Office of the Press 
Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041101-14.html. 
69 Rumsfeld, "Remarks at Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce." 
70 Bush, "President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror." 
71 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People."  
72 Emphasis in original. Powell, 2001, "Preface by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to 
the Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000," Washington, DC: Department of State, 
September 25, iii, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10286.pdf. 
73 Albright, 2003a, "Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?," Foreign Affairs, September/October, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82501/madeleine-k-albright/bridges-
bombs-or-bluster.html. Power, 2007, "Our War on Terror," The New York Times, July 
29, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/29/books/review/Power-t.html. 
 CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TERRORISM 198 
 
repeatedly reiterated this policy, as President Bush did during an April 2002 talk saying, 
“I’ve tried to speak as clearly as I possibly can. You’re either with us or you’re not with 
us. You’re either with us or you’re against us.”74 Similarly, during a March 2004 
address he said, “There is no neutral ground – no neutral ground – in the fight between 
civilization and terror, because there is no neutral ground between good and evil, 
freedom and slavery, and life and death.”75 
The trauma of the 9/11 attacks, coupled with highly normative condemnation of 
and repulsion towards the use of terrorism, made this unambiguous and simple division 
a natural and compelling way to approach the conflict for most Americans.76 In turn this 
reinforced the existing predispositions of key Bush administration decision makers to 
continue to approach the war on terror in this manner.77 As part of this approach, the 
Bush administration has often led with public pressure that potential allies, and 
                                                
74 Bush, 2002e, "Remarks by the President at Connecticut Republican Committee 
Luncheon," (April 9), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020409-8.html. 
75 Bush, 2004b, "President Bush Reaffirms Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and 
Afghanistan," (March 19), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040319-3.html. As with the “with 
us or against us,” or “with us or with the terrorists” framing, the rhetoric of no neutral 
ground was a regular part of how the Bush administration constructed the American 
response. For example: Bush, 2003a, "President Bush Addresses United Nations 
General Assembly," (September 23), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030923-4.html. Cheney, 2001, 
"Vice President Cheney Delivers Remarks at the 56th Annual Alfred E. Smith, 
Memorial Foundation Dinner," (October 18), Office of the Vice President, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011018.html. 
76 The “with us or against us” rhetorical framing of the war on terror has also regularly 
been part of the more highly normative “good versus evil” framing discussed later in 
this chapter, as in a 2002 speech where the President indicated that anyone who is not 
with the United States is evil, saying: “Well, you’ve probably learned by now, I don’t 
believe there’s many shades of gray in this war. You’re either with us or against us; 
you’re either evil or you’re good.” Bush, 2002f, "Remarks by the President at Scott 
McCallum for Governor Reception," (February 11), The White House Office of the 
Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020211-9.html. 
77 President Bush and other members of his administration continue to describe the 
larger war on terror in these terms, although with less frequency after the Iraq war 
became increasingly unpopular. For example: Bush, "President Bush Discusses Global 
War on Terror.". Bush, 2008a, "Interview of the President by Mona Shazli, Dream TV, 
Egypt," (May 12), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080512-12.html. 
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especially Muslim nations and groups, who do not actively support American efforts 
will be “held accountable.”78 
Threatening the Destruction of the United States 
In addition to focusing on the United States as the primary target, large segments 
of the American public after 9/11 came to see the threat as especially grave, even 
existential, transcendent, or the third world war. Using President Bush’s language, 
Vlahos describes this element of the public’s construction of terrorism:  
So we are, as our own government tells us, in a war of civilizations – a national 
testing in which we will emerge triumphant, the true beacon and best hope of 
humankind or else find ourselves destroyed, the detritus of history. This is not 
simply inflated rhetoric. It is avowed American policy. In the president’s own 
words, it is nothing less than “the unfolding of a global ideological struggle, our 
time in history,” pitting “progress” and “freedom” against a “mortal danger to all 
humanity,” the “enemy of civilization.” Moreover, “the call of history has come 
to the right country,” and “the defense of freedom is worth the sacrifice.” 
Ultimately the “evil ones” will be destroyed, and “this great country will lead 
                                                
78 Bush, 2001d, "President Welcomes President Chirac to White House," (November 6), 
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011106-4.html. For example, at a 
2002 press conference, President Bush said, “Almost every day is a new phase, in some 
ways, because we’re reminding different countries which may be susceptible to al 
Qaeda, that you’re either with us or against us. And so we’re constantly working on 
bolstering confidence amongst some nations which may sometimes forget that either 
you’re with us or you’re with the terrorists.” Bush, 2002b, "President Bush, President 
Kwasniewski Hold Joint Press Conference," (July 17), The White House Office of the 
Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020717-3.html. 
Similar language about needing to make a choice to be with us or with the terrorists has 
been used by the administration when pressuring Palestinian leaders, the Iranian 
government, and other Muslim actors. The implicit threat of that statement has been 
made more clearly on a number of occasions, as President Bush did during a 2006 
speech concluding, “Two nations, Afghanistan and Pakistan, made very different 
decisions – with very different results.” Bush, "President Bush Discusses Global War on 
Terror." This threat was explicitly part of the President’s 20 September speech 
launching the war on terror: “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor 
or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” Bush, 
"Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." Vice President 
Cheney similarly said, “Some may question whether we mean it – but the doubters do 
not include the members of the Taliban.” Cheney, 2007e, "Vice President’s Remarks to 
the Central Command, Special Operations Command, and the 6th Air Mobility Wing," 
(September 14), The White House Office of the Vice President, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070914-7.html. 
 CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TERRORISM 200 
 
the world to safety, security, and peace,” a millennial world where “free peoples 
will own the future.79 
Whalid Phares, who regularly appeared on television after 9/11 as a terrorism expert 
and often gives lectures to U.S. government audiences, exemplifies this framing, in his 
words, of “the threat as existential,”80 where liberal democracies are in “a fight for their 
existence”81 – and he means that “the very existence of societies, either physical or 
cultural, [is] at risk”82 in this “world confrontation.”83 Phares emphasizes the strength, 
determination, and unity of the enemy as opposed to the divisions and confusion within 
the West: 
After five years of battling around the world, from Kabul to Beirut, from Bali to 
New York City, the forces of Jihadism and their allies have shown 
unequivocally that they are primarily driven by sheer ideology and a 
determination to crush their opponents absolutely. With modern roots going 
back to the 1920s and the 1970s, the terror networks have at their disposal oil 
power, financial empires, regular armies, militias, underground connections, 
radical clerics, influential media, madrassas, regimes, circles within 
governments, biochemical arms, a totalitarian ideology, wide webs of 
collaborators and sympathizers within the Free World, and, potentially, nuclear 
weapons. That is one camp. On the other side, democracies are divided on the 
inside as to the principles of the War on Terror; are divided among each other as 
to the policies to adopt toward the terrorist threat, particularly the Jihadist one; 
and are tackling the crisis in a confused way…84 
For Phares the urgent question in this “global conflict over the future of humanity” is 
“will the peoples of the world live under the diktat of the Salafists and Khumeinists and 
the regimes they are establishing, or will they not?”85 Fortunately, from his perspective, 
Phares is encouraged that the general American public, thanks to the effort of those 
spreading the message about the threat, now “perceives the conflict as being about 
survival.”86 
                                                
79 Vlahos, "The Fall of Modernity: Has the American Narrative Authored its own 
Undoing?." 
80 Phares, The Confrontation, 16. 
81 Ibid., 14. 
82 Ibid., 17. 
83 Ibid., 13. 
84 Ibid., 16. 
85 Ibid., 6. 
86 Ibid., 92. Reading Phares, and his praise of the media for persuading the American 
public of the threat, it is easy to see where Shahid Alam concludes that “every day … 
America’s politicians, press, and pundits” explain that Islamist terrorists “want to 
destroy” the United States “because they hate our values, our way of life, our 
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As the Bush administration built its case for Iraq becoming the second major 
front of the war on terror, the casualties from a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack 
most frequently measured the threat of terrorism to the United States.87 Much of the 
American public accepted the reality of this danger; especially given the combination of 
the anthrax attacks in the month after 9/11,88 which President Bush had described as “a 
second wave of terrorist attacks”89 and many at the time still assumed to be the work of 
foreign terrorists,90 and evidence that al-Qaida had actively pursued biological and 
nuclear weapons.91 President Bush’s October 2002 speech laying out the case for war 
with Iraq exemplifies the threat as perceived at the time: 
We’ve experienced the horror of September the 11th. We have seen that those 
who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent 
people. Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to 
use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon. Knowing these realities, 
America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence 
of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come 
in the form of a mushroom cloud.92 
Demonstrating that the perception of this threat was not a partisan issue, Senator John 
Kerry frequently spoke of the dangers of nuclear terrorism during the 2004 presidential 
                                                
civilization…” Alam, 2004, "The Clash Thesis: A Failing Ideology?," CounterPunch 
(August 26), http://www.counterpunch.org/alam08262004.html. 
87 For example: Bush, "President Welcomes President Chirac to White House."  
88 Daschle, 2006, "The Unsolved Case of Anthrax," Washington Post, October 15, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/13/AR2006101301417_pf.html. 
89 Allen, 2001, "Bush to Urge Nations to Fight Terrorism with Deeds," Ibid., November 
4. However, in his weekly radio address President Bush clearly stated that the 
government did not know if the anthrax attacks had been carried out by domestic or 
international terrorists. 
90 Ibid. Lichtblau and Meyer, 2001, "Response to Terror: Americans Warned of New 
Attacks," Los Angeles Times, October 30. Stout and Lichtblau, 2008, "U.S. Officials 
Say Documents Tie Scientist to 2001 Anthrax Attack," The New York Times, August 7, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/07/world/americas/07iht-07anthrax.15062862.html. 
91 Proof for the later was dramatically demonstrated by captured documents from 
Afghanistan publicly released by CNN’s Mike Boettcher in January 2002 with the 
summary that the “al Qaeda terrorist organization was building a serious weapons 
program with a heavy emphasis on developing a nuclear device.” Boettcher and 
Arnesen, 2002, "Al Qaeda Documents Outline Serious Weapons Program," CNN 
(January 25), http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/01/24/inv.al.qaeda.documents/. 
92 Bush, 2002a, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, Remarks by the President on 
Iraq," (October 7), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html. 
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election.93 That contest was a good reflection of majority perceptions on the threat of 
terrorism as both candidates, informed by millions of dollars spent on polling and focus 
groups, competed about who would be tougher in fighting the war on terror.94 Similarly 
reflecting the bipartisan consensus of the threat posed, the Democratic Vice-Chair of the 
9/11 Commission Lee Hamilton said, “We know what terrorists want to do: they want 
to kill as many Americans as possible.”95 
By looking at the rhetoric of conservative figures writing or speaking directly 
for their partisan base it is also clear that the comments of members of the Bush 
administration are not merely reflective of a more radicalized side of the partisan 
spectrum. Newt Gingrich, for example, has criticized the administration for not 
sufficiently explaining to the American public that the threat faced is really World War 
                                                
93 For example: Kerry, 2004a, "New Strategies to Meet New threats: Remarks of 
Senator John Kerry," WagingPeace.org (June 1), 
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2004/06/01_kerry_remarks-florida.htm. 
94 As the contest approached election day Senator Kerry often claimed that he would 
fight “a smarter, more effective, tougher war on terror” primarily differentiated by 
increased help from allies around the world. Although some Kerry supporters, and 
many Bush backers, believed that Kerry’s approach would be “softer.” Bush’s 
perspective was likely closer to a significant majority of the public, as CNN noted, 
“Numerous polls show the threat of terrorism to be Bush’s strongest issue.” "Bush, 
Kerry Spar Over Terrorism," 2004, CNN (October 19), 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/10/18/election.main/. See also: Balz and 
Broder, 2006, "More GOP Districts Counted as Vulnerable: Number Doubled Over the 
Summer," Washington Post, September 3, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/02/AR2006090200975_pf.html. Bowman, 2006, "The 9/11 
Hangover Continues to Shape Public Opinion," Roll Call (September 6), 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24865/pub_detail.asp. "Clinton's Team Aids 
Kerry on Military.". Geraghty, "Me Too, Me Too!.". Lustick, Trapped in the War on 
Terror, 24. Navarrette, "Kerry's Dilemma.". Sanger and Wilgoren, "Kerry Says War in 
Iraq has Allowed Bigger Threats to Grow." The fact that Republicans faired poorly in 
the 2006 election, despite having again made the war on terror a central part of their 
election message, had much more to do with American disapproval of the handling and 
state of the war in Iraq. This is emphasized by the focus of Democrats on separating 
Iraq from larger concerns about terrorism and frequently arguing that Iraq had actually 
worsened the threat of terrorism. 
95 Yen, 2005, "9/11 Panel Says US Security Still Lax," The Boston Globe, December 5, 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/12/05/911_panel_says_u
s_security_still_lax/.  
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Three.96 Popular right wing radio talk show host Dennis Prager has said the threat is 
“far more serious” than the Second World War’s Nazis and the Cold War’s Soviet 
Communism.97 During the 2008 Republican Presidential primary, former Governor Mitt 
Romney argued, “Radical Islam has one goal: to replace all modern Islamic states with 
a worldwide caliphate while destroying the United States and converting all non-
believers, forcibly, if necessary, to Islam.”98 In the same race former Governor Mike 
Huckabee argued Islamofascism was “the greatest enemy this country’s ever faced”99 
and that it is hard for Americans to “understand what Islamic terrorists are about, that 
they really do want to kill every last one of us and destroy civilization as we know 
it.”100 Finally, the ultimate Republican nominee, Senator John McCain, regularly called 
“the threat of radical Islamic terrorism” the “transcendent challenge of our time.”101 
                                                
96 Gingrich, 2006, "Lessons from the First Five Years of the War: Where Do We Go 
from Here?," AEI Online (October 11), American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, http://www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID=25002. 
97 He wrote: “The existence of an unprecedentedly large number of people wishing to 
destroy decent civilization as we know it – and who celebrate their own deaths – poses a 
threat the likes of which no civilization in history has had to confront. The evils 
committed by Nazism and Communism were, of course, greater than those committed 
by radical Islam. There has been no Muslim Gulag and no Muslim Auschwitz. But the 
threat is far more serious.” Prager, 2006, "Islamic Threat is Greater than German & 
Soviet Threats Were," Real Clear Politics (March 28), 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/03/islamic_threat_is_greater_than.html. 
98 O'Toole, 2007, "Where the Presidential Candidates Line Up on War in Iraq," 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, September 9, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07252/815958-
176.stm. 
99 Krugman, 2007, "Fearing Fear Itself," The New York Times, October 29, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/29/opinion/29krugman.html. 
100 Similar to Newt Gingrich, Governor Huckabee went on to argue: “The Bush 
administration has never adequately explained the theology and ideology behind Islamic 
terrorism or convinced us of its ruthless fanaticism.” Huckabee, 2008, "America's 
Priorities in the War on Terror: Islamists, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan," Foreign Affairs, 
January/February, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87112/michael-d-
huckabee/america-s-priorities-in-the-war-on-terror.html. 
101 He further argued: “Any president who does not regard this threat as transcending all 
others does not deserve to sit in the White House, for he or she does not take seriously 
enough the first and most basic duty a president has — to protect the lives of the 
American people.” Hirsh, 2008b, "The World According to John McCain," Newsweek, 
April 7, http://www.newsweek.com/id/129660. 
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An Islamic Caliphate as the New Threat Measure 
Although the threat of terrorists using some type of chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear device has remained part of the public discourse, after the 
failure to find weapons of mass destructions in Iraq descriptions of the danger posed by 
terrorists noticeably shifted to an emphasis on the regional or global territorial goals 
espoused by some militant Islamists. Discussion of the goals to re-establish either a 
historic regional caliphate, or even of creating a global caliphate, serve to aggregate the 
threat of many diverse conflicts, alleviate the dissonance of the world’s remaining 
superpower being so gravely threatened by making the conflict global in scale, and 
legitimize American military involvement in Iraq and other parts of the world as being 
more easily recognizable as confrontations with the group that carried out the 9/11 
attacks.102 References to caliphate goals also play to an increased level of knowledge 
about Islamist terrorists, especially among the more involved and highly attentive 
members of the public who often serve as a bridge between elites and the general 
population in the formation of collective attitudes.103 For example, in an August 2005 
                                                
102 The aggregating of diverse groups together by emphasizing the goals of some 
Islamists for establishing a regional caliphate is discussed in the next section. Of note, 
the espoused territorial caliphate goals of many groups are actually more local than 
generally claimed by American politicians or as understood by attentive members of the 
public. For example, Jemaah Islamiyah “seeks the establishment of an Islamic caliphate 
spanning southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines” – an area 
which arguably makes sense geographically, culturally, and ethnically especially when 
viewed not strictly from a religious spectrum, but also as a more traditional nationalist-
separatist goal. "Country Reports on Terrorism 2007," 2007, ed Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism: United States Department of State, April, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/. Explaining the use of this threat as part of a 
framing to make the war on terror seem like World War Two, Vlahos notes: “The 
Defense Department’s ‘Long War’ briefing has even suggested that the Islamofascist – 
like the Nazi – dream of a super-caliphate is but steps away from evil reality.” Vlahos, 
2007a, "Losing Mythic Authority," The National Interest (April 25), 
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14148. 
103 As discussed in chapters three and four, the social movement focus of this thesis 
argues that the aspirations for a regional or global caliphate is not a significant driver of 
terrorism, not a real goal for the majority of those actually involved in fighting, and very 
rarely a supported goal of the larger populations potentially supportive of terrorist 
groups. However, highly attentive members of the public are increasingly aware that re-
establishing a caliphate is discussed in the writings of certain key militant ideological 
leaders and part of many Islamist groups’ official long term goals. As such this becomes 
a powerful rhetorical tool to use in reinforcing the threat posed and directing both 
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speech Secretary Rumsfeld used the goal of establishing a global caliphate to represent 
the threat the U.S. faces: 
We’ve now seen well the future they envision. They’ve made their intentions 
clear… We’ve heard their plan. As the cleric in Britain said to the world after 
last month’s bombing in London, he said, “I would like to see the Islamic flag 
fly not only over Number 10 Downing Street, but over the whole world.”104 
Vice President Cheney has similarly used the goal of establishing a caliphate as an 
alternative mechanism for explaining how terrorists might acquire weapons of mass 
destruction in order to carry out devastating attacks on the United States:  
This enemy also has a set of clear objectives… Their goal in that region is to 
seize control of a country… The terrorists believe that by controlling one 
country, they will be able to target and overthrow other governments in the 
region, and ultimately to establish a totalitarian empire that encompasses a 
region from Spain, across North Africa, through the Middle East and South 
Asia, all the way around to Indonesia. They have made clear, as well, their 
ultimate ambitions: to arm themselves with chemical, biological and even 
nuclear weapons; to destroy Israel; to intimidate all Western countries; and to 
cause mass death here in the United States.105 
In other speeches Vice President Cheney has used descriptions of the caliphate goal as 
part of his argument that the U.S. is the prime target of a destructive, totalitarian, global 
enemy as well as being a central part of the conflict in Iraq.106 
                                                
understanding and efforts in a specific direction. For example, Devji writes: “Yet the 
caliphate is not a political vision so much as a metaphysical category. It remains only an 
ideal, with neither a description nor any concrete plan to set it up. And in fact the 
caliphate’s role thus far is simply conceptual, allowing the jihad to abandon the political 
geography of the Cold War, made up of national states grouped into various alliances, 
for a completely de-territorialized and even anti-geographical space, since the caliphate 
imagined by the jihad possesses neither centre nor periphery.” Devji, Landscapes of the 
Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity, 84. 
104 Rumsfeld, "Remarks at Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce." For another 
example: Bush, 2006g, "President Discusses Global War on Terror," (September 5), 
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060905-4.html.  
105 Cheney, 2006b, "Vice President’s Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee 2006 Policy Conference," (March 7), The White House Office of the Vice 
President, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060307-1.html. He 
used similar language in a October 2007 speech: Cheney, 2007b, "Vice President's 
Remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy," (October 21), The White 
House Office of the Vice President, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071021.html. 
106 Cheney, 2006a, "Vice President's Remarks at a Rally for the Troops," (January 6), 
Office of the Vice President, 
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Terrorists as a Foreign “Them” – An Amorphous (Islamic) Enemy 
The third major change in the public construction is the perception that the wide 
variety of Islamist groups identified as using tactics of terror are actually part of the 
same threat and presumed to be working together.107 While many Americans recognize 
there are many different local groups around the world who are using or have used 
tactics of terrorism, after 9/11 the groups that are talked about are generally perceived as 
sharing the same ideology and together seeking the same long-term goals. As with other 
changes in American thinking, there are important elements of truth in this perception 
underscored by the social movement approach of this thesis emphasizing commonalities 
and connections between a variety of different conflicts and the larger mobilization 
occurring in the Muslim world. However, especially when combined with other biases 
discussed in this chapter, the tendency to see these groups as part of an aggregated, and 
especially undifferentiated threat is counterproductive for identifying and understanding 
the important relevant population dynamics as well as for developing and implementing 
effective counterterrorism strategies. 
                                                
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060106-9.html. Cheney, 2007a, 
"Vice President's Remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 2007 Policy 
Conference," (March 12), The White House Office of the Vice President, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070312.html.  
107 The terrorist groups Americans were most familiar with before 9/11, and most likely 
to recall, were even with generally limited knowledge largely separate. Americans were 
as likely to think and talk about the IRA, the Unabomber, and Timothy McVeigh when 
considering the threat of terrorism. However, even before 9/11 many Americans had 
begun to focus on the threat of “Islamic terrorism,” as emphasized by initial widespread 
assumptions that the Oklahoma City bombings must have been the work of an Islamic 
group. For more on pre-9/11 American coverage of Islamist terrorism see especially the 
new introduction in: Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine 
How We See the Rest of the World. As an example of public experts portraying diverse 
Islamist groups as all working together in unison see Phares who frequently makes us 
versus them comparisons where we are divided and they are united, including, after 
talking about the may advantages the jihadists “from Kabul to Beirut, from Bali to New 
York City” have and their wide webs of collaborators and sympathizers, writing “That 
is one camp. On the other side, democracies are divided on the inside as to the 
principles of the War on Terror; are divided among each other as to the policies to adopt 
towards the terrorist threat, particularly the Jihadist one; and are tackling the crisis in a 
confused way. While the authoritarians and the Jihadists are moving forward, 
converging on their enemy and penetrating its defenses, the other side 9which it wants 
to destroy or take over) has many fragments, and each one of them has its own little 
wars on terror.” Phares, The Confrontation, 16. 
 CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TERRORISM 207 
 
Aggregating Distinct Groups as a Singular Enemy 
Writing in the Guardian, Max Hastings argues that the statements and policies of 
President Bush especially represent this aggregated perspective: 
In his regular radio address to the American people on Saturday he linked the 
British alleged aircraft plotters with Hizbullah in Lebanon, and these in turn with 
the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. All, said the president of the world’s 
most powerful nation, share a “totalitarian ideology”, and a desire to “establish a 
safe haven from which to attack free nations.” ... Bush has chosen to lump 
together all violent Muslim opposition to what he perceives as Western interests 
everywhere in the world, as part of a single conspiracy. He is indifferent to the 
huge variance of interests that drives the Taliban in Afghanistan, insurgents in 
Iraq, Hamas and Hizbullah fighting the Israelis. He simply identifies them as 
common enemies of the United States.108 
President Bush’s shaping of this aggregating perception began with his overall strategic 
framing immediately following the 9/11 attacks. In his 20 September 2001 address he 
said, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end 
until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”109 
While this could have indicated that the U.S. would confront the many different groups 
who use the tactic of terrorism, over time the rhetoric and policies of the administration 
and other opinion leaders clearly aggregated diverse Islamist groups into a single 
common threat. In an August 2005 speech Secretary Rumsfeld explicitly defined the 
enemy as a network of several groups including al-Qaida operating on six continents 
who “seek to impose their dark vision on the future of our world.”110 President Bush 
similarly often speaks of the opponent as a singular enemy, interchangeably in short 
statements mixing the plots and threats of diverse groups linked only by a common 
Islamic faith, without regard for a lack of evidence of collaboration, and much evidence 
                                                
108 Hastings, August 14, "Bush’s Belief in a Worldwide Islamist Conspiracy is Foolish 
and Dangerous," The Guardian, August 14, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/aug/14/terrorism.syria. Similarly, see: 
Hirsh, 2008a, "The Great Conflater: Scenes from George W. Bush's Legacy Tour," 
Newsweek, January 10, http://www.newsweek.com/id/90699. 
109 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." Similarly 
see: Bush, 2001b, "President Bush: 'No Nation Can Be Neutral in This Conflict'," 
(November 6), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011106-2.html. "National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 1.  
110 Rumsfeld, "Remarks at Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce." 
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of intergroup animosity and significantly different ideological goals.111 This most 
frequently occurs in the grouping Sunni and Shia groups who have been mutually 
deeply critical, carried out attacks against one another, and at the violent extremes are 
often separated by religious ideology that sees the others as apostate enemies of true 
Islam.112 
                                                
111 For examples of President Bush speaking of a singular enemy and mixing disparate 
Sunni and Shia groups see: Balz and Abramowitz, 2006, "President Tries to Win Over a 
War-Weary Nation," Washington Post, September 12, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/11/AR2006091101416.html. Bush, 2006e, "President Bush 
Discusses Progress in the Global War on Terror," (September 7), The White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060907-2.html. Bush, 2006h, 
"President's Radio Address," (August 12), The White House Office of the Press 
Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060812.html. Many 
other political and opinion leaders have similarly mixed diverse terrorist groups in this 
way, as Secretary Rumsfeld did suggesting that the Hizballah attack on the American 
marine barracks in Lebanon in 1982 was part of the same historical threat and 
movement as al-Qaida’s subsequent attacks and caliphate goals. Rumsfeld, 2006b, 
"Radio Interview with Secretary Rumsfeld on the Charlie Brennan Show, KMOX," 
(September 11), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3719. In a 2006 
article Newt Gingrich even more directly ties these various groups together and asserts 
they are increasingly collaborating with other enemies of the United States as part of a 
global threat which he elsewhere labels as a third world war. For Gingrich this threat 
includes not just terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, Hizballah, and Hamas but also many 
Muslim majority states such as Iran, Pakistan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia as well as non-
Muslim states who are also opposed to the United States including Cuba, Venezuela, 
and the rest of the Non-Aligned Movement. Gingrich, "Lessons from the First Five 
Years of the War: Where Do We Go from Here?." 
112 Al-Qaida’s ideological training classes in Afghanistan reportedly listed the Shia 
(along with Heretics, America, and Israel) as one of the four principle “enemies of 
Islam”. Wright, 2006, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, Knopf, 
303. For a brief explanation of the ideological enmity between Hizballah and al-Qaida 
see: Saab and Riedel, 2007, "Hezbollah and Al Qaeda," International Herald Tribune, 
April 9, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/09/opinion/edsaab.php. For an example of 
bin Ladin attacking Hizballah see transcripts of his 18 May 2008 audio-message: 
"Analysis: Osama bin Laden Attacks Hizballah's Nasrallah and Shiite Iran," 2008, 
DEBKAfile (May 24), http://www.debka.com/headline.php?hid=5284. For an example 
of Sunni Islamist religious leaders attacking Hizballah: Associated Press, 2006b, "Saudi 
Religious Leader Blasts Hizbullah," The Jerusalem Post, August 5, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1154525810323&pagename=JPost%2FJPAr
ticle%2FShowFull. On Hamas denouncing al-Qaida: Sulmasy, "War on al Qaeda." 
Discussions of al-Qaida in Iraq and Sunni Islamists hatred and attacks on Shia: Jehl, 
2005, "Full Qaeda Letter to Iraq Ally Speaks of Group's Global Goal," The New York 
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Both an example and a symptom of this tendency to aggregate very different 
Islamist groups into a single threat was illustrated by Jeff Stein, Congressional 
Quarterly’s national security expert. In late 2006, five years after 9/11, at the end of 
lengthy interviews he asked several high level Washington counterterrorism officials 
whether they knew “the difference between a Sunni and a Shiite” and then followed up 
with questions about whether specific Muslim groups and states were one or the other. 
Disturbingly he found “most American officials [he] interviewed don’t have a clue” 
including “not just intelligence and law enforcement officials, but also members of 
Congress who have important roles overseeing our spy agencies.” Although admitting it 
was a classic “gotcha” question, he also noted, “It seems silly to have to argue that 
officials responsible for counterterrorism should be able to recognize” the importance of 
the difference and asked, “How can they do their jobs without knowing the basics.”113 
                                                
Times, October 12, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/12/international/middleeast/12intel.html. Kagan, 
2007, "Al Qaeda in Iraq: How to Understand It, How to Defeat it," Weekly Standard, 
September 10, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=14043&R=13
B49E43. Rosen, 2006, "Meanwhile..." New York Daily News, June 9, 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2006/meanwhile. However, it should 
be emphasized opinions within Sunni militant Islamist movements are not settled on the 
Shia. Brooke, 2006, "The Preacher and the Jihadi," Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 
3 (February 16), 
http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/pubID.41/pub_detail.asp. And many 
Sunni militants draw inspiration from the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian 
revolution. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 166. While there is some limited historical 
evidence of Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida working with Shia groups, those have 
generally been short-term collaborations of convenience limited by deeper ideological 
enmity. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, The 
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, Government Printing Office, 240. 
113 Stein, 2006a, "Can You Tell a Sunni from a Shiite?," The New York Times, October 
17, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/opinion/17stein.html. While the officials he 
discussed in his original article were either Republicans or Republican appointees, he 
noted in an article two months later that incoming House intelligence committee Chair 
Silvestre Reyes, a Democrat, thought al-Qaida included both Sunni and Shia, but was 
predominately Shia. Stein, 2006b, "Democrats' New Intelligence Chairman Needs a 
Crash Course on al Qaeda," CQ.com (December 8), Congressional Quarterly, 
http://public.cq.com/public/20061211_homeland.html. Given the otherwise critical 
attention given to speeches by President Bush, I should note that in a 5 September 2006 
policy speech on terrorism he clearly delineated Shia and Sunni terrorists, discussing 
them as representing “different faces of the same threat.” Bush, "President Discusses 
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A principal factor contributing to the perception of all militant Islamist groups as 
being part of the same general threat is simply a manifestation of ignorance and time. 
Americans in general, and even key government officials, have limited time to 
understand the problem, and from an out-group perspective the differences between 
Islamist groups seem minor compared to the commonalities.114 The tendency to 
aggregate is also an effect the original framing and subsequent evolution of the war on 
terror, including especially the war in Iraq, as being aimed at all terrorist groups of 
global reach. The aggregation of terrorists and associated enemies further helps to 
justify perceptions of an especially grave threat to the world’s only superpower.115 
Finally, the tendency to aggregate by the public and the administration is in part related 
to seeing al-Qaida’s attacks on the United States as the same threat that faces Israel 
from Hamas and Hizballah, as well as being part of the United States’ long running 
conflict with Shia Iran. Indicative of this last motivation, American political and 
opinion leaders have frequently linked or jointly highlighted al-Qaida associated attacks 
with attacks by other groups on Israel.116 The Bush administration also prominently 
                                                
Global War on Terror." However, a wide range of relevant policy experts commonly vet 
such speeches, and a scripted speech is not the same as the informal question and 
answer context in which Stein identified official ignorance. President Bush had been 
extensively criticized in the past for statements he allegedly made leading up to the war 
in Iraq failing to recognize the difference. In keeping with the social construction 
analysis of this chapter, I believe the use of the Sunni and Shia details in this policy 
speech are reflective of the growing awareness by attentive and more highly involved 
segments of the public. Stein’s editorial is also indicative of that, as its rhetorical power 
and frequent subsequent citing stemmed from many highly attentive segments of the 
public already being aware of the difference. 
114 In a similar fashion, Americans were more likely to aggregate all communist nations 
together as part of a single global threat during the Cold War, and arguably it was not 
until the late 1960s or early 1970s that President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger began 
to appreciate (for example) the potential differences between communist China and the 
Soviet Union leading to diplomatic moves to drive a wedge between the two. 
115 Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and 
Defeat." 
116 For example: Bush, "President's Radio Address.". Cheney, "Vice President’s 
Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 2006 Policy Conference." As 
previously noted, al-Qaida has been critical of both Hamas and Hizballah, the principle 
Islamist groups threatening Israel, and both of these groups have been highly critical of 
al-Qaida including Hizballah’s spiritual leader quickly and publicly denouncing the 
9/11 attacks. "Analysis: Osama bin Laden Attacks Hizballah's Nasrallah and Shiite 
Iran.". Saab and Riedel, "Hezbollah and Al Qaeda.". Sulmasy, "War on al Qaeda." 
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made Iran part of the “Axis of Evil” despite evidence Iran and al-Qaida were enemies 
and published reports that Iran helped the United States immediately following 9/11.117 
Driving the Assumption that Islam Must be Part of the Problem 
The common perception of a homogenized terrorist threat encourages 
Americans to perceive the enemy as motivated principally by their religion instead of 
the many different local causes driving conflict or recognizing that violent non-Islamic 
groups have mobilized around the same causes.118 Sizeable minorities, at times even 
majorities, believe that Islam itself is a principal part of the problem (instead of a shared 
characteristic of different groups lumped together by the construction) and that most 
Muslims are presumptively suspect, even while also generally recognizing that they 
should not publicly say so.119 The American perception of Arabs and Muslims as being 
disproportionately associated with or prone to terrorism was long established before 
9/11.120 As a result of the 9/11 attacks and subsequent popular reactions these 
stereotypes became stronger, more common, and more threatening. Media portrayals 
and commentary too often falsely imply that the 9/11 attacks were widely embraced and 
                                                
117 Karl, 2008, "Exclusive: Iran in Secret Talks with al Qaeda U.S. Officials Say," ABC 
News (May 29), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/International/story?id=4954667. 
Richardson, 2007, "The Secret History of the Impending War with Iran that the White 
House Doesn't Want You to Know," Esquire, October 18, 
http://www.esquire.com/features/iranbriefing1107. Roy, Globalized Islam, 62-3.  
118 Emphasizing the category error involved Kilcullen and others highlight not only that 
violent non-Islamist groups have carried out attacks for the same causes, but that a 
variety of research supports that whether or not an individual supports or carries out 
violent attacks is correlated with radicalization and political views, and not with level of 
religiosity. Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 250-1. 
119 Deane and Fears, 2006, "Negative Perception Of Islam Increasing, Poll Numbers in 
U.S. Higher Than in 2001," The Washington Post, March 9, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/08/AR2006030802221_pf.html. Friedlander, 2004, "Fear 
factor: 44 percent of Americans queried in Cornell national poll favor curtailing some 
liberties for Muslim Americans," Cornell News - Press Release (December 17), Cornell 
University, http://www.news.cornell.edu/releases/Dec04/Muslim.Poll.bpf.html. 
120 This is represented by entertainment stereotypes, arguably disproportionate coverage 
of terrorism in news stories about the Middle East, and policy and academic discussions 
focusing on a clash of civilizations or the dangers of “Islamic terrorism.” For example: 
Esposito, "Political Islam.". Esposito, 1992, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, New 
York, Oxford University Press. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts 
Determine How We See the Rest of the World. 
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supported by majorities in the Muslim world.121 The war on terror framing of the 
conflict, aggregating only Islamist groups together as the targeted enemy, reinforces 
those perceptions. The fact that these groups actually share some level of historical and 
ideological commonalities and connections provides a foundation of some truth and 
protection from charges of prejudice. Three years after 9/11, almost half of Americans 
were willing to answer polling questions that the United States “government should 
restrict the civil liberties of Muslims.”122  
More Highly Normative: Absolute Rejection and Moral Condemnation 
The final change to the public’s social construction of terrorism discussed in this 
chapter is an intensification of the normative condemnation against those identified as 
terrorists. The moral condemnation of violence against non-combatants is part of the 
beneficial societal goal of eliminating the use of this tactic. However, as the later 
sections of this thesis argue, problems result from a combination of the intensified 
normative judgment, aggregated views of all associated with Islamic terrorism as part of 
the threat and therefore morally complicit, and the narrative that these aggregated and 
associated actors pose an especially grave threat principally targeting the United States. 
In the modern era terrorism has always been a highly normative and pejorative 
term.123 However, before the 9/11 attacks discussions of terrorism and consideration of 
those so labelled in the United States often allowed for a greater degree of ambiguity 
and acceptance that, at least in some cases, those called terrorists might also be freedom 
fighters. Segments of the American public, to the consternation of the British, refused to 
strongly condemn the IRA and in some cases actively provided support to their cause. 
The Chechen guerrillas were viewed sympathetically, with more focus on Russian 
atrocities than Chechen terrorist attacks.124 After 9/11 American tolerances for any such 
ambiguity quickly disappeared. 
                                                
121 Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 5. 
122 Friedlander, "Fear factor: 44 percent of Americans queried in Cornell national poll 
favor curtailing some liberties for Muslim Americans." 
123 Kapitan, "The Terrorism of 'Terrorism'," 3-4. 
124 Hess, 2003, "Like Zealots and Romans: Terrorism and Empire in the 21st Century," 
Crime, Law and Social Change 39 (4), June: 339. Williams, 2004, "From "Secessionist 
Rebels" to "Al-Qaeda Shock Brigades": Assessing Russia's Efforts to Extend the Post-
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A Conflict Between Good and Evil, Civilization and Barbarity 
Examining the rhetoric used in discussing the war on terror illustrates the 
strengthening of a more absolutist moral condemnation of terrorism after 9/11.125 The 
enemy of the war on terror is frequently described by political leaders from both parties 
as fundamentally evil and morally depraved, as individuals who hate all that is good and 
find enjoyment in barbaric acts.126 This is an enemy that plots “evil and destruction,”127 
“rejoices in the murder of innocent, unsuspecting human beings,”128 “will cut off a 
person’s head like that, and not even care about it,”129 is a “mortal danger to all 
humanity,”130 the “enemy of civilization,”131 and embraces a “creed” that “rejoices in 
suicide, incites murder, and celebrates every death we mourn.”132 In this discourse the 
focus is almost always on the reprehensible violence of terrorism, and rarely on the 
broader context that might directly acknowledge similar atrocities committed by those 
locally opposed to the terrorists in question, or recognize that many groups who use 
                                                
September 11th War on Terror to Chechnya," Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East 24 (1). 
125 The “good versus evil” narrative plays not only to shared secular cultural 
conceptions about morality, but in the United States especially speaks to and resonates 
with a very large religious audience. Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 66. 
126 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 122-3. It is perhaps fitting that many of the 
more radical Islamists similarly see the fight as “a titanic struggle between absolutes of 
good and evil.” Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 43. 
127 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." 
128 Cheney, 2003b, "Vice President’s Remarks at 2003 Air Force Convention," 
(September 17), Office of the Vice President, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030917-3.html. Similar language 
is used in: Cheney, "Vice President’s Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee 2006 Policy Conference." Illustrating that such rhetoric is not saved for 
specific audiences, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism similarly 
framed the conflict as a fight against evil and as a defence of freedom and civilized 
society: "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 1. 
129 Bush, 2004g, "President’s Remarks to the Unity Journalists of Color Convention," 
(August 6), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040806-1.html. Similarly see: 
Bush, 2004d, "President’s Remarks at Columbus, Ohio Rally," (September 1), The 
White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040901-6.html. 
130 Bush, 2005b, "President Commemorates Veterans Day, Discusses War on Terror," 
(November 11), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051111-1.html. 
131 Bush, "President Discusses Global War on Terror." 
132 Bush, "President Bush Reaffirms Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan." 
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tactics of terrorism (or those associated with them) also engage in a wider range of 
positive actions such as providing social services and humanitarian care. 
Defining terrorists by a focus on the most reprehensible acts in combination with 
ascribing to them motivations based on hatred and opposition to ideals seen as universal 
goods reinforces the stereotype that they are fundamentally crazy and incomprehensible. 
President Bush has said, “the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the 
destruction they design.”133 While Vice President Cheney has observed, “Some might 
look at these ambitions and wave them off as extreme and mad. Well, these ambitions 
are, indeed, extreme and mad. They are also real, and we must not wave them off.”134 
Although reinforced by the language of the war on terror, the common perception of 
terrorists as somehow pathological and insane is not new. However, at a time when 
greater understanding is called for because of the increased appreciation of the threat 
posed to the United States it is important that this view continues to drown out the 
repeated conclusions of those who study terrorism that “the most outstanding common 
characteristic of terrorists is their normality.”135 
The framing of the construction makes clear that we are good and they are evil, 
contrasting their depravity with our noble values. At a February 2002 luncheon 
President Bush told the audience, “I see things pretty clearly, in just plain terms… this 
                                                
133 Bush, 2002c, "President Delivers State of the Union Address," (January 29), The 
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134 Cheney, "Vice President’s Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
2006 Policy Conference." 
135 Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 379. See also: Crenshaw, "The Logic of 
Terrorism," 10. Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, 5. 
Frey, Dealing with Terrorism, 50-3. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 7. Horgan, "The 
Search for the Terrorist Personality," 16-8, 24. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign 
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Scheuer sought to break the dominant tendency to dismiss and underestimate terrorists 
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Thomas Paine.” Scheuer, 2002, Through Our Enemy's Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical 
Islam, and the Future of America, Washington, DC, Brassey's, Inc., 3. Scheuer notes, 
“According to his closest Muslim associates and many of the Westerners who have 
interviewed him, Osama bin Laden appears to be a genuinely pious Muslim; a devoted 
family man; a talented, focused, and patient insurgent commander; a frank and eloquent 
speaker; a successful businessman; and an individual of conviction, intellectual honesty, 
compassion, humility, and physical bravery.” 
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is a war of good versus evil.”136 In an April 2002 speech, he explained, “They hate us, 
because we’re free… They hate the thought that we educate everybody… They hate the 
fact that we… believe in the dignity of every person… And the only way they know to 
express themselves is through killing, cold-blooded killing.”137 Framing the conflict in 
these terms reinforces the overall narrative of the war on terror as cast in binary and 
polarized terms of an “us” and a “them,” which in turn makes an enemy-centric focus 
only seem natural:138 
No longer is this a political conflict, a cultural conflict or a conflict over specific 
policies, it is simply a struggle between good and evil. This is a powerful way of 
forcing people to choose the side of the United States; after all, no one 
deliberately chooses to be on the side of evil. In any moral conflict, one always 
wants to be on the side of good.139 
Acceptance of the good versus evil, civilized versus barbaric narrative strengthens the 
perception that in the war on terror there can be no negotiation and no accommodation 
with the enemy or, more importantly for this thesis, those who may not choose our 
side.140 
Conclusion 
How the general public, political leaders, decision makers, and those responsible 
for implementing and analyzing American policy think and talk about terrorism largely 
determines what the U.S. approach to counterterrorism will be and how that approach 
will actually be carried out. This in turn, to the degree that American rhetoric and policy 
influences attitudes and perceptions in the Muslim world, plays a significant role in the 
success or failure of American hearts and minds goals. 
                                                
136 Bush, 2002d, "President’s Remarks at 'Congress of Tomorrow' Lunch," (February 1), 
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020201-9.html. 
137 Bush, "Remarks by the President at Connecticut Republican Committee Luncheon." 
138 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 63. 
139 Ibid., 69. 
140 Similarly, “the radical evil argument is a familiar strategy for silencing liberal 
dissent.” Ibid. See also: Aune, 2003, "The Argument from Evil in the Rhetoric of 
Reaction," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 6 (3), Fall: 521. “The argument from evil is thus 
double-edged: it can be remarkably powerful in mobilizing people for action, yet it is 
extremely corrosive of democratic politics, since it undermines the possibility of a loyal 
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promotes it – reads, ‘There are Americans, and there are Liberals’” 
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This section has focused on four important changes to how terrorism is thought 
about and discussed in the United States. First, after 9/11 most Americans now accept 
that the appropriate and best response is a U.S. led war on terror – not metaphorically, 
but very much a real war with a binary division of us versus them, where you are either 
for us or against us. Second, most Americans now perceive terrorism globally as much 
more threatening – measured by mass casualty attacks, a desire to use weapons of mass 
destructions, as well as regional and global territorial ambitions – with that threat 
ultimately or principally targeting the United States. Third, when most Americans talk 
or think about terrorism they are concerned about a foreign, aggregated, and amorphous 
Islamic enemy, which is presumptively working together toward the same ultimate 
goals. Fourth, all of this thinking is much more highly normative, less tolerant of 
ambiguity, and defined by a framing of good versus evil where our side is always 
defending noble, universal ideals and they simply enjoy employing reprehensible 
tactics. 
The following section of this chapter will focus on how these changes, 
especially in combination, undermine the understanding of terrorism and resulting 
efforts to respond. The counterproductive effects are particularly problematic for the 
population-centric efforts of hearts and minds goals informed by the counterinsurgency 
tradition and insights of a social movement approach. However, it should be 
emphasized, that many of these changes are reactions to underlying realities of the 
current threat posed by a variety of groups employing tactics of terrorism. Those 
responsible for 9/11 see themselves and have publicly declared that they are at war with 
the United States. Key leaders, many members, and ideological enablers shared across 
different militant Islamist groups do perceive the United States as important enemy. 
While there are important local differences and divisions between Islamist groups and 
conflicts, there are also important commonalities and connections. And if the language 
of evil has any meaning, I cannot imagine that it would be inappropriate for describing 
the videotaped beheading of hostages.141 
                                                
141 President Bush used similar language in his 2003 State of the Union Address 
speaking of horrible acts of torture committed by the former Iraqi regime saying, “If this 
is not evil, then evil has no meaning.” Bush, 2003c, "President Delivers 'State of the 
Union'," (January 28), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
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This basis in fact for many aspects of the post-9/11 construction of terrorism 
criticized in this chapter for their exaggeration makes the difficulties discussed in the 
next section much more challenging to overcome. Even many experts and specialists, 
let alone policy makers or general members of the public, strongly resist or instinctively 
react against the arguments made here, empowered by a focus on and presumption 
starting from these realities. Changes in thinking about terrorism have raised 
recognition of real threats, and increased resources and priorities for responding. The 
common social desire to normatively reject the use of terror against civilians and non-
combatants is at the fundamental root of why the discourse of terrorism carries with it 
such power and problems, especially when strengthened by the raw emotional reaction 
of a public attacked on a generationally unprecedented level. 
Undermines Understanding and Efforts 
While serving as the three-star general in charge of Marine Corps forces in the 
Pacific region, Lt Gen. Wallace Gregson called the war on terror an inaccurate label 
leading to the wrong policies: 
This war has a popular label and a political label, but it’s not accurate… 
Terrorism is a means of power projection, it’s a weapon, it’s a tool of war. Think 
of it as our enemy’s stealth bomber. This is no more a war on terrorism than 
World War II was a war on submarines. It’s not just semantics… Words have 
meaning. And these words are leading us down to the wrong concept.142 
Long time RAND terrorism scholar Brian Jenkins similarly argues that how we think 
about terrorism undermines our ability to understand the problem: 
Action films rarely inquire into the mindsets or motives of villains. The villains 
are simply presented as bad guys, foils for superheroes. Cyclops is always a 
monster. Dragons breathe fire. Witches are wicked. One need not ask why. We 
are likewise inclined to see terrorists as fiends, wild-eyed expressions of evil, 
diabolical but two-dimensional, some how alien – in a word, inhuman. 
Government officials routinely denounce terrorists as mindless fanatics, savage 
barbarians, or, more recently, “evil-doers” – words that dismiss any intellectual 
                                                
fundamental problem with this usage of the language of evil is “a telling lack of 
consistency.” Hariman explains this writing about the double standard that the U.S. 
follows simply in continuing to support and work with many other nations who practice 
similar policies of extensive torture. Hariman, 2003, "Speaking of Evil," Rhetoric & 
Public Affairs 6 (3), Fall: 514. 
142 Castelli, "Winning Hearts and Minds Stressed." 
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content. The angry rhetoric may resonate with apprehensive homeland 
audiences, but it impedes efforts to understand the enemy.143 
Professor Michael Howard contends that how political leaders define a problem in 
terms of the overall strategic narrative plays a significant role in how we respond, and 
particularly argues that the labelling for the current conflict influences how seriously 
our militaries take the problem in terms of their long range planning and how they 
“adjust their thinking, equipment, and training accordingly.”144 These critiques, and 
many others like them, conclude that how we talk and think about terrorism – the public 
construction of terrorism – can adversely affect understanding of the problem, and 
resulting actions. This section examines the problems caused by how terrorism is 
conceptualized in the United States after 9/11, reinforced by the strategic narrative of 
the war on terror, by examining how: the social construction functions in general; the 
dissonance caused by the dominant construction undermines understanding of important 
dynamics underlying many cases of terrorism; and, the enemy-centric focus resulting 
from the current approach impedes the population-centric perspective recommended by 
counterinsurgency and social movement theory leading to counterproductive rhetoric 
and policies. 
How the Construction Functions in General 
Put simply, “language matters, because it can determine how we think and 
act.”145 At an individual level, the social construction of terrorism influences how we 
understand the phenomenon by establishing frames of reference, triggering (or 
impeding) associations, and setting our baseline presumptions for evaluation. These 
constraints are consciously and subconsciously self-enforced and socially re-enforced. 
At a societal level, the post-9/11 construction establishes the expectation that political 
leaders and government agencies will treat terrorism as amongst the most important 
national security concerns, focusing the resulting efforts on certain counterterrorism 
                                                
143 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 53.  
144 Howard, "A Long War?," 9. 
145 Lakoff and Frisch, "Five Years After 9/11." Similarly, talking about strategic 
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strategies while limiting or discouraging the consideration and development of others. 
Within the partisan competition between political parties the majority adoption of the 
construction constrains what is acceptable and unacceptable to consider and advocate. 
For the bureaucratic competition between agencies the promotion of this understanding 
establishes resource and reward incentives to conform and act in a similarly consistent 
manner. Subsequent policy development, implementation, and supporting analysis are 
further constrained and directed by the same influences, especially given that the 
individuals who carry out and direct these duties are themselves guided by the public 
construction of terrorism. These effects are reinforced by the specific endorsement and 
promotion of the construction by key policy leaders of the Bush administration and 
other opinion shapers who advanced the strategic narrative of the war on terror 
described above. 
Frames and Filters Thinking and Discussion 
The social construction of terrorism serves as a starting point for thinking about 
and understanding the problem.146 It determines what is focused on for consideration 
and discussion, and as a result what is by default left out of the frame of reference. In 
part this is the result of the power of definition and importance of how we choose to 
discuss something: 
[O]ur way of speaking plays an active role in creating and changing our 
perceptions, our cognition and our emotions. First, as something particularly 
human, language moulds how we see the world; it is the main determinant of our 
perceptions, our access to concrete reality. From knowing the difference 
between an apple and a hand grenade, to knowing what to do with each in 
relevant situations, language shapes our understanding of the world around us.147 
                                                
146 Tuman, Communicating Terror. 
147 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 21-2. Casebeer similarly explains how 
narratives shape our understanding and actions: “Reasoning by metaphor and analogy, a 
research program explored by Mark Johnson, George Lakoff, Giles Fauconnier, and 
Mark Turner, argues that our most complex mental tasks are usually carried out not by 
the ‘classical mechanics’ of rational actor theory (where stories really have no place), 
but rather by a set of analogy making and metaphor mapping abilities that form the core 
of human cognition. Exploration into the ‘story-telling mind’ is a research program that 
combines metaphor and analogy into an examination of the powerful grip narrative has 
on human cognition; narratives can restructure our mental spaces in ways that 
profoundly affect our reasoning ability and, ultimately, what we make of the world. 
Think of the grip that the ‘Jihad versus McWorld’ narrative has on Al Qaeda and how 
this affects the way they think about the future. As Mark Turner notes, ‘Story is a basic 
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The war on terror has become the natural background frame shaping the perception and 
consideration of all issues related to terrorism: 
It is assumed without debate or public questioning that terrorism is a problem of 
the sort that must be addressed by a “war.” The War on Terror has thus achieved 
the status of a background narrative. It is used by members of the attentive 
public as the source for categories, questions to be considered, and criteria for 
evaluating options...148 
Defining the frame of reference, and prioritizing the importance of elements within it, 
leads to a series of secondary effects discussed in later sections of this chapter. These 
include: what those involved in analyzing threats or implementing policies choose to 
collect information on and learn more about to inform and guide their duties; the choice 
of which experts and agencies to turn to for guidance and implementation; what 
information is passed on to higher level decision makers, who often only have time for 
concise briefings of key information, and how they in turn contextualize, consider, and 
evaluate what they understand; and, creating an iterative cycle, what subsequent actions 
are taken as well as who is responsible for and involved in implementing those. 
The social construction also drives the associations and oppositions elicited, and 
whether our normative responses are positively or negatively predisposed.149 The 
language habitually used to discuss and frame a phenomenon also has important and 
powerful emotive effects. Certain phrases and associations “can make us feel anxious, 
fearful, angry or joyful.”150 Building upon the emotional trauma of the American 
experience of 9/11 and subsequent focus on other particularly threatening or despised 
acts of terrorism, the emotional power associated with the new social construction of 
terrorism is particularly strong. 
One of the reasons examining the influences of public thinking about terrorism 
is important is that social constructions are generally perceived as natural, normalized as 
the way things are expected to be, and unquestioned by most people.151 This has the 
                                                
principle of mind. Most of our experience, our knowledge, and our thinking is 
organized as stories.’” Casebeer and Russell, "Storytelling and Terrorism." 
148 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 17. See also: Lakoff, 2006, "'War on Terror,' 
Rest in Peace," Rockridge Institute (February 28), 
http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/research/lakoff/gwot_rip/. 
149 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 21. 
150 Ibid., 22. 
151 In this sense Berger and Luckmann focus on the institutionalization and 
normalization of social constructions. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction 
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effect of creating presumptions and biases for evaluation and action that are especially 
powerful given their instinctive application and the reflexive resistance when they are 
challenged. The unquestioned nature of social constructions coupled with their 
influence on framing and filtering our thinking and discourse has important implications 
for the consideration of how we respond to terrorism. The construction affects how we 
think, by influencing what is and is not associated, and by making some choices “appear 
perfectly reasonable and commonsensical while others appear absurd.”152 In the context 
of counterterrorism these effects presumptively privilege not just the consideration of 
enemy-centric over population-centric approaches, but even the underlying collection 
and evaluation of information that subsequently tends to make certain suggestions or 
evaluations seem obvious and other ones irrational and unacceptable based quite 
logically on what is (and is not) put forward for deliberation. 
With respect to changes in the social construction of terrorism, Americans are 
aware that after 9/11 things are different, as emphasized by political denunciations of a 
“pre-9/11” or “September 10” worldview.153 But most perceive this as simply a direct 
consequence of changes to the objective reality of the threat faced. Individual actors and 
the public at large thus unconsciously frame and filter thinking and discussion about 
terrorism. Even where notable disagreements remain about aspects of the threat faced, 
what generates it, and how best to respond, other important elements of the new 
construction remain shared and unquestioned. The evolved public construction of 
                                                
of Reality. In his classic book, The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle 
repeatedly explores the social construction of money, examining the intricate ways the 
concept of currency is dependent upon entirely socially created norms and expectations, 
which in many senses are purely arbitrary from an external perspective yet almost never 
questioned. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality. 
152 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 22. See also: Foucault, 1977, Discipline and 
Punishment: The Birth of the Prison, New York, Vintage Books. 
153 For example: Borger and Goldenberg, 2004, "Quoting President Bush," The 
Guardian, October 19, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/oct/19/uselections2004.russia. Bush, 
"President's Remarks in Greeley, Colorado.". Bush, 2006j, "Remarks by the President at 
John Doolittle for Congress Reception," (October 3), The White House Office of the 
Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061003-11.html. 
Cheney, 2004, "Vice President and Mrs. Cheney Q & A in Cedar Rapids, Iowa," 
(September 17), Office of the Vice President, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041023-5.html. McClellan, "Press 
Gaggle with Scott McClellan, Aboard Air Force One, En Route Allentown, 
Pennsylvania."  
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terrorism serves to constrain and define what can be contested and the chances for 
success of alternative approaches and understandings. 
Research into communication as well as social and cognitive psychology 
focusing on information processing, persuasion, and attitude change provides theoretical 
explanations and repeated experimental findings supporting the influence of shared 
constructions on our understanding, beliefs, and actions. A common element of 
cognitive processing models is that individuals rely on heuristics (short cuts, simple 
guides, “rules of thumb,” and common sense) to help filter and process information and 
guide judgments to come to “sufficiently accurate” assessments given constrained 
resources. Such heuristics are generally used as the default mode of processing and 
enable individuals to focus more highly involved central processing either on that 
information or those decisions deemed particularly important, as well as to enable 
individuals to simultaneously carry out other tasks.154 These heuristics also play a role 
in helping to determine what other information may be relevant for more involved or 
focused examination of an issue. The import of the social construction of terrorism is to 
help establish, direct, or reinforce specific heuristics that may come in play over the 
range of consideration of issues related to terrorism. The more that the social 
construction, or strategic narrative, on which these heuristics are based fails to 
accurately describe and define the threat the more likely that these heuristics will 
encourage counterproductive shortcuts and biased analysis.155 Similar theories and 
                                                
154 Bradley, 2007, "Neural Network Simulations Support Heuristic Processing Model of 
Cultivation Effects," Media Psychology 10. Chaiken, 1980, "Heuristic versus systematic 
information processing and the use of source versus message cues in persuasion," 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39 (5). Chaiken and Stangor, 1987, 
"Attitudes and attitude change," In Annual Review of Psychology, ed. Rosenzweig and 
Porter, Palo Alto, California: Annual Reviews Inc. Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, The 
Psychology of Attitudes, Fort Worth, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers. 
Petty and Cacioppo, 1981, "Issue involvement as a moderator of the effects of attitude 
on advertising content and context," Advances in Consumer Research 8. Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1986, "The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion," In Advances in 
experimental social psychology, ed. Berkowitz, New York: Academic Press.  
155 Such heuristics might include an assumption that violent Islamist groups seek to 
attack the United States and are likely to be working with other Islamist groups, both of 
which would tend to lead one to be less critical of information that is supportive, to 
interpret ambiguous information as being consistent, and to be dismissive of 
information that runs contrary. Other heuristics could include: presumptions that anyone 
who deals with terrorist groups are supportive of them and part of the problem; 
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research also suggests how individuals modify their behaviour, attitudes, and 
information processing out of motivations to avoid social isolation or to evaluate 
whether their opinions are correct by reference to those around them. These influences 
may help trigger the use of heuristic or more intensive processing paths for cognitive 
evaluation, as well as guide when and how an individual is willing to speak up on a 
controversial topic.156 This self-censorship in turn shapes the observed reality for other 
                                                
assumptions about terrorists real motivations leading to the discounting or ignoring of 
other claims they make; beliefs that anyone who appears sympathetic with, to be 
justifying, or expressing understanding of the grievances or goals allegedly motivating a 
terrorist group either doesn’t get it or is part of the problem; or, the assumption that all 
Islamists seek similar long term goals which are incompatible with liberal values 
leading to both the aggregation of potential diverse groups and the dismissal of 
alternative paths to countering the long term threat. 
156 For example, consider research into Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence theory: 
Noelle-Neumann, 1984, The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion – Our Social Skin, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Noelle-Neumann, 1974, "The Spiral of Silence: 
A Theory of Public Opinion," Journal of Communications 24. Noelle-Neumann, 1977, 
"Turbulences in the climate of opinion: Methodological applications of the spiral of 
silence theory," Public Opinion Quarterly 41. Noelle-Neumann and Petersen, 2004, 
"The Spiral of Silence and the Social Nature of Man," In Handbook of Political 
Communication Research, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Noelle-Neumann principally bases her theoretical explanation on a “fear of isolation” 
ground in Asch’s conformity research. Asch, 1951, "Effects of Group Pressure upon the 
Modification and Distortion of Judgments," In Groups, Leadership and Men: Research 
in Human Relations, ed. Guetzkow, New York: Russell & Russell, Inc. Asch, 1965, 
"Effect of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments," In 
Dimension in Communication, ed. Campbell and Hepler, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing. While her original theory has been criticized and has only shown small 
measurable effects over many studies, refinements to the theory and exploration of other 
motivating influences provide additional support for how shared social judgments 
influence and constrain individual attitudes. Glynn and McLeod, 1984, "Public opinion 
du jour: an examination of the spiral of silence," Public Opinion Quarterly 48. Glynn, 
Hayes and Shanahan, 1997, "Perceived Support for One's Opinions and Willingness to 
Speak Out: A Meta-Analysis of Survey Studies on the 'Spiral of Silence'," Public 
Opinion Quarterly 61 (3), Fall. Glynn and McLeod, 1985, "Implications of the spiral of 
silence theory for communication an public opinion research," In Political 
Communication Yearbook 1984, ed. Sanders, Kaid and Nimmo, Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press. Neuwirth and Frederick, 2004, "Peer and Social Influence on 
Opinion Expression: Combining the Theories of Planned Behavior and the Spiral of 
Silence," Communication Research 31 (6), December. Neuwirth, Frederick and Mayo, 
2007, "The Spiral of Silence and Fear of Isolation," Journal of Communication 57 (3), 
September: 450-1, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/cgi-
bin/fulltext/118502287/PDFSTART. Salmon and Kline, 1985, "The Spiral of Silence 
Ten Years Later: An Examination and Evaluation," In Political Communication 
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individuals, influencing their social and evaluative judgments about what ideas to 
consider and what ideas are commonly held to be valid, as well indirectly by what is 
marginalized or obscured. 
Guides and Constrains National Strategy and Policy 
How the public and political leaders talk and think about terrorism, especially 
the perceptions of the threat posed to the United States and the strong emotional 
response motivating government action, places terrorism at or near the top of the 
national agenda while guiding and constraining subsequent action. The way the problem 
is framed by both the social construction and strategic narrative described above creates 
political capital and incentives for politicians and bureaucracies to pursue specific 
strategies, while constraining or discouraging others.157 Of course, the language of 
terrorism has long had a particularly politically charged effect.158 After 9/11 the way 
American political leaders and the public framed and came to understand terrorism 
strengthened and modified the existing normative construction of the term. The war on 
terror now functions “to normalize and legitimize the current counter-terrorist 
approach,” “to empower the authorities and shield them from criticism,” and to 
marginalize or disadvantage dissenting opinions or alternate approaches.159 This 
                                                
Yearbook 1984, ed. Sanders, Kaid and Nimmo, Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press. James Der Derian relates a specific anecdote of the failure of those 
who held similar critical attitudes to his about the American approach to the war on 
terror failing to speak up publicly given the normative constraints of the dominant 
construction. Der Derian, 2004, "9/11 and Its Consequences for the Discipline," In 
Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, Heft, June, 89-90, http://www.zib-
online.info/zib/hefte/ZIB_1_2004.pdf. 
157 “Expressed another way, we can say that language has a reality-making effect; it is a 
way of constructing reality and not merely reflecting it. Because language affects 
perception, cognition and emotion, it inevitably also affects concrete political action; it 
has consequences for social processes and structures.” Jackson, Writing the War on 
Terrorism, 23. 
158 “It is clear from surveying the literature on terrorism, as well as the public debate, 
that what one calls things matters. There are few neutral terms in politics, because 
political language affects the perceptions of protagonists and audiences, and such effect 
acquires a greater urgency in the drama of terrorism. Similarly, the meaning of terms 
change to fit a changing context. Concept follows politics.” Crenshaw, ed 1995b, 
Terrorism in Context, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 7. 
159 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 2. Similarly: Lakoff and Frisch, "Five Years 
After 9/11.". Soros, 2006, "A Self-Defeating War," Wall Street Journal, August 15, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115560280788735731.html. 
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thinking further sets and constrains the agenda, rewarding particularly hard and 
aggressive counterterrorism approaches with domestic support and political resources, 
while devaluing and limiting other actions important to a population-centric strategy as 
described at the end of Chapter Two. 
Research into the effect and influence of public opinion on foreign policy 
provides a number of possible theoretical explanations for the influence of the social 
construction of terrorism as well as some suggestive empirical support.160 Noelle-
Neumann takes a strong view arguing that public opinion is a “powerful force capable 
of resolving conflicts, [and] toppling governments.”161 Media studies have suggested 
that modern 24-hour news coverage provides a “policy forcing” mechanism and create 
potential for real time knowledge and feedback allowing public opinion to influence 
foreign policy.162 Public choice arguments apply economic theories to argue that 
especially in a two party system politicians adopt and advocate positions reflective of 
majority viewpoints in order to maximize their electoral chances.163  
Poliheuristic theory provides a more specific explanation for how the public 
construction serves to constrain and guide American counterterrorism policy consistent 
                                                
160 For example: Hill, 2003, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Palgrave, 262-8. 
Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam. Wittkopf, 
1990, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Duke 
University Press. 
161 Noelle-Neumann, 1993, The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion – Our Social Skin, 
2nd ed, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. In full, she notes: “The effectiveness 
of public opinion as a powerful force capable of resolving conflicts, toppling 
governments, and oppressing individuals who resist until the “dead member falls from 
the social body” has been uncovered in more and more new areas: in the stories of the 
Bible and in Homer, in the unwritten laws of antiquity, in fairy tales as well as in the 
present. In recent years, history has taught us a great lesson in public opinion through 
the breakdown of Marxism in Eastern Europe. Aristotle maintained that a king who 
loses the support of his people is no longer a king. No longer a king, no longer a 
dictator, no longer a ruler.” 
162 Gilboa, 2000, "Mass Communication and Diplomacy: A Theoretical Framework," 
Communication Theory 10. Gilboa, 2002, "Global Communication and Foreign Policy," 
Journal of Communication 52, December. Gilboa, 2005, "Global Television News and 
Foreign Policy: Debating the CNN Effect," International Studies Perspectives 6 (3), 
August. 
163 Black, 1948, "On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making," The Journal of Political 
Economy 56 (1), February. Holcombe, 1989, "The Median Voter Model in Public 
Choice Theory," Public Choice 61 (2), May. 
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with the normative aspects of widely held attitudes on an important subject, in 
suggesting that political leaders apply a two-step process to decision making: 
During the first stage, the set of possible options is reduced by applying a 
“noncompensatory principle” to eliminate any alternative with an unacceptable 
return on a critical, typically political, decision dimension. Once the choice set 
has been reduced to alternatives that are acceptable to the decision maker, the 
process moves to a second stage, during which the decision maker uses more 
analytic processing in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits.164 
How the public talks and thinks about terrorism constrains the choices deemed 
acceptable in the first stage, especially as proponents of poliheuristic theory even when 
examining foreign policy questions generally posit that “domestic politics are ‘the 
essence of decision’ because decision-makers almost always try to avoid choices that 
could bring political damage to themselves.”165 Thus counterterrorism strategies, 
beyond the aggressive disrupt and destroy focused tactics, associated with elements of 
an overall population-centric approach are often taken out of or deemphasized for 
consideration. This influence is repeated in the second stage to the degree that the 
decision maker themselves, as well as those advising and assisting them, share the 
perspective of the social construction of terrorism constraining and biasing how they 
evaluate the remaining choices.  
Consistent with this explanation, Joseph Nye explains why focuses on soft 
power, have received little attention compared to hard counterterrorism in the post-9/11 
environment: 
Soft power is an analytical term, not a political slogan and perhaps that is why, 
not surprisingly, it has taken hold in academic analysis, and in other places like 
Europe, China and India, but not in the American political debate. Especially in 
the current political climate, it makes a lousy slogan – post 9/11 emotions left 
little room for anything described as “soft.” We may need soft power as a 
nation, but it is a difficult political sell for politicians. Bill Clinton captured the 
new mindset of the American people when he said that the electorate would 
always choose “strong and wrong” over “timid and right.”166 
                                                
164 Mintz, 2004, "How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (1), February. 
165 Sandal, Zhang, James and James, 2006, "Poliheuristic Theory in Comparative 
Perspective: Theory and Evidence for Turkey and China," In Annual Meeting of the 
International Studies Association, San Diego, California, March, 
http://web.missouri.edu/~umcaspolswww/papers/Zhang_ISA2006.pdf. See also: Mintz, 
"How Do Leaders Make Decisions?." 
166 Nye, "Our Impoverished Discourse." 
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The constraints created by the current thinking are both self-enforced, as politicians and 
other policy-makers are very much attuned to public attitudes and potential 
consequences, as well as reinforced by political partisans, pundits, and other opinion 
shapers and highly attentive members of the public who draw upon the power of general 
public attitudes.167  
Although bureaucratic level decision makers in executive, military, and 
intelligence agencies involved in efforts related to the war on terror are more insulated 
from the electoral implications, they are likely influenced in a similar way to the degree 
that they share the general public construction and as they are more directly sensitive to 
the strategic narrative as advanced by the administration in power. From a top-down 
perspective, the adoption and promotion of the dominant construction by the current 
administration’s strategic narrative, as well as politicians more generally, creates an 
environment in which the influences and rewards of resources and responsibilities 
encourage consistent action, favour those bureaucratic agencies already so predisposed, 
and neglect those who do not adapt. While from the bottom-up, individuals holding 
ideas and attitudes consistent with the public construction collectively influence the 
orientation and actions of their agencies. 
The Cognitive Dissonance of Studying Terrorism 
The highly normative and oppositional nature of how we talk and think about 
terrorism generates individual and social biases that discourage and constrain efforts to 
understand the phenomenon. In the preface to The Psychology of Terrorism John 
Horgan asks: 
Where do we begin to try to understand such an act? Indeed, why even try to 
understand it? Perhaps we might be better off just to condemn it. Maybe 
attempts to understand such behaviour might detract from the sense of outrage 
and shock that seems a more appropriate and justifiable reaction than any 
supposed intellectual debate?168 
At the end of that work he argues: 
A crucial imperative here involves recognizing the social, political and 
psychological conditions in which we are more likely to condone actions against 
terrorists that in the long run do more harm than good. In the immediate climate 
post-11 September, to convey this statement would probably have led to (and 
                                                
167 Der Derian, "9/11 and Its Consequences for the Discipline," 90. 
168 Emphasis in original. Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, xii.  
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probably still does in certain quarters) a view about the analyst that 
‘understanding terrorism’ equates to somehow ‘forgiving’ the terrorist and 
sympathizing with his plight. Of course it should never imply such identification 
with the aggressor, but it reflects a reality of political violence – terrorists 
frequently claim victimization as a justification for further violence (often 
conducted on behalf of a ‘represented’ community).169 
This section analyzes in more depth the personal and social disapproval with 
“understanding terrorism” after 9/11 that Horgan references in passing, and then 
examines how this moral discomfort with really understanding terrorism undermines the 
population-centric approach needed to win Muslim hearts and minds.170 
It Feels Wrong to Understand 
Our strong inclination is to morally denounce and unambiguously reject the use 
of terrorism. However, especially in the context of terrorism arising out of broad and 
long-running societal conflicts with complex related grievances, understanding the 
dynamics contributing to terrorism and potential public support for or sympathy with 
those using violent tactics often requires recognizing and appreciating that there are “no 
white hats or black hats.”171 This in turn generates uncomfortable and problematic 
ethical concerns associated with the observation that “to understand is to forgive.” 172 
Deeply exploring these conflicts one often realizes that cycles of blame, shared 
                                                
169 Ibid., 167. 
170 Writing in 2005 Horgan was largely focused on an academic audience, possibly 
including a policy audience that was already particularly receptive to a more rigorous 
and challenging understanding of terrorism. This section argues that from a larger 
American public perspective, as well as from a focus on the approach of the Bush 
administration, the biases against an open and critical understanding of terrorism remain 
stronger and more persistent than Horgan’s language of “probably still does in certain 
quarters” would imply. 
171 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. 
172 The idea that knowledge leads to forgiveness is captured in the French phrase tout 
comprendre c’est tout pardoner, drawing upon the human tendency to be more likely to 
forgive or to perceive mitigating circumstances the more we understand the particular 
history behind, contributing factors of, and context around bad behaviour. In his 
philosophical study of forgiveness in interpersonal and political contexts, Charles 
Griswold emphasizes the complexity and distinctions of aspects related to mitigating 
blame through exculpatory factors that may lead to excusing or diminished 
responsibility as well as those that lead to forgiveness. He writes: “The difficulties arise 
in part because of the sheer complexity of the concept of voluntary action. One could 
argue that there are always mitigating excuses, that wrong-doing is never just voluntary; 
there is always a story about how one ended up doing the evil deed.” Griswold, 2007, 
Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, Cambridge University Press, 7. 
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responsibility, mutual misunderstanding, and some good deeds and intentions on all 
sides make absolute moral judgments unsatisfying. Jenkins explains this presumption 
working against more nuanced analysis of the problem: 
The understanding of terrorism itself can arouse suspicions. “Understanding” 
simply connotes comprehension, but “to be understanding” suggests something 
less judgmental, a softening of attitude toward punishment and retribution, 
substandard zeal in pursuing dangerous evildoers. Terrorists are not to be 
understood but to be eradicated.173 
For individuals it therefore often feels wrong to understand the complex factors 
contributing to terrorism – because of the association between “being understanding” 
with mitigating, forgiving, and condoning. Both individually and socially this leads 
many to reject or diminish consideration of explanations that could be interpreted as 
sympathetic with those using violence, while favouring explanations more consistent 
with clear-cut denunciation of those employing terrorism.174 Hegghammer suggests that 
this effect of the more highly emotional and normative construction of terrorism after 
9/11 has hindered the learning needed to more effectively respond: 
More than six years after 9/11, the study of jihadism is still in its infancy. Why 
has it taken so long to develop? One reason, of course, is that we started almost 
from scratch. Another factor is that it takes time for primary sources to emerge. 
But the most important reason is no doubt that the emotional outrage at al-
Qaeda’s violence has prevented us from seeing clearly. Societies touched by 
terrorism are always the least well placed to understand their enemies. It is only 
when we see the jihadists not as agents of evil or as religious fanatics, but as 
humans, that we stand a chance of understanding them.175 
                                                
173 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 57. See also: Kapitan, "The Terrorism of 
'Terrorism'," 8. 
174 These tendencies are consistent with psychological theories about the resolution of 
cognitive dissonance. Individuals and social groups tend to reject information that 
increases dissonance – in this case information that increases understanding of 
underlying conflict dynamics, grievances, past histories, and multi-sided responsibilities 
for blameworthy acts. Individuals and social groups also tend to display confirmation 
biases for information consistent with the dominant construction of terrorism – for 
example, evidence that the motives and goals of those labelled as terrorists are as 
reprehensible as their means. However, undermining predictive value, cognitive 
dissonance may also explain the opposite reaction of some people who become stronger 
critics of their own government’s actions in response to the dissonant information of 
previous grievances contributing to current political violence. 
175 Hegghammer, 2008, "Jihadi Studies," The Times Literary Supplement, April 2, 
http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/the_tls/article366750
5.ece. 
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Richardson argues that American political leaders have framed the issue to delegitimize 
any consideration or need for understanding of underlying grievances that drive the 
larger potentially supportive populations who are key to hearts and minds goals.176 The 
discomfort created by the dominant construction of terrorism over consideration of the 
deeper dynamics driving contentious action both creates subconscious as well as 
conscious influences to constrain, redirect, self-censor, or at least exercise strong 
caution in approaching such issues.177  
To understand and to be understanding are of course different concepts. This 
thesis argues that we need to do a better job of understanding terrorism, which likely 
involves being more understanding of larger potentially sympathetic populations, but 
does not require less of a moral denunciation of the use of terrorist tactics nor 
necessitate a moral judgment that specific U.S. policies were wrong. Indeed, we will 
perhaps most often come to the decision that specific U.S. policies are desirable, 
however using the knowledge that comes from a better understanding to take other 
actions to decrease or protect against the threat of violence, while also increasing 
counterterrorism efforts directly targeting those who may pose such threats. 
                                                
176 “The president put it this way: ‘In fact, we’re not facing a set of grievances that can 
be soothed and addressed. We’re facing a radical ideology with unalterable objectives: 
to enslave whole nations and intimidate the world. No act of ours invited the rage of the 
killers – and no concession, bribe or act of appeasement would change or limit their 
plans for murder.’ In so saying the President delegitimized any effort to engage with the 
grievances that might have fueled support for bin Laden.” Richardson, What Terrorists 
Want, 196. quoting Bush, 2005d, "President Discusses War on Terror at National 
Endowment for Democracy," (October 6), The White House Office of the Press 
Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3.html. Here 
Richardson is also making a larger criticism of the tendency of the Bush administration 
to frame the war on terror in religious moral language of good and evil where God is on 
our side. She cites several cases where President Bush explicitly invokes God in 
framing arguments that the terrorists represent all that is evil. 
177 The degree of caution exercised even by those academics and experts who raise this 
problem is indicative of the strength of these forces. The introduction (and often 
subsequent discussion) of these criticisms is very frequently accompanied by explicit 
emphasis that this is not to suggest that anyone other than the terrorists are morally to 
blame. For example, Michael Scheuer discusses the grievances he says motivate al-
Qaida as “predicate conditions,” rhetorically decontaminating and distancing his 
assessment from casting blame on those U.S. policies. John Horgan puts quotes around 
the word “represents” to disconnect the potentially sympathetic larger population and 
the terrorist groups alleging to act in their name. 
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How the Construction Solves this Dissonance 
Post-9/11 thinking and talking about terrorism demonstrates a classic dissonance 
resolution to the discomfort caused by considering that at least intelligible grievances 
may have contributed to support for groups using tactics of terrorism. News media 
reports on “why do they hate us” have often listed the consistent history of specific 
policy complaints being raised in the Muslim world, and experts – including some from 
the U.S. intelligence, defence, and diplomatic communities – have regularly made the 
same point. However, the official and strongly defended judgment of the Bush 
administration is that any claim that terrorism or radical support is caused by U.S. 
policies, or indeed by anything other than a hatred of freedom and love of destruction, is 
simply wrong, misguided, and counterproductive. Reflecting and constrained by the 
predispositions of the general public, political leaders and supportive opinion elites have 
repeatedly spoken about the need for moral clarity and a “clear understanding” of this 
point. For example, President Bush has said, “In the war on terror, there is no place for 
confusion and no substitute for victory.”178 Secretary Rumsfeld similarly has spoken out 
against questioning of this position in a manner serving to rhetorically reinforce 
agreement arguing, “Any kind of moral and intellectual confusion about who and what 
is right or wrong can severely weaken the ability of free societies to persevere.”179 
The problem this thesis highlights is the tendency, especially pronounced in the 
United States in the current war on terror, of allowing a desire for unambiguous moral 
blame to lead to antagonism towards any analysis that may be perceived as 
                                                
178 Bush, "President’s Remarks on Homeland Security in New Jersey." Similarly see: 
Bush, "Remarks by the President at Connecticut Republican Committee Luncheon.". 
Kerry, 2004b, "Senator John Kerry's Remarks in Pennsylvania," The New York Times, 
September 24, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/24/politics/campaign/25TEXT-
KERRY.html. 
179 Tyson, 2006, "Rumsfeld Assails Critics of War Policy," Washington Post, August 
30. A sophisticated version of these arguments recognizes an important distinction 
between moral responsibility for violent actions and the “predicate factors,” “root 
causes,” or “exploited and enabling grievances” that contribute to understanding the 
context and dynamics driving the use of and support for political violence. However, 
political leaders responsible for maintaining broad support for difficult policies, from a 
public that generally does not have the time or opportunity to engage in nuanced 
consideration of these issues, may understandably prefer a simplified explanation. 
Casting moral judgments on terrorism in a black and white manner is also far from 
unique to the Bush administration, being a consistent bipartisan practice of previous 
U.S. administrations as well as of other world leaders. 
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complicating that clarity. For example, after key points of the declassified 2006 
National Intelligence Estimate on Trends in Global Terrorism were cited as concluding 
that the Iraq war had increased terrorist recruitment, President Bush warned that 
accepting this type of thinking would increase the threat to the United States by buying 
“into the enemy’s propaganda” and that “if this ever becomes the mind set of the 
policymakers in Washington, it means we’ll go back to the old days of waiting to be 
attacked and then respond.”180 
They are Evil: No Understanding (Apologists) Allowed 
Too often the current approach to talking and thinking about terrorism 
aggressively discourages a deeper understanding by turning the normative power of this 
discourse on those who advocate alternative viewpoints, morally denouncing and 
rejecting them as complicit in or even outright supporters of terrorism.181 Kapitan 
describes the effects of the public construction of terrorism writing: 
Because of its negative connotation, the ‘terrorist’ label automatically discredits 
any individuals or groups to which it is affixed. It dehumanizes them, places 
them outside the norms of acceptable social and political behavior, and portrays 
them as people who cannot be reasoned with. By delegitimizing any individuals 
or groups described as ‘terrorist,’ the rhetoric: erases any incentive an audience 
might have to understand their point of view so that questions about the nature 
and origins of their grievances and the possible legitimacy of their demands will 
                                                
180 Bush, "President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror." See also: "Declassified 
Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate 'Trends in Global Terrorism: 
Implications for the United States'," 2006, (April), 
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf. Secretary 
Rumsfeld similarly argues for rejection of explanations that American policies 
contribute to the rise of terrorism, noting that to accept this is to “return to the 
destructive view that America – not the enemy – is the real source of the world’s 
trouble.” Tyson, "Rumsfeld Assails Critics of War Policy." 
181 Bianco, 2006, "Understanding v. Appeasement," TheAbsurdReport.com (August 2), 
http://www.theabsurdreport.com/2006/understanding-v-appeasement/. Kamiya, 2006, 
"Why We Can't Win the 'War on Terror'," Salon (September 15), 
http://www.salon.com/books/review/2006/09/15/richardson/print.html. Walid Phares’s 
writings exemplify this aspect of the post-9/11 social construction labelling those who 
disagree with the idea of a unified global jihad focused on destroying the United States 
as “blind to jihad or Jihadophiles themselves,” suggesting that those promoting these 
ideas are potentially responsible “for the defeat of the free world,” and argues that even 
six years after 9/11 “the bulk of the cultural establishment, a majority of artistic talents 
and celebrities, and a segment of the political elite are blocking the full mobilization of 
liberal democracies in what may be a fight for their existence.” Phares, The 
Confrontation, 5, 14. 
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not even be raised; deflects attention away from policies that might have 
contributed to their grievances; [and] repudiates any calls to negotiate with 
them… If individuals and groups are portrayed as irrational, barbaric, and 
beyond the pale of negotiation and compromise, then asking why they resort to 
terrorism is viewed as pointless, needlessly accommodating, or, at best, mere 
pathological curiosity.182 
Jenkins, despite coming from a very different perspective,183 reaches a very similar 
conclusion: 
But if terrorists could not be dismissed as crazies, they could instead be elevated 
to the realm of evil. Evil is a powerful concept. It resonates with those who have 
a Manichaean view of the world and is popular with those who see the devil not 
as a theological abstraction but as a real-world operator. This view also 
discourages research: Evil people are just evil. No further explanation is 
required, no deeper inquiry is necessary. To explore the mind set or the decision 
making of evil doers is to try to fathom evil itself – it is futile and unnecessary. 
In this view, any inquiry that suggests taking terrorists out of the evil-incarnate 
category also undermines the inquirer’s claim on good.184 
To a significant degree the problem each of these experts cite is inherent in our desire 
for terrorism to be a strongly normative construct. Because we want our language about 
terrorism to assist us in enforcing a societal prohibition against violent political attacks 
on civilians, we make it much more likely that the power of that language will be used 
against efforts to understand underlying dynamics. 
This problem is heightened by the more highly normative construction of 
terrorism in the U.S. after 9/11 framing the war on terror as a morally simple battle 
between good and evil: 
To stand up to evil you have to be morally strong. If you’re weak, you let evil 
triumph, so that weakness is a form of evil in itself, as is promoting weakness. 
Evil is inherent, an essential trait, that determines how you will act in the world. 
Evil people do evil things. No further explanation is necessary. There can be no 
social causes of evil, no religious rationale for evil, no reasons or arguments for 
evil.185 
                                                
182 Kapitan, "The Terrorism of 'Terrorism'," 6-7. 
183 Kapitan may be fairly described as coming from a “critical” academic tradition, as 
highlighted by his involvement with “a diverse community of engaged philosophers and 
philosophically oriented intellectuals” publishing on the web as part of the 
CognitiveDissidents.org project. Jenkins has been a Captain with the U.S. Army Special 
Forces who served in Vietnam, a Deputy Chairman of the security consulting firm Kroll 
Associates, and an advisor in many positions to national and international government 
commissions and boards. 
184 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 57.  
185 Lakoff, "Metaphors of Terror." 
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Jackson similarly explains: 
Second, the language of good and evil suppresses questions: we don’t need to 
ask what the motivations or aims of the terrorists were if they are ‘evil’, as ‘evil’ 
is its own motivation and its own self-contained explanation. Evil people do not 
have any politics and there is no need to examine their causes or grievances. Evil 
people do what they do simply because they are evil. Clearly, the use of this 
language is a way of encouraging quiescence and displacing more complex 
understandings of political and social events.186 
The temptation and easy path is to stop with the moral denunciation and the labelling of 
terrorists as evil, when what is needed is complimentary action to insure an as unbiased 
and open assessment as possible of the particular problems faced in responding to a 
terrorist threat.187 Yglesias argues: 
This notion that in order to preserve the terrorists moral culpability for their 
atrocities we need to believe that their actions are somehow uncaused is daft… 
To be sure, there are some implacable opponents out there who we’ll have to do 
our best to kill. But there are also lots of other people out there – placable 
opponents, young kids with unformed views, fence-sitters, whatever – and our 
actions do, indeed, play a role in whether or not they become implacable 
opponents. This matters. It probably matters more than anything else. And the 
domination of Western politics by people who don’t understand that is going, 
one day, to get an awful lot of Americans killed.188 
Kinsley observes that political and partisan predispositions of the Bush administration 
and many of their supporters reinforce the tendency of the post-9/11 public construction 
of terrorism to focus on an its “all-about-evil” explanation and avoid examination of 
what motivates and generates support for terrorist acts. He argues that examination of 
the detailed grievances of Muslim populations violates a long-standing taboo against 
                                                
186 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 69. 
187 Michael Kinsley articulates: “Calling terrorists ‘evil’ requires no courage and 
justifies no self-congratulatory puffing. It’s just not a problem. But it’s also not a 
solution. There are many people, unfortunately, who would be happy to hijack four 
airplanes, fly them into crowded buildings, and kill 3,000 Americans. In terms of 
malign intent, they all are evil. But only one of them managed to actually do it. The 
concept of evil tells you nothing about why – among the many evils wished upon the 
United States – this one actually happened. Nor does ‘evil’ help us to figure out how to 
stop evil from visiting itself upon us again.” Kinsley, 2002, "Deliver Us From Evil," 
Slate (September 19), http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2071148. 
188 Emphasis in original. Yglesias, 2006, "Causes and Responsibilities," The Atlantic 
(September 28), http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2006/09/24-week/. 
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“blaming America first.”189 Thus the explanation is “evil” with “nothing else to 
discuss,” as he concludes:  
They are so afraid of the fallacy of “tout comprendre c’est tout pardoner” that 
they fall right into it: In order to avoid the danger that understanding terrorism 
might lead to excusing terrorism, they put understanding itself beyond the pale. 
This is not just anti-intellectual, but actually a hindrance to the war on terrorism. 
Blocking any deeper understanding of the terrorist’s mentality and motives 
cannot be good for the war effort.190 
One manifestation of this aspect of the dominant construction has been to cast as 
suspect and significantly constrain the influence of those perceived as sympathetic to 
populations in the Muslim world. This especially includes those labelled as “Arabists” 
(used with a negative connotation) at the Department of State or in divisions of U.S. 
intelligence agencies long tasked with studying Muslim countries.191 Another social 
manifestation and enforcement of this aspect of the construction is the common 
rhetorical move to denounce and discredit examination of contributing factors by 
labelling those who advocate such an approach as “apologists” or “appeasers.”192 
                                                
189 Kinsley, "Deliver Us From Evil." An effect of this is to create a “blame America 
Last” bias in American thinking about terrorism. Petti, 2006, "Blame America Last," 
The Duck of Minerva (November 17), 
http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2006/11/blame-america-last.html. 
190 Kinsley, "Deliver Us From Evil." 
191 Glain, 2004, "Freeze-Out of the Arabists," The Nation, October 14, 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20041101/glain. Graham, 2006, "Old Hands on Deck," 
The Walrus (October 18), http://www.walrusmagazine.com/articles/2006.06-
international-security-iraq-war-exit-strategy/] . Kaplan, 1993, The Arabists: The 
Romance of an American Elite, New York, Free Press. Yglesias, "The Said Factor." 
192 Exemplars include: Bukay, 2008, "The Esposito School: Islamic Apologists in 
Action, or Who is the 'Near Enemy'?," Sharia Finance Watch, July 1, 
http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/5324. Feder, 2006, "In the War on Terror, 
Liberals are More Dangerous than Muslims," HumanEvents.com (September 11), 
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=16958. Geras, 2005, "There are 
Apologists Amongst Us," The Guardian, July 21, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/jul/21/july7.iraq. Laskin, 2005, "U Penn's Terror 
Apologists," FrontPage Magazine, March 30, 
http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.aspx?GUID={5F68709D-B81B-46B0-
A476-F4B786F7C3B7}. Netanyahu, 2002, "What We're Fighting: The Root Cause of 
Terrorism – It's Tyranny," Wall Street Journal, April 19, 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=105001950. Radu, 2002, "The 
Futile Search for 'Root Causes' of Terrorism," E-Notes (April 23), Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/americawar.20020423.radu.futilesearchforrootcauses.html. 
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The Construction Biases and Constrains the Understanding Needed 
How we talk and think about terrorism works to constrain and bias our 
understanding at individual and social levels, through mechanisms that are subconscious 
and conscious. At a basic level, the degree to which we accept the common collective 
framing of terrorism, focusing on evil actors seeking goals that are on face unjustifiable, 
decreases the motivation for a wide range of people – from political leaders and 
government agency decision makers to low-level military and government personnel – 
involved in the actual implementation and development of policies related to the war on 
terror to fully critically consider what gives rise to and drives the potential support for 
groups using tactics of terrorism from larger populations. The binary division of the 
conflict, coupled with the repeated simple narrative that Western states are defending 
civilization and universal ideals while terrorists seek totalitarian oppression achieved 
through death and destruction, creates a presumption that anyone or any population who 
might be sympathetic with them or choose to provide support to them is an enemy – 
with the effect of significantly devaluing any other possible explanation for such 
sympathies or support.193 As the discussion of lessons from classic and contemporary 
insurgencies as well as the study of social movements in Chapter Two emphasizes, 
without a pervasive population-centric understanding of the strategy needed to counter a 
global insurgency and the potential related disparate local conflicts we will not achieve 
the recommended unity of effort, and instead will often end up with a wide range of 
rhetoric and action running counter to overall strategic goals. 
At a more advanced or in-depth level, where the dynamics driving groups using 
terrorism and populations related to them are considered, how we talk and think about 
terrorism enables confirmation biases and suppression of dissonant information to filter, 
frame, and focus our understanding of the phenomenon. The result again emphasizes an 
enemy and threat-centric perspective over the population-centric approach 
recommended by a social movement and counterinsurgency foundation. In part this 
occurs because of what we do and do not tend to study and analyze, coupled with how 
                                                
Muslims (June 25), Islam-Watch.org, http://www.islam-
watch.org/MuminSalih/BlameWest.htm. Taranto, 2005, "Best of the Web Today: Why 
Do They Hate Us?," Wall Street Journal, July 13, 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/best/?id=110006957. 
193 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 194. 
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we initially understand and assess those elements, their relevance, and the connecting 
agency. These biases make it more likely that in analyzing and developing responses we 
will seek out and embrace information that is consistent with the overall enemy-centric 
construction, while passing over or raising the bar for information that is inconsistent. 
For example, consider the often-asserted criteria for assessing the threat of 
terrorists that we should “listen to what they say,” “read what they write,” and “take 
them at their word.”194 On its own this measure is neutral and presumptively appropriate 
advice. However, in practice in U.S. political and policy debates since 9/11, it has more 
been used as a rhetorical trump card to highlight evidence consistent with the dominant 
construction while rarely given equal weight to dissonant evidence. This occurs in who 
is and is not listened to or read, what particular speeches or writings are chosen, and 
how ambiguous or contradictory information is portrayed and interpreted. A young 
radical British Muslim, without connections to any international group, saying that 
“Islam will conquer the White House” and “Downing Street” is put forward as proof of 
global Islamist aspirations,195 while the repeated focus on local issues and divisions 
between Islamist groups is deemphasized in public discussions of the threat.196 
Denunciations of Hizballah by al-Qaida leaders197 and al-Qaida by Hizballah leaders198 
                                                
194 For example: Farah, 2006, "Jihad, Zakat and Words from the Master," 
CounterTerrorismBlog.org, 
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/11/jihad_zakat_and_words_from_the.php. 
Fletcher, 2006, "Bush Warns Of Enduring Terror Threat: Words of Bin Laden, Allies 
Show Their Goals, He Says," http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/05/AR2006090500312_pf.html. Phares, 2006, "The Caliph-
Strophic Debate," CounterTerrorismBlog.org, 
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the War on Terror, Brassey's. 
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does not undercut allegations that they are working towards the same global goals,199 as 
are indications that Hizballah is focused on local nationalist political goals,200 rather 
than being part of some Islamist alliance seeking a global caliphate.201 We highlight 
calls for violence in response to the publication of Danish cartoons deemed insulting to 
the prophet Mohammad, and interpret subsequent mass protests as proof that majorities 
in the Muslim world support such violence, while ignoring prominent Muslim leaders 
who called for non-violent protest and the fact that the vast majority of the protests were 
peaceful.202 I do not believe this is generally used deceitfully, with conscious awareness 
of the biased and inconsistent application, but instead is a simple manifestation of how 
the construction functions to filter and focus our understanding. Information consistent 
with expectations is heuristically sorted as credible and confirming, while information 
that is inconsistent is not reported, unconsciously discounted, or more critically 
examined with a presumption of being suspect. 
Another example of how the construction constrains and biases our 
understanding is shown in what is studied and analyzed. Because of his importance to 
militant Islamists for establishing arguments about an individual Islamic duty to engage 
in violent jihad and his enmity towards the United States, policy elites and others highly 
engaged in discussions about the war on terror have become increasingly familiar with 
the name Sayyid Qutb. But these same people are not familiar with many prominent 
                                                
198 For example: “Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, Hizbollah’s spiritual founding 
father, dismissed Al Qaeda’s claim that its attacks had been religiously sanctioned. In 
dozens of interviews, sermons, and lectures immediately after September 11, Fadlallah, 
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rather than “martyrdom operations,” and thus deemed them illegitimate.” Gerges, 
Journey of the Jihadist, 189. 
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Hizballah, Bush mentioned attacks and threats from other terrorist groups and then 
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200 Roy, Globalized Islam, 63. 
201 Phares, The Confrontation, 16. 
202 "Qaradawi Condemns Violent Cartoon Protests," 2006, IslamOnline.net (February 
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Islamists who have renounced al-Qaida,203 such as Egyptian Yusuf al-Qaradawi who 
has a “hugely popular program on al-Jazeera” which “advances an Islamist 
understanding of all aspects of life” and is “singularly anti-bin Laden.”204 Similarly, 
consistent with the construction, policy elites are more likely to think of the Muslim 
Brotherhood for its historical connections to al-Qaida through the splinter group 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, than for the modern sharp split between the two over theology 
and violent methods.205 In national security discussions Hamas’s historic connections to 
the Muslim Brotherhood are given more weight to describe the overall Islamist threat 
than the extensive efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in electoral politics 
in Egypt and Syria are seen as potential for moderation and non-violent inclusion of 
Islamist movements.206 
Some normative bias resulting from labelling acts as terrorism or groups as 
terrorists is understandable given our associated desire to denounce and discourage 
political violence directed against civilians and non-combatants. While understanding a 
problem and being understanding are distinct, there is often an inevitable connection as 
deeper exploration creates ambiguity and complexity at odds with simple and 
unequivocal moral condemnation. Unfortunately the changes in American thinking 
about terrorism after 9/11 have strengthened the absolutist normative tendencies 
favouring enemy-centric approaches and undermining the pervasive understanding of 
                                                
203 Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 255-6. Gerges highlights the release of eight 
manuscripts since early 2002 by senior leaders of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (from which 
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205 Writing about the Egyptian context under Mubarak, Wickham notes: “A glance at 
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population-centric dynamics important for engaging the vital larger populations who 
play a key role in enabling or countering the rising terrorist threat, reinforcing 
aggregation instead of disaggregation, and damaging efforts to engage in key framing 
contests. 
Encourages an Enemy instead of a Population-centric Focus 
The underlying argument of this thesis is that the choice of vital populations to 
either provide or deny support to violent groups plays an important role in how 
dangerous such groups become as well as in the success or failure of counterterrorism 
efforts. Although the ability of states to influence the dynamics driving popular support 
is constrained, lessons from the study of counterinsurgencies and social movements 
emphasize the need for a population-centric approach to more fully understand these 
conflicts and pursue effective policies. Problematically, significant aspects of how 
Americans talk and think about terrorism encourage an enemy-centric approach. In part 
this predisposition is a result of the modern normative nature of the concept as well as 
the tendency to focus on the violence and potential threat. Key aspects of the changes in 
how Americans think about terrorism after 9/11, reinforced by the strategic narrative 
employed by the Bush administration, exaggerate this tendency, including the adoption 
of a war approach to combat an amorphous and aggregated enemy who is seen as 
posing an especially grave threat primarily targeting the U.S. in a conflict viewed as a 
transcendent, generational struggle between civilization and barbarity. The result runs 
counter to the four strategic precepts discussed in Chapter Two of adopting a 
population-centric strategy, seeking unity of understanding of the challenge in a manner 
that promotes rhetoric and actions consistent with that approach, while working to 
disaggregate instead of aggregating the potential transnational threat, and embracing 
propaganda of the deed through taking steps to address the legitimate grievances and 
aspirations of wider populations while engaging productively in the framing contests 
driving mobilization. The exaggerated focus on the violent international threat to the 
United States emphasizes preference for an enemy-centric approach. The tendencies to 
apply a rigid moral framework where all actors are either on the side of good or the side 
of evil creates shifts in presumption and evaluation working against our ability to 
encourage understanding leading to constructive engagement with key populations. The 
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propensity to see populations and groups who show any sympathy or have any 
association with groups using terrorism as presumptively antagonists 
counterproductively encourages aggregation, while deemphasizing efforts that may 
promote disaggregation, and similarly discourages support and follow through for 
programs to address the grievances and aspirations of these populations. The overall 
enemy-centric approach, which deemphasizes appreciation for the perspective of vital 
Muslim populations, damages proactive efforts to engage in the war of ideas, while 
increasing the chances for mistakes that reinforce the framing promoted by militant 
Islamists. 
We Focus on the Violence, the Terrorists, and the Threat to Us 
Applying the label of terrorism to a conflict presumptively frames and defines 
the problem in line with our construction of the concept. We then instinctively focus on 
the use or threat of violence by those identified as terrorists, with our motivation driven 
primarily by any threat to ourselves or to those with whom we identify. The principle 
actors, presumed to have the most agency, become ourselves and the terrorists. Our 
understanding and knowledge about the conflict, as well as the timeline for events we 
consider as important, starts with when we became aware of the terrorist threat and 
branches out defined by that threat. To the extent that we expand what we know about 
the conflict our understanding is driven by these priorities and presumptions. We 
evaluate new information and other actors from a presumptive negative bias against 
those with any association to the use violence, while assuming opposition to those who 
use violence is a positive. Thus, populations who share grievances with those using 
violence are likely part of the problem, while governments or other actors opposed to 
them are presumptive allies – even if the same government has often been responsible 
for its own atrocities or the grievances giving rise to the conflict. While these tendencies 
have long been a part of the construction and resulting approach to terrorism, the 
changes discussed in this chapter exaggerate the effect. 
Given the focus on the threat of violent Islamist groups potentially targeting the 
United States, the post 9/11 construction of terrorism more strongly encourages a 
presumption that other actors motivated by either an Islamic revival or ideals of political 
Islam are enablers of a dangerous trend. Islamic political parties are frequently 
discussed as only providing cover and legitimacy for violent Islamist actors, and are 
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suspected of only supporting democratic institutions as a means to take power before 
revealing their true authoritarian and expansionist nature (Islamic democracy interpreted 
as “one man, one vote, one time”). Islamic NGOs, charities, and missionary 
organizations – “claiming” to provide relief services to the oppressed or suffering 
populations – are suspected of being mere fronts for terrorist financing and facilitation, 
and otherwise intent on radicalizing at risk populations to violent extremist views 
supportive of Islamist terrorism. Moderate, liberal, or reformist Islamic groups are 
suspected of being fronts, apologists, or figments of Western liberal imagination.207 
Changing focus to a larger social movement perspective, which does not 
privilege those groups using terrorist tactics to target the United States as the principal 
actors, may provide a different understanding. While many of these other Islamic 
groups have connections to extremists using or supportive of violence, those 
connections are often secondary, individual, and not necessarily part of their central 
motivations. Instead, extremists groups advocating violence become just one of several 
relevant actors, in turn illuminating that the various groups are often to varying degrees 
in disagreement with each other about appropriate means and desired goals. Although 
these groups may be intertwined and mutually sympathetic to a degree that should cause 
concern, the choice to see them all as presumptively part of the threat risks becoming a 
self-fulfilling prophecy creating a much larger danger.208 An alternative approach of 
exploiting and over time increasing the divisions between them, while making sure to 
understand and act in accordance with the dynamics driving larger popular attitudes, 
may often offer a more promising path to non-violent alternatives for most while 
isolating violent radicals and building support for other counterterrorism efforts 
targeting them. Repeated studies of how terrorist and insurgent conflicts come to an end 
emphasize the importance of opening political paths away from violence, rather than 
dividing everyone into binary camps with those on the other side seen as irredeemable. 
The post-9/11 construction of terrorism further feeds the problems of this 
enemy-centric focus by de-rationalizing the larger conflicts. In explicitly rejecting 
                                                
207 For example, Baran argues that non-violent Islamist movements are a dangerous 
gateway to more violent organizations, playing “a crucial role in indoctrinating Muslims 
with radical ideology.” Baran, 2005, "Fighting the War of Ideas," Foreign Affairs 84 
(6), November-December. 
208 Kapitan and Schulte, 2002, "The Rhetoric on 'Terrorism' and Its Consequences," 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Summer: 8-9. 
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explanations that real or perceived grievances have anything to do with the emergence 
or threat of terrorism, the dominant construction and its promotion through the strategic 
narrative employed by key decision makers discourages understanding of the 
population-centric dynamics influencing popular support. As Scheuer explains, “It’s 
much easier to tell Americans that crazy people are after you and tomorrow morning 
your daughter is going to have to go to school in a burqa,”209 than to engage in real 
debate and consideration of how American policies and efforts contribute to the 
problem. 
The shift to viewing the U.S. conflict with terrorism as a war, and for the large 
majority of Americans after 9/11 a real war, is the most direct way in which current 
thinking and talking about terrorism encourages an enemy-centric approach.210 Put 
simply, the traditional view of a war requires an enemy. The rhetoric used to motivate 
action during a war, the historical comparisons drawn, the tendency to focus coverage 
and discussion on military options, and the common preference for patriotic unity all 
strengthen the presumption that the approach will be enemy-centric. As an example an 
analysis of five speeches President Bush gave in 2006 building support for his policies 
shows the consistent use of very traditional war language, all of which triggering 
associations that emphasize an enemy-centric approach.211 Framing the conflict as a war 
encourages a “with us or against us” binary division, especially when “they” are seen as 
continuing to threaten the United States with especially destructive attacks. The 
                                                
209 Barry, 2008, "'Our Country is in Trouble', An ex-bin Laden Hunter on Why the U.S. 
hasn't Beaten al-Qaeda," Newsweek Web Exclusive, February 13, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/110937. 
210 This is highlighted in the very traditional wartime language used by President Bush 
and other opinion leaders discussed in the first half of this chapter. Similar meta-
analysis of the war language used to describe the war on terror can be found in: Hess 
and Justus, "(Re)Defining the Long War," 5. Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism. 
211 “Obviously, the term ‘war’ is the central element in the acronym GWOT. But the 
presence of other language also points toward a very traditional conceptualization of the 
current fight against terrorism. In the narrative contained within the speeches: ‘allies’ 
form a ‘coalition’ that use a ‘clear plan’ to stay on the ‘offensive’ in order to ‘defend 
civilization’ and ‘win the war’ all aimed at the end goal of ‘complete victory’ within a 
‘global campaign.’ This narrative is juxtaposed with that of the terrorists, which 
characterizes them as ‘enemies’ and their ‘terrorist allies’ who utilize ‘propaganda,’ 
‘strategy,’ and pursue ‘weapons of mass destruction’ as part of a larger effort to ‘defeat’ 
our troops through ‘multiple attacks’ with the final goal of creating a ‘violent political 
utopia’ and ‘forcing America to retreat.’” Hess and Justus, "(Re)Defining the Long 
War," 5. 
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associations that are triggered by and seem natural to this framing reinforce perceptions 
and tendencies to view and approach this as a simple conflict in which any who may 
support or sympathize with those threatening America are enemies and part of the 
problem.  
How Americans think and talk about terrorism in recent years has also increased 
the tendency to de-localize the understanding of these conflicts.212 By emphasizing, and 
often greatly exaggerating, the international connections between and cohesiveness of 
the various militant Islamist groups as well as framing their goals as centred on 
establishing an international caliphate and attacking global actors (primarily the United 
States) the construction again devalues understanding of the important and generally 
much more local dynamics driving potential popular support. More attention is paid to 
and information privileged that supports or is related to these global connections and 
international threats. In turn policies, actions, and rhetoric are driven by this focus, with 
significantly less attention given to addressing issues that are important to the key local 
populations – often with the net result of undermining hearts and minds goals. As Drum 
writes:  
[W]e’re trying to force a hundred little propaganda wars, each of which requires 
a media and intelligence strategy all its own, into the more familiar straitjacket 
of a single broad-based military war (the “war on terror,” “Islamofascism”). But 
that broader war is a chimera, and refusing to acknowledge this in a serious way 
is just making things worse.213 
Kilcullen similarly concludes: 
Our too-willing and heavy-handed interventions in the so-called War on 
Terrorism to date have largely played into the hands of this AQ exhaustion 
strategy, while creating tens of thousands of accidental guerrillas and tying us 
down in a costly (and potentially unsustainable) series of interventions.214 
The social movement perspective employed by this thesis recognizes that there are 
important international connections and ideological ties between various violent 
Islamist groups, however an important insight from this perspective for security goals is 
                                                
212 Gardels, 2006, "De-Globalize the Jihad," Huffington Post (September 29), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/deglobalize-the-jihad_b_30561.html. 
213 Drum, 2006, "Global Counterinsurgency Revisited..." Political Animal (December 
18), Washington Monthly, 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2006_12/010415.php. 
214 Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 264. 
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that taking actions that reinforce these connections and ties is generally 
counterproductive.215 
Risk Distortion Shifts Presumption Against Hearts and Minds 
The 9/11 attacks significantly changed the American perception of the threat of 
terrorism. Before the attacks the common perception was that “terrorists want a lot of 
people watching, not a lot of people dead,” whereas now it is assumed that “terrorists 
want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.”216 The American perception of 
the threat is heightened by a fear of what type of unprecedented attack could happen 
next.217 The construction of the terrorism, calibrated by the trauma of 9/11, emphasizes 
this change by focusing on the possibility of especially lethal mass casualty attacks 
using chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear devices and also by focusing 
on regional and global territorial goals. The war on terror is thus part of a “global 
ideological struggle” where the enemy is a “mortal danger to all humanity”218 following 
“in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.”219 
                                                
215 Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency.". Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency 
Redux.". Kilcullen, "New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict." 
216 Emphasis in original. While Jenkins is widely cited for the first observation, and is 
quoted here for both, he references works (including his own) before 9/11 that were 
noting the increasing intended lethality of terrorist attacks starting in the mid-1980s. He 
also emphasizes that while many terrorist groups now seek high lethality attacks this is 
not true of all terrorist groups. Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of 
Conflict," 15. Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 8-9. 
217 This is heightened by the often repeated observation, “What we also know is that a 
terrorist can attack at any time, at any place, using any conceivable technique, and it’s 
not possible to defend at every point, at every minute of the day or night against every 
conceivable technique.” Rumsfeld, 2004, "Secretary Rumsfeld Town Hall Meeting at 
Ft. Campbell, KY," (September 14), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Public Affairs), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2397. 
218 Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and 
Defeat." Isaac Chotiner summarizes that this is a tendency that is neither unique to the 
United States or to our conflict with terrorism: “All societies, not just our own, tend to 
overstate the dangers they face. If this weren’t the case, after all, it would be harder to 
motivate people to fight and die. […] Terrorism is certainly a serious danger, and if 
Islamic fundamentalists can get their hands on a nuclear weapon, perhaps we would be 
in existential danger. But it’s worth remembering that even the Sandinistas were billed 
as a threat to our way of life, and we have a (sometimes understandable) tendency to 
overstate our own peril.” Chotiner, 2007, "How Big a Threat?," The Plank from The 
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One of the problems with concentrating on the most dramatic potential 
devastation as a measure of the terrorist threat is that it shifts the presumptive 
appropriate framework further towards an enemy-centric focus. This is reflected in the 
approach portrayed as necessary by Fox’s hit series, which “for all its fictional liberties, 
‘24’ depicts the fight against Islamist extremism much as the Bush administration has 
defined it: as an all-consuming struggle for America’s survival that demands the 
toughest of tactics.”220 Especially when coupled with the view that all Islamist groups 
are part of the same aggregated threat and generally working together, this increases the 
presumption that any specific group, or associated and potentially sympathetic 
population, is an especially dangerous enemy who must be fought rather than engaged. 
As Vlahos explains, “If we explicitly fight ‘Islamofascists’ we must just as explicitly 
oppose everyone who supports or even sympathizes with Muslim resistance.”221 
The presumption shift towards an enemy-centric focus from these influences is 
driven by understandable and often admirable motivations. Those involved in American 
counterterrorism efforts, from politicians and agency heads through individual analysts 
and military personnel, as a rule are guided by desires to protect the general public. This 
attitude was expressed by a former master sergeant now working at one of the national 
counterterrorism watch centres charged with detecting and reacting to security breaches 
of American transportation services who explained that he was motivated by making 
sure that no one will hurt Americans, “not on my watch, not while I’m standing 
                                                
New Republic (January 30), The New Republic, 
http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/the_plank/archive/2007/01/30/34716.aspx. 
219 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." 
220 Mayer, "Whatever It Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind '24'." 
221 Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and 
Defeat." He continues: “Already the narrative of the Long War has won over the 
faithful. Freerepublic.com is probably the biggest ‘red’ community blog. Most talk on 
the war there moves quickly to declarations like: ‘History shows that wars only end 
with a totally defeated enemy otherwise they go on … Either Islam or us will quit in 
total destruction.’ Or another: ‘Will it take an American Hiroshima to awaken the 
majority, to mobilize our masses against the Islamic quest of world domination?’” 
Although the views of these partisans are representative only of a more extreme 
perception of the threat, they still dramatize the tendencies inherent in how terrorism is 
currently popularly constructed. 
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here.”222 As with quantitative research, efforts to decrease the error rate for false 
negatives (the failure to accurately detect a threat) often come at the cost of increasing 
the error rate for false positives (identifying a threat that is not actually there).223 As the 
dominant construction increases the perception of the risk from failing to prevent a 
threat individuals are more likely to adopt an enemy-centric perspective, especially 
when they do not similarly perceive an increased risk from mistakenly identifying 
threats that are not actually there.224 Feeding this bias is that a decision maker faced 
with briefings from a proponent of the enemy-centric focused perspective (highlighting 
grave potential threats) versus a proponent of the population-centric perspective 
(arguing that the dangers from a specific group are much more locally focused) may 
rationally choose to act on the warnings of the first to be safe given the relative 
dangers.225 Fallows explains this presumption: 
It takes little courage to warn that bad things might happen... If you’re wrong, 
everyone is happy. Moreover, since you can always say that the crisis hasn’t 
happened yet, it’s very hard for a gloomy prediction to be proved incorrect. But 
to claim that a certain fear or threat is exaggerated is to subject oneself to 
                                                
222 Blumenfeld, 2008, "The Flight Watchmen," Washington Post, June 22, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/19/AR2008061902627.html. 
223 In the same way that it is possible to reduce both false positives and false negatives 
through better experiment design, the unity of understanding recommended in Chapter 
Two for contemporary counterinsurgencies would help individuals involved at every 
layer to better understand and recognize real threats as well as opportunities for 
engagement. 
224 Ron Suskind explains how the Bush administration, and especially Vice-President 
Cheney, was motivated in this manner to respond to even a 1% threat of a devastating 
terrorist attack as if the danger were a certainty. As several critics have pointed out the 
statistical mistake the “Cheney doctrine” makes is a failure to appreciate the downside 
risks of pre-emptive action. Suskind, 2006, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside 
America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11, New York, Simon & Schuster. 
225 As Ian Lustic explains: “Within the government this particular mechanism is known 
colloquially as CYA – ‘cover your ass.’ In the War on terror it operates, within regular 
departments, the intelligence community, the military, and law enforcement agencies 
throughout the country, to weaken and slow our system’s capacity to distinguish useful 
from wasteful activity. With an enemy imagined as totally ruthless, infinitely cunning, 
and interested in inflicting as much damage as possible on America, every attack that 
anyone can imagine occurring eventually becomes a threat that must be considered and 
countered.” Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 89. 
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disproof – it’s a “falsifiable hypothesis,” in scientific terms – and, worse, to 
blame and ridicule if the nightmare you said probably wouldn’t happen does.226 
The post-9/11 construction reinforces this tendency by establishing that a global dire 
threat is the accepted reality, placing the presumption of proof on those who would 
argue otherwise. At the same time it empowers those who believe the dire threat is real 
through the fear of “what if they are right” coupled with normative trumps that their 
opponents either still have a “pre-9/11” world view or are undermining the moral clarity 
necessary to defeat this evil.227 Unfortunately, a population-centric view warns that the 
actions now being taken are likely to make the problem worse and possibly risk creating 
a self-fulfilling prophecy.228 
A final problem caused by measuring the threat of terrorism in terms of the most 
damaging potential future attacks is that this creates a disconnect with understanding the 
perspectives of key local Muslim populations. Those populations make their judgments 
about the relative culpability and threat posed by various groups, through their own 
selective filters, and in terms of local conflict contexts often dominated by long histories 
of violence, terror, oppression, and other sources of grievances by actors on all sides. 
Violence by local groups Americans label as terrorists is measured first by what they 
have actually done, not what some global amorphous Islamist threat might do, and 
tempered or justified in relation to what opposing groups or states have done. Because 
                                                
226 Fallows, 2006a, "Act As If Mueller Is Right: Responses to 'Is There Still a Terrorist 
Threat?' Round 1," Foreign Affairs, September 7, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/special/9-11_roundtable/9-11_roundtable_fallows. 
227 Discussing the demagogic uses of the war on terror to promote specific policies: 
Brzezinksi, "Terrorized by 'War on Terror'." As an example of this demagogic approach 
see the writings of Walid Phares who reguarly alleges that anyone who disagrees with 
the dominant construction of a unified global jihadist movement threatening the survival 
of Western society is either “blind to jihad or a jihadophile.” Phares, The Confrontation, 
14. For example: “One has to realize that immense obstacles will be put in the way of 
building an enlightened defense of the homeland. The resistance will naturally come 
from the already indoctrinated and influenced elements in the country and within the 
layers of institutions. The Jihadophiles will use all their political and academic power to 
protect the Jihadists, and the latter will use all their financial and diplomatic resources to 
protect Jihadism.” Phares, The Confrontation, 154. 
228 David Kilcullen, for example, argues that al-Qaida and Islamists terrorists do not 
themselves pose an existential threat, however our reaction to them risks creating much 
greater dangers. He compares this to the at most 2,000 people killed by anarchists 
terrorists a century ago but triggering World War I because of how states responded to a 
single assassination. Fallows, 2006b, "Declaring Victory," The Atlantic Monthly 
(September), September, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200609/fallows_victory. 
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the enemy-centric focus tends to ignore or actively discount these other factors, it 
becomes significantly more difficult for Americans to appreciate why Muslim 
populations do not clearly reach the same judgments.229 In turn this increases the 
likelihood that Americans will reach the conclusion that given populations or specific 
groups within those are part of the problem and thus opponents, while also making it 
less likely that proactive messaging efforts aimed at these populations will be developed 
in a manner that meaningfully connects and persuades.  
Moral Shunning Shifts Presumption Against Hearts and Minds 
The highly normative nature of current thinking and talking about terrorism 
creates a similar shift favouring an enemy-centric over population-centric approach. The 
normative discourse of the war on terror regularly warns that states must never reward 
terrorism or negotiate with terrorists, and that any accommodation is simply a display of 
weakness repeating the mistakes of appeasement, legitimizing those who use terror, and 
encouraging future attacks.230 In a March 2004 speech, President Bush explained: 
No concession will appease their hatred. No accommodation will satisfy their 
endless demands. Their ultimate ambitions are to control the peoples of the 
Middle East, and to blackmail the rest of the world with weapons of mass terror. 
There can be no separate peace with the terrorist enemy. Any sign of weakness 
or retreat simply validates terrorist violence, and invites more violence for all 
nations. The only certain way to protect our people is by early, united, and 
decisive action.231 
                                                
229 For example, in commenting on Talal Asad’s book On Suicide Bombing Power 
emphasizes the disconnect which occurs between the American and Muslim 
perspectives. The American perspective sees these conflicts as morally unambiguous 
with suicide terrorism as clearly one of the most reprehensible forms of violence that 
must be denounced and opposed. The perspective of many in the Muslim world may 
recognize the horror of suicide attacks but also perceives many acts by the U.S. and 
allied nations, such as Israel’s use of cluster bombs in Lebanon, as also worthy of strong 
moral criticism. While she maintains and defends the moral distinctions that underlie 
the more sophisticated American arguments such as the intent of primarily targeting 
civilians, she also recognizes the problems caused by the failure of Americans to 
appreciate the alternative perspective. Power, "Our War on Terror." 
230 Neumann, 2007, "Negotiating With Terrorists," Foreign Affairs (January/February), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86110/peter-r-neumann/negotiating-
with-terrorists.html. 
231 Bush, "President Bush Reaffirms Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan." 
Similarly, in a May 2008 speech before the Israeli Knesset, President Bush said: “Some 
seem to believe we should negotiate with terrorists and radicals, as if some ingenious 
argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along. We have heard this 
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While in the abstract this reasoning is persuasive, in the complex and messy reality of 
most cases where tactics of terror emerge it places policy makers in a polarized trap. 
The terrorist groups focused on in the war on terror have become more threatening 
because larger Muslim populations share and identify with many of the grievances and 
causes they claim to represent. Problematically, normative prescriptions from this part 
of the strategic narrative and dominant construction require avoiding the appearance of 
negotiation and accommodation, which in turn discourages action on or engagement 
with less radical elements and the larger potentially supportive population over the 
issues that are often most important to them. Reinforcing this trap, political and other 
opinion leaders after 9/11 have frequently denounced suggestions that specific policies 
or grievances give rise to terrorism as absurd, inaccurate, and counterproductive. A 
cumulative effect of these problems is to favour adoption of an enemy-centric approach, 
which is less likely to raise uncomfortable contradictions and provides prescriptions that 
feel more natural and consistent with the dominant construction. 
Also reinforcing the presumption to adopt an enemy-centric approach, is the 
repeated message of the administration’s strategic narrative and desire inherent in the 
normative construction of terrorism to unambiguously divide actors as being either 
“with us” or “with the terrorists,”232 as “a war of good versus evil.”233 When local 
populations and specific groups fail to clearly reject militant Islamists, and worse tend 
to show varying levels of understanding for and sympathy with those using violence, 
Americans in turn are predisposed to categorize these populations as opponents and part 
of the problem. Although many government actors and specific policies take a more 
sophisticate approach towards Muslim populations, actively emphasizing that reaching 
out to them is an important goal in the conflict, this predisposition limits those efforts, 
                                                
foolish delusion before. As Nazi tanks crossed into Poland in 1939, an American 
senator declared: ‘Lord, if only I could have talked to Hitler, all of this might have been 
avoided.’ We have an obligation to call this what it is – the false comfort of 
appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history.” Bush, 2008b, 
"President Bush Addresses Members of the Knesset," (May 15), The White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080515-1.html. Of note, in this 
speech President Bush included radicals in those we are prohibited from engaging, 
which is an example of the tendency of this discursive approach to be expanded to those 
we perceive as associated with terrorists. 
232 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People."  
233 Bush, "President’s Remarks at 'Congress of Tomorrow' Lunch." 
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serves as a constraint for how far and what specific groups policy makers are willing to 
engage, and increases the tendency for general rhetoric and policies to end up alienating 
these target populations.  
An example of how these related attitudes have undermined American efforts to 
effectively communicate with the larger Muslim world after 9/11 is found in the U.S. 
government’s ignoring, discrediting, and at times shunning of al-Jazeera. Prior to 9/11 
al-Jazeera was seen as a great success story, breaking authoritarian censorship across 
the Middle East and encouraging the type of diverse perspectives, citizen engagement, 
and critical examination important to building the civil society base that enables 
political liberalization and democratization.234 However, after 9/11 al-Jazeera was 
quickly reframed as complicit with terrorism for broadcasting statements from Usama 
bin Ladin and giving greater coverage to the death and destruction caused by American 
military attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.235 American officials saw this as encouraging 
support for or showing too much sympathy with the terrorist enemy, and quickly 
lumped al-Jazeera in with radical Muslim clerics and fundamentalist madrassas as part 
of the problem.236 Despite al-Jazeera having by far the largest audience and most 
                                                
234 Hroub, 2006, "Al-Jazeera may Transmit Islamist Rhetoric, But That's the Middle 
East's Reality," Daily Star, October 10, 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=76024&cat_ID=5. Lynch, Voices of 
the New Arab Public. Macleod, 2006, "Tearing Down the Walls," Time (European 
Edition), November 6, 
http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901061106-
1551994,00.html. Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds. Lynch notes, “al-Jazeera 
rose to dominance in the Arab political arena in the late 1990s, but hostility to the 
United States only shot skyward in 2002. In the words of Abdallah Schleifer, the Arab 
media became “a convenient scapegoat for profound U.S. policy errors.’” Lynch, Voices 
of the New Arab Public, 21.  
235 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 19-21, 213-6. For example: Ralph Peters 
wrote in the New York Post on 21 June 2004, “Al-Jazeera has become the most 
powerful ally of terror in the world – even more important than Saudi financiers. We’re 
foolish if we do not recognize it as such.” Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 19. 
One repeated criticism of al-Jazeera was for allegedly showing video of hostages being 
behead by terrorists in Iraq, which through repetition reinforced the belief of many 
Americans that al-Jazeera sided with al-Qaida. However, al-Jazeera’s management has 
“bitterly denied that it had ever aired a video of a hostage being beheaded” and even 
offered a reward to any critic who could document such a broadcast. Lynch, Voices of 
the New Arab Public, 233. 
236 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public. Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds. For 
example: “Rumsfeld became increasingly exasperated with the channel as the Iraq 
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credibility in the Muslim world, over time relatively few American officials would 
appear on, agree to be interviewed by, or provide information to the network.237 Instead 
amongst the United States first major hearts and minds initiatives after 9/11 was 
launching Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television as alternatives to the perceived biases of 
existing Arabic news services (meaning for many al-Jazeera).238 A fundamental mistake 
of this American effort was the belief that Muslim populations were desperate for 
unbiased reporting in the same way Cold War populations of the Eastern Bloc were 
looking for an alternative to the tightly controlled official propaganda of their own 
governments news media, instead of recognizing that in the age of satellite broadcasts 
the Arabic speaking world already had a plethora of choices spanning a range of 
                                                
adventure went bad. In early 2004, according to Fox News, he began equating its news 
coverage of Iraq with murder: ‘We are being hurt by Al-Jazeera in the Arab world,’ he 
said. ‘There is no question about it. The quality of the journalism is outrageous – 
inexcusably biased – and there is nothing you can do about it except try to counteract 
it.’ He said it was turning Arabs against the United States. ‘You could say it causes the 
loss of life,’ he added. ‘It’s causing Iraqi people to be killed’ by inflaming anti-
American passions and encouraging attacks against Iraqis who assist the Americans, he 
added.’” Cole, 2005, "Did Bush Plan to Bomb al-Jazeera," Salon (November 30), 
http://dir.salon.com/story/opinion/feature/2005/11/30/al_jazeera/index.html. 
237 Armstrong, 2006, "'Arrogance and Stupidity': The Fallout from an Honest 
Statement," MountainRunner (October 22), 
http://www.mountainrunner.us/2006/10/arrogance_and_s.html. Krieger, 2006, "Voice 
of America," Newsweek, August 29, 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/14560221/site/newsweek/. Lynch, Voices of the New Arab 
Public, 250. Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 10-1. Tatham, "Hearts and 
Minds," 332. For example, Kenneth Tomlinson of the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
stated: “Our competitive edge in the Middle East is our very dedication to truth and free 
and open debate. And we will stand out like a beacon of light in a media market 
dominated by sensationalism and distortion… We will challenge the voices of hate and 
repression with truth and the voices of tolerance and moderation. The people will hear 
free and open discussions not just about conflict in the Middle East, but also about 
subjects critical to that region’s future.” Shelby, "U.S. Launches Arabic Satellite 
Television Broadcasts Feb. 14: Alhurrah Aims to Deliver 'Accuracy' and 'Free and Open 
Debate'." 
238 Kujawa, "Panel Urges Renewed Public Diplomacy Efforts to Engage Muslim 
World.". Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 169. Tatham explains a specific 
instance of how the inclination to avoid Arab media compounded other problems when 
President Bush sought to address Muslim audiences about the Abu Ghraib photos but 
chose to do so through the American Alhurra: "That US President George W Bush 
should have chosen to explain the US regret at the abuses of Abu Ghraib on a US 
government funded Arabic language channel that is uniformly ignored throughout the 
Middle East was construed by many as being entirely counter-productive and indicative 
of the unwillingness to engage Arab media." Tatham, "Hearts and Minds," 334. 
 CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TERRORISM 253 
 
perspectives.239 Muslim populations did not and do not perceive al-Jazeera as 
particularly biased (especially given its tradition of being critical of and taking on many 
Arab and Middle Eastern governments), while on the other hand those same populations 
view American broadcasting as official U.S. propaganda.240  
The American response to al-Jazeera also demonstrates further differences 
between an enemy-centric and population-centric approach. Instead of seeing al-Jazeera 
as an opportunity to engage with the key population and the coverage on al-Jazeera as 
reflective of the attitudes and interests of its audience,241 American officials cast it as 
the enemy and saw anyone associated with it as presumptively suspect. Instead of 
seeing al-Jazeera’s coverage as a measure of the challenges the U.S. faced in winning 
over support from Muslim populations, American officials collected, often exaggerated, 
and reframed out of context examples of alleged support by al-Jazeera for terrorism, 
justifying their antagonism and preference for working through other outlets.242 In this 
context of American criticism, mistakes that led to the bombing of al-Jazeera facilities 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq were easily framed within the Muslim world as proof that 
the U.S. war on terror was really a larger war on all things Islam.243 The enemy-centric 
approach to al-Jazeera by the U.S. military included promoting Dorrance Smith to 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Al-Jazeera had been temporarily 
kicked out of Iraq while he was a senior official responsible for media under the 
Coalition Provisional Authority, and he had written in the Wall Street Journal that: 
The collaboration between the terrorists and Al-Jazeera is stronger than ever. 
While the precise terms of that relationship are virtually unknown, we do know 
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241 Hroub, "Al-Jazeera may Transmit Islamist Rhetoric, But That's the Middle East's 
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World." 
242 "American Forum: The Media and Islam," 2008, American University School of 
Communication (April 14), WAMU 88.5 FM American University Radio, 
http://wamu.org/programs/american_forum/mediaandislam/index.php. Cole, "Did Bush 
Plan to Bomb al-Jazeera.". Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 202-3. 
243 Cole, "Did Bush Plan to Bomb al-Jazeera.". Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 
180. "U.S.: Al-Jazeera Bomb Story 'Outlandish'," 2005, CNN.com (November 23), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/11/22/us.al.jazeera/. 
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this: Al-Jazeera and the terrorists have a working arrangement that extends 
beyond a modus vivendi.244 
Neither of which were promising for Smith’s predisposition to constructively engage in 
public diplomacy with the Muslim world.245 Perhaps this animosity and shunning could 
be defended if al-Jazeera’s record had really been as biased and supportive of terrorism 
as some American officials have described. However, as many media and regional 
experts who speak Arabic and have followed the channel emphasize, despite some 
mistakes and biases reflective of its audience, al-Jazeera’s actual coverage has been 
much more balanced and often critical of militant Islamists.246  
A similar example of how the strategic narrative of the war on terror and the 
related public construction undermines pursuit of a population-centric approach is found 
in the history of the Sunni awakening movements that many credit with playing a 
crucial role in reversing the course of the Iraq war and dealing a possibly crushing blow 
                                                
244 Smith, 2005, "The Enemy on Our Airways," The Wall Street Journal, April 25, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB111438848754715621.html?mod=todays_us_opinion/. 
245 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 214. 
246 See generally: Ibid. Lynch emphasizes that “virtually every issues that American 
critics claim is ignored by the Arab media in fact has been covered” (p9) by al-Jazeera, 
and that although the channel reflects the biases of its audience its coverage is overall 
much more objective than American critics contend and arguably better than the 
American Fox News (p47-49). He further highlights a wide range of programs and 
episodes regularly giving voice to a wide range of opinions for and against the invasion 
as well as supportive and critical of the subsequent occupation, including regular 
appearances by Iraqi figures supporting the invasion and continued Coalition 
operations. (p11, 211-2) Lynch’s study of al-Jazeera’s content and approach includes 
analysis of the “transcripts from 976 episodes of the five most important al-Jazeera talk 
shows broadcast between January 1999 and June 2004” as well as a secondary 
collection of “al-Jazeera programs dealing specifically with Iraq.” (p9) "American 
Forum: The Media and Islam.". Driscoll, 2006, "Al-Jazeera: A Thorn in a Side, a 
Catalyst for Change, or Both?," Eccentric Star: A Public Diplomacy Weblog (October 
30), 
http://eccentricstar.typepad.com/public_diplomacy_weblog_n/2006/10/aljazeera_a_tho.
html. Macleod, "Tearing Down the Walls." One anecdote demonstrating the disconnect 
between American perceptions of al-Jazeera as exaggerating every excuse to discredit 
the U.S. is shown by al-Jazeera’s “first, and most visible, response to the revelations of 
sexual torture of Iraqis by Americans in Abu Ghraib prison” which was broadcast on 
the very popular discussion show hosted by Faisal al-Qassem who used it to lunch a 
critical show focused on conditions in Arab prisons. Lynch, Voices of the New Arab 
Public, 9. 
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to al-Qaida in Iraq.247 For the first several years of the war almost all insurgent and 
terrorist attacks in Iraq, and especially all Sunni groups, were often lumped together as 
part of the terrorist insurgency portrayed as led by al-Qaida in Iraq.248 The strategic 
narrative as advanced by the Bush administration and described above made it clear that 
there was no possible benefit from negotiating with terrorists, especially not those 
connected with al-Qaida, and that to do so would was immoral and would simply repeat 
the mistakes of appeasement encouraging our enemies in their global pursuit.249 The 
resulting guidance and general predisposition framed Sunni insurgents in Iraq as radical 
Islamist terrorists who needed to be defeated as irreconcilable enemies of democracy 
and peace in Iraq, and who would be carrying out terrorist attacks in the United States if 
we were not fighting them there. 250 This did not change until the U.S. military began to 
shift emphasis to a counterinsurgency informed population-centric strategy – in part 
under the leadership of General Petraeus and an emerging cohort of other military 
thinkers associated with the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual and in part as a 
                                                
247 Kilcullen, The accidental guerilla, 173-4. McCary, 2009, "The Anbar Awakening: 
An Alliance of Incentives," The Washington Quarterly (January), 
http://www.twq.com/09winter/docs/09jan_McCary.pdf. Rose, 2009, "Heads in the 
Sand," Vanity Fair (May), http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/05/iraqi-
insurgents200905. Shin, 2009, ""Awakening" Beyond Iraq: Time to Engage Radical 
Islamists as Stakeholders," Military Review (May-June), 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090
630_art008.pdf. Smith and MacFarland, 2008, "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point," 
Military Review (March-April), 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20080
430_art008.pdf. However, many still note that there are dangers inherent in this strategy 
and difficult challenges remain for continuing to unite the ethnic groups in Iraq. Kahl 
and Brimley, 2007, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," Foreign Policy (September), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3968. Kilcullen, 2007a, 
"Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt," Small Wars Journal (August 29), 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/. Long, 2008, 
"The Anbar Awakening," Survival 50 (2). 
248 Tilghman, 2007, "The Myth of AQI," Washington Monthly (October), 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0710.tilghman.html. 
249 Bush, "President Bush Reaffirms Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan.". 
Bush, "President Bush Addresses Members of the Knesset.". Neumann, "Negotiating 
With Terrorists." 
250 Bush, "President's Remarks in Greeley, Colorado." The resonance of the fighting 
“terrorists abroad so we do not have to face them here at home” framing with the 
general public is emphasized by its frequent repetition. Bush, "President’s Remarks in 
Des Moines, Iowa." 
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bottom up relearning by units frustrated with the course of the war.251 The military 
started to increasingly reach out to traditional local leadership structures connected with 
some of these insurgent groups, recognizing that most of the insurgents were not 
motivated by a shared embrace of al-Qaida’s violent transnational goals, but by local 
self interest which through circumstances of convenience and shared short term 
sectarian concerns led the groups to fight together.252 Emphasizing that the resulting 
shift in Sunni tribal groups against al-Qaida in Iraq could have occurred earlier but for 
the enemy-centric approach supported by the war on terror narrative, a number of 
observers highlight earlier attempts by Sunni tribes to reach out to the U.S. government 
as well as earlier initiatives by the same insurgent groups to oppose the influence of al-
Qaida in Iraq in their areas.253 It is likely that even if a population-centric approach had 
been fully employed from the start of the Iraq war that many of these Sunni groups 
would still have initially taken up arms against the Coalition, especially given sectarian 
fears about how they would be treated under a Shia dominated government and ties to 
the regime structure the invasion had overturned.254 However, it is also likely that the 
strategic narrative of the war on terror, which the Iraq war was intimately connected 
with from the start, increased the amount of conflict and sectarian tension, while 
missing earlier opportunities to disaggregate the overall threat. 
                                                
251 Alderson, "US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally's Perspective.". Crane, Horvath 
and Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency.". Hoffman, 
"Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?.". Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking 
Counterinsurgency," 43-4. McCary, "The Anbar Awakening." Note: McCary and others 
emphasize that the Anbar Awakening started and was already showing significant 
success well before the “surge” of new troops arrived in mid-2007 emphasizing that this 
did not occur from a show of force that some may associate with enemy-centric 
strategies, even though the surge is largely characterized as part of the larger 
counterinsurgency efforts initiated by General Patraeus. 
252 Kilcullen, "Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt.". Long, "The Anbar Awakening." Of note 
this this thesis many of the articles examining the Anbar Awakening highlight the 
importance of important aspects of why the effort was successful that are 
complimentary with the tool set proposed by a social movement theory approach, 
including especially the important roles played by kinship and friendship networks, elite 
alliances, and grievances and aspirataions for driving mobilization. 
253 Long, "The Anbar Awakening," 78. McCary, "The Anbar Awakening.". Rose, 
"Heads in the Sand.". Smith and MacFarland, "Anbar Awakens," 42-3. 
254 McCary for example emphsizes that part of the Awakening movement was 
disillusionment with al-Qaida in Iraq and especially the groups particularly violent 
tactics and goals. McCary, "The Anbar Awakening," 51-3.  
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Overall the normative biases of post-9/11 talking and thinking about terrorism 
strongly favours hard counterterrorism policies, even when expert opinion appears to 
support a more diversified and engaged approach consistent with the counterinsurgency 
lessons described in Chapter Two.255 This effect is consistent with both the general 
influences of the social construction discussed in this chapter as well as specifically the 
normative presumption shift to engaging in an enemy-centric approach. Unfortunately, 
the rigidity of approach that these biases encourage prevents analysts and advocates 
from drawing upon the lessons of historical cases that argue against an overemphasis on 
enemy-centric efforts, and instead examining or pursuing incremental engagement and 
population-centric policies that may encourage less radicalized groups to turn towards 
non-violent paths away from terrorism.256 
Population Viewed as Part of the Problem not Part of the Solution 
In discussing the American approach to terrorism after 9/11 – and particularly 
the construction of an amorphous, aggregated, worldwide Islamist enemy – Hasting 
quotes a proverb attributed to Ali ibn Abu Talib, cousin to the Prophet Mohammed,257 
saying “He who has a thousand friends has not a friend to spare, and he who has one 
enemy will meet him everywhere.”258 Hasting’s criticism is that the perspective typical 
in American thinking, and frequently endorsed by the rhetoric of the Bush 
administration, of a largely interconnected global Islamist enemy is both substantively 
incorrect and highly counterproductive. This part of the post-9/11 construction of 
                                                
255 “Similar contradictions abound in analysis of counter-terrorism and at no time has 
this become more blatantly obvious than during the War on Terrorism. We may well be 
aware of how certain responses to terrorist movements actually increase support for the 
use of terrorism against the state, yet governments find it inhuman and absurd to resist 
engaging terrorists in ways other than those we assume are deserved by cowards.” 
Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 159. 
256Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 19. Neumann, "Negotiating With 
Terrorists.". Perry and Cooke, 2006, "How to Lose the War on Terrorism - Part One: 
Talking with the 'Terrorists'," Conflicts Forum (March 31), 
http://conflictsforum.org/2006/how-to-lose-the-war-on-terrorism/. 
257 Of note to the larger point being made here Sunni Muslims consider Ali to be the 
fourth and final rightly guided Caliph, while Shia Muslims see him as the first infallible 
Imam. The dispute over whether Ali was the rightful successor to Muhammad and the 
circumstances of his assassination are at the core of the split between Sunni and Shia 
traditions. 
258 Hastings, "Bush’s Belief in a Worldwide Islamist Conspiracy is Foolish and 
Dangerous." 
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terrorism leads to a tendency to see large parts of the world’s Muslim population, and 
almost all groups motivated by Islam as presumptively suspect. This is reinforced by the 
sympathies with and connections between many Muslim populations with local Islamist 
groups who are in some manner connected to militant activity. Frequent media images 
of crowds and large public gatherings in the Muslim world associated with causes seen 
as related to terrorism (or opposing those seen as allies in the war on terror) bolster this 
perception.259  
Although American politicians and other opinion leaders frequently claim that 
the conflict in the war on terror is only with extremist elements who have hijacked a 
peaceful religion, the constant aggregating and connecting of so many different groups 
creates a strong tendency for the public at large to at least quietly conclude that many 
Muslims in these countries must really be supportive of al-Qaida’s goals.260 The 
statements of political leaders to the contrary are seen as transparent political 
                                                
259 Michael Vlahos explains: “All give a curt nod upfront to the distinction between the 
majority of peaceful Muslims and a core of radicals. But that distinction quickly fades 
before the relentless imagery of chanting Muslim throngs and the fiery mullahs driving 
them – blending and folding into our memory of the same images of pilgrim crowds in 
Mecca, of worshippers everywhere: this is Islam, the terror comes out of Islam, the 
enemy is everywhere in Islam, it is all about Islam. That such savagery is so intimately 
coterminous and widespread within civilization is the true mark of a failed civilization. 
Ralph Peters is characteristically more direct: ‘We are without doubt witnessing 
something without precedent, the crash of a once great, still proud civilization, that of 
Middle Eastern Islam. The terrorist problems we face from the Middle East are not 
America’s fault. It’s the fault of the extreme failure of Middle Eastern civilization.’” 
Vlahos, "The Fall of Modernity: Has the American Narrative Authored its own 
Undoing?." Quoting Ralph Peters on the Lehrer Newshour on 8/21/2006. 
260 Michael Vlahos explains: “The Great Muslim War advances this transformation. 
They say that the dark side is only evil radicals—and their supporters. But listen 
closely: except for the tiny handful of ‘moderate Muslims’ we anoint, all Islamists and 
their communities are declared evil radicals.6 And if hundreds of millions so 
sympathize, then truthfully, is not the dark side the entire Muslim world? To make sure 
the point is not missed, war commentators are quick to add that Islam’s civilization is 
decayed and failed. But this is no simple fight with the Muslim world and Islamic 
civilization. This is a global war, and the very survival of our civilization is at stake. Us 
versus them is not Americans versus Muslims but civilization and its enemies. Thus our 
transfigured narrative can keep its titular universalism as it expands the enemy ‘other’ 
beyond ragtag Takfiris to something really big: the Demiurge, the great Evil. If we are 
civilization, then the full enemy, in our unspoken logic, is the entire amniotic sea of 
dark humanity birthing and succoring attackers. Universalism is bent to the service of 
grand struggle.” Ibid. 
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correctness as nearly all Islamists are denounced as part of the problem.261 After all, if 
the global militant Islamist movement is focused on ultimately causing us great harm 
and is a barbaric enemy of civilization rejoicing in violent atrocities, and so many 
Muslims around the world often express sympathy for or are connected with local 
Islamist groups and their causes, then it seems only rational to recognize that something 
must be deeply wrong with their religion and culture. Even if the connections and 
support for the terrorist atrocities is indirect, a step removed, or conflicted by the 
victims of many attacks also being Muslim, the gravity of the potential threat perceived 
and absolute moral condemnation of terrorism magnifies the degree of attributed guilt. 
If the problem is also with them, then in the war on terror it makes simple sense for 
many Americans to treat them as enemies. 
President Bush and other opinion leaders have frequently compared the war on 
terror to the Cold War as a measure of how great and important the struggle is with the 
aggregated militant Islamist enemy. As part of this framing, President Bush and other 
opinion leaders often describe the conflict in clash of civilization terms that reflect the 
same narrative framing that radical Islamists promote. In his 1949 book, Social Justice 
in Islam, Sayyid Qutb predicted that the ultimate showdown would be “between Islam, 
on the one hand, and the Western and Eastern blocs, on the other.”262 Viewing the war 
on terror as a civilizational clash further undermines adoption of population-centric 
approaches as understanding and engaging their values and perspectives becomes 
antithetical to our ideals. 
Similarly, the aggregated and prejudicial view is also reinforced by the use of 
intentionally disparaging labels such as “Islamofascist,” which has no true 
correspondence with the actual ideology of any particular group other than representing 
the lumping of often very diverse actors into a homogenized whole associated with 
                                                
261 The only Muslims who are not denounced are those recognized by American 
political and opinion leaders as “moderates.” However, the functional definition of 
moderates in this case is “pro-Western.” In too many cases this means the United States 
aligns with existing power structures responsible for the grievances driving contentions 
action in local conflicts. At the same time many non-violent Muslim groups avoid pro-
American positions and statements in order to maintain local credibility with the result 
of being labelled as extremists and reinforcing the view that all Muslim groups are part 
of the problem.  
262 Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 163. 
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condemned previous enemies.263 While defenders of the term attempt to draw analogies 
between the excesses of violent terrorism and authoritarian nature of Salifists’ religious 
world views with the embrace of violence and totalitarianism by Fascists,264 critics 
                                                
263 Boyle, "The War on Terror in American Grand Strategy," 193, 8. Burke, "The End 
of Terrorism Studies," 45-6. Codevilla, 2009, Advice to War Presidents: A Remedial 
Course in Statecraft, Public Affairs, 25-6. Ignatius, 2006a, "Are We Fighting 'Islamic 
Fascists'?," The Washington Post, August 18, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/17/AR2006081701193.html. Larison, 2007, "Term Limits," 
The American Conservative (November 19), 
http://www.amconmag.com/article/2007/nov/19/00015/. Vlahos, "Losing Mythic 
Authority." 
264 Hitchens, 2007b, "Defending Islamofacism: It's a Valid Term - Here's Why," Slate 
(October 22), http://www.slate.com/id/2176389/. Howard, "A Long War?.". Safire, 
2006, "On Language: Islamofascism," New York Times, October 1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/magazine/01wwln_safire.html. Schwartz, 2006, 
"What is 'Islamofacism'?," The Weekly Standard, August 17, 
http://weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/593ajdua.asp. Michael 
Howard’s defense of the term in the journal Survival has been advanced by those who 
suggest the term is accurate and beneficial. However, Howard violates his own criteria 
that terms we use should define and diagnose the problem correctly without obscuring 
or misleading, as well as guide our military to “adjust their thinking, equipment and 
training accordingly” to deal with who “our adversaries are… what motivates them, and 
what kind of threat they pose.” Contrary to Howard’s claims, the term Islamofascism: is 
neither specific nor accurate; is likely to be viewed as offensive, reinforcing the “war on 
Islam” framing of our adversaries and alienating the moderate populations we need to 
engage; and, does not inform our militaries (or governments) while obscuring and 
misdirecting. Howard was right in his criticisms of the label “war on terror,” however 
widespread use of the phrase Islamofascism would likely have set us back even further. 
(1) Howard defends the Islamic portion in two sentences saying “they are” because their 
thinking is derived from a specific Wahhabi and purist interpretation of Islam. The 
availability of alternative labels such as Salafist or takfiri, which more accurately 
describe the religious thinking of the groups he wishes to include, without including 
Muslims in general, underscores why Islamofacism is likely to give offense while not 
providing a precise diagnosis. He defends the fascism portion by focusing on the 
historical rejection of enlightenment freedoms and noting that the new enemy is 
“fanatics like al-Qaida who reject our values and will stop at nothing to destroy them.” 
Setting aside that that is not really a precise description of Fascism, while some of the 
terrorist actors in the current conflict deserve that nihilistic description, for many of the 
groups and actors to whom the label has been applied it is not accurate and obscures the 
more complex social, political, economic, and ideological drivers discussed elsewhere 
in this thesis. Not all Islamists involved in the movement of which al-Qaida is an 
extreme manifestation are far enemy, anti-Western Salifists who seek a return to a 
mythical period of Islam under some form of authoritarian rule. Further, there are 
significant differences in the types of violence these groups will engage in, including: 
whether they will target or actively avoid targeting Westerners; the degree to which they 
target civilians or will go to avoid civilian casualties when striking other targets; and, 
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emphasize that these claimed similarities are simply common to most “armed 
revolutionary movements” and ignore that the ideologies of the violent Islamists and 
Fascists have almost nothing in common.265 Larison explains that the term is applied as 
                                                
the treatment (or likely execution) of hostages. Use of the term Islamofacism, especially 
with heightened focus by most on the prototype of al-Qaida, would counterproductively 
promote association with that extreme across all cases as well as encourage rhetoric and 
action more likely to aggregate when contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine advises 
the opposite underscoring the danger given that our language shapes how we respond 
(with which Howard agrees). (2) In defending the Islamic portion of the term, Howard 
seeks to redirect charges of bias by quickly noting that fanatics have also committed 
abominations in the name of Christianity. But significantly he does not show that we 
productively called those groups some version of “Christofascists,” which I suspect 
many Christians would find blasphemous and may take offense at in an analogous 
situation. Howard also acknowledges that the term fascist “is a general term of abuse” 
in contemporary usage, which explains why it is likely to cause offense. As Howard 
recognizes, our labels matter because they both shape our own thinking and play a 
larger role in the virtual narrative competition that is a very real part of contemporary 
counterinsurgency. Even if Islamofascist provided deeper specificity, it would not be 
wise to use. (3) Both Bush and Howard apply the label to a much larger population of 
groups than the narrow group of violent transnational terrorists who might meet the 
description Howard gives of fanatics “who reject our values and will stop at nothing to 
destroy them.” This aggregated and undifferentiated thinking about the conflict early on 
in Iraq retarded our ability to identify and then to understand the important structural 
and motivational differences between Shia and Sunni groups generally as well as within 
the multitude of groups making up those factions. Overcoming this mindset was a 
significant part of efforts to engage with currently reconcilable groups while increasing 
coercive force on irreconcilable elements. The significant differences between Shia and 
Sunni groups, despite both using at times similar types of terrorist violence and being 
associated with Islamist ideologies, meant that reconciliation efforts on each side were 
often very different. The success of the Sons of Iraq, Awakening Councils, and related 
efforts on the Sunni side played a very significant role in decreasing violence, turning 
the tide against the remaining Sunni rejectionists, and created space and opportunities 
for confidence building measures with the Shia led government. The Shia side has also 
involved a wide range of targeted application of force while at the same time 
encouraging outreach to and negotiation with elements of the Shia insurgency in order 
to calm communitarian violence, increase confidence in the government, bring 
competing Shia groups together in meaningful power sharing arrangements conducive 
to political development, and reconciling former violent actors into the system while 
keeping pressure on other parts of the networks to degrade and deny their ability to 
undermine the whole project. The Shia side of the equation has also involved 
recognition of potentially much greater Shia violence that was in part avoided by 
proactive engagement with religious leaders who share ties and religious ideology with 
some who Bush and Howard label as Islamofascists. 
265 Codevilla, explains that Fascism “was an aggressively secular, socialist, nationalist 
movement that organized society in a corporatist way and stressed modernization” and 
that the “closest thing to a fascist movement in the Islamic world is the Ba'aath party of 
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“a demon word designed to generate visceral, irrational reaction.”266 From the 
counterinsurgency informed perspective encouraging a unity of understanding that 
advances population-centric actions this is, again in Larison’s words, “precisely the 
opposite of the careful, deliberate, and informed responses we need to cultivate.”267 He 
concludes that the purpose of those who use the label is to “group together the many 
regimes and groups they wish to cast as a cohesive, united enemy, conflating mutually 
hostile forces into a single, undifferentiated mass.”268 Used in this manner the term 
continues to reinforce the perception that all Muslims are part of the problem, 
undermining population-centric goals by eroding the understanding and motivation to 
pursue them as well as by giving insult to the larger vital populations in the conflict, 
including especially domestic diaspora groups whose support plays many crucial roles. 
Ignatius writes: 
The notion that we are fighting “Islamic fascists” blurs the conflict, widening the 
enemy to many if not all Muslims. It's as if we were to call Hitler and Mussolini 
“Christian fascists,” implying that it is their religion, not resistance to 
transcendence, that is the root cause of the problem. The revolution that began in 
Iran in 1979 must be contained so that it doesn't destabilize the region more than 
it already has. But it will only be broken from within, by people who are at last 
ready to transcend.269 
The result is to make every Muslim movement becoming part of our larger enemy, as 
Vlahos explains: 
The real Cold War analogy is in the Soviet metaphor itself. Thus the “Islamo-
fascist” threat equals the Soviet threat, requiring an equivalent struggle. But 
unlike the Cold War, our survival now depends not on deterrence but literally on 
destruction. This story has remarkable implications for alternative communities. 
                                                
Syria and Iraq” whose founders “imitated Fascism's aggressive rejection of religion, its 
nationalism and socialism.” Codevilla, Advice to War Presidents: A Remedial Course in 
Statecraft, 25-6. Larison similarly writes: “The key problem with the label is its 
stunning ignorance of both fascism and jihadism. Fascism was a specific, secular, 
modernizing ideology – what historian Stanley Payne has called ‘revolutionary hyper-
nationalism’ – that emerged out of Europe’s ruins in WWI. It was focused above all on 
exalting the nation. Search in vain for any resemblance to a transnational, religious 
movement that claims to seek the restoration of a theocratic state. In art and 
architecture, fascists were champions of modernism; jihadists clearly have no such 
interests. The valorization of war and death that Hitchens cites in his defense as proof of 
the similarity between the two is common to all armed revolutionary movements.”  
266 Larison, "Term Limits." 
267 Ibid. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ignatius, "Are We Fighting 'Islamic Fascists'?." 
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Our Islamofascist branding makes every movement of Muslim resistance an 
attack on us. Yet most resistance instead speaks to local yearnings. By seeing an 
enemy of civilization in every Muslim non-state actor, we unthinkingly widen 
the struggle. Alternative communities are indelible in the “evil” world landscape 
painted by the global war on terrorism – the ongoing metamorphosis of the 
global other into the Mordor of our imagination.270 
In a separate article Vlahos similarly concludes that the adoption of this construction of 
the threat leads us to an enemy-centric approach treating Muslim populations at large as 
part of the problem for showing sympathy with what they locally see as resistance 
movements fighting grievances generally ignored by Americans.271 
This predisposition to view the populations of many Muslim populations as part 
of the problem undermines American efforts to win hearts and minds and discourages 
adoption of a population-centric approach by: obscuring the key local differences in the 
related conflicts; constraining policies to engage moderates and address motivating 
grievances; and, encouraging rhetoric and action that counterproductively feeds the 
wrong dynamics. For example, the strategic narrative as applied to the build up for the 
Iraq war by the Bush administration regularly linked al-Qaida to Iraq as part of the 
central justification for the war.272 This helped reinforce the misperception of many 
Americans that Saddam Hussein was connected to the 9/11 attacks.273 For American 
troops in Iraq this was constantly reinforced by visual and verbal references linking 9/11 
to their service, and reminders that they were deployed as part of the war on terror. 
Tatham concludes this had the unfortunate consequence during the initial invasion and 
subsequent occupation of undermining the type of positive interactions with Iraqi 
civilians needed for a population-centric strategy because many U.S. troops regarded 
Iraqis (and Arabs in general) “not as innocent people but as enemies – enemies who, the 
                                                
270 Vlahos, "The Fall of Modernity: Has the American Narrative Authored its own 
Undoing?." 
271 Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and 
Defeat." 
272 Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 39. For example, President Bush said in 
October 2002: “We know that Iraq and the Al-Qaeda terrorist network share a common 
enemy, the United States of America. We know that Iraq and Al-Qaeda have had high-
level contacts that go back a decade. We've learned that Iraq has trained Al-Qaeda 
members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after 
September 11 Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on 
America. Confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror.” 
Bush, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, Remarks by the President on Iraq." 
273 Clarke, 2004, Against All Enemies, Washington, DC, Free Press, ix. 
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U.S. media had told them, had collaborated with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda to mount the 
horrific attacks on the World Trade Center.”274 
Former CIA analyst Paul Pillar warns that the oversimplified aggregation of 
diverse groups with different ideologies leads to a misunderstanding of what is really 
needed for counterterrorism policy in each specific case.275 Fukuyama argues that “it 
makes no sense to lump together” these diverse groups, while Gardels concludes that 
this aggregation confuses “the solutions by obfuscating the causes.”276 Other experts 
have noted the results of this approach are policies and strategies that largely only target 
the symptoms (violence) and not the underlying causes and dynamics.277 As to the 
effect adoption of this perspective has on policy makers, Dickey relates a story told by 
anthropologist and counterterrorism expert Scott Atran about discussing the 
radicalization of European Muslim youth: 
In Washington last year he was briefing White House staffers on his findings 
when a young woman who worked for Vice President Dick Cheney said in the 
sternest tough-guy voice she could muster, “Don’t these young people realize 
that the decisions they make are their responsibility, and that if they choose 
violence against us, we’re going to bomb them?” Atran was dumbfounded. 
“Bomb them?” he asked. “In Madrid? In London?”278 
The predisposition to see large parts of the population, and especially potentially 
moderate Muslim groups, as inherently aligned with much more violent and potentially 
implacable Islamist militants discourages engagement efforts and support for reforms 
that may contribute to shifting the evolution of the larger movement towards non-
violent participation within political structures. Vlahos concludes, “So, in the end, our 
                                                
274 Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, 50-1. 
275 Balz and Abramowitz, "President Tries to Win Over a War-Weary Nation." 
276 Gardels, "De-Globalize the Jihad." 
277 Kapitan, "The Terrorism of 'Terrorism'," 17-8. 
278 Dickey, 2008b, "'Jihadi Cool': Comic Book Action Heroes may be Better Weapons 
Against Terror than Bullets or Bombs," Newsweek Web Exclusive (April 15), 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/132147. Anthropologist and Department of Defense 
advisor Montgomery McFate relates a similar anecdote of how American troops in Iraq 
counterproductively adopted the same enemy-centric focus, as described by Packer: 
“[S]he was told by one Marine Corps officer, ‘My marines were almost wholly 
uninterested in interacting with the local population. Our primary mission was the 
security of Camp Fallujah. We relieved soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division, and 
their assessment was that every local was participating or complicit with the enemy. 
This view was quickly adopted by my unit and framed all of our actions (and 
reactions).’” Packer, "Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the 'War on 
Terror'?." 
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dark narrative prevents us from distinguishing reform and resistance movements we can 
live with from groups we absolutely must destroy.”279  
Another result of this presumption shift is that American leaders tend to side 
with and publicly support local elites to a degree that they are able to increase 
repression and avoid addressing the underlying grievances motivating contentious 
mobilization. Over the long term this has the very counterproductive effects of more 
strongly identifying the United States with the enemies of popular movements, further 
losing the race for hearts and minds, while also pushing these movements towards more 
violent methods and anti-system goals. Such policies and rhetorical stances also 
disadvantage moderate elements who may have been sympathetic with the United States 
outright, or who at least supported the types of democratic, nonviolent, and reform-
oriented paths American goals also favour. 
Conclusion 
The highly normative nature of how we talk and think about terrorism, and 
especially the specific changes after 9/11 discussed in the first half of this chapter, 
create a series of biases undermining both the understanding of terrorism and the 
resulting efforts to respond. The public construction frames and filters thinking and 
discussion of issues related to terrorism, focusing attention on certain aspects of the 
problem and not others, generating or impeding specific associations, and establishing 
presumptions for how information is evaluated and understood. This construction is 
strongly influenced by the strategic narrative advanced by the Bush administration, 
which further serves to reinforce the constraints and adverse effects on resulting rhetoric 
and policy. At a national level these effects constrain the strategies and tactics 
politicians and decision makers consider, strongly favouring aggressive and hard 
counterterrorism policies and ignoring or devaluing many efforts more consistent with 
the recommendations of a population-centric approach drawing on the lessons of 
counterinsurgencies and the study of social movements.  
The biases and predispositions of the current construction of terrorism also 
discourage efforts to understand the larger complex dynamics surrounding cases where 
                                                
279 Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and 
Defeat." 
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terrorism emerges, especially as these dynamics relate to potentially sympathetic 
populations. In part these biases come from the dissonance caused by recognizing and 
considering the reasons why larger populations may turn to or be sympathetic with the 
use of violence in response to grievances coupled with the desire to unambiguously 
denounce and reject terrorism while seeing ourselves as defending good from evil. Too 
often the result is a rejection of at least certain types of understanding necessary for a 
population-centric approach, and greater emphasis on the violence as well as the 
culpability and threatening intentions of those who employ it. The resulting 
understanding of the problem in turn again constrains and guides responses towards a 
more enemy-centric approach. 
How Americans talk and think about terrorism, especially after 9/11, also creates 
a number of direct influences favouring an enemy-centric over population-centric 
approach to understanding and responding to terrorism. The framing of discussion about 
the issue focuses on the violence, the terrorists, and the personalized threat. The 
tendency to measure that risk in terms of especially grave possible threats as well as the 
accompanying moral shunning of the normative construct both shift the presumption 
towards an enemy-centric approach. As part of how the threat tends to be constructed, 
potentially sympathetic populations are generally seen opponents instead of possibly 
being part of the solution. 
Ian Lustick has argued that “without a comparably serious understanding of the 
motivations and predicaments of al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups we are doomed to 
suffer self-inflicted wounds more devastating than anything we do to our foes.”280 As 
Chapter Two explains encouraging unity of understanding throughout all levels of 
government and allied effort for the conflict faced based upon an accurate 
understanding of the threat and possible roles of vital populations is essential for 
creating the synergies of consistent action without risking mistakes that undermine 
overall goals. It is not sufficient that a few experts “get it” or even that the U.S. military 
as a whole appears to be largely moving towards an institutional appreciation of 
population-centric counterinsurgency given that there are too many other important 
actors from highly visible public officials down to the regular government personnel 
who carry out much of the development and implementation of policy as well as other 
                                                
280 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 122. 
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aligned non-governmental actors and other Coalition governments. Unfortunately the 
way Americans talk and think about terrorism after 9/11, the shared public construction 
that has been specifically endorsed and promoted by the Bush administration’s strategic 
narrative, undermines this deeper understanding. The result is a more enemy-centric 
approach to counterterrorism that repeats many of the same mistakes criticized by fifty 
years of counterinsurgency literature and increases the chances U.S. action will create 
self-fulfilling prophecies. 
The worst problems discussed in this chapter emerge out of the exaggeration and 
combination of changes in how terrorism is perceived. It is true that there are 
connections between many different militant Islamist groups, and that larger Muslim 
populations often are sympathetic with and to varying degrees supportive of some of the 
actions and goals of these groups. There are also strong reasons for enforcing a societal 
rule normatively insisting on a blanket rejection of violent tactics targeting civilians and 
non-combatants. It is true that many militant Islamist groups see the United States as an 
enemy and some of these have prioritized carrying out mass casualty attacks against 
American and other Western interests. And there are good arguments that the U.S. 
response needs to include aggressive, hard counterterrorism options targeting the most 
threatening militant Islamists. To maintain public support this may require seeing the 
country as engaged in a military conflict. However, mixed together in the manner that 
has occurred in the United States after 9/11 these observations, with often significant 
exaggeration and misunderstanding reinforced by the strategic narrative of the Bush 
administration, create a bias of incorrectly seeing most Muslims as part of an especially 
grave threat, morally culpable for attacks that have occurred, and part of the enemy in a 
real war threatening destruction of the United States. In combination these attitudes and 
biases help to explain why the war on terror, from the perspective of the lessons of 
American and British counterinsurgencies and the study of social movements, has too 
often: disproportionately focused on enemy-centric and coercive counterterrorism 
policies; underfunded and underprioritized population-centric efforts failing to address 
important grievances and aspirations; counterproductively encouraged aggregation of 
disparate groups increasing the overall threat while failing to pursue options that would 
disaggregate conflicts; and reinforced the narrative framing of militant Islamists while 
undermining the intended counterframing for engaging in the war of ideas.
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CHAPTER SIX: FLAWED MODELS  
AND LIMITS TO AGENCY 
“How could a mass murderer who publicly praised the terrorists of September 11 be 
winning the hearts and minds of anyone? How can a man in a cave out communicate 
the world’s leading communications society?”1 
–Richard Holbrooke, 28 October 2001 
Richard Holbrooke’s question captures common and recurring frustrations as 
repeated surveys of Muslim attitudes have frequently reported increasing or deepening 
anti-Americanism. This chapter argues that part of the answer to this question is that the 
national counterterrorism strategy advocated by the Bush administration was based on a 
flawed model for pursuing hearts and minds goals, while at the same time that those 
who pose Holbrooke’s question expect too much and overestimate American agency for 
influencing the central dynamics driving popular support. The chapter begins by 
examining the model underlying the Bush administration’s approach and argues that it 
overemphasizes American centrality while ignoring or misunderstanding the important 
role of larger populations who mobilize around real grievances. The second half of the 
chapter examines how the frequently repeated question of how the United States could 
possibly be losing to terrorists in the competition for popular attitudes overestimates 
American and local state agency to influence the dynamics driving popular 
mobilization.  
The Problems of an Enemy and State-centric Model 
In order to understand why the United States performed poorly in the 
competition for hearts and minds during the first seven years after the September 11 
attacks this section argues that the overall strategic approach of the Bush administration 
did not sufficiently appreciate the central importance of popular support and 
mobilization to the conflict. The conceptual model for international terrorist threats the 
administration advanced largely did not prioritize or provide inherent support for the 
type of hearts and minds initiatives that were needed. The Bush administration’s 
                                                
1 Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out." 
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strategic model is first described by looking at the 2003 and 2006 editions of the 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which is consistent with the strategic 
narrative for the war on terror as discussed in the previous chapter. The section then 
explores how the model gives too much emphasis to the United States and al-Qaida, 
while underestimating the difficulty of changing attitudes by failing to appreciate the 
role that real grievances play in mobilization. The section ends with a discussion of how 
this model could be improved by incorporating insights from the study of 
counterinsurgencies and social movements. 
The Bush Model for Counterterrorism with Respect to Hearts and Minds 
Chapter Five discusses the importance of the strategic narrative advanced by 
political leaders for a conflict emphasizing that it is the foundation on which “policy, 
rhetoric, and action” are built.2 The strategic narrative in turn plays a central role as the 
framework for guiding and constraining policy choices and implementation, 
establishing priorities and resource allocations, and shaping how other government 
actors prepare for and pursue the missions that the narrative establishes as important.3 In 
order to understand the model for countering the terrorist threat informing and often 
represented in the Bush administration’s narrative for the war on terror with respect to 
hearts and minds goals this section focusing primarily on the two versions of the 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism published by the White House in 2003 and 
2006.4 The extensive review of public statements made by President Bush and key 
members of his administration for the previous chapter serves as a background 
foundation to identify important themes in these two documents consistent with the 
administration’s overall public framing of the war on terror. Approached from a 
counterinsurgency and social movement theory informed perspective, three important 
aspects emerging from analyzing these documents are discussed here. 
                                                
2 Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and 
Defeat." 
3 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 328. Barry and Elmes, "Strategy 
Retold.". Casebeer and Russell, "Storytelling and Terrorism.". Freedman, The 
Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 22. 
4 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.". "National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism." 
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To begin with, both versions the Bush administration’s National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism reflect an enemy-centric instead of population-centric approach to 
combating terrorism, emphasizing the United States as playing the central or leading 
role with the full capability to affect all necessary goals which are largely focused on 
terrorist groups disconnected from larger populations.5 The enemy-centric framing of 
these documents is especially apparent in what they do not discuss and in comparison to 
population-centric counterinsurgency texts. For example, the preface and executive 
summary of the new U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide published in January 
2009 repeatedly emphasizes a population-centric perspective highlighting that 
insurgencies are fundamentally about assisting local governments to “serve their 
populations” and are “primarily a political struggle,” “understanding of the ‘human 
terrain’ is essential,” attitudes of the “contested population” influence the “probability 
of success,” and “historically COIN campaigns have almost always been more costly, 
                                                
5 The discussion of the post-9/11 social construction of terrorism in the previous chapter 
provides many examples of how this model manifests in the official and public 
discourse that guides U.S. counterterrorism policy. A war framing creates traditional 
assumptions of a simple us versus them binary division, where the United States and its 
terrorist enemy are naturally the principal combatants. Hess and Justus, "(Re)Defining 
the Long War," 5. Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 63. Repeated claims that the 
United States is the primary target of plots threatening especially grave devastation by a 
generally aggregated terrorist enemy reinforces these central roles. For example: 
Cheney, 2005a, "Vice President's Remarks at a Rally for the Troops," (May 11), Office 
of the Vice President, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070511-
5.html. Cheney, "Vice President's Remarks at the 73rd National Convention of the 
Military Order of the Purple Heart." The assumption that the U.S. shares primary 
agency in the conflict is seen in the reciprocal language emphasizing the United States 
as the “right country” to be answering the “call of history” in the “global ideological 
struggle [of] our time” and that “this great country will lead the world to safety, 
security, and peace.” Vlahos, "The Fall of Modernity: Has the American Narrative 
Authored its own Undoing?." The secondary role given to other actors is consistent with 
the “with us or against us” language demanding that others must choose and will be 
held “accountable” for their choices. It is also reflected in the rhetorical assumptions 
that those actors are choosing between the pursuit of freedom and democracy versus the 
embrace of senseless killing and totalitarian rule. For example: Bush, "Address to a 
Joint Session of Congress and the American People.". Bush, "President Bush, President 
Kwasniewski Hold Joint Press Conference.". Bush, "Remarks by the President at 
Connecticut Republican Committee Luncheon.". Bush, "President Bush Reaffirms 
Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan.". Bush, "President Bush Discusses 
Global War on Terror." 
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more protracted and more difficult than first anticipated.”6 In comparison the 
introduction to the 2003 strategy document emphasizes direct action against the terrorist 
enemy, stating:  
While we appreciate the nature of the difficult challenge before us, our strategy 
is based on the belief that sometimes the most difficult tasks are accomplished 
by the most direct means. Ours is a strategy of direct and continuous action 
against terrorist groups, the cumulative effect of which will initially disrupt, over 
time degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist organizations. The more 
frequently and relentlessly we strike the terrorists across all fronts, using all the 
tools of statecraft, the more effective we will be. The United States, with its 
unique ability to build partnerships and project power, will lead the fight against 
terrorist organizations of global reach. By striking constantly and ensuring that 
terrorists have no place to hide, we will compress their scope and reduce the 
capability of these organizations.7 
This is not to imply that the 2003 strategy fails to mention any non-directly enemy 
focused aspects of the war on terror, as it does for example briefly discuss the “war of 
ideas” and importance of denying support to terrorists (although focused on state 
sponsorship). However, in comparison to population-centric counterinsurgency 
documents the emphasis is very heavily from an enemy-centric perspective. This is 
further demonstrated in the 2003 strategy document’s discussion of the nature of the 
terrorist threat describing a structure of terrorism essentially disconnected and 
independent of larger populations. The only population-centric reference in this part of 
the document is a brief mention of underlying conditions that terrorists exploit, but even 
                                                
6 "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide." This new guide – published jointly by 
the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development – demonstrates how far the U.S. government’s understanding and 
institutional prioritization of counterinsurgency has come over the seven years covered 
by this thesis. The guide not only provides an excellent summary of the classic 
counterinsurgency lessons, but also reflects thinking about the new challenges posed by 
contemporary insurgencies that exploit the transnational and virtual dimensions of a 
more globalized world. However, the rapid evolution in counterinsurgency thinking was 
not reflected in the public statements and overall strategy of the Bush administration 
with respect to the war on terror. In part this is a result of the fact that the driving force 
behind re-learning of counterinsurgency lessons and understanding how those changed 
in a modern environment emerged out of the U.S. military as a reaction to the course of 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The apparent success of a shift to population-centric 
counterinsurgency practices in Iraq was not widely recognized until the last year of 
President Bush’s two terms in office, leaving little chance for it to become part of a 
larger shift in approach to counterterrorism especially with the pressures of an election 
year. 
7 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 2. 
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here the emphasis is on the terrorists, reinforces that terrorists are not really motivated 
by these concerns, and stresses the need to change a larger belief that terrorism is 
acceptable as opposed to addressing those underlying grievances.8 In comparison, the 
document gives significantly more emphasis to the importance of: terrorists having 
physical environments in which they can freely operate;9 state sponsorship of terrorism; 
and, the interconnections between terrorist groups.10 The 2006 version of the National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism similarly places emphasis on an enemy-centric 
perspective. This is perhaps most strongly shown in the introductory section titled 
“Today’s Realities in the War on Terror” that identifies nine successes and seven 
remaining challenges. All of the successes listed are measures from an enemy-centric 
approach, including depriving al-Qaida of safe haven through the invasion of 
Afghanistan, “aggressively prosecuting the war against terrorists in Iraq,” significantly 
degrading the al-Qaida network by capturing and killing its leadership, and highlighting 
the number of nations that have joined the fight on terrorism.11 Similarly, at least five of 
the seven challenges are enemy-centric focusing on terrorist networks, attacks that have 
occurred or the threat of attacks including terrorist intentions to use weapons of mass 
destruction, and the continued state sponsorship of terrorism by Syria and Iran. The 
final two challenges discuss the war of ideas, but even then focusing on terrorists and 
not the larger population, noting that terrorists have twisted the fight for freedom in Iraq 
into a rallying cry and that they have gotten more sophisticated about using the internet 
and media for propaganda and communication.12 
Part of the enemy-centric focus of the two national strategy documents, which 
emerges in comparison to population-centric approaches, is that the Bush administration 
strategy views states as the principle external enabler for terrorists instead of seeing 
                                                
8 On grievances the document writes: “At the base, underlying conditions such as 
poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists 
to exploit. Some of these conditions are real and some manufactured. Terrorists use 
these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support. The belief that terror is 
a legitimate means to address such conditions and effect political change is a 
fundamental problem enabling terrorism to develop and grow.” Ibid., 6. 
9 It is important to note that the document is not talking about a permissive environment 
in terms of Mao’s supportive population, but instead is focused on state sponsors, failed 
states, or liberal and tolerant European laws. 
10 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 5-10. 
11 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 3-4. 
12 Ibid., 4. 
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mobilized populations as the key potential support base. For example, a classic Maoist 
counterinsurgency perspective focuses on the ability of the insurgent to move freely 
within the people as playing a vital role for sanctuary while contemporary theorists 
highlight how globalization has created virtual sanctuaries amongst disparate 
populations in other countries. In comparison, when the 2003 document discusses 
terrorist sanctuary it focuses first on state sponsorship, then weak of failed states, and 
finally European countries where terrorists exploit the legal protections of “liberal, and 
tolerant societies.”13 Further, when the 2003 document discusses how to accomplish its 
second top-level goal of denying terrorists sponsorship, support, and sanctuary all of the 
objectives it outlines are state-centric and not population-centric, including: ending the 
state sponsorship of terrorism; working on international standards of accountability to 
hold states to; and, strengthening and sustaining the effort of other states to fight 
terrorism.14 The 2006 strategy document similarly continues an emphasis on state 
sponsorship, highlighted in the titles of three of its four short-term priorities: “deny 
WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them,” “deny terrorists the 
support and sanctuary of rogue states,” and “deny terrorists control of any nation they 
would use as a base and launching pad for terror.”15 The 2006 strategy document does 
give emphasis to a presumptively population-centric approach over the long term 
focused on promoting effective democracy as the answer to the four sources of 
terrorism that it discusses.16 However, even in this section of the document it does not 
explain how these four sources of terrorism lead to larger populations providing 
important support to terrorists. The section also does not explain how democracy 
promotion is part of the “war of ideas” to change attitudes amongst potentially 
supportive populations (especially in the short term), and instead focuses on explaining 
                                                
13 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 8. Similarly, all of the funding sources 
for terrorists that the document explicitly mentions are either from state enablers or 
criminal activity, with no mention of popular support being a source of funding. 
14 Ibid., 17-22. 
15 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 11-7. Emphasizing the enemy-centric 
focus and not population-centric focus of the 2006 strategy document the first short 
term priority mentioned is “prevent attacks by terrorist networks” followed by the three 
listed above. No mention is made under any of these four priorities of the important role 
that the attitudes of larger populations may play in achieving the objectives or for 
enabling terrorists. 
16 Ibid., 9-11. 
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how once effective democracy has been achieved that will eliminate the problems 
giving rise to terrorist violence.17 This demonstrates that the thinking behind the 
strategy remains focused on state structures instead of on the importance of popular 
attitudes and mobilization dynamics. Chapter Seven explores how the Bush 
administration in 2005 and 2006 perceived democracy promotion as its key to engaging 
the war of ideas, and the negative consequences for overall attempts to win hearts and 
minds that resulted from problems in how this effort was conceived and the 
administration’s reactions to subsequent events. 
Consistent with the strategic narrative advanced by the Bush administration 
discussed in the previous chapter, to the extent that both national security documents 
raise grievances that are potential mobilizing factors for popular support to terrorism the 
discussion focuses on portraying those as on face illegitimate or essentially unrelated to 
the rise of terrorist violence. This again underscores the enemy-centric focus when 
compared to counterinsurgency documents that stress that popular support for groups 
using violence is generally driven by real grievances that must be addressed in order for 
the state to prevail. For example, half of the 2003 document’s very short discussion of 
underlying conditions of terrorism simply says, “The belief that terror is a legitimate 
means to address such conditions and effect political change is a fundamental problem 
enabling terrorism to develop and grow.”18 While I agree that this is an important 
normative goal, it does not reflect or explain a population-centric understanding of what 
causes violent mobilization. Similarly, the third of four overall goals of the 2003 
strategy is to “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit” which 
begins by emphasizing that terrorists have little in common with those who experience 
legitimate grievances, although it then goes on to say that the U.S. will provide support 
and aid to local nations to address those conditions. By so strongly distancing 
grievances from the emergence of violence the document, and similar frequent rhetoric 
from the administration, creates the impression that these efforts really are not that 
important to the war on terror. In the same manner, in its brief discussion of the war of 
ideas, the 2003 document emphasizes: 
                                                
17 Ibid.  
18 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 6. In the six-page section on the nature 
of terrorism underlying conditions are discussed in a short 60-word paragraph, half of 
which is above. 
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We must use the full influence of the United States to delegitimize terrorism and 
make clear that all acts of terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, 
piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or 
support and all must oppose. In short, with our friends and allies, we aim to 
establish a new international norm regarding terrorism requiring non-support, 
non-tolerance, and active opposition to terrorists.19 
This establishes that what is most important in the “war of ideas” is delegitimizing 
terrorism, rather than engaging what larger populations are actually thinking and talking 
about, considering why those populations may be sympathetic to militants, or 
responding to the actual arguments put forward by terrorist groups.20 The one specific 
exception is that the 2003 document includes a paragraph on addressing the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict as an important part of the war of ideas.21 However, the language 
merely echoes long standing U.S. policy, and as Chapter Seven will further discuss the 
actual resulting administration public rhetoric and actions after 9/11 served to reinforce 
related grievances and militant framing of this issues. Indicative of the failures with 
respect to addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a manner consistent with 
engaging in the war of ideas, the 2006 document drops all mention of this priority with 
the exception of noting that al-Qaida plotted the 9/11 attacks during a time when the 
peace process was actively being pursued as a reason that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
really isn’t an important cause of terrorism.22 The 2006 strategy document, again 
echoing much of the Bush administration’s public rhetoric, puts more effort into casting 
the mobilizing causes of terrorists as so obviously repulsive that a reader (or listener) 
cannot help but wonder why anyone would ever support them. For example: 
What unites the movement is a common vision, a common set of ideas about the 
nature and destiny of the world, and a common goal of ushering in totalitarian 
rule. What unites the movement is the ideology of oppression, violence, and 
hate.23 
                                                
19 Ibid., 23-4. 
20 Chapter Seven includes a discussion of the long history of grievances that these 
groups have consistently advanced, as well as the related resistance of American policy 
makers for acknowledging that U.S. policies could have anything to do with this. 
21 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 24.  
22 The 2006 document notes: “Terrorism is not simply a result of Israeli-Palestinian 
issues. Al-Qaida plotting for the September 11 attacks began in the 1990s, during an 
active period in the peace process.” "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 9. 
23 Ibid., 5. 
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In discussing the sources of terrorism the 2006 document emphasizes: political 
alienation, grievances that can be blamed on others, subcultures of conspiracy and 
misinformation, and an ideology that justifies murder.24 While all of these are important 
factors for understanding the current rise of violent conflict, the framing and lack of 
discussion of other factors emphasizes the view that there really isn’t any good reason 
for larger populations to by sympathetic to militant groups who use terrorist tactics. For 
example, there is no discussion of militant groups: providing extensive social services 
largely free of corruption; developing from non-violent groups in response to violent 
government repression; or, protecting related populations from other violent groups, 
especially in ethnic and sectarian conflicts where state security has broken down or the 
state is actively supporting the other groups. This is not to argue that terrorism is 
justified, but to underscore that the framing and model advanced by the Bush 
administration largely precludes understanding of the much more complicated realities 
in which terrorism emerges as a violent tactic (and rarely the only tactic) and why larger 
populations may provide support to militant groups. As the counterinsurgency literature 
emphasizes, understanding the motivations of larger populations, and often addressing 
the underlying grievances, is essential to eliminating the use of violence as well as 
enabling coercive efforts targeting the radicalized hardcore elements. Chapter Seven 
will illustrate how the lack of appreciation for the larger dynamics and long running 
historical grievances led to counterproductive action and rhetoric detrimentally 
reinforcing the mobilizing frames of militant movements. 
Finally, I should emphasize that the discussion above is not meant to suggest 
that the Bush administration or the United States did not pursue any population-centric 
initiatives. As Chapter Three describes, many different initiatives, policies, and 
diplomatic efforts were undertaken during these years consistent with and justified by 
hearts and minds goals. Some of these, such as the U.S. militaries development and 
implementation of new counterinsurgency doctrine stand out as particularly 
                                                
24 Ibid., 9-10. The 2006 document implicitly acknowledges that grievances such as 
poverty, hostility to U.S. policy in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and other 
counterterrorism efforts contribute to terrorism. However, minimizes these 
contributions by mentioning that they do not necessarily lead to terrorism and following 
with strong talking point arguments to cast them as simplistic and misinformed under 
the lead of what does and does not cause terrorism followed by where today’s terrorism 
comes from. "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 9. 
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successful.25 However, as that chapter also emphasizes, many observers have criticized 
the Bush administration for not giving sufficient resources or priority to those especially 
in comparison to enemy-centric efforts, for leaving many of the proposed initiatives in 
development or otherwise unrealized, and for not providing consistent follow through or 
top level support to others. From a strategic narrative perspective the above analysis of 
the Bush administration’s principal strategy documents for combating terrorism helps to 
explain the preference for enemy-centric approaches and relative lack of emphasis and 
attention to population-centric efforts. Recalling the importance of unity of 
understanding to enable unity of effort for population-centric goals from Chapter Two’s 
discussion of new counterinsurgency strategic precepts further helps to explain how 
given the overall strategic narrative and model for counterterrorism advanced by the 
Bush administration the resulting hodgepodge of hearts and minds efforts likely failed 
to achieve the desired reinforcing synergy that would have been possible under a 
population-centric framework. At the same time, despite many promising hearts and 
                                                
25 Consistent with the focus of this chapter I would emphasize that the military’s new 
counterinsurgency doctrine was not developed with the intent of informing global 
counterterrorism efforts nor did the Bush administration subsequently adapt its 
counterterrorism strategy to match. Further, the development of the military’s 
counterinsurgency doctrine was largely an institutional effort, which did not emerge 
from the administrations strategic narrative for the war on terror. Instead, it as driven by 
military leaders such as General Patreaus as well as a bottom up effort of lower level 
military personnel who perceived the previous strategy as failing and possibly 
contributing to the rising violence. Giving respect to President Bush, I should 
emphasize that he appointed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as well as promoting 
General Patraeus, who at a leadership level perhaps deserve the most credit for the 
change in course in Iraq and implementing the new counterinsurgency approach. The 
apparent success of this strategy in Iraq did not become apparent in tracking of violence 
levels until early to mid-2008, when there was less than a year left in President Bush’s 
final term of office leaving little opportunity for a significant reframing of 
counterterrorism strategy, especially given the political pressures of an election year. 
Finally, application of a population-centric counterinsurgency approach in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is arguably the most important place to start, and there are subsequent 
indications that appreciation of a shared conception of counterinsurgency across U.S. 
agencies – unity of understanding – is occurring as emphasized by the January 2009 
joint publication of the new U.S. Guide to Counterinsurgency by the Departments of 
State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development as one of the last 
acts of the leaderships of those institutions at the end of the Bush presidency. What 
remains to be seen is whether the population-centric understanding reflected in that 
document becomes an overall approach to the war on terror with top-level support by 
the new and subsequent administrations. 
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minds initiatives, the lack of overall unity of understanding of a population-centric 
strategy likely contributed to counterproductive mistakes and own goals in the war of 
ideas. 
Too Much Emphasis on the United States and Al-Qaida 
The assumption that the United States and al-Qaida are the primary actors in this 
conflict makes initial sense. Americans are responding to what remains the largest 
single act of sub-state terrorism by almost a factor of 10 when measured in casualties, 
from a terrorist group that has publicly declared war on the United States. That group is 
also responsible for several other plots targeting U.S. interests. The U.S. government is 
responsible for taking action to protect American safety and national security, and in the 
context of terrorism al-Qaida and its affiliates (or those it inspires) pose the greatest 
current threat. However, while it makes sense that the U.S. is motivated by potential 
attacks from these terrorist groups, the fundamental mistake is therefore assuming that 
in the larger context the U.S. is also the principle actor with the greatest agency. A 
repeated theme of this thesis is that a narrow focus on the United States and its terrorist 
enemy obscures and ignores many of the key dynamics actually determining how much 
of a threat international terrorism poses. 
This mistake is not unique to the war on terror. Shafer explains that in other 
counterinsurgency conflicts over the past century the United States has regularly 
overestimated its agency in terms of ability to carry out its intended policies, influence 
local actors, and bring about required changes consistent with prevailing American 
strategy.26 Lang argues the root problems underlying the failure of humanitarian 
interventions are found in dilemmas, including overemphasis, of state agency.27 It is an 
understandable reaction of people who are threatened or attacked to assume and 
attribute causality and agency focused on themselves and their own situation. At a time 
when the United States is universally recognized as the world’s sole superpower, it is 
not only Americans who assume the U.S. has relatively dominant capability to pursue 
and achieve its foreign policy objectives. 
                                                
26 Shafer, Deadly Paradigms. Shafer, "The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency." 
27 Lang, 2002, Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention, State 
University of New York Press, 188. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the enemy-centric perspective of the Bush 
administrations strategic narrative for the war on terror tends to encourage an emphasis 
on coercive counterterrorism efforts directly targeting terrorist groups. To the extent 
that hearts and minds strategies are pursued they are often approached simply as an 
extension of this binary thinking, positioning Muslim populations as part of the ground 
over which the U.S. and al-Qaida are fighting. Even when these Muslim populations are 
themselves given greater agency, the United States is still generally seen as the central 
actor directly competing for their support with terrorists. It is from this framing that 
Richard Holbrooke’s question resonates; with most Americans simply dumbfounded 
this is even a competition. 
The flaw in this thinking is that the United States is not a central actor with 
relatively significant agency in the dynamics driving popular attitudes and mobilization 
in different social conflicts across much of the Muslim world, even if groups such as al-
Qaida often focus their criticisms on the United States as part of their far enemy strategy 
or if local movements include anti-American rhetoric as part of their protests. Instead, 
as Chapter Four discusses, Islamist mobilization is the result of long running conflicts, 
mostly local in origin and focus, built on a history of failures and disappointments, over 
a wide range of long festering grievances, involving many other actors who by virtue of 
their more proximate and immediate roles exercise greater influence and capability to 
affect changes than the United States. The attitudes and beliefs of individuals in these 
contexts are highly contested and much more directly influenced by a wide range of 
local actors who are not driven by the same simple counterterrorism priorities of the 
United States and whose position gives them much more access, credibility, and import. 
Focusing on the personal beliefs influencing whether Egyptian youth join Islamist 
groups Wickham observes, “such ostensibly private rank-orderings are routinely the 
target of intensive ideological contestation, as government leaders, parents, religious 
clergy, movement organizers, and others compete for the ‘hearts and minds’ of their 
constituents.”28  
Many Islamist grievances do involve the United States or the West in general, 
but these often have as much or more to do with complaints over the last century or 
more of history as they do about current factors over which the U.S. may have 
                                                
28 Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 15. 
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immediate and direct influence. The substance and specifics of these grievances with 
the United States are driven by local conditions and ideological debates over which the 
United States has little credibility or ability to engage. Much of the blame ascribed to 
the United States and other Western nations is about the relative economic and political 
state of development in the Muslim world, which are problems that cannot be quickly 
and easily addressed, and are in many cases a function of the current global economic 
system.  
Blaming or even attacking the United States and other international actors is 
often more an instrumental tactic in a competition between local or regional actors in 
the pursuit of local or regional goals. Doran explains that al-Qaida’s 9/11 attacks were 
an attempt to win a framing competition influencing mobilization within the Muslim 
world as part of a conflict that is “somebody else’s civil war.” Observing that this is “an 
intra-Muslim ideological battle [and] a struggle for hearts and minds” Doran is 
concerned “it is not altogether clear that Americans understand fully this war’s true 
dimensions.” He emphasizes, “the fight over religion among Muslims is but one of a 
number of deep and enduring regional struggles that originally had nothing to do with 
the United States and even today involve it only indirectly.”29 
The urgent question facing many Muslim populations is not a simple choice of 
whether to support the United States or al-Qaida where one option brings a return to 
normal peace and prosperity and the other involves fears of unpredictable violence. 
Instead, these populations are frustrated by long histories of grievances and failed 
aspirations. They are focused on their own contentious challenges, attempting to find 
solutions for economic hardship, social disruption, political repression, local violence, 
and perceived threats to culture and identity. The choice to support an Islamist group 
opposed by the United States may have much more to do with favouring an 
organization that provides needed social services free of corruption. The choice to 
express anger at the United States may be intertwined within a cluster of other unrelated 
beliefs that are part of a larger collective action seeking to pressure local elites to 
respect basic human rights, allow greater political representation, and make progress on 
basic economic conditions. Participating in an organized protest against a government 
who is a U.S. ally in the war on terror may be driven by the repressive policies of that 
                                                
29 Doran, "Somebody Else's Civil War." 
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government and failure to deliver economic improvements, with only secondary 
opposition to the United States because of its support for that government or the fact 
that the primary organizers were Islamist. The important point is the dynamics involved 
are far from simple situations where the U.S. and a terrorist enemy are the central actors 
and the choice key populations face merely involves comparing the two. 
Changing Attitudes is Difficult: Recognizing Real Mobilizing Grievances 
The second major problem with the simple United States versus al-Qaida model 
of agency as applied to hearts and minds objectives is that it greatly simplifies what is 
involved in winning popular support. The enemy-centric focus of the Bush 
administration’s strategic model, which is also implicit in the question raised by critics 
of the administration such as Richard Holbrooke, makes the choice for Muslim 
populations seem obvious because the only alternatives it considers are support for the 
United States (promoting democracy, peace, prosperity, and freedom) versus support for 
al-Qaida (representing a movement for totalitarian rule, oppression, violence, and hate). 
This binary framing ignores that Muslim populations who are sympathetic to al-Qaida 
may actually be supporting local movements and groups (left unmentioned by the 
model or the question) pursuing much more desirable goals from their perspective, and 
only expressing opposition to the United States because they see America as supporting 
a local actor (usually an authoritarian government) denying those aspirations for a better 
life. Similarly, even if not using a binary model, by overemphasizing U.S. centrality to 
the question of what Muslim populations choose advocates obscure that Muslim 
opinions are also based upon choices of what competing path offers the best perceived 
chances for addressing their grievances and achieving their aspirations. These decisions 
are influenced by the complicated contexts of social networks and opportunities, local 
government actions and elite decisions. Recognizing that the United States may only be 
a scapegoat or tangential actor who is associated with one or another set of beliefs, 
where those competing choices each involve much more complicated sets of logical and 
emotional attitudes, helps to emphasize the limits to what American efforts can 
accomplish. 
The underlying focus of Richard Holbrooke’s question, as well as of the 
dominant “us versus them” framing of the war on terror, demonstrates the U.S. 
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misconception that the central choice is whether they like Americans. For example, in 
October 2001 President Bush said: 
[H]ow do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic 
hatred for America? I’ll tell you how I respond: I’m amazed. I’m amazed that 
there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would 
hate us. I am, I am – like most Americans, I just can’t believe it. Because I know 
how good we are, and we’ve go to do a better job of making our case.30 
While whether they like Americans or not is part of the question, by overemphasizing 
America’s centrality advocates and analysts miss several other factors that are important 
to the dynamics of who populations in the Muslim world support and how contentious, 
and sometimes violent, mobilization develops. 
The focus of most discussions about winning hearts and minds is on changing 
attitudes. Does the larger population in general have a positive or negative opinion of 
the United States? Do they tend to support or oppose those using tactics of terrorism, 
especially in terms of targeting American or other Western interests? Are they inclined 
to support anti-state groups or the local government and other forces allied with the U.S. 
against those using tactics of terrorism? These are important questions and the answers 
to them are a partial reflection of the success or failure of population-centric objectives. 
Captured by the phrase hearts and minds is recognition that the factors 
underlying these attitudes also have emotional as well as cognitive dimensions. Feelings 
of sympathy for a group perceived as oppressed or the upwelling of pride associated 
with the actions of someone seen as “standing up for” one’s group will influence logical 
concerns about the tactics used or disagreement with ultimate end state goals. Repulsion 
at atrocities, whether caused by terrorist attacks or the result of military collateral 
damage, can trump or colour rational examination. Analysis of hearts and minds goals 
therefore should also consider the wide range of affective dimensions from the 
perspectives of key local populations. 
Lessons from the study of classic counterinsurgencies emphasize success at 
winning hearts and minds is based upon securing improvements at a number of societal 
levels for the population in question – recognizing that the grievances and aspirations 
motivating the public are often based in real problems, whether or not those issues are 
                                                
30 Bush, 2001c, "President Holds Prime Time News Conference," (October 11), The 
White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html. 
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really what motivates the insurgent leaders. Shafer describes these as the three great 
oughts of counterinsurgency, recommending improvements in security, good 
governance, and development. 31 Explained from a social movement theory perspective, 
for a local state to win back the popular support of a potentially mobilized population 
requires convincing the public that supporting the government provides the best hope 
for addressing shared grievances and aspirations.32 
Recognizing these needs and how they interconnect contains two further lessons 
for attempts to win hearts and minds as applied to counterterrorism. Foremost is that the 
process is complicated because of the wide range of necessary actions and 
improvements requiring concurrent attention and success. Because much of the 
necessary improvements are at the local level, and dependent upon the capability and 
willingness of a local state to successfully pursue these goals, the ability of the U.S. to 
influence the process is constrained. Because serious terrorist threats tend to only arise 
later in these conflicts, providing improvements while countering anti-state forces often 
requires the use of hard military and security measures which themselves often risk or 
exacerbate public backlash and alienation.33 
The second implication of this counterinsurgency insight is that changing 
attitudes will be an even more complicated process than simply successful emotional 
and cognitive persuasion, because the determinants of popular support are also 
dependent upon the population’s perception of underlying improvements in the 
conditions which gave rise to the potential for political violence in the first place: 
insecurity, lack of good governance, and aspirations for a better life. The larger 
population may continue to give their support to other groups challenging the current 
system if they do not believe the local state is best able or sufficiently seeking to make 
these improvements. This may include continuing to support groups who use tactics of 
terrorism and in part espouse a fundamentalist and anti-western ideology, even if the 
population does not embrace the tactics, ideology, or all of the ultimate end goals 
sought. For the United States winning hearts and minds will therefore often also involve 
                                                
31 Shafer, "The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency," 63. 
32 Kilcullen makes a similar prescriptive analysis in arguing that U.S. counterterrorism 
should adopt a global insurgency perspective of the threat. See especially: Kilcullen, 
"Countering Global Insurgency," 611-2. 
33 Hoffman, "Beyond Public Diplomacy." 
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helping to create better alternatives for the local population to support. In many current 
conflicts the ground reality is often that local states suffer from corruption, a lack of 
legitimacy, and a history of repression. At the same time larger Islamist social 
movements include elements that are more responsively and successfully providing 
basic social services, largely free of corruption, and supporting a sense of pride for 
traditional identities. Unfortunately, in important cases these larger Islamist movements 
are also part of or associated with more radical groups or militant wings espousing the 
need for violent attacks in order to achieve long-term goals. 
These combined insights highlight the importance of recognizing that winning 
hearts and minds is much more than just changing attitudes. It involves recognizing that 
the opinions often used as measures of success or failure in pursuing a hearts and minds 
strategy are based on rational and affective dimensions, are related to real underlying 
grievances and aspirations, and are shaped by a wide range of social dynamics. To a 
significant extent, these attitudes may ultimately be more of a reflection of agreeing 
with a movement that seems to offer the best hope of addressing underlying grievances 
and achieving aspirations, than the result of careful analysis of the available facts on the 
specific issue of whether the United States is really to blame. Developing successful 
overall strategies to change these attitudes will therefore require engaging in all of the 
contributing levels, which the following sections explain is dependent upon the actions 
of many players, with limited opportunity for American influence.  
A Counterinsurgency and Social Movement Informed Model 
Shifting to a counterinsurgency understanding of winning hearts and minds 
begins to correct for many of the problems of an enemy and state-centric model of 
agency. It places central emphasis on the attitudes of the larger population around the 
group using tactics of terrorism. This approach stresses the importance of popular 
support as a force multiplier either aiding terrorist groups by providing recruitment, 
resources, concealment, and sanctification of violent tactics, or aiding government 
forces by providing intelligence, discouraging recruits, isolating terrorists, and 
stigmatizing violent tactics. The American and British counterinsurgency tradition 
further emphasizes the centrality of the local government and the need for real 
improvements to local conditions for determining success, while analysis of the 
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evolution of contemporary counterinsurgencies highlights the additional complications 
stemming from globalization. This shift in focus begins to address the problems of 
overestimating American agency while under appreciating the importance of local 
actors and ignoring the difficulties inherent in working with local governments to 
pursue strategic goals. Recognition of the need for real improvements underscores that 
popular attitudes are based in large part on perceptions about local grievances, the 
responsiveness of local governments, and expectations about what path will best lead to 
communal aspirations. Adapting a counterinsurgency model to understand the war on 
terror also begins to place more emphasis on the wide range of local Islamist terrorist 
and insurgent groups who are actually responsible for the vast majority of sub-state 
political violence and terrorist attacks. Finally, the lessons of American 
counterinsurgencies in the last century also cautions against overemphasizing the 
guiding ideals and end-state goals of an insurgency’s ideological leaders, and ignoring 
the driving motivations and actual desires of the average recruit and larger populations 
supporting them. 
The study of social movements provides significant further general benefits for 
understanding terrorism and specifically for examining why hearts and minds efforts 
since 9/11 have often been ineffective. A social movement approach to analyzing 
terrorism shifts the focus further to not just stress the importance of larger publics, but 
to explain that in many cases it is dynamics driving social mobilization that create the 
potential for the success of or even lead to the emergence of related more radical anti-
state elements advocating violent tactics. A social movement analysis focuses on: the 
grievances and hopes of the larger population; the political opportunities shaping the 
conflict dynamics (including access to political structures, elite alignments and allies, 
and levels of state repression); the mobilizing networks within the society related to the 
conflict; and, the framing processes drawing on cultural and ideological elements 
creating perceptions of grievances and aspirations, and defining legitimate tactics to 
address and obtain those. A social movement approach enables examination of the 
contemporary transnational and virtual dynamics where groups such as al-Qaida may 
have the most influence on the evolution of identity and political violence, as well as the 
more local, often national level conflict dynamics driven by the problems facing 
particular states and how individual governments have responded. This helps to explain 
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the commonalities, connections, and ideological ties between anti-state groups active 
across the Muslim world, without ignoring the important differences and local contexts. 
A social movement approach also emphasizes that many of the important conflict 
dynamics may not be related to the use of violence at all. Given that core grievances 
often have much more to do with basic social services, economic opportunities, and 
political participation it is not surprising to find from a social movement perspective 
that Islamist groups are very active at all of these levels. While some of these Islamist 
groups are also tied to violent groups, many reject the use of violence, especially attacks 
on civilians. Many of these Islamist groups, while generally part of the same Islamic 
awakening or belief that Islam has something to say about political structures, do not 
share the fundamentalist beliefs of al-Qaida. From the enemy-centric model perspective 
the activities of Islamist groups participating in or agitating for electoral politics, 
providing social services, and evangelizing for a resurgence of Islamic ideals are too 
often seen as part of the same existential threat – indeed, from the war on terror model 
discussed above, these other efforts are often thought to be merely covers and 
deceptions to achieve radical goals, instead of honest efforts to improve the well being 
of the individuals served. From a social movement perspective analysis may show that 
some of these are linked, however it may emphasize divisions that can be exploited and 
emphasized, potential allies or sympathetic elements who have more local credibility, 
and possible alternative paths that may help influence the conflict dynamics away from 
violence. The social movement perspective also helps to explain how the enemy-centric 
model can counterproductively create enemies that did not exist before, fail to engage in 
meaningful ideological debates, and ignore the important underlying grievances and 
aspirations that must be addressed for a mobilized population to consider alternatives. 
Finally, a social movement perspective helps to explain the more limited and 
constrained role of the United States and other Western actors in most of the relevant 
dynamics. 
The shift in focus encouraged by the counterinsurgency and social movement 
perspectives, placing more emphasis on local conflicts and local actors, is not intended 
as an argument that there is no significant threat of international terrorism. Violent 
attacks by local groups on international interests serve a multitude of instrumental goals, 
including: generating significant publicity and media coverage both locally and 
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internationally; embarrassing the local state, highlighting weakness, and encouraging 
overreactions that can drive the larger public toward the anti-state group; building a 
source of pride amongst members of the group as well as larger populations who see 
international actors as part of the problem; and, as signs of solidarity with a radical 
international Islamist movement including al-Qaida. The U.S. and other Western actors 
are also significantly threatened by continued al-Qaida led or inspired attacks, 
consistent with the far-enemy framing, which has shown some success in spreading to 
other regions as previously locally focused violent Islamist groups have pledged 
allegiance to or otherwise aligned themselves with al-Qaida. A special concern to the 
U.S. and other Western nations is the threat from homegrown terrorist cells, whether 
drawn from radicalized members of diaspora communities or converts, who may initiate 
attacks entirely on their own inspired by the ideology of violent Islamists or who may 
gain increased capability by making connections to and training with al-Qaida affiliated 
individuals or groups. For these homegrown radicals the local conflict dynamics and 
targets are the West. However, the argument of this thesis is, that in each of these cases 
the enemy-centric model obscures and misdirects more than it is beneficial. Adapting 
understanding to include insights from counterinsurgency and social movement studies 
improves analysis, explains previous failures, and perhaps may help avoid future 
problems. While there is a threat to U.S. and Western actors, policy advocates need to 
understand that in most cases the role the United States plays is limited and constrained, 
as the rest of this chapter discusses in more depth, and that most of the important 
dynamics driving these conflicts are at the local level within the relationships and 
actions of larger publics, other movement elements, and local governments. 
Overestimating American Agency 
The next problem helping to explain America’s failure over the past seven years 
is that advocates overestimate the United States’ ability to effectively implement the 
prescribed actions and do not appreciate the even greater challenges when working with 
local partners. Analysis of foreign policy often highlights the gap between ideal 
implementation when a state is conceived of as a unified actor and the significantly 
constrained reality imposed by a myriad of conglomerate agencies, with different 
bureaucratic cultures and perspectives, separately pursuing official policy as well as 
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their own institutional goals and self-preservation. Implementation of foreign policy by 
these various agencies occurs in a context where resources are limited, domestic politics 
and partisanship constrain action, and the available skills, capabilities, and attitudes of 
individuals ultimately mediate what is actually accomplished. All of these constraints 
come into play for the pursuit of hearts and minds goals in the war on terror. 
Starting on the Wrong Foot and Failing to Appreciate the Past 
Perhaps the largest challenge facing hearts and minds efforts targeting terrorism 
is serious terrorist threats rarely emerge spontaneously from otherwise peaceful and 
stable conditions. Counterterrorism efforts are generally initiated only after terrorism 
has risen to the level of a national security threat, by which time concerned international 
actors are attempting to address problems with long and difficult histories where their 
own credibility is usually already damaged. As Robert Coonrod, former Deputy 
Director of the Voice of America, wrote in 2007: 
Rising interest in public diplomacy in Washington is confirmation that 
something has already gone seriously wrong. All the theory would suggest 
otherwise - that public diplomacy is best used as an instrument to reduce the 
probability or severity of international conflict; yet, interest in and support for 
public diplomacy only rises in times of serious conflict.34 
To make matters worse, several of the underlying drivers of conflict in the current 
context are likely to get worse for some time, continuing to generate conditions ripe for 
exploitation by violent extremists.35 
The dynamics of popular attitudes in much of the Muslim world are shaped by at 
best official neglect and a series of government mistakes, and too frequently by violent 
state repression and sanctioned terror. Muslims in many Western countries have their 
own remembered histories of grievances which coupled with a growing sense of Islamic 
identity may heighten sensitivities to the troubles facing their coreligionists around the 
world. Populations potentially supportive of those using tactics of terrorism remember a 
history of deceit, perceived injustice, and serial disappointments at the hands of 
governments as well as sequential movements promising a better future. At the heart of 
                                                
34 Coonrod, 2007, "Rising Interest in Public Diplomacy Signifies Something is Wrong," 
Financial Times, December 24, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bceb7486-b1c2-11dc-9777-
0000779fd2ac.html. 
35 Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." 
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many violent conflicts are real multi-sided grievances where all parties bear some 
blame, although rarely acknowledging their own contributions and usually too quick to 
emphasize or misinterpret those of others. In such cases suspicions and biases, angers 
and alliances, and judgments and self-justifications are often entrenched before efforts 
to change attitudes are ever initiated. 
Unfortunately, one result of the focus encouraged by the binary enemy-centric 
model, is to obscure or hide much of the important preceding history shaping such 
conflicts. Consider competing perspectives on the U.S. military experience in Lebanon 
in the early 1980s, which continue to undermine American efforts interacting with 
populations in the Levant as well as across the wider Muslim world today. From the 
U.S. perspective, American troops took part in an internationally sanctioned operation, 
driven by the humanitarian goal of ending a civil war tearing apart what had been an 
exemplar of the modern Arab world. The one thing most Americans remember was a 
suicide attack by Islamic terrorists on 23 October 1983 killing 241 U.S. marines in their 
barracks on a peacekeeping mission. Americans more familiar with the events of that 
time may recall the series of Westerners taken hostage in Lebanon over the 1980s, an 
earlier suicide attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, or (if they are very well versed) 
perhaps even the near-simultaneous similar 23 October attack on French troops that 
were also part of the international force. Americans with specialized expertise may 
explain the context behind the attack on the U.S. marine barracks by emphasizing the 
highly fractured nature of the Lebanese civil war at that time, perhaps noting that 
amongst the atrocities committed by all sides were massacres in two Palestinian refugee 
camps by Lebanese Christian militias carried out in an area under Israeli control which 
local factions may have associated blame for with the U.S., or even suggesting that an 
ultimate source of Lebanon’s problems may be the confessional electoral system 
established by the French. But American policy makers are also quick to place the 1983 
suicide-bombings in the context of a long history of attacks associated with Hizballah as 
an international terrorist group that is described as an Iranian proxy, keeping the focus 
on unjustified terrorist violence by an internationally sanctioned Islamist terrorist group 
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and separating it from the less harshly condemned indigenous violence of a fractured 
civil war.36 
From the perspective of Lebanese populations potentially sympathetic to those 
responsible for the 23 October attacks the American military intervention was not a 
neutral, non-combatant peacekeeping operation. Instead it was part of a long series of 
policies and actions to support Israel and pro-Western minority right-wing militias, 
aligned with an unpopular government, kept in power by an unjust colonial 
arrangement. From this perspective the largely U.S. and French military intervention 
was timed to favour one set of factions in the civil war and seen as an extension of the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon earlier that year. Given that French colonial troops had only 
left 36 years earlier, France’s participation signalled that this was merely a continuation 
of Western domination of the region and support for a confessional political system and 
geographic boundaries designed to keep pro-Western minorities in control of the 
Lebanese government. Antagonistic Lebanese populations also saw U.S. involvement as 
a continuation of a previous U.S. military mission in 1958 to prop up another unpopular 
right-wing Christian President and in context of consistent strong American support for 
Israel who had conducted various military operations and strikes inside Lebanon since 
at least 1968. American and French forces were not seen as impartial non-combatants, 
but simply further outside participants, no different than Syria or Israel, in the Lebanese 
civil war. Before the October suicide attacks, American military forces were already 
perceived to have been responsible for attacking civilian populations. For example, a 
month before the barracks’ attack, U.S. warships shelled the Druze-dominated Chouf 
mountains south of Beirut in support of Lebanese Army factions battling Syrian-backed 
militias in the battle at Souk el-Gharb, during which that village was largely destroyed. 
While American officials described the naval bombardment as a “defensive action” 
striking militias in the mountains south of Beirut,37 by taking sides in this manner the 
U.S. became in the “eyes of the rest of the Lebanese population, just another militia and 
                                                
36 For example, the 2007 NIE on homeland threats gave prominent mention to Hizballah 
after AQ central and AQI: "National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the 
US Homeland," 2007, Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
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37 Friedman, 1983, "Two U.S. Warships Again Bombard Artillery Batteries Outside 
Beirut," The New York Times, September 21. 
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thus fair game.”38 In a military study of the lessons for marine peacekeeping based on 
the 1982 to 1983 deployment to Lebanon, Major Ronald Baczkowski reached the 
conclusion that, with the employment of naval shelling at Souk el-Gharb, “The 
neutrality of U. S. ground forces, already in question, now had clearly been lost.”39 The 
use of big naval guns (which would not be described today as precision weapons) in this 
and later actions was seen as indiscriminate strikes on civilian areas firing shells that 
many today recall as “flying Volkswagens.”40 This is not to say that all Lebanese 
opposed American action and certainly not to suggest that most Lebanese supported the 
suicide-attacks, hostage takings, or other terrorist acts. Instead this is meant to 
emphasize that the local attitudes which American hearts and minds efforts confront 
today often remember a different historical narrative, have reasons they see as justified 
to be at least suspicious if not antagonistic, and have their own long series of violent 
atrocities committed by many sides to temper relative moral condemnation to those new 
atrocities driving American perceptions. 
Part of the problem underlying the difference in perspectives is the asymmetry 
in influence and effect. Put figuratively, America is an 800-pound gorilla whose minor 
movements have lasting impact on other populations. Most Americans, including too 
often those making and implementing policy decisions, do not remember or appreciate 
local perceptions of past intentional (as well as unintentional, wrongly attributed, or 
misunderstood) American actions that had little to no effect in the United States but 
may have had or been perceived to have significant effect in other countries. The 
unfortunate exception is those rare events that cause America significant pain. 
Americans remember Iranian revolutionaries taking U.S. diplomatic staff hostage in 
1979 for 444 days, in clear violation of international norms, but rarely remember U.S. 
involvement in overthrowing a democratically elected and popular Prime Minister in 
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1953 to re-install an unpopular, but pro-Western monarch.41 American policy makers 
and defence personnel rightly remember the 12 October 2000 suicide attack on the USS 
Cole in Yemen killing 17 sailors in peacetime, but appeared not to appreciate the 1980’s 
legacy of naval shelling when placing the USS Cole off the coast of Lebanon in March 
2008 with the stated intent of sending a message of support to the Lebanese government 
during a time of factional political wrangling with many regional observers suggesting 
the move had just the opposite effect.42 
Americans are quicker to remember positive contributions, without sufficiently 
appreciating that key local populations may not view those as favourably. In response to 
criticism that Israel historically receives the largest share of U.S. foreign aid,43 
American political leaders and other commentators often respond that Egypt, a Muslim 
country, historically receives the second largest share of aid. However, local critics note 
that this is mostly military aid earmarked to specific projects (as compared to 
unrestricted Israeli aid implicitly signalling that only Israel can be trusted) and largely 
contributes to keeping in power an undemocratic, authoritarian regime with a long 
history of domestic repression.44 Similarly, Americans generally perceive the 1991 U.S. 
war with Iraq as liberating Kuwait and protecting the region from further Iraqi 
aggression, while many Arabs perceived America as motivated by a desire to retain 
access to and indirect control of the region’s oil wealth – especially given American 
support for Saddam after he began an earlier war with Iran that killed a half million or 
more fighters and civilians during the preceding decade. 
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Limits of Bureaucratic and Human Action 
Overestimating Coordination and Underestimating Time 
Since 9/11 a wide range of policy experts and panels have highlighted the need 
for a comprehensive communication strategy in order to engage in the battle of ideas 
and win popular support in the war on terror. Many of these argue that to be effective 
American messaging efforts should be coordinated across agencies, consistent with 
policy efforts, and integrated into the full cycle of policy development and 
implementation. Subsequent studies have found that U.S. efforts over the following 
years continue to fall far short of such coordination, consistency, or integration.45 While 
part of the problem is that hearts and minds strategies have not generally had true top-
level priority and support since 9/11, the many efforts that have been undertaken have 
themselves been hampered by the actual limits of foreign policy action as compared to 
ideal assumptions. 
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A significant part of the difficulties with coordination is simply the vast number 
of disparate agencies and size of the bureaucracies involved in the war on terror and 
related foreign policy. The principle actors under the authority of the executive branch 
involved in any comprehensive communication strategy to engage popular attitudes in 
the Muslim world would include: activity directly controlled by White House staff, 
including Presidential statements, the White House communication office, cabinet 
officials, the National Security Council, and various official surrogates and 
representatives authorized to speak for the administration; the Departments of Defense, 
with its partially autonomous services and commands, multitude of subordinate 
agencies, and numerous joint operations conducted with a wide range of international 
partners; the Department of State, with career staff and political appointees working 
from D.C. as well as in embassies in almost every country around the world where 
public diplomacy and related staff report locally and do not fall directly under the 
coordination of those leading the same efforts back in Washington;46 the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors (BBG), which is semi-autonomous from State and has a politically 
appointed bi-partisan board each somewhat able to pursue their own agendas, while 
overseeing a competing conglomerate of historically different agencies; the United 
States Agency for International Development involved with or contributing to a wide 
range of new as well as long-standing initiatives often implemented by a mix of NGOs 
and foreign agencies; and, the intelligence agencies, involved in covert and semi-covert 
related activity, separate from each other and without input from, coordination with, or 
even the knowledge of most other actors.47 The vast extent of coordination problems for 
projecting a consistent message becomes even more apparent when one adds to this mix 
the range of other official government actors who on occasion will legitimately be 
perceived overseas as representing the United States or who fund and operate programs 
significantly affecting Muslim populations important to hearts and minds efforts, let 
alone the wide range of private or semi-private contractors involved in key activities 
who still are often perceived as representative of or synonymous with the U.S. 
                                                
46 GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim 
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges," 6.  
47 For example: GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Intragency Coordination Efforts 
Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy." 
 CHAPTER SIX: FLAWED MODELS AND LIMITS TO AGENCY 295 
 
government. Summarizing the problem of oversight and organization, Joseph Nye 
comments:  
Many official instruments of soft power – public diplomacy, broadcasting, 
exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military to military 
contacts – are scattered around the government and there is no overarching 
strategy or budget that even tries to integrate them with hard power into an 
overarching national security strategy.48 
Repeated GAO studies over the last five years have detailed the launch of initiatives and 
panels to address the lack of communication coordination for U.S. hearts and minds 
efforts in the war on terror, only to note that these were left unfulfilled, disbanded 
without action being taken, were not involved with or did not influence actions that 
were taken, or continue to be in their initial stages of development.49 An in-depth 
investigation into American hearts and minds efforts in April 2005 noted: 
The inevitable turf wars also came into play. The war of ideas cut across 
otherwise-neat lines of responsibility in bureaucratic Washington. At the 
Pentagon and the NSC, public-affairs staffers warily eyed psyop officers who 
argued that public diplomacy, press relations, and psychological operations 
should be united under a single information strategy. White House veterans of 
tough political campaigns brought a short-term, manage-the-news outlook to 
what others thought would take a generation to fix. As a result, by mid-2004 – 
nearly three years after 9/11 – the government still had no one in charge of 
winning the war of ideas and no strategy for winning it. That summer, 
Government Accountability Office investigators told Congress they found 
public diplomacy staffers without guidance and a department short of linguists 
and information officers.50 
Focusing more deeply on the multitude of U.S. government actors involved, 
consider just the counterterrorism efforts of the U.S. intelligence agencies. The 9/11 
Commission Report, as well as numerous other hearings and panels, identified the lack 
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of coordination and information sharing between the 16 national level intelligence 
agencies as one of the significant problems leading up to al-Qaida’s attacks. These 
findings led to legislation and executive action publicized with much fanfare to create a 
more unified effort under a Director for National Intelligence. However, the reality five 
years after 9/11 was what another report described as “a counterterrorism infrastructure 
… so immense and unwieldy that many looking at it from the outside, and even some 
on the inside, have trouble understanding how it works or how much safer it has made 
the country.”51 Part of that reorganization created a new National Counterterrorism 
Center intended to focus the efforts of America’s intelligence agencies with relation to 
terrorism, however at the same time: 
[I]nstitutions historically charged with protecting the nation have produced a 
new generation of bureaucratic offspring – the Pentagon’s Counterintelligence 
Field Activity (CIFA) and Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating 
Terrorism (JITF-CT), the Treasury Department’s Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis (OIA), and the FBI’s National Security Service (NSS), to name a few – 
many with seemingly overlapping missions.52  
Many of these new organizations simply represent larger institutions protecting 
traditional units (now renamed) who had focused on this problem set before as well as 
bureaucratically responding to the increased available resources for everything terrorism 
post 9/11. The result is an “ad hoc construction, adding layer upon layer with none 
taken away” leaving “intelligence and security agencies competing for turf.”53  
Many of the basic problems involved in reorienting the United States to engage 
a war for hearts and minds in the Muslim world are simply difficult and take years to 
address, problems that are magnified by the delays of bureaucratic, uncoordinated, 
resource constrained action. For example, the lack of fluent linguists for key languages 
such as Arabic, Pashto, Urdu, and Farsi was frequently noted after the 9/11 attacks.54 
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The State Department estimates it takes roughly a year in the classroom full-time and a 
year in country to get to a level 3 on a 5-point scale in Modern Standard Arabic.55 
Developing programs to train the variety of necessary languages needed is a daunting 
task. The government must recruit sufficient numbers of individuals who: are able to 
fluently learn a target language; have other necessary expertise; and, are willing to set 
aside their careers for several years with uncertain long-term pay back. Considering 
these difficulties it is perhaps not surprising that evaluations of U.S. government efforts 
continue to highlight a lack of needed language skills in many key positions. Limited 
follow through, bureaucratic delays, a lack of resources, security concerns, a lack of 
sufficient incentives, and competing priorities have compounded these difficulties.56 
Human Limits 
Further constraining the reality of implementation of a hearts and minds strategy 
is the human limits of the individuals who collectively represent the United States. With 
the American military deployed in two major combat zones, 18 year old privates fresh 
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out of training and army captains in their early 20s are frequently the face in the last 
three feet of diplomacy playing the key role for local counterinsurgency goals as well as 
the U.S.’s global image because of the immediacy of international media coverage. The 
private is expected to make instant judgments on when to shoot in self-defence, to 
protect a scared foreigner neither of whom speaks the other’s language, and to conduct 
daily activities such as driving through town with respect while knowing that at any 
instant a sniper or improvised explosive device (IED) could kill the person sitting next 
to them in the passenger seat.57 At the same time, young captains are frequently placed 
in roles similar to colonial viceroys, in charge of large sectors with near-autonomy, able 
to “call down devastating American firepower one day and approve multimillion-dollar 
projects the next.”58 
Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl became one of the celebrated young military 
intellectuals of the U.S. Army’s post-9/11 efforts to learn and better implement a 
population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. His Oxford PhD comparing British and 
American military experiences with insurgencies was completed between serving in 
combat operations in Iraq during the terms of both Presidents Bush, and led to him 
playing a significant role in contributing to the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual. 
Nagl personally highlights the tendency to underestimate the difficulty of what is 
required of military personnel for winning hearts and minds. In an interview about his 
first posting to the current conflict in Iraq he admitted to thinking he understood 
something about counterinsurgency until he started doing it and that it was “far more 
difficult than [he] had imagined it could be.” Discussing the challenges of stray tank 
rounds, lethal force at check points, the danger of car bombers, and other problems he 
noted, “Killing an insurgent today may be satisfying, but if in doing so you convince all 
the members of his clan to fight you to the death, you’ve actually taken three steps 
backwards.”59 The difficulties and challenges of population-centric strategies when 
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considering the reality of the human beings required to implement them under often life 
threatening conditions has led many observers to emphasize that successful 
counterinsurgency operations are much harder to pursue than generally assumed and to 
question whether at times the required standards may be practically speaking almost 
unachievable. 
Bureaucracy, Culture, and Politics 
The institutional and cultural traditions of various agencies and organizations 
within the U.S. government, and the interaction of perceptions about these with other 
policy makers and the public in general, further work to constrain the ability to 
implement idealized strategies for winning hearts and minds. Several knowledgeable 
observers have explained that influential board members on the BBG after 9/11 chose to 
create entirely new broadcasting efforts for the Arab world in the form of Radio Sawa 
and Alhurra TV, instead of reinvigorating the existing VOA Arabic which arguably 
would have been faster and built upon years of experience and established credibility, in 
large part because of political disagreements with the staff of VOA.60 The current 
Secretary of Defense has noted the State Department’s Public Diplomacy efforts remain 
horribly underfunded, which others suggest is a direct result of conservative perceptions 
that career State Department staff are too sympathetic to foreign perspectives. Efforts by 
the Department of Defense to launch larger information operations capabilities were 
similarly shut down in response to liberal opposition. Many within the military as well 
as outside observers argue the 20th century American experience (victories in “world 
wars” and suffering with insurgencies) lead to an institutional focus on large 
conventional conflict and lack of developed capability needed for the type of ongoing 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This institutional culture, reinforced by the biases of 
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the social construction of terrorism, helps to explain the lack of early focus on winning 
popular support, resistance and occasionally outright opposition to adopting 
counterinsurgency approaches, and a continuing emphasis on developing hard power.61 
Competing Priorities 
Another factor constraining U.S. capabilities to carry out programs aimed at 
winning popular support in the Muslim world is competing priorities. Discussions of 
strategic communication and pursuing hearts and minds goals too often fail to recognize 
the constraints that come with the inevitable trade-offs not only of other 
counterterrorism priorities, but also the influence of the full range of other related 
priorities for the national government.62 Arguments about the benefits of allowing 
Pakistan to pursue a slower, counterinsurgency friendly strategy in the FATA versus 
making more cross-border military strikes against suspected al-Qaida senior leadership 
facilities become increasingly more complicated when recognizing the very real 
concerns about the stability of Pakistan’s government, progress in peace talks between 
Pakistan and Indian, long term control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the influence of 
developments in Pakistan on both Iranian and Chinese military posture, and the effect of 
developments in Pakistan on immigrant communities in Europe who may be at 
heightened risk of radicalization and recruitment by terrorist networks. 
A direct example of competing priorities constraining American hearts and 
minds efforts since 9/11 has been the trade-off created by decisions to significantly 
heighten security and limit exposure for American embassies and diplomatic missions 
around the world.63 At the same time that overall diplomatic budgets have increased, 
threats based in part on increased anti-Americanism have in many regions, especially in 
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countries with significant Muslim populations,64 resulted in significantly increased 
security costs. Such additional precautions make maintaining former levels of activity 
more costly, often offsetting the increased budgets intended to new and additional 
targeted hearts and minds efforts. Because of the inherent difficulty in protecting against 
terrorism, where the attacker has the luxury of adapting to refocus on the least protected 
target, post-9/11 diplomatic security measures have often resulted in cancellation or 
scaling-back of previous outreach efforts and limiting visitors able to partake in public 
access activity at embassies themselves.65 Increased security concerns have also made it 
harder for the State Department and other U.S. Agencies to fill posts in key regions, 
leaving many missions unstaffed or staffed with individuals lacking necessary language 
skills, while also leading to shortened tours of duty undermining local knowledge and 
contacts. Security concerns have also at times precluded State and USAID from 
publicizing American sponsorship of programs, limiting the good will generated for the 
United States.66 Finally, the need to quickly reinforce physical security at many 
embassies has created visible perceptions of these as hardened, defensive, military 
facilities reinforcing an image of Fortress America – unapproachable, militaristic, and 
distrustful – the opposite of what diplomatic efforts wish to portray.67 All of these 
security effects have made it difficult for American diplomats to merely continue pre-
9/11 levels of outreach, while frustrating and constraining initiatives to increase hearts 
and minds efforts. 68  
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Overestimating Local Agency 
The problem of misunderstanding agency strikes twice when turning to the local 
governments most involved with the conflicts driving Islamist terrorism. Consistent 
with the binary “us versus them” war on terror model, too often these local governments 
are considered only as secondary players who partner with and support the United 
States in the battle with terrorism, instead of as central players in their own long-
running, local social and political conflicts involving much more than terrorism where 
the U.S. and other Western nations are tangentially involved actors. When they are 
considered American strategies too often treat local governments as unitary actors with 
the capability and willingness to fully and consistently implement U.S. strategy as 
advocates idealize it, instead of recognizing that they face all of the same limits to 
agency as well as having their own opinions, competing agendas, and imperfections. 
This is compounded by the reality that important domestic constituencies and the local 
state itself are usually directly involved with various sides of the underlying conflict. 
The unspoken assumption is too often what the United State’s wishes to do is “fully 
determined action, whereas what other people do is simply a consequence of that action, 
with no independent or autonomous ‘agency’ of its own.”69 
Limits to Capacity 
Local governments face similar problems of bureaucracies and internally 
competitive agencies, the inertia of culture and conflicts of competing goals and 
priorities, as well as the ultimate mediating role of individuals all of which constrain 
and limit the ability of these states. In almost all cases these local governments have 
greater resource constraints and budget limits, while facing much more profound 
challenges of meeting their citizens basic needs. The challenges facing these states often 
play a significant roll in driving the conflict dynamics. Complicating the agency 
problem for the war on terror is that many of the governments the United States chooses 
to work with are some of the least capable with the greatest institutional challenges. 
Daniel Byman summarize the problem in “Going to War with the Allies You Have”: 
                                                
69 Hitchens, 2007a, "Appointment in Mesopotamia: Iraq's Problems Existed Long 
Before 2003," Slate (February 5), http://www.slate.com/id/2159082/. 
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Potential U.S. allies in counterinsurgencies linked to al-Qaida frequently suffer 
from four categories of structural problems: illegitimate (and often repressive) 
regimes; civil-military tension manifested by fears of a coup; economic 
backwardness; and discriminatory societies. Because of these problems, allies 
often stray far from the counterinsurgency (COIN) ideal, both militarily and 
politically… Washington must recognize that its allies, including those in the 
security forces, are often the source of the problem as well as the heart of any 
solution…. [T]he ally’s structural problems and distinct interests have daunting 
implications for successful U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. The nature of 
regimes and of societies feeds an insurgency, but the United States is often 
hostage to its narrow goals with regard to counterinsurgency and thus becomes 
complicit in the host-nation’s self-defeating behavior. Unfortunately, U.S. 
influence often is limited as the allies recognize that America’s vital interests 
with regard to fighting al-Qaida-linked groups are likely to outweigh any 
temporary disgust or anger at an ally’s brutality or failure to institute reforms. 
Training, military-to-military contacts, education programs, and other efforts to 
shape their COIN capabilities are beneficial, but the effects are likely to be 
limited at best.70 
These problems are well illustrated by some of the countries the United States turned to 
immediately after the 9/11 attacks including Pakistan and the five Central Asian 
republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In 
exchange for military basing and other support in the war on terror, the United States 
provided billions of dollars of economic and military assistance to these countries, in 
part tying local perceptions of the U.S. to the actions of these governments. 
Problematically these countries are largely authoritarian regimes, with histories of 
domestic repression, poor economic outlooks, and large youth populations vulnerable to 
the appeal of radical movements.71 While the United States continues to provide advice 
and encouragement to these countries to pursue actions consistent with overall U.S. 
strategy, including efforts to win over popular support, the U.S. by association inherits 
blame for their previous mistakes and becomes partially hostage to their current and 
future actions as well as being limited by the constraints on their capability, willingness, 
and competing priorities. The same problems and limits are repeated around the world 
as the United States chooses to work with a multitude of countries perceived as 
important to winning the war on terror. Recalling that terrorism rarely rises to a national 
                                                
70 Byman, 2005, "Going to War with the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, 
and the War on Terrorism," Strategic Studies Institute, November 1, v, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=630. 
71 GAO, "Central and Southwest Asian Countries: Trends in U.S. Assistance and Key 
Economic, Governance, and Demographic Characteristics ". 
 CHAPTER SIX: FLAWED MODELS AND LIMITS TO AGENCY 304 
 
security threat without a long history of conflict, contention, and mistakes on all sides, it 
should be no surprise that most of these partners are far from perfect. 
The countries most involved in the conflicts generating terrorism often face 
significant problems of legitimacy, ethnic tensions, rapidly growing populations, a lack 
of economic opportunities coupled with daunting challenges for development, weak 
political structures, histories of coups and failed promises, along with legacies of 
colonial or at least Western economic penetration fanned today by the rapidly changing 
social and economic influences of globalization. The high levels of corruption in many 
of these states demonstrate one example of how these problems constrain both local 
capability as well as U.S. efforts to improve its image in the battle for hearts and minds. 
Corruption fuels the social conflict underlying insurgencies and terrorism by 
magnifying inequalities, increasing frustration with official services, and decreasing 
popular support for the governments with whom the United States often must work. 
Local officials skimming off or diverting U.S. aid undermines the positive impact of 
many hearts and minds efforts, further limiting the efficacy of programs intended to 
address the problems of poverty, promote development, and strengthen civil society.72 
Just how much this constrains U.S. efforts to win hearts and minds is emphasized by 
Iraq, where in 2006 Foreign Policy’s Commitment to Development Index estimated that 
just 10 cents on the dollar of aid to Iraq went to its intended purpose due to corruption 
and security overhead.73 Similarly, U.S. efforts in Afghanistan are constrained by the 
reality that those who have gained power since the overthrow of the Taliban generally 
learned their political outlook and governing skills as insurgent leaders fighting first 
against the Soviets and then in a long civil war where bribery, smuggling, personal 
armies, and authoritarian leadership were key to survival.74 At the same time, in many 
of the key local conflicts, the problems caused by corruption of official services and 
                                                
72 Diamond, 2008, "End Foreign Aid as We Know It," Democracy: A Journal of Ideas 
(Spring, No. 8), http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6584. 
73 "Ranking the Rich," 2006, Foreign Policy, September/October, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story_id=3547. 
74 “You can make a warlord a civil servant, but you can’t make him disband his militia, 
give back his guns, or crack down on bribe taking.” Stanchak, 2006, "Today's Papers: 
Silicone Valleys 2.0," Slate, http://www.slate.com/id/2154130/. Summarizing: 
Zucchino, 2006, "Afghan Warlords Find Limits to Power: They Still have Clout, but as 
Public Servants They are able to Make Little Difference," Los Angeles Times, 
November 18.  
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resulting public dissatisfaction are often leveraged by Islamist groups who provide 
otherwise lacking social services while stressing a religiously based purity from graft, 
bribery, and fraud. In the persuasive framing debate at the core of the battle of ideas this 
efficacy and lack of corruption becomes compelling observable evidence supporting the 
Islamist narrative that problems in the Muslim world arise because regimes have turned 
away from Islamic ideals. As actors generally challenging the current system from 
outside, Islamist groups are able to criticize all of these problems while portraying 
themselves as offering compelling solutions. 
Limits to Willingness 
Even if partners in the war on terror are capable of effectively pursuing desired 
strategies, American goals are often frustrated by a lack of their willingness to do so. 
Local governments have their own agendas and assessments of what actions are in their 
best interests. The U.S. is often focused on a limited set of issues, notably the threat 
posed by international terrorist attacks. Local governments meanwhile are concerned 
about a different set of risks from these conflicts and other related problems rationally 
leading them to different decisions. Local actors, who are closer and more intimately 
involved, also have a presumptively compelling argument of a better understanding to 
justify reaching different conclusions – even if, from the U.S. perspective, it seems clear 
that the actions of many of these governments are at least exacerbating their problems. 
To the extent that recognition of limits to U.S. agency includes the necessity of planning 
for mistakes, any strategy should recognize that local partners inevitably also take 
actions that in retrospect turn out to be unwise.  
A significant limit on the willingness of local governments to take actions 
desired by the United States arises out of self-preservation. The very changes that 
counterinsurgency prescriptions recommend for improving the responsiveness of local 
government and opening meaningful space for political participation frequently threaten 
either the ability of ruling elites to remain in power or at least come at a direct trade off 
in cost to the resources that they and their key constituencies enjoy: 
Compounding this challenge is that our instrument of change is often the very 
regime and security forces that are part of the structural problem in the first 
place. The United States cannot by itself foster economic development in 
Algeria or political reform in Uzbekistan. Such measures require local regimes 
to take action. For many local interlocutors, reform is more threatening than the 
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insurgency: Political reform would throw them out of power, military reform 
might increase the chances of a coup, economic reform would lessen 
opportunities for corruption, and social reform would hinder their group’s hold 
on power. Not surprisingly, foreign leaders often turn the United States down 
when it presses for reform. At times, they may half-heartedly embrace reform, 
going through the motions (and taking U.S. money and resources) but perverting 
the outcome to ensure the stability of the status quo.75 
U.S. association with these local governments, coupled with either the perceived failure 
of the U.S. to encourage local reform or the perception that the U.S. is supportive of the 
status quo and not serious about reform, undermines hearts and minds goals and opens 
up additional opportunities for anti-state groups to argue that the U.S. is part of the 
problem.  
Existing anti-Americanism within local populations further plays into limiting 
local agency from the U.S. perspective in two important ways. First, local governments 
concerned about being tarnished by association with the United States may either 
outright reject participation with U.S. programs and advice,76 or frequently limit public 
recognition of U.S. aid and involvement.77 Second, local governments feeling 
threatened by other forces often use anti-Americanism as a pressure valve, exploiting 
opportunities to criticize Western actions in order to redirect local tensions.78 While 
some visible independence may be important for maintaining local credibility, and may 
arguably be beneficial in the long run, these factors at least complicate American efforts 
and in many cases are part of the overall problem. 
Moral Hazard and Enabling Counterproductive Action 
The structure of the relationship between the United States and its local partners 
in the war on terror encourages a moral hazard problem. Because local partners know 
                                                
75 Byman, "Going to War with the Allies You Have," 27. 
76 For example, an Ethiopian elder argues that U.S. pressure delayed the release of 
Ethiopian political prisoners: Kelemen, 2007, "Under Pressure, Ethiopia Releases 
Prisoners," NPR, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12158920. 
77 Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." 
78 Salman, 2007, "Editor of Arab Reformist Website: Dictatorial Arab Regimes are 
Winning the ‘Battle for Hearts And Minds' In America," MEMRI: Special Dispatch 
Series (November 15, No. 1766), 
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=middleeast&ID=SP17660
7. Shamsie, 2006, "Agent Provocateur," The New York Times, February 15, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/15/opinion/15shamsie.html. 
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that the United States is dependent upon them without easy alternatives, they are less 
likely to fear negative consequences from not following through on U.S. desires and 
more likely to take risks on the assumption that American dependency will guarantee 
additional U.S. support when needed: 
U.S. support of a government often makes it less necessary for the regime to 
undertake the reforms required to gain popular support. U.S. backing comes 
with a degree of legitimacy as well as with financial and other resources. Thus 
empowered, governments can put off land reform, stop reining in corruption, 
and avoid other changes that would hurt the insurgent cause. In Uzbekistan, for 
example, the regime used the U.S. embrace to enhance its legitimacy, even as it 
cracked down on dissent at home. Ironically, the United States may be tarred 
with the brush of a brutal ally, even if it is urging that ally to reform.79 
The failure to anticipate and account for this problem in part emerges from the simple 
model problems of forgetting that one’s partners have full individual agency, coupled 
with the distortion of perspective that places the U.S. at the centre of action instead of 
recognizing that the local states are much more deeply involved, with longer histories 
establishing their own preferred courses of actions and perspectives. Involved mostly at 
a distance, without the lifetime of expertise and nuanced knowledge local actors have, 
the United States government becomes susceptible to the manipulations of local 
political actors frustrating attempts to carefully manage policy implementation and 
political outcomes in these conflicts.80 This manipulation in part manifests as local 
partners frequently take purely superficial actions to appear to go along with U.S. 
requests or recommendations, producing no meaningful change at the local level. In 
turn this reinforces feelings of local resentment, as local actors are better able to see 
through the misdirection and often assume the American complicity.81  
                                                
79 Byman, "Going to War with the Allies You Have," 28. 
80 Yglesias, 2008c, "The Stakes," The Atlantic (March 27), 
http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/03/the_stakes_2.php. 
81 Greenway, 2006, "Straying from a Failed Course," The Boston Globe, October 31, 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/10/31/straying
_from_a_failed_course/. Recounting: “My favorite example of American innocence 
abroad, recounted by Peter Galbraith in his book ‘the end of Iraq,’ is the tale of an 
American coming up to Kurdistan to bully the Kurds into giving up their militia, the 
Peshmerga. The Kurds agree to disband their militia, and form instead three separate 
units, a rapid reaction force, a counter terrorism strike force, and a mountain ranger unit. 
The official leaves, saying ‘how important it was that the Kurds, masters of Iraq’s 
largest militia, were willing to give it up for the sake of national unity,’ Galbraith 
writes. However, ‘Some doubt may have crept into his mind [when he] asked for the 
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Pakistan as an Exemplar 
Pakistan, which has been simultaneously described as “perhaps the most 
important U.S. partner in the war on terrorism” and a “state mired in instability and 
uncertainty,”82 exemplifies the agency problems of capacity and will discussed in this 
section. In the first six years after the 9/11 attacks Pakistan received as much as $20 
billion in U.S. aid while also playing a central role in many U.S. war on terror efforts.83 
As a Muslim state created by the end of British colonialism, located in one of the cross 
roads of the Cold War, with its own continuing history of governance and development 
problems, Pakistan is not surprisingly home to a range of violent and non-violent 
Islamist groups typifying the complex social and political dynamics found elsewhere in 
the Muslim world. Pakistan’s military and security forces have historically provided 
significant support to Islamist elements including (with American backing) to the 
mujahideen fighting the Soviets (who became al-Qaida and the Taliban as well as 
returning to join many other Islamist groups around the globe). Many believe that 
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continues to have significant ties to the 
Taliban, possibly other individuals connected with al-Qaida, and almost certainly to 
Islamist insurgent and terrorist groups fighting against India over the Kashmir, although 
recent events emphasize that these ties do not constitute government control.84 
Complicating and constricting U.S. action is the competing policy reality that Pakistan 
is a nuclear armed country, who proliferated in defiance of international norms and was 
responsible for sharing nuclear technology with other marginalized states, whose 
conflicts with India may have seen the two closer to a nuclear exchange than any other 
belligerents, and where concerns about the current government falling – whatever its 
                                                
Kurdish translation of mountain rangers. ‘Peshmerga,’ was the reply. ... Had he asked 
he would have discovered that rapid reaction force and counterterrorism strike force are 
also rendered into Kurdish as Peshmerga.” 
82 Fair, 2008, "U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability, and the Future of 
U.S. Policy," In Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee 
on the Middle East and South Asia, January 16, 
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84 Gall and Rohde, 2008, "Militants Escape Control of Pakistan, Officials Say," The 
New York Times, January 15, 
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problems – always raise the spectre of radical elements taking control of a nuclear 
arsenal.85 
Immediately after 9/11, geographically located between Afghanistan and deep 
water, Pakistan played a key role in supporting American led efforts to overthrow the 
Taliban government. With its regional influence Pakistan then helped to encourage 
broader ethnic support and provide initial legitimacy for the new Afghan government. 
However, seven years later the limits to Pakistan’s capabilities are also apparent with 
Taliban forces and al-Qaida operatives using large parts of Pakistan’s Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) for safe 
havens to support attacks against Coalition and Afghan government forces as well as for 
operations elsewhere. At the same time, the indigenous rise of Islamists opposed to the 
Pakistani government, some of whom are blamed for the assassination of former Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto when she returned to challenge President Musharraf in 
elections encouraged by the United States, highlight the domestic threat to the Pakistani 
government itself and further limit its ability to pursue American objectives.86 In 
response the United States has provided Pakistan with billions of dollars of military and 
development aid. Unfortunately, a combination of security problems, corruption, and 
competing domestic priorities have seen little of that aid go to its intended purposes87 
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and less positive credit attributed to the United States because of Pakistani concerns 
about anti-Americanism.88 Part of the problem is that American policy makers talk and 
think as if Pakistan is a controllable element of their strategic thinking, while failing to 
appreciate just how different each country’s interests often are.89 While addressing any 
of the wide range of economic, social, and political problems limiting Pakistan’s ability 
to help in the wider war on terror alone would be challenging, as with other 
counterinsurgencies experts also emphasize that as much as possible all of these goals 
should be pursued at the same time.90 
Further illustrating the differences between perspectives, competing priorities, 
and lack of control over action is Pakistani military efforts in the FATA.91 Some critics 
have argued that Pakistan has often been too quick to arrange truces with FATA based 
militants, choosing to avoid conflict and surrender large areas to the control of Islamists 
who allow Taliban elements and al-Qaida operatives safe haven.92 Other observers 
suggest that Pakistan’s go-slow approach is actually consistent with the same 
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counterinsurgency strategies to win over popular support that the United States is 
advocating in Iraq and likely including in its training of Pakistani forces.93 Some of 
these criticize the U.S. for pushing for hard military action focused only on short-term 
concerns about al-Qaida, without appropriate weight given to the long-term rise of 
Islamist militants or the stability of Pakistan.94 Alternatively, other critics argue that it is 
Pakistan’s political elites and military that are too focused on their own short-term 
survival, without sufficient care to the long-term emergence of Islamist threats in the 
country.95 Untangling these competing assessments is not necessary to emphasize the 
complexity, limits to certainty, and other constraints challenging American strategy 
involving Pakistan. 
 Conclusion 
The basic explanation of a hearts and minds strategy has a compelling logic. If 
in the process of combating groups using tactics of terrorism the actions of a state 
further radicalize larger populations, the number of terrorists killed or captured, and the 
resources of the group denied or destroyed may quickly be outweighed by the flow of 
new recruits and new support. On the other hand, if a state can win back popular 
support, then larger publics may tend to provide crucial intelligence enabling more 
successful counterterrorism operations, while discouraging recruits, helping to dry up 
support, and stigmatizing the use of violent tactics. In the current context of the United 
State’s war on terror, where rising levels of anti-Americanism are perceived to be 
fuelling Islamist terrorism globally, the pursuit of a hearts and minds strategy seems 
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particularly appropriate. However, while the logic seems simple, the reality of 
implementing such a strategy proves to be much more difficult, and the ability of 
American actions to actually influence the important underlying dynamics are more 
limited than generally assumed. Problems with current American approaches relate to 
the use of an overly simplistic enemy-centric model for counterterrorism, the reality that 
significant terrorist threats usually only develop after a long history of previous conflict, 
a failure to recognize the full range of factors underlying successful efforts to change 
attitudes, overestimation of American agency, and a misunderstanding of local 
government capacity and will. The failure of the Bush administration to appreciate these 
challenges and constraints has led to overly optimistic attempts that do not sufficiently 
engage the depth of long term, incremental, proactive, and pervasive effort needed. At 
the same time, similar misconceptions by critics, risk derailing beneficial efforts 
undertaken by pre-judging them before they have had a full chance to make positive 
benefits or because other actions have overwhelmed their contributions. The challenges 
explored here are not an argument against the wisdom of pursuing hearts and minds to 
influence attitudes and guide policy, but a warning that efforts to build popular support 
are often much more difficult than first assumed, best employed as a long-term and 
proactive strategy, and beyond the capability of state actors to significantly control.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: U.S. POLICY AND  
CONTESTED FRAMING PROCESSES 
“When one nation is bombing another, it is difficult to  
convince the bombed of the virtue of the bombers.”  
–Becker 20011 
The great paradox of most American efforts to respond to Muslim anger is the 
frequent observation that the primary factor driving anti-Americanism is the perception 
of U.S. policies coupled with a refusal to recognize this by American leaders. Experts 
and surveys, within and outside of the government, repeatedly emphasize it is not U.S. 
values or our freedoms generating hostility in the Muslim world, but instead a long 
history of policies fuelling resentments and perceived as hostile, reinforced and 
exacerbated by the rhetoric and actions of post-9/11 America. At the same time, 
political leaders have insisted it is American freedoms, values, way of life, and embrace 
of democracy at home and support for these abroad motivating the terrorist to attack.2 
They have often suggested the United States only need to better explain its own good 
nature and improve use of the internet, countering extremist propaganda and Arab 
media distortions, for Muslim populations to appreciate America’s basic decency and 
many positive global contributions.3 
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2 For example: Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People." This framing of the conflict has been pervasive throughout the war on terror. 
For further discussion see: Aslan, "Why Do They Hate Us?.". Esposito, 2008, "Iraq: 
America in Muslim Eyes," Middle East Strategy at Harvard (March 20), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/03/iraq_america_muslim_eyes/.  
3 Thomas Carothers, director of the democracy project at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, explains, “The administration is convinced that if only the Muslim 
world understood us better they’d like us more, whereas many Muslims feel it’s 
precisely because they understand us that they’re unhappy.” Wright and Kamen, 2005, 
"U.S. Outreach to Islamic World Gets Slow Start, Minus Leaders: Effort Involves No 
Muslims; Hughes Will Not Arrive Until Fall," April 18, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61213-2005Apr17.html. For similar 
observations: Satloff, "Voices Who Speak for (and Against) Us." Zaharna, 2006, "Tools 
of Engagement," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62 (5), September/October, 
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The insistence of American political leaders for following this approach may 
have better maintained domestic support for important policies, as it is comfortably 
compatible with the dominant construction discussed in Chapter Five including 
especially the normative biases and enemy-centric focus. Unfortunately, as a social 
movement informed analysis helps to explain, the resulting messages and manner in 
which policies were pursued severely undermined U.S. hearts and minds goals in the 
Muslim world. This chapter examines three key framing contests during the first seven 
years after 9/11 shaping the evolution of attitudes and mobilization important to 
whether larger populations provide or deny support to militant Islamist groups. This 
analysis shows that the United States reinforced the perception of existing Muslim 
grievances against the U.S., feeding Islamist arguments that the war on terror is really a 
war on Islam, and counterproductively undermining the United States’ own intended 
counter narrative. Rhetoric and policies intended to win hearts and minds as well as 
more general actions that should be guided by such concerns are both shown to have 
been part of the problem. 
The Truth Political Leaders Refuse to Acknowledge: 
Policies Matter 
A long series of surveys and opinion polls, government specialists and outside 
experts explain it is U.S. policies and not American values primarily driving anger and 
resentment in the Muslim world.4 In 2003 the Department of State’s Bureau for 
                                                
4 For example: Esposito, "Iraq: America in Muslim Eyes.". Esposito and Mogahed, Who 
Speaks for Islam. America's Image in the World. Mogahed, "Framing the War on 
Terror.". Telhami, "Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll.". Telhami and Zogby, Arab 
Attitudes Towards Political and Social Issues, Foreign Policy and the Media (May), 
University of Maryland 2004, 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/SADAT/pub/Arab%20Attitudes%20Towards%20Political%2
0and%20Social%20Issues,%20Foreign%20Policy%20and%20the%20Media.htm. 
Telhami and Zogby, Arab Attitudes Towards Political and Social Issues, Foreign Policy 
and the Media (October), University of Maryland 2005, 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/sadat/pub/survey-2005.htm. Zogby, Attitudes of Arabs: An 
In-Depth Look at Social and Political Concerns of Arabs, Arab American Institute 2005, 
http://aai.3cdn.net/6e38e45846c8ce7df5_k0m6be9di.pdf. Zogby, Five Nation Survey of 
the Middle East, Arab American Institute 2006a, 
http://aai.3cdn.net/96d8eeaec55ef4c217_m9m6b97wo.pdf. Zogby, 2006b, "Slip Sliding 
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Intelligence and Research concluded, “the belief that the U.S. is hostile toward Muslim 
countries was the single largest component of anti-American sentiments in all 10 
countries” they surveyed,5 which a 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report built upon noting, “All of our panelists agreed that U.S. foreign policy is the 
major root cause behind anti-American sentiments among Muslim populations and that 
this point needs to be better researched, absorbed, and acted upon by government 
officials.”6 The 2003 Department of State appointed Report of the Advisory Group on 
Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (more commonly known as the 
Djerijian Report) observed, “Surveys show clearly that specific American policies 
profoundly affect attitudes toward the United States.”7 Michael Scheuer, head of the 
pre-9/11 Usama bin Ladin unit at CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, argues:8  
We need to acknowledge that we are at war, not because of who we are, but 
because of what we do. We are confronting a jihad that is inspired by the 
tangible and visible impact of our policies… We have a dozen years of reliable 
polling in the Middle East, and it shows overwhelming hostility to our policies – 
and at the same time it shows majorities that admire the way we live, our ability 
to feed and clothe our children and find work… In the long run, we’re not safer 
because we’re still operating on the assumption that we’re hated because of our 
freedoms, when in fact we’re hated because of our actions in the Islamic world.9 
                                                
Away," NY Daily News, September 7, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ideas_opinions/story/449982p-378743c.html. 
5 GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim 
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges." 
Similar results are found in: Office of Research, 2005, "Independent Survey of Arab 
Publics Shows Bad U.S. Image Based Primarily on U.S. Regional Policy," Department 
of State, March 23. 
6 GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim 
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges." 
7 Djerejian, "Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. 
Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World," 22. Note the Djerejian Report 
specifically highlighted: “It is not, however, the mandate of the Advisory Group to 
advise on foreign policy itself.” (p22) 
8 Scheuer, a 22-year veteran of the CIA, was Chief of the bin Ladin unit (aka Alec 
Station) from 1996 to 1999. From September 2001 to November 2004 he served as a 
special advisor to the Chief of that unit. While still a senior intelligence officer he 
published two books anonymously: Scheuer, Through Our Enemy's Eyes. Scheuer, 
Imperial Hubris. 
9 Silverstein, 2006b, "Six Questions for Michael Scheuer on National Security," 
Harper's Magazine (August 23), http://www.harpers.org/sb-seven-michael-scheuer-
1156277744.html. Scheuer makes the same argument in both of his published books, 
including Through Our Enemy’s Eyes which was completed before 9/11 out of a project 
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Andrew Kohut, President of the Pew Research Center, concludes based on their 
considerable polling, “Dislike of America undoubtedly reflects dislike of U.S. policies 
in the Middle East.”10 In his surveys of Muslim populations Shibley Telhami, of the 
University of Maryland, has directly asked whether attitudes towards the U.S. are based 
more on American policy or American values. Across multiple years he has reliably 
found overwhelming majorities responding it is the policies and not the values.11 
Gallup’s extensive research also highlights that it is policy and not Western values, 
reporting that Muslim populations hold more negative views of the U.S. and U.K., 
while at the same time reporting more positive views of France and Germany than even 
some other Muslim states.12 Gallup further focused their studies to compare the views 
of more religiously extremist Muslims to the responses of relative moderates and found, 
“The real difference between those who condone terrorist acts and all others is about 
politics, not piety.”13 They noted that the more radicalized were much more likely to 
cite American policies as justification for violence and much less likely to give religious 
justifications. And, in an October 2004 videotape, Usama bin Ladin directly responded 
to this debate saying that it was American policies “contrary to Bush’s claim that we 
                                                
to inform policy makers about the threat posed by Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida. 
Scheuer, Through Our Enemy's Eyes. Scheuer, Imperial Hubris. 
10 Kohut, 2003, "American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World," In Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People & the 
Press, February 27, http://people-press.org/commentary/print.php3?AnalysisID=63. 
11 In 2008 80% said policy while 12% said values, which is similar to the 2006 numbers 
of 70% and 11% respectively. Telhami, "Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll." 
12 Esposito, 2007, "It's the Policy, Stupid: Political Islam and US Foreign Policy," 
Harvard International Review, http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1453/. 
13 Mogahed, "Framing the War on Terror." These groups were identified based on the 
level of religiosity and political radicalization of the individual responder, using 
Gallup’s survey data “representing more than 90% of the global Muslim population.” 
Of related significance Gallup found: “[T]here was no correlation between level of 
religiosity and extremism among respondents.” Gallup probed respondents further and 
asked both those who condoned and condemned extremist acts why they said what they 
did. The responses contradict the conventional wisdom. For example, in Indonesia, the 
largest Muslim majority country in the world, many of those who condemned terrorism 
cited humanitarian or religious justifications to support their response. On the other 
hand, not a single respondent in Indonesia who condoned the attacks of 9/11 cited the 
Quran for justification. Instead, this group’s responses were markedly secular and 
worldly.  
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hate freedom,” and continuing “Let him tell us why we did not attack Sweden for 
example.”14 
This is not to argue that value related issues play no role. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, social and economic disruptions threatening traditional interpersonal 
networks are a significant part of the underlying dynamics generating mobilization, and 
often these are blamed on forces of globalization which many connect with Western 
values or see the U.S. as leading. Further, majorities of Islamists do oppose and 
denounce many Western associated values. As a framing of “Islam is the solution” 
shapes the identity and beliefs of mobilized populations related religious attitudes are 
also likely to acquire greater salience. Thus, individuals who increasingly identify 
themselves with Islamic traditional ideas (in many cases because of non-religious 
grievances) may be motivated to oppose specific elements of liberal Western society in 
the same way that Western religious conservatives do (such as increased tolerance of 
pornography, changing gender roles, separation of church and state, and acceptance of 
homosexuality). Further, as mobilized groups increasingly see the U.S. and other 
Western nations as the cause of their problems and as actors who seek to suppress them, 
these groups may increasingly turn against Western values and Western backed 
solutions, such as the promotion of democracy. The important point to emphasize is the 
repeated finding that specific U.S. policies play a much larger role in driving anti-
American mobilization than value issues, and that to some significant degree evidence 
of opposition to Western values derives from opposition to Western policies. 
In striking comparison to the repeated emphasis of polls and experts who 
highlight the roll of American polices for generating resentment in the Muslim world, 
American political leaders have with equal frequency rejected this explanation, instead 
concentrating on hatred for American values.15 This is highlighted by the numerous 
                                                
14 bin Laden, 2004, "God Knows it did not Cross Our Minds to Attack the Towers," The 
Guardian, October 30. 
15 Dawoud, 2004, "Arab Opinions," Al-Ahram Weekly (July 30), 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4305. Satloff, "Voices Who Speak for (and 
Against) Us.". Scheuer, 2006a, "The Plotters Against America: Two New Books 
Disagree Sharply About How Big a Threat Osama bin Laden and his Allies Pose," 
Washington Post, November 26, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/22/AR2006112201536_pf.html. The vehemence with 
which politicians have opposed the policy explanation was illustrated during a debate 
between Republican candidates for their party’s Presidential nomination on 15 May 
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ways in which post-9/11 hearts and minds efforts have focused on anti-American 
attitudes as a public relations problem to be solved by better communication efforts.16 
For example, to demonstrate that he was taking action to win hearts and minds, 
President Bush prominently appointed to the position of Undersecretary of Public 
Diplomacy first a high profile advertising executive (Charlotte Beers), later the person 
most closely associated with running communications for his successful political 
campaigns (Karen Hughes), and finally someone whose previous career was also in 
publishing, editing, and broadcasting (James Glassman).17 Perhaps more telling of 
internal thinking about what U.S. political leaders were willing and not willing to 
consider when examining how best to engage in hearts and minds efforts is the pattern 
of establishing panels and advisory bodies whose mandates have not directed (nor 
enabled) them to explore the effect of or suggest modifications to U.S. foreign policy.18 
                                                
2008. After maverick candidate Congressman Ron Paul suggested that opposition to 
U.S. policies motivated al-Qaida, former NYC Mayor Rudy Giuliani, who had spent 
much of 2007 viewed as the presumptive nominee, interrupted to angrily denounce that 
statement as “absurd.” Giuliani went on to insist that Paul retract his remark, “as the 
crowd applauded wildly.” Martin, "Paul's 9/11 Explanation Deserves to be Debated." 
16 Wright and Kamen, "U.S. Outreach to Islamic World Gets Slow Start, Minus 
Leaders: Effort Involves No Muslims; Hughes Will Not Arrive Until Fall.". Zaharna, 
"Tools of Engagement." A key GAO report includes an oblique criticism of the refusal 
of political leaders to consider the roll of policy: “All of our panellists agreed that U.S. 
foreign policy is the major root cause behind anti-American sentiments among Muslim 
populations and that this point needs to be better researched, absorbed, and acted upon 
by government officials.” GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to 
Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant 
Challenges." See also: Klein, 2002, "America is Not a Hamburger: President Bush's 
Attempts to Rebrand the United States are Doomed," The Guardian, March 14. 
17 Although the appointment of former Moroccan Ambassador Margaret Tutwiler does 
not fit with this pattern, hers was the lowest profile appointment and lasted a mere six 
months before she resigned. For specific criticisms of various appointees to this post 
that they are too focused on advertising and branding: Fisk, 2006b, "The Age of Terror - 
A Landmark Report," The Independent, October 8, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-the-age-of-terror--
a-landmark-report-418953.html. Garfield, 2007, "Scuttle Diplomacy: Bob Garfield 
Interviewing Price Floyd," National Public Radio (June 1), 
http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2007/06/01/01. 
18 For example, pollster John Zogby explained: “I had the privilege of serving on the 
congressionally-created Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy with several 
distinguished colleagues in 2003. The commission did an admirable job – but our 
mandate did not include any discussion of U.S. policy in the region. And that is an 
unfortunate blind spot – because it is America’s policy that remains the core problem.” 
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Based on my research I believe that there are three general explanations for why 
U.S. political leaders, especially in the years after 9/11, are so reluctant to discuss 
American policies as contributing to resentment. First is the highly normative and 
enemy-centric manner in which terrorism is socially constructed and the war on terror 
approached after 9/11 as discussed in Chapter Five. Focusing on their hatred of our 
values is part of the good versus evil, civilization versus barbarity narrative underlying 
moral rejection of terrorism, reassurance of our own innocence, and our calls for others 
to choose sides. To focus on possibly legitimate grievances disruptively moves the 
terrorists from mad fanatics into a rational political realm, and triggers the dissonance 
and aversion discussed with the fear that understanding will lead to condoning their 
goals, shift blame to the victim, cause confusion about the clarity of the war, and 
encourage future attacks. Repeated surveys actually show that many Americans, in 
some cases majorities, agree when prompted that American policies are at least partially 
motivating Muslim resentment and terrorist attacks.19 However, the biases discussed of 
the social construction help to explain why majorities also are quick to punish political 
or opinion leaders who voice such ideas and continue to support an approach to the war 
on terror that largely excludes significant consideration of the role U.S. policies play. 
                                                
Zogby, "Slip Sliding Away." The Djerejian report specifically highlighted that “It is not, 
however, the mandate of the Advisory Group to advise on foreign policy itself.” 
Djerejian, "Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public 
Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World," 22. A GAO report requested to focus on 
State Department public diplomacy efforts made prominent mention of the need of 
political leaders and policy makers to understand and more fully consider the roll of 
policies. GAO, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim 
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges." 
See also discussion of what was and was not focused on and acted upon in: Kaplan, 
"Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." Based on his 22-year career with the CIA, Scheuer argues 
that political pressure from both Republican and Democratic administrations, who 
refuse to question the central policies generating Muslim resentment, has significantly 
constrained or limited public mention of the roll played by American foreign policy in 
official government reports, specifically discussing the unclassified 2006 National 
Intelligence Estimate on Trends in Global Terrorism: "Behind the NIE: Scheuer Parses 
the Intelligence from the Politics," 2006, The National Interest Online (September 28), 
http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=12318. See also: Scheuer, 
Imperial Hubris. 
19 Kull, Americans on the Middle East Road Map (May 30), Program on International 
Policy Attitudes (PIPA) 2003, 
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/IsPal_Conflict/IsPalMap_May03/IsPalMap_May03
_rpt.pdf. 
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Second, to officially recognize that American actions may be part of the problem 
is to undermine and threaten long-term policies in the Middle East supported by both 
political parties.20 In the same manner, political leaders after 9/11 avoided recognition 
of the negative influences of American policy because to do so would legitimize 
criticism of their own policy decisions.21 Finally, political leaders have found pragmatic 
benefits to maintaining domestic and international support for America’s war on terror 
and other major policies in the Middle East from framing the clash as one in which 
terrorists threaten core Western values.22 Popular sentiment in the U.S. and other 
European countries is more likely to support hard counterterrorism efforts and military 
intervention in defence of nearly universally shared liberal values as opposed to 
defending specific policies however strong the arguments for them may be. 
The failure to recognize officially or in major strategies that past and present 
American policies play a significant role in Muslim anger at the United States has left 
U.S. public diplomacy and many other hearts and minds efforts simply repeating and 
trying to improve on messages that the U.S. respects, is not threatening, and is making 
positive contributions to the Muslim world. Unfortunately, for many Muslims, these 
positive messages are judged to be hypocritical propaganda out of sync with the reality 
of how they perceive and experience American policies on a daily basis. The Defense 
Science Board, which advises the Secretary of Defense, stressed in its repeated reports 
that “actions trump words” and that political leaders and practitioners need to be aware 
that “what we do matters more than what we say.”23 Or as Zarhana explained, “What 
America does, through its policies and practices in Iraq and Palestine, speaks louder 
than all of the official statements coming out of Washington.”24 
                                                
20 "Behind the NIE: Scheuer Parses the Intelligence from the Politics.". Hornberger, 
2006, "Why Do they Hate us?," (August 9), The Future of Freedom Foundation, 
http://www.fff.org/comment/com0608c.asp. Scheuer, Imperial Hubris. 
21 For example: Arkin, "Rumsfeld's Incomplete Information War." 
22 Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds. 
23 Emphasis in original. Defense Science Board, "Strategic Communication," x.  
24 Zaharna, American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World: A Strategic 
Communication Analysis (November), Foreign Policy in Focus 2001, 
http://www.fpif.org/papers/communication.html. 
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The Importance of Framing Processes 
A social movement analysis of the contested framing processes common to 
many of the current mobilization dynamics across the Muslim world helps to explain 
how the rhetoric and actions which result from a refusal to recognize the important role 
played by policies is a significant factor in explaining the poor performance of the 
United States in the race for Muslim hearts and minds.25 This analysis may be thought 
of as a social movement informed approach for evaluating an important aspect of the 
war of ideas as it applies to population-centric strategies.  
One insight from the study of social movements is that the existence of 
grievances alone is not sufficient to explain why particular groups of people choose to 
take collective action at a specific time nor the form or direction that such mobilization 
follows. Researchers have noted that movements can develop without an appreciable 
change in underlying grievances, and that similarly aggrieved populations may pursue 
very different forms of collective action. Helping to explain these observations, social 
movement theory has emphasized the role played by framing processes, that is the 
“conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the 
world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.”26 Within a 
social movement context, framing processes are important for shaping perceptions of 
collective identity, creating a common understanding of being aggrieved, and 
legitimizing the belief that a specific course of action in pursuit of particular shared 
goals can bring about a better future. Or as Zald explains, “frames work to provide 
shorthand interpretations of the world, to locate blame, to suggest lines of actions.”27 As 
individuals come to accept and be persuaded by a movement’s frames they begin to 
                                                
25 Explaining the importance of this Casebeer writes: “A grand counter-terrorism 
strategy would benefit from a comprehensive consideration of the stories terrorists tell; 
understanding the narratives which influence the genesis, growth, maturation and 
transformation of terrorist organizations will enable us to better fashion a strategy for 
undermining the efficacy of those narratives so as to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist 
groups.” Casebeer and Russell, "Storytelling and Terrorism." 
26 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, "Introduction," 6. For classic works on framing 
processes: Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization.". Snow and Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.". Snow, 
Rochford, Worden and Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and 
Movement Participation." 
27 Zald, "Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing," 269. 
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perceive conditions and events through the filter of those frames, which in turn 
encourages identification with the movement and increases the likelihood of adopting 
other movement frames, and becoming more supportive of or mobilized to participate 
with the movement. The success of a frame depends upon how well it resonates with 
individuals and the larger public, which Benford and Snow explain as the frame having 
“empirical credibility, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity.”28 
The insistence of U.S. political leaders that it is values and not policies is an 
example of a framing process. For domestic American audiences, this frame resonates 
on many levels: it is reinforced empirically by the highlighting of selected reference to 
the statements of militant Islamists denouncing Western values; it is experientially 
consistent with media coverage of Muslim countries focusing on the rejection or lack of 
protection for these values; and, it is consistent with the dominant construction of 
terrorism and repeated related discourse. This analysis is consistent with the success of 
this aspect of the current construction of the war on terror being adopted by the majority 
of Americans, creating perceptions of identity in opposition to a terrorist enemy, placing 
unambiguous blame on that enemy, and encouraging or justifying the responses of the 
war on terror as a social movement approach would highlight. However, if we presume 
that political leaders are intentionally attempting to use this as a framing narrative to 
appeal in the Muslim world (perhaps as an alternative explanation of their observed 
refusal to acknowledge the role of U.S. policies), we can also understand why it fails for 
that population. As many experts and reports have noted, the “its our values and not our 
policies” rhetoric of U.S. leaders has been consistently rejected by audiences in the 
Muslim world because it simply does not resonate. Again, using Benford and Snow’s 
three criteria: populations in the Muslim world judge this non-credible as they are 
familiar with widespread respect and aspiration for many of these same values; it is not 
consistent with their daily personal or media experience, which highlights the perceived 
negative affect of U.S. and Western policies not opposition to Western values; and, they 
                                                
28 Benford and Snow, 2000, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview 
and Assessment," Annual Review of Sociology 26, August. Okruhlik, 2004, "Making 
Conversation Permissible: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia," In Islamic Activism: 
A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Wiktorowicz, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 251. Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization." 
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are more directly aware that it is not a full and true reflection of even militant Islamist 
narratives that dominantly centre on grievances with American policy.29 
Within a dynamic of collective action framing processes are often contested at 
many levels. Actors within a movement generally are attempting to attract and mobilize 
new members by persuading individuals in the larger population of the compelling 
nature of how the movement frames identity, grievances, and solutions. Competing 
elements within a movement often contest the meaning and application of accepted 
frames or advocate for different frames to influence the direction of a movement. And, 
counter-movement actors (such as the state or groups mobilized in opposition) often are 
attempting to undermine or otherwise refute specific frames, as well as their 
interpretation and application, in order to reduce the appeal of a movement to both 
already mobilized individuals as well as others in the larger population. While these 
contests are generally intentional in nature, with movements refining frames as well as 
consciously choosing when and how to apply them, important actors may also 
unintentionally use rhetoric or take action that either encourages the acceptance of a 
movement’s frames or causes other unintended consequences as individuals interpret 
those events through the perspective of specific frames. 
From the perspective of U.S. counterterrorism priorities three criteria assist in 
evaluating the results of these framing contests: whether various Muslim populations 
are more or less likely to blame the United States (or Western actors in general) for the 
grievances they perceive; whether they choose to pursue or support more violent or non-
violent strategies to achieve their goals; and, whether and to the extent they identify 
with specific other populations and groups who may encourage or enhance (or 
discourage and diminish) the threat posed. The United States has a security interest in 
the result of these framing contests to the degree that various mobilized groups come to 
believe violent strategies are necessary and attacks threatening international interests are 
legitimate and beneficial. From a social movement perspective one of the most 
important aspects of a successful counterterrorism hearts and minds strategy is 
influencing these framing contests in a direction that decreases the short and long-term 
security threats; or conversely, proactively avoids or mitigates action that has the 
                                                
29 Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements.". Snow and Benford, 
"Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization." 
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opposite effect. Such influence may be direct in terms of engaging in contested framing 
processes, or indirect in terms of shaping rhetoric and actions with consideration of how 
those will be viewed through the perception of specific frames or to either reinforce or 
disrupt specific frames. 
The following sections of this chapter examine how U.S. rhetoric and action 
have counterproductively contributed to three important framing contests: by 
reinforcing existing grievances with U.S. policy used by militant Islamist groups as 
motivators and justification for their vision and tactics; by validating militant Islamists’ 
argument that the United States is involved in a war on Islam, which again justifies anti-
U.S. attacks and serves to radicalize Muslim populations; and, by undermining the 
natural counter frames, which are the core message of U.S. hearts and minds efforts, 
that generate admiration and goodwill for the United States. 
Reinforcing Existing Anti-American Grievances 
Over the preceding decades dominant narratives across much of the Muslim 
world related to economic, political, and social problems have increasingly attributed 
blame to the United States.30 These criticisms often were the result of local elites 
seeking to displace anger on an external scapegoat, Cold War divisions and propaganda, 
and the inevitable resentment of a global superpower whose status, actions, and rhetoric 
(often unintentionally and unknowingly) had local implications. The long history of 
U.S. policies and actions in these countries, especially when interpreted and filtered by 
local perspectives, provided evidence for these accusations. These complaints often 
alleged that the United States supported their enemies in oppressing local populations, 
exerted control through complicit governments or hegemonic interventions, and 
exploited local resources. 
As part of the “Islam is the solution” meta-framing, Islamists have argued that 
the Muslim world needs to return to Islamic values, often in an idealized purity, both 
individually and in their governments. Related to this, many Islamists emphasize 
grievances that encourage a shared Islamic identity, reinforce that Western (or non-
                                                
30 Anti-Americanism has a long history in the Arab and Muslim world dating back to at 
least the 1950’s when it “was originally promoted by ‘progressive’ secularists rather 
than by Islamists.” Kinnane, 2004, "Winning over the Muslim Mind," National Interest 
(75), Spring: 95. 
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Islamic) influences are often to blame, and establish that rejection of those influences is 
part of the solution to a better future. The history of anti-American grievances has long 
easily been incorporated into this Islamist framing. 
Following 9/11 this framing has been reinforced by U.S. reaffirmation of many 
contentious policies including support for Israel and opposition to Palestinian groups, 
connections with authoritarian regimes and perceived tolerance of their abuses in 
exchange for support of the war on terror, an increased military presence widely viewed 
as asserting American hegemony, and continued rhetoric about America’s strategic need 
to maintain access to and a regular supply of cheap oil. The result is an opinion climate 
across the Muslim world where people are “suspicious of American power” and believe 
that the “true purpose of the war on terrorism” is “American control of Middle East oil 
and U.S. domination of the world.”31 The following two sections further explain the 
history of anti-American grievances and how post-9/11 American rhetoric and policies 
have provided strong evidence for militant Islamists to use in supporting their framing 
arguments to the detriment of U.S. hearts and minds goals. 
A Long History of Anger at U.S. Policies 
In discussing the success of al-Qaida’s arguments blaming America for Muslim 
grievances, Lia observed, “there is some truth to” them.32 This is not a comfortable 
conclusion for Americans to draw, and given the absolutist moral climate after 9/11 a 
very unpopular position for political leaders to publicly recognize or for the average 
American involved with analyzing, developing, or implementing policy to incorporate 
into their endeavours.33 Problematically most Americans, including many of those 
involved in deciding upon and contributing to policy, are unfamiliar with the history of 
                                                
31 America's Image in the World. 
32 Lia, 2008, "Al-Qaida's Appeal: Understanding Its Unique Selling Points," In Treating 
Terrorism, Dubai, United Arab Emirates: Dubai Consultancy Research and Media 
Centre, March 17-18, 3, 
http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00106/Al_Qaeda_s_Appeal_-_106463a.pdf. 
33 Many of these policies may have been (or continue to be) objectively beneficial from 
a U.S., global, or even local perspective. Those highlighting anti-American grievances 
are likely to distort, exaggerate, and fabricate while ignoring positive American 
contributions. However, the bottom line remains that the widespread acceptance of 
these criticisms is a constraint limiting U.S. hearts and minds efforts, especially when 
the development of those efforts and U.S. policy in general fails to account for these 
attitudes and often reinforces them. 
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U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and how various policies and interventions are 
often viewed from a local perspective.34 However, to understand the failure of 
American hearts and minds efforts to prevent further erosion in popular support in the 
Muslim world (let alone make significant gains) it is important to recognize that there is 
a long history of American policies providing tangible ground to justify suspicion of 
and antagonism to the United States from the perspective of individuals living in the 
Muslim world. 
Probably the single most important continuing and long running area of U.S. 
policy generating resentment and anti-American biases across the Muslim world is 
American support for Israel. Graham Fuller writes: 
It is impossible to discuss relations between the Muslim world and the West 
without examining the impact of the establishment of the state of Israel... The 
creation and role of the Israeli state is the single most emotionally charged and 
violently contested issue between East and West. Partisans on both sides are 
often extreme and uncompromising... [W]hile most peoples of the developing 
world retain some historical memory and grievance from the colonial period, for 
the Muslim world, and especially the Arab world, the establishment of Israel and 
its Western-supported dominance remains a source of fierce hostility toward the 
powers of the West as a form of neo-imperialism.35 
As early as 1946, at a time when many in the Muslim world saw the United States as a 
champion opposing the colonial era, the Islamist writer Sayyid Qutb argued that U.S. 
support for the establishment of Israel proved America’s “treachery” and “duplicity,” 
and Gerges further reports that “every Islamist and jihadist” he has interviewed over 
many years “has made a point of condemning America’s policies toward Israel.”36  
Ayman al-Zawahiri explained in Knights Under the Prophets Banner, published shortly 
after the 9/11 attacks, that to mobilize the greater Muslim nation required rallying them 
under slogans with which they identified: 
The Muslim nation will not participate with [jihad] unless the slogans of the 
mujahideen are understood by the masses of the Muslim nation. The one slogan 
that has been well understood by the nation and to which it has been responding 
for the past 50 years is the call for the jihad against Israel. In addition to this 
                                                
34 Hamid, "Why Do They Hate Us?.". Stein, "Can You Tell a Sunni from a Shiite?." 
35 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 152-3. Similarly see: Habeck, Knowing the 
Enemy, 97-100. 
36 Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, 160-1. 
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slogan, the nation in this decade is geared against the US presence. It has 
responded favourably to the call for the jihad against the Americans.37 
In social movement terminology Zawahiri understood the resonance of the Palestinian 
issue with Muslim populations and potential as a framing process to motivate Islamist 
mobilization.  
Muslim populations are very aware: Israel receives the most U.S. foreign aid;38 
the United States has repeatedly used its Security Council position to prevent criticism 
or international action against Israel;39 at times of crisis the U.S. has provided 
emergency military and economic support to Israel; and, the United States has provided 
political support at times when Israel has launched military campaigns or other 
operations against neighbouring countries or the occupied territories.40 Muslim 
populations perceive Western outrage against terrorist attacks on Israel as hypocritical 
when the same nations at most offer softened criticisms of Israeli actions that kill 
civilians or entrench what is feared to be a permanent conquest of occupied territory. 
Attitudes and in-group/out-group sympathies established and reinforced by the long-
running Israeli-Palestinian crisis carry over to Muslim framing and understanding of 
other “East-West” interactions and moral judgments to the significant disadvantage of 
U.S. counterterrorism and especially hearts and minds efforts. 
Another principal source of anti-American sentiment across the Muslim world 
was the posture, implementation, and effect of many U.S. Cold War policies. Beginning 
at least with the Eisenhower Doctrine, announced in 1957 aimed at deterring Soviet 
                                                
37 al-Zawahiri, "His Own Words," 209-10. 
38 The standard American response that Egypt traditionally receives the second most 
foreign aid is not persuasive to many Muslim populations, especially those who are 
increasingly mobilized, given criticisms that this aid merely helps to prop up an 
authoritarian regime. Aid to Egypt is also seen as a bribe to split a united Arab front, 
allowing Israel to continue to oppress the Palestinians and maintain control of occupied 
territory in violation of international norms. For example: Zuhur, Egypt: Security, 
Political, and Islamist Challenges, 18-21. 
39 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue: “Since 1982, the United States has 
vetoed 32 United Nations Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel, a 
number greater than the combined total of vetoes cast by all the other Security Council 
members.” Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, "The Israel Lobby," London Review of Books 
(March 23), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_.html. 
40 Fisk, 2001, "The Awesome Cruelty of a Doomed People," the Independent, 
September 12. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem. Schiff, 1983, "Green Light, 
Lebanon," Foreign Policy (Spring). 
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influence, the U.S. increasingly exercised its military, economic, and diplomatic 
capabilities regularly throughout the Muslim world. Despite rhetoric about promoting 
the “self-government and independence” of the new nations of the Middle East, 
American actions were generally guided by superpower geopolitical strategy and not 
concern for impact on local populations.41 For example, at a time when Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab Nationalism had captured the imagination 
and hopes of majorities across the Middle East, the U.S. opposed this movement and 
those aligned with it because “Eisenhower feared” that a regional power vacuum “had 
allowed Nasser to spread his pan-Arab policies and form dangerous alliances with 
Jordan and Syria” opening “the Middle East to Soviet influence.”42 The history of 
Western colonial and economic control over the Middle East as well as support for 
Israel also provided an opportunity exploited by Soviet diplomacy and propaganda 
during the Cold War further laying the foundation of modern anti-American attitudes.43 
Secular Arab regimes, such as the Nasserist and Baathist ones, facing daunting 
development challenges and legitimacy deficits, similarly contributed to the current 
received historical perception of the United States long before the rise of current 
militant Islamist groups.44 
The role America has historically played as a regional hegemon also contributes 
to current anti-Americanism.45 Over the past half century, during and after the Cold 
                                                
41 Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East: 
Delivered in person Before a Joint Session of Congress (January) 1957b, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11007&st=&st1=. For example: 
Bergen and Reynolds, 2005, "Blowback Revisited," Foreign Affairs 84 (6), November-
December. 
42 Of interest to this thesis, the above quotation is from the Office of the Historian at the 
Department of State’s Bureau of Public Affairs on “The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957.” 
This article also notes the Eisenhower Doctrine “was motivated in part by an increase in 
Arab hostility toward the West.” U.S. Department of State, 2008, The Eisenhower 
Doctrine [cited October 20 2008], http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/82548.htm. 
43 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 154. 
44 Paz, 2003, "Islamists and Anti-Americanism," MERIA: Middle East Review of 
International Affairs 7 (4), December, 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue4/jv7n4a5.html. 
45 The Defense Science Board in 1997 noted, “Historical data show a strong correlation 
between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks 
against the United States.” Defense Science Board, 1997, "Summer Study Task Force 
on DoD Responses to Transnational Threats," Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, October, 15. A 1998 CATO institute study provides explanations for a long 
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War, the U.S. used economic, diplomatic, and military influence and interventions in 
the pursuit of a variety of strategic goals from maintaining a regional military balance to 
protecting global access to and uninterrupted supplies of oil.46 With polls indicating that 
Muslim anti-Americanism has increased significantly with the current U.S. military 
actions in Iraq, it is useful to recall that many in the Muslim world remember the U.S. 
as supporting Saddam during his invasion and war against Iran in the 1980’s over the 
course of which a half million or more died. Allegations about American and Western 
supplies and intelligence supporting Saddam’s use of chemical weapons undermined the 
primary U.S. rationale for the 2003 war with Iraq for many in the region.47 The 
deployment of the U.S. Navy to the Persian Gulf towards the end of that war in the 
1980’s to protect Iraq’s distribution of oil from Iranian threats reinforced perceptions 
that America’s primary concern was access to oil.48 Many (and not only Muslims) 
                                                
series of terrorist attacks on U.S. interests, many of which were in or related to the 
Muslim world, to provide empirical data in support of this observation. Eland, 1998, 
"Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism? The Historical Record," CATO 
Foreign Policy Briefing No. 50 (December 17), CATO, 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-050es.html. 
46 Fisk, 2006a, "Double Standards of Morality: The Age of Terror," CounterPunch 
(October 9), http://www.counterpunch.org/fisk10092006.html. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Towards the end of the Iraq-Iran war the USS Vincennes accidently shot down Iran 
Air Flight 655 killing 290 passengers and crew, which remains a particularly tragic 
example of the type of “collateral incidents” resulting from America’s military 
involvement in overseas conflicts. The credibility of the United States was particularly 
damaged by this incident as the U.S. initially insisted that the airliner was following an 
unusual flight pattern, appearing to descend towards the U.S. naval vessel, and neither 
responding to nor transmitting appropriate civilian radio signals. Some even suggested 
the Iranians contrived the event. The U.S. was slow to admit that these claims were not 
true. However, the formal U.S. investigation known as the Fogarty Report ultimately 
found: “The data from USS Vincennes’s tapes, information from USS Sides and reliable 
intelligence information, corroborate the fact that TN 4131 [the Iranian aircraft] was on 
a normal commercial air flight plan profile, in the assigned airway, squawking Mode III 
6760, on a continuous ascent in altitude from take-off at Bandar Abbas to shoot down.” 
Fogarty, 1988, "Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing 
of a Commercial Airliner by the U.S.S. Vincennes (CG49) on July 3, 1988," 
http://press.princeton.edu/books/rochlin/chapter_09.html. Perceptions of U.S. attitudes 
toward Muslim civilians were not helped by the statements of then Vice-President 
George H. W. Bush who reportedly said in response to questions about the incident, 
“I’ll never apologize for the United States of America. Ever. I don’t care what the facts 
are.” "Perspectives," 1988, Newsweek, August 15. Although the U.S. did not formally 
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similarly believe the United States went to war with Iraq in 1991 out of concerns over 
control of oil and not altruistically to liberate Kuwait and prevent further aggression by 
Saddam. Perceived American indifference to the suffering of Iraqi citizens during the 
following decade of sanctions reinforced the belief that the United States did not care 
about Muslim citizens,49 as did incidents such as when U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations Madeleine Albright was asked by 60 minutes, “We have heard that half a 
million children have died. I mean, that is more children than died in Hiroshima. And, 
you know, is the price worth it?” And responded, “I think that it is a very hard choice, 
but the price, we think, the price is worth it.”50 
The continuing presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia for the decade after 
the 1991 war not only was one of the most frequently mentioned grievances of bin 
Ladin, but also for some proof of his earlier arguments. Leading up to the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait bin Ladin had given speeches in Saudi mosques warning of the danger 
Saddam posed. Before the American intervention, bin Ladin attempted to persuade the 
Saudi ruling elite to reject America’s offer, as it would be a religious outrage to have 
infidel troops in the country, and use the mujahideen from the successful war against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan. He warned that if American troops were allowed to base in the 
                                                
admit responsibility or apologize, in 1996 an agreement with Iran was reached 
involving a payment of $61.8 million in compensation for the Iranians killed. 
49 Hornberger, "Why Do they Hate us?." For example, in Usama bin Ladin’s 26 
December 2001 audio statement Nineteen Students he said, “Every day, from east to 
west, our umma of 1200 million Muslims is being slaughtered, in Palestine, in Iraq, 
Somalia, Western Sudan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Assam. We 
do not hear their voices, yet as soon as the victim rises up and offers himself on behalf 
of his religion, people are outraged.” bin Laden, 2005a, "Nineteen Students (26 
December 2001)," In Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, ed. 
Lawrence, London: Verso, 153. 
50 Richman, 2003, "Albright 'Apologizes'," (November 7), The Future of Freedom 
Foundation, http://www.fff.org/comment/com0311c.asp. Recognizing the disastrous 
effect of her comment on public diplomacy, and providing another anecdote that hearts 
and minds strategies are limited by the human failings of even very experienced 
diplomats, Madeleine Albright wrote in her memoirs: “I must have been crazy; I should 
have answered the question by reframing it and pointing out the inherent flaws in the 
premise behind it. Saddam Hussein could have prevented any child from suffering 
simply by meeting his obligations... As soon as I had spoken, I wished for the power to 
freeze time and take back those words. My reply had been a terrible mistake, hasty, 
clumsy and wrong. Nothing matters more than the lives of innocent people. I had fallen 
into the trap and said something I simply did not mean. That was no one’s fault but my 
own.” Albright, 2003b, Madam Secretary, Miramax Books, 275. 
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country they would not leave, despite public assurances at the time to the contrary from 
both the Sauds and the U.S. Domestic opposition to the presence of U.S. troops then 
served to boost bin Ladin and al-Qaida’s credibility and popularity.51 
Some have suggested that populations in the Arab world (or maybe developing 
and less powerful countries in general) are particularly susceptible to conspiracy 
theories. This allegedly accounts for some of the difficulties the U.S. is having with 
hearts and minds (especially given, as the highlighted conspiracies often explain, that as 
a superpower the U.S. should be able to control everything).52 However, while 
conspiracy theories and rumour are problems challenging hearts and minds efforts, the 
history of American involvement in the Arab and larger Muslim world provides 
repeated lessons that the U.S. often has attempted covert schemes to overthrow regimes 
and control events. For example, in 1953 the CIA working with Britain’s SIS helped 
overthrow the elected and popular government in Iran led by Mohammed Mossadegh to 
protect Western petroleum companies from plans to nationalize the oil industry.53 
Reinforcing These Narratives 
The actions and rhetoric of the United States after 9/11 have often reinforced 
these historical grievances. The American public, responding as a nation that had 
suffered the single largest terrorist attack in history and the first major attack of any 
kind on its shores in over 50 years, was quickly supportive of a much more aggressive 
military and diplomatic posture to pursue a war on terror. The result was even closer 
alignment with Israel as well as other nations combating Islamist terrorist groups, 
greater reliance on authoritarian but cooperative Muslim-majority states, and a 
significant increase in U.S. military forces stationed and active in Muslim countries. 
                                                
51 Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, 70. Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, 184-5. Scheuer, 
Through Our Enemy's Eyes, 113-8. 
52 For example: Fuller, The Future of Political Islam. 
53 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 27-53. De Luce, "The Spectre of Operation Ajax.". Martin, 
"Paul's 9/11 Explanation Deserves to be Debated.". Risen, "Secrets of History." This 
also emphasizes how the difference in selective perspectives undermines U.S. hearts 
and minds efforts. In general Americans are simply unaware of the Mossadegh history, 
and even for those who are it is at most a minor event in the distant past. Especially for 
Iranians, but also for many other politically informed Muslims, it is a commonly 
remembered event that is part of a larger history proving their perception of American 
manipulation of the region for its own purposes.  
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Militant Islamist groups were quick to exploit and spin these actions as consistent with 
their anti-American framing narratives, while many in the Muslim world came to 
independent similar interpretations based on acceptance of the same or related existing 
frames. 
America’s support for Israel historically has been the most contentious issue 
driving negative attitudes towards the United States in the Muslim world.54 Even closer 
U.S.-Israeli ties inevitably aggravated these perceptions after 9/11 as the American 
public responded to al-Qaida’s attacks with greater support and sympathy for others 
facing similar threats and a broader consensus that Israel was a crucial ally against a 
common global enemy.55 The American perception aggregating all Islamist terrorist 
groups as part of that common threat, coupled with the absolutist normative climate 
condemning those who use terrorism, further drove American policy to shun negotiation 
with Hamas at the very time that group was ascendant in Palestinian politics. The 
United States was also willing to be more tolerant of aggressive Israeli policies 
including expanded settlements in the West Bank, construction of a wall at points deep 
into Palestinian territory, targeted assassinations, and various forms of collective 
punishment as countermeasures to terrorist attacks.56 The result is that post-9/11 surveys 
of Muslim populations find even stronger opinions of American bias, where consistent 
majorities believe the U.S. is “seeking to expand Israel’s territory” and disagreeing with 
assertions that “the U.S. genuinely seeks to create an independent and viable Palestinian 
state.”57  
Part of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 attempts to generate good will and 
win popular support in the Muslim world was the high profile Freedom Agenda centred 
on encouraging democratic elections.58 Despite the resistance of other key regional 
                                                
54 Mead, 2008, "The new Israel and the Old," Foreign Affairs (July/August). A common 
myth in American discourse is that the Palestinian issue was not important to Usama bin 
Ladin or al-Qaida before 9/11, however the frequent and prominent focus on this issue 
in pre-9/11 writings and speeches from bin Ladin and other key al-Qaida leaders 
strongly refutes this perception. Hegghammer, "Jihadi Studies." 
55 Mearsheimer and Walt, "The Israel Lobby."  
56 Fisk, "Double Standards of Morality: The Age of Terror." 
57 Kull, "Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda." 
58 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism." As Chapter Six discusses, democracy 
promotion at the start of 2006 was the Bush administration’s answer for how to engage 
in the war of ideas and address the sources of terrorism over the long term. 
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players, the Bush administration pushed for Palestinian elections as an exemplar of this 
policy and out of a belief that elections would spur progress on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. However, this policy encountered its largest setback when Hamas and not 
Fatah decisively won a majority in the January 2006 voting for the Palestinian 
Legislative Council. The American administration, caught by surprise according to 
several sources, quickly reversed course on reform moving to isolate and destabilize the 
newly elected parliament.59 This highly negative reaction, especially viewed from the 
critically predisposed perspective of various Muslim populations, more than offset any 
positive effects of the overall campaign, undermining the intended American hearts and 
minds message, and reinforcing militant Islamist framing that the United States only 
supports ideas such as democracy promotion to further its control of the region.60 
                                                
59 For example: “Some analysts argued that Hamas had a substantial moderate wing that 
could be strengthened if America coaxed it into the peace process. Notable Israelis – 
such as Ephraim Halevy, the former head of the Mossad intelligence agency – shared 
this view. But if America paused to consider giving Hamas the benefit of the doubt, the 
moment was ‘milliseconds long,’ says a senior State Department official. ‘The 
administration spoke with one voice: We have to squeeze these guys. With Hamas’s 
election victory, the freedom agenda was dead.’” Rose, 2008, "The Gaza Bombshell," 
Vanity Fair, April, http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804. 
See also: Dickey, 2008a, "Bush's 10 Commandments: the U.S. President's Latest 
Pronouncements on Iran and the Arab World Generated Doom and Gloom on his 
Mideast Tour," Newsweek Web Exclusive, May 20, http://www.newsweek.com/id/137. 
"Palestinians' Risky Elections," 2006, Washington Post, January 22, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/21/AR2006012100906.html. Perry and Cooke, "How to 
Lose the War on Terrorism - Part One: Talking with the 'Terrorists'.". Wilson, 2006, 
"Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast," 
Washington Post, January 27, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012600372.html. 
60 Dickey, "Bush's 10 Commandments.". Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell.". Wilcox, 2006, 
"U.S. Policy and Palestine: Reform and Peace are Interdependent," Arab Reform 
Bulletin 4 (#9, November 2006), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18857&prog
=zgp&proj=zme#reform. In Usama bin Ladin’s Why we are Fighting You, he references 
previous American hypocrisy with respect to the success of Algerian Islamists in 
Algerian elections in the early 1990’s. bin Laden, "Why We are Fighting You: Osama 
bin Laden's Letter to Americans (October 2002)," 205. For a longer example of militant 
Islamists denunciation of Western democracy and arguments that Islamist groups who 
participate in electoral politics are misguided and damaging the cause, see extracts from 
Ayman al-Zawahiri’s The Bitter Harvest: The Brotherhood in Sixty Years, which 
criticizes the Muslim Brotherhood for renouncing violence and seeking influence 
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The American response to Israel’s summer 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon 
similarly did more to reinforce existing framing of the U.S. as seeking (along with 
Israel) to control and dominate the region without concern for the suffering of primarily 
Muslim civilian populations. Although triggered by Hizballah provocations, which 
generated some Muslim criticism of the group and opened an opportunity for American 
influence operations,61 the size and extent of the Israeli response convinced many it was 
long planned.62 Significant civilian suffering and casualties during the fighting between 
Hizballah and Israel led to widespread calls for a temporary ceasefire to allow civilians 
to escape the area and to pursue diplomatic solutions. However U.S. diplomatic moves, 
including statements and presumably pressure by American Ambassador to the United 
Nations John Bolton, were seen as preventing international action and “green lighting”63 
continued Israeli operations, contributing to anti-American attitudes.64 Further 
reinforcing for many Muslims that the U.S. was not only supportive of Israel’s 
operation, but that this was part of a wider American plan for the region, Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice responded to a series of questions about America’s plans given 
                                                
through Egyptian elections, published in: Ibrahim, ed 2007, The Al Qaeda Reader, 
Translated by Ibrahim, New York: Broadway Books, 116-36. 
61 "Mufti of Mt. Lebanon Criticizes Hizbullah for its July Attacks Against Israel," 2006, 
Foreign Policy: Passport (December 8), Foreign Policy, 
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/2551. 
62 However, several sources have emphasized that reports of Israeli “massacres,” 
“genocide,” or “war crimes” were unsupported, gross exaggerations, or fabrications. 
Reporting also emphasized that while Israel unleashed a pre-planned military operation 
to “destroy” Hizballah, it was careful to avoid targeting much civilian infrastructure 
while also attempting to limit civilian causalities. It is also true that Hizballah, as a non-
state militia designated by several countries as a terrorist organization, operated freely 
from southern Lebanon attacking Israel, and concealing assets and fighters within 
civilian communities to use those as human shields. Arkin, 2006a, "Facts and Myths 
About the Israel-Hezbollah War," Early Warning (September 19), Washington Post, 
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/09/facts_and_myths_about_the_isra
.html. Arkin, 2006c, "Shock and Awe in Lebanon," Early Warning (September 18), 
Washington Post, 
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/09/shock_and_awe_in_lebanon.htm
l. 
63 Umansky, 2006, "Israel's 'All Clear'," Slate (July 20), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2146207/. 
64 Wright and Lynch, 2006, "U.S. at Odds With Allies on Mideast Conflict: Citing 
Civilian Casualties, European Nations and U.N. Eager for Cease-Fire," Washington 
Post, July 20, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/07/19/AR2006071901932_pf.html. 
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the devastation in Beirut and southern Lebanon saying, “What we’re seeing here, in a 
sense, is the growing – the birth pangs of a new Middle East and whatever we do we 
have to be certain that we’re pushing forward to the new Middle East not going back to 
the old one.”65 After the fighting stopped, U.S. efforts consistent with a hearts and 
minds strategy also proved lacking, as promised American humanitarian aid was slow to 
arrive while Hizballah quickly and efficiently delivered much more aid, leading many to 
observe that they won the post-conflict narrative battle.66 Based on his polling of the 
region, Shibley Telhami explained the overall framing effect U.S. rhetoric and actions 
during the conflict had noting, “many in the region conclude that the Lebanon war is 
America’s war,” and “most Arabs surveyed now see the United States as one of the 
greatest threats to them.”67 
Broader American policy over the last seven years has also frequently reinforced 
previous complaints. Prior to 9/11 Usama bin Ladin and others regularly pointed to the 
American military presence in the Muslim world as indications of U.S. intentions to 
exert historic Western imperial control. Since 9/11 the United States has invaded and 
occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, significantly expanded the U.S. presence with new 
bases and increased troop levels in several other Muslim majority countries, played a 
significant military support (and sometimes direct) role in several other conflicts 
(notably in the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia), and intentionally used military 
shows of force as part of diplomatic moves in other areas (such as prominently and 
                                                
65 Rice, 2006, "Special Briefing on Travel to the Middle East and Europe," (July 21), 
U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69331.htm. 
66 In an ironic postscript demonstrating counterproductive American actions consistent 
with the enemy-centric bias, in early 2007 as part of efforts to use financial weapons 
against terrorist groups the U.S. announced sanctions against a Hizballah associated 
Lebanese construction firm that had been involved with much of the post-conflict 
rebuilding. From a counterterrorism perspective this probably had little effect on 
Hizballah’s terrorist capabilities, while from a hearts and minds perspective it provided 
proof to Lebanese audiences that the U.S. doesn’t care about human suffering or 
attempts to rebuild. "Washington's Weird Way of Trying to Make Friends in Lebanon," 
2007, The Daily Star, February 22, 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/printable.asp?art_ID=79748&cat_ID=17. Also see David 
Kilcullen’s discussion of how effective and intelligent Hizballah was about post-conflict 
aid: Packer, "Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the 'War on 
Terror'?." 
67 Telhami, "Hezbollah's Popularity Exposes al-Qaeda's Failure to Win the Hearts." 
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intentionally stationing the USS Cole off of the coast of Lebanon during political 
negotiations there).  
Many in the Muslim world perceive these military actions as consistent with 
Islamist framing that the U.S. is simply continuing to exercise hegemonic control and 
insure its capability to exploit regional oil reserves consistent with pre-9/11 framing of 
American intentions.68 For example, in his letter October 2002 letter Why We are 
Fighting You bin Ladin writes, “You steal our wealth and oil at paltry prices because of 
your international influence and military threats. This theft is indeed the biggest theft 
ever witnessed by mankind in the history of the world.”69 Despite repeated U.S. 
insistence that such theories are “utter nonsense,”70 the Iraq war especially is perceived 
by many as motivated in large part by oil given that Iraq has the second largest oil 
reserves behind American ally Saudi Arabia.71 President Bush (similar to previous 
                                                
68 For example: “In a 1998 interview, [Usama bin Ladin] ‘claimed that the United States 
has carried out ‘the biggest theft in history’ by buying oil from Persian Gulf countries at 
low prices. According to bin Laden, a barrel of oil today should cost $144. Based on 
that calculation, he said, the Americans have stolen $36 trillion from Muslims…’” 
Banerjee, 2001, "Fears, Again, of Oil Supplies at Risk," The New York Times, October 
14, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9401E2DC123FF937A25753C1A9679
C8B63. Korin, 2008, "Rising Oil Prices, Declining National Security: Testimony by 
Anne Korin Co-Director Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS)," House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (May 22), 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/kor052208.htm. See also: Fisk, "Double Standards 
of Morality: The Age of Terror.". Kull, "Negative Attitudes Toward the United States in 
the Muslim World: Do They Matter?." 
69 bin Laden, "Why We are Fighting You: Osama bin Laden's Letter to Americans 
(October 2002)," 199. Bin Ladin’s letter was a response to a public letter signed by 60 
American thinkers titled What We’re Fighting For published in February 2002 which 
led to a response letter from 153 prominent Saudi scholars titled How We Can Coexist. 
Bin Ladin’s letter chastises the Saudis for “prostrations” to the West, and a 
“theologically invalid and cowardly response.” Ibrahim, ed The Al Qaeda Reader, 196. 
70 As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in early 2003 cited in: Rehm, 2003, 
"U.S. Not Interested in Iraqi Oil, Rumsfeld Tells Arab World," American Forces Press 
Service (February 26), U.S. Department of Defense, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29374. 
71 For example, these suspicions are reinforced by news of decisions to award 
significant contracts to American and Western oil companies in Iraq on a no-bid basis. 
Altman, 2008, "High Energy Thursday: A Peculiar Deal for Some of Iraq's Oil," 
International Herald Tribune: Managing Globalization (June 19), 
http://blogs.iht.com/tribtalk/business/globalization/?p=744. Kramer, 2008a, "Deals with 
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Presidents) frequently publicized diplomatic pressure on oil producing allies such as 
Saudi Arabia to increase production of oil in order to keep prices low feeds these 
perceptions.72 
Short-term U.S. priorities after 9/11, especially with respect to the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the larger war on terror, led the United States to 
increase support for a variety of authoritarian regimes across the Muslim world. This 
again validated pre-existing criticisms and reinforced the larger frames of radical 
Islamist groups, especially as these generally corrupt and oppressive governments are 
labelled as apostates by militant Islamists and framed as a central part of the problem 
that a return to Islam will solve. In order to quickly initiate and supply military 
operations in Afghanistan, land-locked in an area where the U.S. had no historic 
military basing, Pakistan was elevated to the role of a crucial American ally while the 
United States also quickly sought and reached agreements with Central Asian states to 
the north of Afghanistan.73 Problematically all of these governments had continuing 
troubled relations with their own Muslim populations and varying reputations for 
human rights abuses and autocratic rule undermining American claims that the invasion 
of Afghanistan and the war on terror in general were part of a larger defence of freedom 
and not a war on Islam.74 A letter from bin Ladin To Our Brothers in Pakistan for 
                                                
Iraq are Set to Bring Oil Giants Back," The New York Times, June 19, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/world/middleeast/19iraq.html. 
72 Exemplary of bin Ladin’s frequent criticism of this subject, in a March 1997 
interview with CNN’s Peter Arnett, explained that if the Islamist movement were to 
take over control of Saudi Arabia, “As for oil, it is a commodity that will be subject to 
the price of the market according to supply and demand. We believe that the current 
prices are not realistic due to the Saudi regime playing the role of a US agent and the 
pressures exercised by the US on the Saudi regime to increase production and flooding 
the market that caused a sharp decrease in oil prices.” Lawrence, ed Messages to the 
World, 46. 
73 Bases were established for U.S. troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan while security 
arrangements enabling other military activity were made with other states such as 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.  
74 Symbolic of the long-term rights abuses and problems in these countries was the May 
2005 brutal suppression by the government of Uzbekistan of a popular uprising in the 
city of Andijon along the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border. On 13 and 14 May, following months 
of growing protests and unrest, government forces killed hundreds of mostly unarmed 
civilians, including many children. While international condemnation prompted the U.S. 
to break off its basing agreement after this incident, reporting since indicates the U.S. 
has continued military ties to Uzbekistan as well as with similar countries in the region 
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example, broadcast internationally on 24 September 2001, quickly initiated these 
themes.75 The tension between the ideals of the administration’s Freedom Agenda and 
the realities that many key states in the war on terror were far from liberal has 
repeatedly caused problems undermining U.S. hearts and minds goals over the last 
seven years.76 Reliance on Middle Eastern governments including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
and Kuwait with respect to the war in Iraq as well as several other Muslim majority 
states such as Egypt, Algeria, and Libya for other aspects of the war on terror have led 
to the United States often ignoring or only softly criticizing abuses by those 
governments while exaggerating any signs of liberal progress, even when from local 
vantage points such steps were transparently superficial. As with the American u-turn 
on Hamas’ election victory, these examples again provide evidence for militant Islamist 
claims that Western promotion of democracy and human rights are only superficial 
covers for maintaining regional control. 
The perspective of a social movement theory approach to understanding 
terrorism emphasizes the problems inherent in the trade-off that while authoritarian 
governments are generally more willing and capable in the short-term of responding to 
                                                
feeding Islamist framing. As one foreign policy analyst cynically wrote, “So what if 
Uzbek President-for-life Islam Karimov boils dissidents alive and has unarmed civilians 
gunned down in the streets? He’s in a strategic location.” Hounshell, 2008, "Buttering 
Up Central Asian Dictators," Foreign Policy - Passport (January 25), Foreign Policy, 
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/7914. See also: Beehner, 2005, "Asia: U.S. Military 
Bases in Central Asia," Council on Foreign Relations: Backgrounder (July 26), Council 
on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/8440/. "Uzbekistan: The Andijon 
Uprising," 2005, Asia Briefing (#38, May 25), International Crisis Group, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3469. The annual U.S. Department of 
State reports on human rights abuses by governments around the world provides a more 
general picture of the problem of U.S. support for various regimes, with many key U.S. 
war on terror allies regularly appearing for significant criticism. The 2008 report for 
example includes: Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Liberia, Indonesia, Morocco, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. 
75 bin Laden, 2007d, "To Our Brothers in Pakistan (24 September 2001)," In The Al 
Qaeda Reader, ed. Ibrahim, New York: Broadway Books, 100-2. 
76 Carothers, 2003, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror," Foreign Affairs 
(January/February), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030101faessay10224/thomas-
carothers/promoting-democracy-and-fighting-terror.html. Kreisler, 2003, "Islam and the 
West: Conversation with John L. Esposito," Conversations with History, 
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Esposito/esposito-con0.html. Zambelis, 2005, 
"The Strategic Implications of Political Liberalization and Democratization in the 
Middle East," Parameters (Autumn). 
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terrorism and political violence, over the long run the inherent problems of autocratic 
rule are central to the grievances mobilizing contentious collective action. Further, the 
repressive manner in which authoritarian governments respond to social movements has 
a strong influence on radicalizing populations, encouraging clandestine networks, and 
particularly contributing to the adoption of violent repertoires.77 Finally, from a framing 
perspective strengthening the perception that the U.S. supported authoritarian regimes 
was especially problematic for U.S. hearts and minds goals. Central to the security 
concerns of the United States, with respect to conflicts that in many cases were largely 
local, is countering al-Qaida’s far enemy logic justifying attacks on international actors 
as necessary to solve a wide range of popularly held local grievances. Unfortunately, 
repeated association with and perceptions the United States was actively supporting 
through military, economic, and diplomatic means the vary authoritarian governments 
these populations had problems with provides validation for this framing. Especially as 
many authoritarian regimes noticeably used the war on terror and post-9/11 
international sentiments to crack down on domestic Islamist groups or their own 
minority Muslim populations.78  
Repeated surveys and polls conducted by Pew, Gallup, and others reinforce the 
negative effect U.S. rhetoric and actions after 9/11 have had in terms of reinforcing the 
overarching Islamist frame that American policy is biased against Muslims and really 
driven by desires to protect and strengthen Israel, control oil and other natural resources, 
and prevent Muslim states from gaining power to challenge U.S. and Western 
domination. Shibley Telhami, for example, reported anti-U.S. Muslim opinions had 
continued to harden in 2008. When asked what two factors they believe are most 
important in driving American policy very few responded promoting democracy (4%), 
spreading human rights (4%), promoting peace and stability (6%), fighting terrorism 
(7%), or preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (12%), while much larger numbers 
                                                
77 Della Porta, "Political Socialization in Left-Wing Underground Organizations.". Della 
Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy.". Della Porta, Social Movements, Political 
Violence, and the State. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 85, 168. Hafez, "From 
Marginalization to Massacres.". Hafez and Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the 
Egyptian Islamic Movement.". Singerman, "The Networked World of Islamist Social 
Movements.". Wiktorowicz, ed Islamic Activism. 
78 Exum, 2008a, "Return of the Jihadi," Democracy: A Journal of Ideas (#9, Summer), 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6619. Fuller, The Future of Political 
Islam, 85, 168.  
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said preserving regional and global dominance (30%), weakening the Muslim world 
(33%), protecting Israel (47%), and controlling oil (50%). 79 
Contributing to a War on Islam Frame 
The most significant framing failure for the United States was the lack of 
appreciation for how predisposed Muslim audiences were to see American actions as 
engaging in a wider war on Islam, and then pursuing a balance of polices and a 
rhetorical style feeding this perception.80 A significant element of militant Islamist 
framing, especially of groups such as al-Qaida advocating a far enemy logic, has long 
been arguments that the United States intentionally sought to oppress and subjugate 
Muslim populations, did not respect and deliberately was undermining Islamic values, 
and was actively continuing a Judeo-Christian crusade against Islam.81 Following the 
9/11 attacks, fearing that the United States would react harshly to Muslims in general, 
many in the Muslim world were primed to be very attentive for evidence of America’s 
                                                
79 Indyk, 2006, "Lebanese Public Opinion Amidst a New Cycle of Violence," 
(December 1), The Brookings Institution, 
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20061201.pdf. Telhami, 2006a, "Annual Arab 
Public Opinion Survey (with Zogby International)," (November), University of 
Maryland, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/2006Lebanon.pdf. Telhami, 
"Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll." See also: Kohut, "American Public Diplomacy in 
the Islamic World." The prevailing opinion among people in this region is that the 
United States ignores the interests of their countries in deciding its international 
policies. This view is as dominant in Turkey (74%), a NATO ally, as it is in Lebanon 
(77%). More specifically, the Pew survey finds a strong sense among most of the 
countries surveyed that U.S. policies serve to increase the formidable gap between rich 
and poor countries. Moreover, sizable minorities feel the United States does too little to 
help solve the world’s problems. 
80 See also: America's Image in the World. Kohut and Stokes, America Against the 
World. p15,26. Logan and Preble, 2006, "Who Gave Us the World?," National Review, 
June 26, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6474. "Muslims Believe US 
Seeks to Undermine Islam.". Wike, 2007a, "Karen Hughes’ Uphill Battle: Foreign 
Policy, Not Public Diplomacy, Mostly Determines How the World Views America," 
Pew Global Attitudes Project (November 1), Pew Research Center, 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/627/karen-hughes. Consolatore, for example, discusses how 
the war on terror, and its associated wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, “have unavoidably 
produced an international climate of ‘Islam in danger.’” Consolatore, 2004, "Probing 
Hearts and Minds in Kashmir and India: Social Psychology and Ethno-Religious 
Nationalism in South Asia," In 45th Annual International Studies Association 
Convention: Hegemony and Its Discontents, Montreal, Quebec, March 20, 23. 
81 Ibrahim, ed The Al Qaeda Reader. Lawrence, ed Messages to the World. 
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“real intentions.” Coupled with existing suspicions and biases against U.S. policy, this 
predisposed Muslim populations to undervalue American rhetoric or actions intended to 
counter a war on Islam frame, while being more likely to believe sinister explanations. 
Such an environment most likely required game changing disruptive moves by the 
United States to reassure Muslim populations and win the struggle for popular support. 
Some mistakes (isolated use of crusader language) and unpopular but expected actions 
(invading Afghanistan) may have done only limited short-term damage to opinions of 
the United States, or could have been offset by high level pursuit of other hearts and 
minds efforts (significantly increased economic aid and strong engagement through 
regional media). However, the overall American rhetorical and diplomatic approach and 
major policy choices, especially the invasion of Iraq, significantly contributed to the 
“war on terror” being viewed increasingly as a “war on Islam.” 
As this frame grew in acceptance across Muslim populations, U.S. foreign 
policy had the counterproductive effect of increasing “the potential recruiting pool (let 
alone sympathy) for groups like al Qaeda.”82 Kull explains how Papa’s surveys support 
this evolution in the framing contest: 
For decades, polls in the Muslim world and the statements of Muslim leaders 
have shown a variety of resentments about US policies… But now there is also a 
new feeling about the US that has emerged in the wake of 9-11. This is not so 
much an intensification of negative feelings toward the US as much as a new 
perception of American intentions. There now seems to be a perception that the 
US has entered into a war against Islam itself… in the focus groups this was 
described as something that has arisen recently from American anger about 9-
11. America is perceived as believing that it was attacked by Islam itself and as 
having declared war on Islam.83 
Kull’s continued testimony is consistent with social movement theory explanations 
about how these changing perceptions led to the success of other aspects of militant 
Islamist framing. Their repeated surveys found increased Muslim self-identity linked to 
an increasingly shared “sense of Islam as being under siege.” Even though the U.S. and 
al-Qaida are both “seen as largely illegitimate,” Muslim populations have come to see 
                                                
82 Logan, 2006, "The False Hope of Public Diplomacy," CATO@Liberty (May 9), 
CATO, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2006/05/09/the-false-hope-of-public-diplomacy. 
See also: Betz, "The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency," 520. 
83 Kull, "Negative Attitudes Toward the United States in the Muslim World: Do They 
Matter?."  
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the U.S. as a greater threat. This leads to increasing demands for the United States to 
withdraw its troops (a long-term al-Qaida goal advocated as a solution Islamists should 
seek) and widespread support for attacks on American troops. Highlighting the basic 
logic of a hearts and minds approach, Kull observes: 
However, anti-American feeling can lead Muslims to suppress their moral 
doubts about al Qaeda. This makes it politically more difficult for governments 
to take strong action against al Qaeda, it makes general publics more likely to 
passively accept al Qaeda and it creates an environment where it is more likely 
that individuals will cross the threshold into actively supporting al Qaeda. In 
other words it gives al Qaeda more room to maneuver.84 
He also notes that the combination of increased anti-Americanism with the perception 
that al-Qaida is at least standing up to the U.S., while itself not being strong enough to 
take control of local countries, leads many to spend less time examining al-Qaida’s 
faults.85 U.S. efforts to win over Muslim attitudes were always going to be challenging 
given pre-existing Muslim biases as well as other structural problems and sources of 
grievances outside of American control. However, the diplomatic approach of the Bush 
administration and the decision to invade Iraq greatly fuelled these dangers. Examining 
these choices from a framing process perspective helps to explain why American hearts 
and minds efforts have had little positive influence, while Islamist groups have 
succeeded in arguing that the U.S. is leading a war on Islam. 
Rhetorical Choices 
During the 2000 presidential election then Governor of Texas George W. Bush 
campaigned under a promise of a humble approach to foreign policy: 
If we’re an arrogant nation, they’ll resent us; if we’re a humble nation, but 
strong, they’ll welcome us. And our nation stands alone right now in the world 
in terms of power, and that’s why we’ve got to be humble, and yet project 
strength in a way that promotes freedom.86 
However, after the September 11 attacks President Bush and his administration adopted 
an aggressive international posture, demanding that other nations choose sides, rejecting 
                                                
84 Ibid. 
85 “As long as the weaker one is standing up to the stronger one, it makes sense that they 
are inclined to play down their dislike for the weaker one… Enemies of one’s enemies 
are not necessarily one’s friends. But it is pretty normal to not spend a lot of time 
scrutinizing their faults…” Ibid. 
86 Suarez, 2000, "Presidential Debate," NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (October 12), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec00/for-policy_10-12.html. 
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multilateral diplomacy and institutions, establishing a doctrine of pre-emptive war, and 
boldly promising a new, post-9/11 approach to fighting terror.87 Bush’s war on terror 
was notably broad in its goals, not seeking simply to target Usama bin Ladin and al-
Qaida, but as part of an ideological struggle on the scale of the Cold War targeting all 
terrorist groups with global reach.88 In practice, over the following seven years, U.S. 
rhetoric and policy have focused exclusively on violent Islamist groups.89 This 
combination of an expansive description of the threat that in operational reality 
transparently focuses on Muslims has provided frequent evidence for those arguing that 
the U.S. is really pursuing a war on Islam, undermining U.S. hearts and minds efforts, 
and giving the advantage to anti-American groups in the contest for popular support.90 
The phrase war on terror has frequently been criticized as part of the problem 
generating fear and antagonism. The tendency of Bush administration figures and others 
representing the United States to use the phrase in the context of a larger clash of 
civilizations narrative where (Western supported) freedom and democracy are 
threatened by or being defended against evil, hateful others (who always happen to be 
Muslim) reinforces the framing that the U.S. is merely using terrorism to justify the 
pursuit of other goals.91 Contributing to this perception is a series of statements, which 
                                                
87 Recognizing the importance of the President’s words and their ability to strongly 
influence the outcome of conflicts, Douglas Feith wrote, “Victory or defeat can hinge 
on the president’s words as much as on the military plans of his generals or the actions 
of their troops on the ground.” Feith, 2008, "How Bush Sold the War," The Wall Street 
Journal, May 27, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121184655427621367.html.  
88 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.". Bush, 
2006i, "Remarks by President Bush on the Global War on Terror," (April 10), Office of 
the Press Secretary, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/64287.htm. 
89 Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency." 
90 For example, Dalia Mogahed of Gallup argues that, “Defining the current conflict as 
a battle between Western values and ‘radical Islam’ misses the root cause of terrorism 
while energizing the very perception that fuel sympathy for it – that Islam itself is under 
attack. These findings begin to expose the danger of acting on the Cold War-war on 
terror analogy.” Mogahed, "Framing the War on Terror." See also: Kraidy, "Arab Media 
and US Policy," 10-1.  
91 Although there were various attempts by parts of the government to change the 
language used to describe the war on terrorism in order to mitigate such 
counterproductive effects, such as aborted attempts to talk about a “Global Struggle 
Against Violent Extremists” and later advice by the National Counterterrorism Center to 
avoid public use of terms such as Islamic terrorism, these were generally quickly 
denounced or ignored by more senior administration officials. At the same time, terms 
such as Islamofacism were often widely used, which many criticized as being intended 
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individually may have been unintentional, but taken collectively appear to be persuasive 
proof of America’s true attitude. Some of this rhetoric reinforces militant Islamist 
framing that this is simply an extension of a millennial conflict between Christianity and 
Islam, as when President Bush warned Americans the week after 9/11 that “this crusade, 
this war on terrorism, is going to take awhile.”92 Islamists have frequently invoked this 
                                                
to play to domestic audiences without concern for the negative international effect. 
Although Bush used the term Isalmofacism or a derivative on several occasions, some 
have suggested that Condoleezza Rice and Karen Hughes may have convinced him to 
stop using it as a small success story at mitigating further damage. Bush, 2005a, 
"President Addresses Troops at Osan Air Base in Osan, Korea," (November 19), The 
White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051119-5.html. Bush, "President 
Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy.". Bush, 2006c, 
"President Bush and Secretary of State Rice Discuss the Middle East Crisis " (August 
7), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060807.html. See also: Ignatius, 
2006b, "Are We Fighting 'Islamic Fascists'?," Washington Post, August 18, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/17/AR2006081701193_pf.html. Nunberg, 2006, "Who Are 
You Calling a Fascist?," Los Angeles Times, August 17, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/aug/17/opinion/oe-nunberg17. Schwartz, "What is 
'Islamofacism'?.". Stevenson, "President Makes It Clear: Phrase Is 'War on Terror'."  
92 Ford, "Europe Cringes at Bush 'Crusade' Against Terrorists." Unfortunately on 
numerous other occasions individuals seen as representing the United States have made 
or taken actions contributing the perception that this is a crusader conflict. Amongst the 
more extreme of these were then active duty Lt. Gen. William G. Boykin’s various 
comments, including: Arguing that Islamic extremists hate the United States “because 
we’re a Christian nation, because our foundation and our roots are Judeo-Christians. ... 
And the enemy is a guy named Satan.” Telling an audience about a battle against a 
Muslim Warlord in Somalia, “I knew my god was bigger than his. I knew that my god 
was a real god and his was an idol.” "Rumsfeld Defends General Who Commented on 
War and Satan," 2003, CNN.com (October 17), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/16/rumsfeld.boykin.ap/. And, then in sections of his 
statement about the controversy that were subsequently removed by Pentagon attorneys, 
“As a Christian I believe that there is a spiritual war that is continuous as articulated in 
the Bible. It is not confined to the war of terrorism.” "Pentagon Deleted Part of 
Official's Apology," 2003, CNN.com (October 20), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/20/boykin.statement/index.html. Similar incidents 
which have contributed to crusader framing include: State Department funding of 
programs that also pressure Muslims to convert to Christianity Stockman, 2006, "For 
Those Excluded, Loan Program is No Success," The Boston Globe, October 10, 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2006/10/10/for_those_excluded_loan
_program_is_no_success/., using a fundamentalist Christian broadcasting studio to 
initially produce Arabic News for Alhurra TV Mokhiber and Weissman, 2003, "U.S. 
Hires Christian Extremists to Produce Arabic News," AlterNet (May 2), 
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and similar “crusade” comments to justify their framing, as bin Ladin did in what was 
probably his first public statement, a 24 September 2001 letter To Our Brothers in 
Pakistan, after Bush’s first post-9/11 public mention of the term.93 In another repeated 
use of this comment, Bin Ladin stated: 
Bush left no room for doubts or media opinion. He stated clearly that this war is 
a Crusader war. He said this in front of the whole world so as to emphasize this 
fact. … When Bush says that, they try to cover up for him, then he said he didn’t 
mean it. He said, ‘crusade.’ Bush divided the world into two: ‘either with us or 
with terrorism’ … The odd thing about this is that he has taken the words right 
out of our mouths.94 
As bin Ladin also mentioned, Bush’s frequent use of “with us or against us” diplomacy 
along with other rhetoric that aggregates all opponents (“axis of evil” or tying Saddam 
to al-Qaida) has created self-fulfilling, polarizing forces.95 For many Muslim 
populations this is especially true when American rhetoric has demanded that they 
choose sides when the other side includes groups they perceive as defending and 
providing for other Muslims (such as in Palestine, Lebanon, Kashmir, and Chechnya), 
while the American side includes traditional enemies or at least antagonists (Israel, 
India, Russia, and a series of authoritarian governments).96 Many Muslims also believe 
that the U.S. exposed its true intentions when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
described damage in Lebanon from the summer of 2006 Hizballah-Israel conflict as 
simply the “birth pangs” of a new Middle East.97 Senior al-Qaida leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri responded in a July 2006 statement that the pain of this transformation is 
being felt by Muslims who were being forcefully reshaped in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan by “the Zionist-Crusader aggression,” and then called on “all 
                                                
http://www.alternet.org/story/15801/., and reports of abuse of the Koran by U.S. 
soldiers. Nizza, 2008, "Reactions: Defusing a Koran Shooting in Iraq," The New York 
Times, May 20, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/reactions-defusing-a-
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93 bin Laden, "To Our Brothers in Pakistan (24 September 2001)." See also: al-
Zawahiri, 2007b, "Loyalty and Enmity: An Inherited Doctrine and a Lost Reality 
(December 2002)," In The Al Qaeda Reader, ed. Ibrahim, New York: Broadway Books, 
66. 
94 Aslan, "Why Do They Hate Us?." 
95 Hirsh, "The Great Conflater." 
96 Weisberg, 2006, "That Axis of Evil: Its Here Now. Thank you, Mr. President," Slate 
(October 11), http://www.slate.com/id/2151353/. 
97 Kaplan, Ibid."There are Worse Things than the Status Quo: Condi's Witless Optimism 
about the Middle East," (July 24), http://www.slate.com/id/2146392/. 
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oppressed and wronged people in the world, the victims of Western oppressive 
civilization led by America: [to] Stand by Muslims in the face of this injustice which 
humanity has never witnessed before.”98 Both bin Ladin’s and Zawahiri’s statements 
exemplify how American rhetorical mistakes are consciously used by militant Islamists 
to support framing processes in order to encourage shared identity, heighten perceptions 
of grievances, and advocate movement specific solution steps. 
The Bush administration’s rhetorical style is in part a manifestation of the more 
highly normative and enemy-centric construction of terrorism discussed in Chapter 
Five, and emphasizes the ways in which that construction undermines U.S. hearts and 
minds goals.99 Similar statements by other prominent American personalities have 
likewise reinforced Islamist framing. Many of the statements that have caused problems 
were meant for domestic audiences, but in the modern media reality are simultaneously 
broadcast to and critically re-interpreted by concerned international populations.100 The 
overall effect is that messages and actions not intended to be part of American hearts 
and minds effort are interpreted by Muslim populations as indications the U.S. is 
antagonistic to Islam and poses a significant threat, reinforcing the “war on Islam” 
narrative advanced by radical Islamists, while often overwhelming the limited 
intentional attempts of American diplomacy and policies to counter this frame.101 
The Iraq War as the Real Proof 
The war in Iraq is the single most important factor in explaining the failure of 
the United States in the race for Muslim hearts and minds after September 11. The 
results of repeated surveys and polls, as well as the near consensus judgment of experts 
from a wide range of perspectives is that the U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation 
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of Iraq has done more to increase anti-American opinions around the Muslim world, 
while undermining U.S. credibility and reinforcing the framing narratives of violent 
Islamists than any other issue, including continued Muslim perceptions of unconditional 
American support for Israel.102 Andrew Kohut, of Pew Global, testified “Iraq is the key 
problem” driving current anti-American attitudes and responsible for many in Muslim 
countries seeing the U.S. as a threat to Islam.103 Al-Qaida expert Peter Bergen 
concludes the invasion of Iraq confirmed “for many Muslims bin Laden’s contention 
that the United States was at war with Islam.”104  
Gerges illustrates the dramatic effect of the decision to invade Iraq shortly after 
Afghanistan had on reversing Muslim support for America after the 9/11 attacks: 
When Russian troops invaded Kabul, the call for jihad echoed from almost every 
corner and mosque in Arab and Muslim lands. At least fifty thousand faithful 
flooded into Afghanistan; they had the blessings of the religious and the ruling 
establishments. A comparatively deafening silence followed the United States’ 
war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda… No religious authority lent his name and the 
legitimacy to repelling the American troops. In response to an inquiry from the 
most senior Muslim chaplain in the U.S. army, a group of leading Islamic 
scholars issued a fatwa on September 27, 2001, directing that American 
Muslims were obliged to serve in the armed forces of their country, even when 
the United States was at war with a Muslim nation. Yusuf Qardawi, one of the 
best known conservative Islamic scholars – someone who has never hesitated to 
criticize American foreign policies – endorsed the fatwa.105 
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Islamist from Egypt with a “hugely popular program on al-Jazeera,” but also cautions 
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However, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, “the same Qardawi who had forcefully 
denounced bin Laden and his cohorts now accused the Bush administration of declaring 
war on Islam.”106 
The decision to quickly turn focus towards Iraq after the successful toppling of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan also framed and reframed understanding of American 
actions in that country.107 For many Muslims who opposed U.S. military action in 
Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, without believable links to al-Qaida, was dramatic proof 
that the U.S. war on terror was nothing more than an excuse to dominate the Muslim 
world. Many others, who had potentially been willing to see the invasion of Afghanistan 
as an understandable U.S. reaction to 9/11, especially as acceptance of al-Qaida’s 
responsibility and close relationship with the Taliban became more widespread, were 
also now more likely to be persuaded by militant Islamist framing that the U.S. was a 
threat.108 Coupled with the shift in resources and attention, Iraq further undermined 
subsequent U.S. efforts to win popular support in Afghanistan and portray positive steps 
there to others across the Muslim world.109 
Sentiment across the Muslim world was already primed for an adverse reaction 
to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq based upon 10 years of focus upon the humanitarian 
crisis in Iraq caused by international sanctions and enforced in part by periodic U.S. and 
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attitudes turned against al-Qaida, but that even the militant Islamist circles he had 
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U.K. air strikes.110 Reporting on extensive coverage and discussion of the crisis by Arab 
media, Lynch describes the backdrop this created: 
American diplomats could argue all they wanted that the dying babies on Arab 
television sets were Saddam’s fault, or that there weren’t as many as he claimed, 
but these arguments carried little weight compared to the horrifying pictures 
coming out of Baghdad.111 
Insufficient attention to growing Arab anger during the 1990s by the Clinton 
administration, punctuated by Ambassador Albright’s comment which seemed to imply 
that the death of a half million Iraqi children was an acceptable price, further biased the 
rhetorical and perceptual ground faced by the Bush administration.112 Unfortunately 
both the Clinton administration during the 1990s to maintain the sanctions regime and 
then the Bush administration leading up to the Iraq war focused much of their 
diplomatic efforts in the region privately on heads of state instead of engaging Arab 
publics directly through the media they were watching.113 Demonstrating the failure to 
appreciate the importance of a population-centric approach for the global 
counterinsurgency being fought under the war on terror, the Bush administration 
accepted the requests of Arab governments that they only provide private assurances of 
support allowing them to publicly oppose the war in Iraq.114 
If Usama bin Ladin’s organization was nearly defeated by early 2002, the Iraq 
war has driven radicalization and recruitment, reinvigorating al-Qaida and the violent 
side of the larger Islamist movement with which it is associated.115 Senior news analyst 
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Daniel Schorr observed, “The president has said that Iraq is the central battleground in 
the war against terrorism. But the intelligence agencies suggest that if this is so, it is 
only because the war has made it so.”116 The publicly released version of the 2006 
National Intelligence Estimate on Trends in Global Terrorism, to which he was 
referring, notes in part: 
We also assess that the global jihadist movement – which includes al-Qa’ida, 
affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells – is 
spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts. The Iraq conflict has become 
the “cause célèbre” for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement 
in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist 
movement.117 
Of significant interest to the approach of this thesis, the understanding of factors driving 
the jihadist movement portrayed in the NIE is highly congruent with a social movement 
theory perspective on terrorism and especially the framing processes discussed in this 
chapter. The NIE for example notes: 
Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1) 
Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western 
domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the 
Iraq “jihad;” (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and 
political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US 
sentiment among most Muslims – all of which jihadists exploit. 
What militant Islamists are exploiting is the ability to use evidence of these underlying 
factors in support of their framing narratives to influence popular attitudes and 
encourage mobilization. A series of studies examining the background and motivations 
                                                
http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/Afghanistan_on_the_brink. Stockman, 2007, 
"In Afghan Effort, Wins and Losses Recounted: US Teams Seek Order, Good Will," 
The Boston Globe, July 10, 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2007/07/10/in_afghan_effort_wins_an
d_losses_recounted/. 
116 Schorr, 2006, "Stay the Course in Iraq? What Course? If Iraq is the central front for 
the war on terror, it's only because the war there has made it so.," The Christian Science 
Monitor, September 29, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0929/p09s02-cods.htm. See 
also: Benjamin and Simon, 2006, "Of Course Iraq Made It Worse," Washington Post, 
September 29, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/28/AR2006092801455_pf.html. Bergen, "War of Error: 
How Osama Bin Laden Beat George W. Bush." 
117 "Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate 'Trends in Global 
Terrorism: Implications for the United States'." Press reports claim the classified version 
is “considerably bleaker.” Miller, 2006a, "Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Fuels Terror," 
Los Angeles Times, September 24, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-
na-intel24sep24,0,2161892.story?coll=la-home-headlines. 
 CHAPTER SEVEN: U.S. POLICY AND CONTESTED FRAMING PROCESSES 351 
for individuals who travelled to Iraq to join anti-Coalition forces lend strong support to 
the explanation that radicalization and willingness to participate in violence – explained 
here by framing processes – was most often driven by opposition to specific U.S. 
policies, especially the invasion of Iraq, as compared to alternative explanations such as 
long-standing previous involvement with violent Islamist networks.118 This is also 
consistent with the profile of foreign fighters in Iraq put together by the Department of 
Defense “based upon debriefings of 48 foreign members of al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) 
currently in U.S. custody.”119 
Examining how the Iraq war contributed to acceptance of framing arguments 
that the “war on terror” was really a “war on Islam” helps to explain the 
contemporaneous sharp increase in anti-American attitudes across the Muslim world, 
shifts in at least short-term popular support or acceptance of militant Islamist groups 
and their violent tactics, and the resulting revival and resurgence of al-Qaida fuelled by 
the radicalization of a new generation of recruits.120 The population-centric social 
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movement approach employed by this thesis emphasizes the importance of 
understanding how rhetoric and actions are viewed and interpreted from the perspective 
of the key populations who may provide or deny support to anti-state actors, 
considering their pre-existing biases, who they identify with, and how they will receive 
information. Adopting this perspective it is easier to see how many in the Muslim world 
were likely to be at least suspicious of U.S. action, more concerned about the immediate 
effect on average Iraqi citizens, and likely to base their judgments on formal and 
informal communication networks that would be much more critical of American action 
and much more likely to include viewpoints from those actively opposing the U.S. 
Recognizing this, and based on the extensive international polling the Pew Research 
Center had already conducted, Andrew Kohut stated before the war that, “The 
unpopularity of a potential war with Iraq can only further fuel hostilities – almost no 
matter how well such a war goes.”121 
The first challenge facing the United States was that a war with Iraq was hard to 
sell as a direct and understandable reaction to al-Qaida’s attacks on September 11, and 
was widely perceived as a “war of choice.” While many Americans were willing to 
accept that Saddam may have or might cooperate with bin Ladin or others like him, and 
therefore Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction posed a threat justifying a pre-emptive 
war,122 from the Muslim world perspective this appeared to be too ridiculous to be the 
real explanation. Emile Nakhleh, who served for 15 years with the CIA and retired in 
mid-2006 as the Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program, observed, 
“Everyone in the Middle East knew it was a joke.”123  
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Although the argument tying Saddam to 9/11 was likely intended first and 
foremost to generate domestic support for the war, its effect in the Muslim world – 
being perceived as simply not credible – was to strengthen the relative position of 
competing framing arguments that the U.S. actually sought to use the war on terror as a 
cover to subjugate the Muslim world, exploit its resources, and strengthen America’s 
Israeli allies. Since the first U.S.-Iraq war bin Ladin had been disputing American 
claims that Iraq’s WMD programs guided its actions as not credible given previous U.S. 
support for the use of those in the 1980’s, and instead framing America’s conflict with 
Iraq as part of a hegemonic and crusader war on Islam.124 In a January 2004 audio tape 
to the Iraqi people bin Ladin described the “occupation of the crusaders” as having been 
carried out “under the pretext” of “weapons of mass destruction,” but that it is clear this 
is a “religious-economic war” to “set the stage for controlling and dominating the whole 
world” and “due to the presence of the largest oil reserves.”125 And in a 29 October 
2004 address by bin Ladin, he describes that the real motivation for the war was to 
“remove a former collaborator, and install a new one who will help steal Iraq’s oil” and 
that Bush knew before the invasion that “everything he needed” to remove Iraqi 
“weapons of mass destruction – assuming they existed” could be accomplished without 
invading.126  
Anti-American framing narratives gained further support in the run-up and 
subsequent events of the Iraq war given the multitude of competing justifications 
provided by just Bush administration insiders, let alone supportive and opposing 
political figures in the United States and across the globe. Later shifts in justification, 
especially those forced by the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (which itself 
was especially damaging),127 only reinforced Muslim suspicions, provided fodder for a 
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wide range of conspiracies,128 and gave credibility to anti-American radicals whose 
arguments remained relatively consistent. 
Another frequently repeated justification for the war, which similarly fed anti-
American framing arguments, was the idea that an invasion of Iraq was justified as part 
of a revolutionary project to transform the Middle East.129 On its own the idea of a 
Western power seeking to militarily reshape the Middle East was unlikely to be well 
received by those who may be on the receiving end of “collateral damage.” But, making 
things worse for hearts and minds goals in the Muslim world, this project was closely 
associated with a group of Bush administration advisors who saw it as key to the long-
term defence of Israel.130 Phrases such as “the road to Jerusalem leads through 
Baghdad,” along with rumoured or actual plans associated with this justification, 
resonated strongly with a wide range of existing interconnected Islamist frames tying 
U.S. military action against Iraq as part of defending Israel and a larger Judeo-Christian 
crusader war on Islam. Although addressed to the American people, bin Ladin’s 18 
October 2003 message titled Israel, Oil, and Iraq, exemplifies the interconnected 
arguments of al-Qaida’s regular framing of this issue.131 The result of Muslim 
perceptions of this connection was a hardening of attitudes against the United States and 
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biasing future interpretation of events with respect to Iraq.132 Condoleezza Rice’s 
descriptions of suffering associated with the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict as the “birth 
pangs” of a new Middle East discussed previously (at a time when at least 400 Lebanese 
civilians had been killed and a half million turned into refugees) similarly contributed to 
these fears that the invasion of Iraq, war on terror, and American support for Israel were 
all part of the same “war on Islam.”133  
The war in Iraq further encouraged acceptance of al-Qaida’s narrative by 
confirming long-standing warnings. As Michael Scheuer explains: 
Iraq was the perfect execution of a war that demanded jihad to oppose it. You 
had an infidel power invading and occupying a Muslim country and it was 
perceived to be unprovoked… The war has validated everything bin Laden said: 
that the United States will destroy any strong government in the Arab world, that 
it will seek to destroy Israel’s enemies, that it will occupy Muslim holy places, 
that it will seize Arab oil, and that it will replace God’s law with man’s law.134 
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Reinforcing this perspective was the memory in the Arab world that Saddam Hussein 
and Washington had been allies, with the U.S. using Saddam to offset Iran and (as the 
regional theory went) keep the region divided to insure American access to Middle 
Eastern oil, at least until Saddam dared challenge U.S. power and America pursued 
other means of exerting control.135 
While the belief that the United States would be broadly welcomed as liberators 
appears perhaps crazy in hindsight, it remains arguably compelling proof of the good 
intentions of American policy makers.136 Unfortunately, poor planning and bad 
decisions coupled with predictable resentment quickly turned whatever initial good will 
may have existed into a multi-sided insurgency and civil war.137 U.S. military and 
political leaders first denied that there was any significant opposition, beyond a “few 
dead enders” in their “last throes.”138 On the other hand, populations in the 
neighbouring Arab countries as well as the rest of the Muslim world, culturally more 
familiar with the various actors and following media channels emphasizing different 
aspects of the conflict, were quicker to recognize the reality on the ground that 
significant numbers of Iraqi’s, from diverse backgrounds, were fighting American and 
coalition forces (as well as each other). Media and insurgent propaganda coverage of 
the rise of an indigenous insurgency, joined by other Muslims answering a militant 
Islamist call to defensive jihad, served to fortify the narrative framing of the U.S. war in 
Iraq as an occupation and part of a war on Islam.139 Bin Ladin’s 19 October 2003 
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the War in Iraq in a 2008 Paper for the National Defense University. Collins, "Choosing 
War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath." 
138 Associated Press, 2003, "Rumsfeld Blames Iraq Problems on 'Pockets of Dead-
Enders'," USA Today, June 18, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-06-18-
rumsfeld_x.htm. "Iraq Insurgency in 'Last Throes,' Cheney Says," 2005, CNN.com (June 
20), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/05/30/cheney.iraq/.  
139 Van Evera, "The Bush Administration Is Weak on Terror." 
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message to the Iraqi people, titled Quagmires of the Tigris and Euphrates, congratulated 
the Iraqi resistance and those answering the jihadist call casting them as the defenders 
of Islam, equating their restoration of Muslim pride with the “descendants of the great 
knights who brought Islam as far east as China,” while continuing to reinforce the 
framing of the conflict as the response to a Jewish-Crusader alliance.140 
American hearts and minds efforts attempting to portray the United States as 
seeking peaceful coexistence with Islam and as a force for good across the Muslim 
world, promoting human rights and democracy (discussed further in the following 
section), were constantly undermined by the drumbeat of bad news coming out of Iraq 
that received far more media and public attention than isolated U.S. public diplomacy 
and aid efforts.141 In-group/out-group identification underlines why Muslims around the 
world are more likely to sympathize with and adopt the perspective of their 
coreligionists than the United States.142 Since the invasion Iraqi civilians have suffered 
the hardships of daily life in the midst of a violent insurgency or civil war, an 
experience that Muslims around the world have shared through global media and 
extending the effect that the invasion of Iraq has had for militant Islamist framing to 
many other local conflicts. 
While this section has focused on the many ways in which the invasion of Iraq 
has reinforced anti-American frames in the Muslim world, this is not the complete story. 
Over the course of the subsequent invasion the United States has taken actions 
mitigating many Muslim complaints, helping to make real improvements for various 
populations in Iraq, and demonstrating traits that are admirable. While overall the net 
effect of the Iraq war over this period has been largely negative, it has not been 
universally damaging. The U.S. military for example appears to be doing a significantly 
better job of working with different ethnic and religious groups within Iraq, fostering at 
least initial improved relations and cooperation that may help improve America’s 
                                                
140 bin Laden, 2005b, "Quagmires of the Tigris and Euphrates (19 October 2003)," In 
Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, ed. Lawrence, London: 
Verso, 207-11. 
141 Schirch, 2008, "The Two Wars in Iraq: Ours and Theirs," Washington Post: 
PostGlobal, April 4, 
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/needtoknow/2008/04/the_two_wars_in
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142 Kaplan, 2007a, "A Debt of Gratitude: Why is Bush So Obsessed with Ungrateful 
Foreigners?," Slate, March 13, http://www.slate.com/id/2161644/. 
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standing compared to the status quo in the future. At the same time, while violent 
Islamist groups in Iraq may have gained short-term support by “standing up to” the 
United States and have seen success at growing adoption of parts of their anti-American 
frames, they have also suffered their own popularity disasters with growing majorities 
opposing violent attacks on civilians and continuing to reject fundamentalist ideals for 
an Islamic state. The dominant use of terrorist tactics may ultimately in many cases be 
self-defeating for specific elements of a movement.  
Consistent with these framing arguments for how the invasion of Iraq was 
perceived by many in the Muslim world, polls following the invasion show a significant 
increase in anti-American attitudes accompanied by suspicions of America’s true 
intentions and fears that the U.S. will attack other Muslim countries. Suggesting limits 
to the success of violent Islamist groups to build upon these attitudes for their broader 
goals, surveys also generally find broader support only for violent attacks on American 
troops, perceived as legitimate targets occupying a Muslim country, but continued 
opposition to attacks against civilians. Muslim populations also generally continue to 
only support Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida to the extent that they are seen as standing 
up for and defending Muslims, while continuing to reject the group’s long-term 
ideological goals and idealized form of a fundamentalist Islamic state. However, from a 
hearts and minds perspective, even the limited short-term support coupled with 
intensified opposition to the United States poses considerable security problems as it 
constrains the cooperation of local governments, provides some security cover and 
likely increased resources, and creates conditions that are more favourable to the 
radicalization and recruitment of new members for terrorist groups than if the larger 
population was not at all supportive and instead exercised greater condemnation of 
violent extremism as a path for achieving shared goals.143 
From a population-centric perspective, examining how rhetoric and events 
surrounding the U.S. invasion of Iraq played to existing and contested framing 
processes given established and likely intragroup connections, the observed changes in 
                                                
143 Amongst polls, surveys, and other research supporting these findings see: America's 
Image in the World. Kohut and Stokes, America Against the World. Kull, "Negative 
Attitudes Toward the United States in the Muslim World: Do They Matter?.". "Muslims 
Believe US Seeks to Undermine Islam," 2007b, WorldPublicOpinion.org (April 24), 
http://65.109.167.118/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/346.php. Telhami, 
"Hezbollah's Popularity Exposes al-Qaeda's Failure to Win the Hearts."  
 CHAPTER SEVEN: U.S. POLICY AND CONTESTED FRAMING PROCESSES 359 
attitudes and opinions across the Muslim world make sense. Jeff Stein, Congressional 
Quarterly’s national security editor observes, “Iraq is the recruiting poster for al Qaeda. 
It’s not our way of life or religions or anything else. It’s our support for corrupt and 
repressive governments, and the war in Iraq. Everybody knows this, but nobody in the 
Bush administration can say it.”144 The invasion of the Iraq war generated a sharp 
increase in anti-American attitudes, which likely will abate some merely as time passes 
from the initial invasion. Opinions will likely further improve to the extent that the 
United States continues to draw down troops and to the degree the Iraqi government 
proves to be truly independent.145 However, this expected improvement in America’s 
standing should not conceal that the Iraq war has fundamentally reshaped how the U.S. 
is viewed by many in the Muslim world and provided strong support for at least another 
generation of the narrative that the United States is a threat to Muslim countries.146 
The post-9/11 Bush administration rhetoric and decision to invade Iraq have all 
contributed to reinforcing the frame that the United States is really pursuing a war on 
Islam. As a result of American policy actions, especially the invasion of Iraq, and as 
part of this framing the United States is seen as “unpredictable and dangerous,”147 and 
as the biggest threat to Muslim countries.148 When PIPA’s 2007 opinion poll in the 
Muslim world asked what they thought the primary purpose of the war on terror was, 
the least number of respondents in all countries surveyed chose “to protect itself from 
terrorist attacks” with significantly larger numbers choosing either “to achieve political 
and military domination to control the Middle East” or “to weaken and divide the 
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145 Recent polls showing a levelling or even occasional slight improvement of attitudes 
towards the United States in various countries are probably representative of this 
predicted effect. To some degree this is likely a “regression to the mean” phenomenon 
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146 Discussing that the war cannot be undone, and going forward American policy must 
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Islamic religion and its people.”149 This demonstrates just how much the United States 
has failed to win the framing battle over the true intentions of its actions.150 From a 
hearts and minds perspective as Muslim populations increasingly see the U.S. as 
threatening, especially given the United States position as the sole global superpower, 
they are more likely to align with and give at least short term support to those actors 
perceived as defending Islam and standing up to the United States. In turn this enables 
more successful recruitment by violent groups and constrains the ability of local 
governments to support U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 
Undermining Natural Counter Frames 
The third major framing failure is exposed by examining how American policies 
and rhetoric since 9/11 have undermined core qualities historically admired around the 
world and central to the counter narratives U.S. hearts and minds efforts have attempted 
to advance. In his September 20, 2001 speech to the American people, President Bush 
said, “I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have 
come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by 
them.”151 Unfortunately, from the perspective of many around the world and in the 
United States, the American government failed to live up to that in its subsequent 
decisions and pursuit of the war on terror. Instead, policies and rhetoric have too often 
undermined natural strengths, further contributing to rising anti-American attitudes and 
an erosion of popular support for and cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts 
despite near universal sympathy and good will directed toward the United States 
immediately after the 9/11 attacks. 
A central theme of proactive U.S. hearts and minds efforts over the last seven 
years has been to portray the United States as an exemplar and force for good in the 
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world, a nation caring for others and promoting universal ideals of freedom, democracy, 
and human rights, where people of all religions and background are treated equally and 
live together peacefully.152 These messages largely build on traits and values that a long 
history of surveys and research indicate individuals in Muslim and other countries 
around the world admire about the United States, even if they also historically have had 
long held grievances with specific American policies.153 Unfortunately a series of 
tactical and rhetorical choices for how the U.S. pursued the war on terror and 
diplomatically positioned itself have damaged these long-held perceptions.154 
Sacrificing moral high ground has weakened America’s counter framing in the 
contested processes ultimately influencing the shape and direction of collective 
mobilization in the Muslim world. In conjunction with reinforcing existing grievances 
and contributing to a war on Islam narrative, this explains a significant part of the 
overall failure of the U.S. in the race for Muslim hearts and minds. 
This section examines two areas of U.S. policy after 9/11 illustrating how 
American rhetoric and action has undermined natural counter frames. The first is largely 
a failure to sufficiently consider and value hearts and minds in the development, pursuit, 
and defence of other policies by looking at the counterproductive effects on Muslim 
attitudes resulting from the U.S. approach to detainees in the war on terror, including 
disparaging the Geneva Conventions, the use of rendition and torture, Guantanamo, and 
Abu Ghraib. The second is an example of the failure to consistently pursue a proactive 
hearts and minds strategy in terms of democracy promotion, a post-9/11 goal that has 
suffered from unrealistic expectations setting, embarrassing reversals, and hypocrisy in 
application. Both of these examples are representative of other policy choices and 
rhetorical approaches employed by the United States after 9/11. 
                                                
152 For example: Freeman, 2006, "Why Not Let them Hate Us, As Long As They Fear 
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154 Kean and Hamilton, 2007, "Are We Safer Today? Six Years After 9/11 and Three 
Years After the 9/11 Report, Is the U.S. Ready to Get Serious About Terrorism?," 
Washington Post, September 9, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/07/AR2007090702050.html. 
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Post-9/11 Detainee Policy 
With the decision to invade Afghanistan and aggressively pursue a larger war on 
terror targeting al-Qaida and similar groups globally one of the many complicated and 
challenging problems the United States suddenly had to face was how to handle a large 
number of unconventional detainees. Key members of the Bush administration believed 
the type of individuals being detained by U.S. and cooperating governments were 
qualitatively different from what international agreements had been developed to deal 
with in the past.155 Many of those detained were not caught on a traditional battlefield, 
were not part of an organized structure that might agree to a negotiated end of 
hostilities, and did not share international conceptions about conflict underlying the 
traditional separation of sanctioned combat from illegitimate violence. At the same 
time, many of those detained could provide valuable tactical or strategic information 
important to protecting forces and civilian populations while quickly bringing an end to 
hostilities, some may have had knowledge that could help prevent expected near-term 
international acts of mass casualty terrorism, and a few were involved to varying 
degrees with the 9/11 attacks or other atrocities around the world. Many were detained 
by and were nationals of foreign governments whose treatment of them if the United 
States did not take them or simply repatriated them straight away would vary, often 
without correlation to actual culpability, from indifference to the draconian. Finally, the 
widely differing circumstances of capture and how these individuals came to U.S. 
control meant that knowledge of their specific situations, past actions, and potential 
importance was often fragmentary, of varying credibility, and alternatively exaggerated 
or surprisingly understated. None of which was made any easier by the involvement and 
lack of coordination between a wide range of hastily mobilized conventional and special 
military units, as well as intelligence and law enforcement agencies involved in 
handling these detainees at many different locations while also focused on everything 
from active combat and helping build a new civil structure, to chasing down a torrent of 
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reported terrorist threats and responding to emotionally charged political pressure at 
home.156 
Under any approach sorting out the flood of incoming detainees, and developing 
operational and legal processes was going to be difficult and inevitably involve 
mistakes. The preference of the Bush administration was that none of those mistakes 
would increase or fail to counter short-term threats to the United States, and that any 
processes developed or authorities recognized would not constrain their ability to act as 
they may determine necessary in the future. Those involved in making these decisions 
were driven by the best intentions of protecting Americans and U.S. interests. However, 
consistent with the more highly normative and enemy-centric construction discussed in 
Chapter Five, the administration was also characterized by a preference for a harder and 
more militaristic response to terrorism, a tendency to refuse to re-examine major 
decisions once made and to become entrenched when defending them, and a lack of 
appreciation for how actions and rhetoric were perceived by foreign audiences and the 
effect this had on the development of long-term security threats. From the perspective 
of influencing popular attitudes in the Muslim world, the decisions and rhetoric of the 
Bush administration with respect to detainee policy significantly undermined the 
intended counter framing of the United States as a force for good and exemplar of 
shared ideals, while providing much propaganda for Islamist militants arguing that the 
war on terror is really a war on Islam. 
Continuing a diplomatic posture established before 9/11, the Bush 
administration’s approach to detainee issues was characterized by a rejection and 
disparaging of international laws and norms as inappropriate constraints on American 
sovereignty, ineffective for achieving their nominal goals, and a threat to U.S. 
security.157 Philip Carter observes that of the wide variety of legal options for how 
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President Bush could have handled the “prisoner’s dilemma” of detainees based upon 
previous precedents and debates, the administration’s choice was to “sanction a 
wholesale abandonment of the law.” The President signed: 
[A] blanket statement of policy that the men captured in Afghanistan would not 
be subject to the Geneva Conventions, and that by executive fiat, they would all 
be declared “unlawful enemy combatants,” a category that does not exist in 
international law. 
Under the advice of politically appointed White House, Justice Department, and 
Pentagon lawyers President Bush also signed a secret finding determining “that none of 
the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or 
elsewhere throughout the world.”158 Carter concludes, “For all intents and purposes, 
these memoranda gutted the Geneva Conventions.”159 While many of the specific 
decisions were kept secret, and only slowly leaked or otherwise released to the public, 
the rhetoric and actions of the Bush administration with respect to detainee issues were 
widely interpreted as reflecting the same attitudes and opinions, with rejection of the 
Geneva Conventions widely discussed.160  
The Bush administrations decisions to discard traditional interpretations of 
international law were largely driven by two factors: an expectation that they would 
want to hold many detainees long after hostilities ceased in Afghanistan, and a belief 
that less restrained (i.e. coercive or “enhanced”) interrogation techniques were 
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necessary to protect Americans from the new terrorist threat.161 Power argues that the 
highly charged rhetorical framing of the war on terror, that is the social construction 
discussed in Chapter Five, enabled the “executive branch to remove itself from 
traditional legal frameworks and consolidate power in imperial fashion.”162 An 
indication of how far the administration was willing or desired to go is found in the 
legal opinion requested by then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales that the 
threshold for the existing statutory ban on torture was only met if pain rises “to the level 
of death, organ failure, or the permanent impairment of a significant body function.”163 
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administration approach was recounted in 2008 Senate hearings: “The CIA, which had 
authority to use harsh interrogation techniques on suspected terrorist detainees, advised 
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Many members of the military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies as well as 
some members of the administration raised concerns and pushed back against the more 
aggressive approach to detention and interrogations at the time for moral and pragmatic 
reasons. Despite these warnings, and without reliable proof such methods were 
effective, the administration moved forward because of the preferences of key 
administration leaders reinforced by the emotionally laden fears and uncertainties of the 
time.164 
While the Bush administration repeatedly insisted any interrogation methods 
used did not violate U.S. or applicable international law, and that the United States 
“does not torture,” what is important from a hearts and minds perspective is the 
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methods were initiated from the top levels of the administration, contradicting previous 
accounts which had suggested that requests for permission to use such approaches arose 
from below. Warrick, 2008, "Report Questions Pentagon Accounts: Officials Looked 
Into Interrogation Methods Early On," Washington Post, June 17, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/16/AR2008061602779.html. 
164 The reality that the administration’s decisions were made without reliable proof that 
such methods were more effective, while many of those with expertise and experience 
resisted, only makes the resulting loss of credibility more tragic. A study by the 
National Defense Intelligence College released in 2006 presents perhaps the best 
indication of an insider consensus that there is not reliable proof for the efficacy of 
enhanced interrogation methods. Intelligence Science Board, 2006, Educing 
Information: Interrogation: Science and Art, Washington, DC, National Defense 
Intelligence College Press. The fact that the CIA abandoned waterboarding years before 
political pressure became significant, but while still reportedly capturing several more 
high value and high-level al-Qaida detainees, is likely a further indirect reflection of 
their judgment of the utility of these measures. Consistent with this interpretation, CIA 
and administration resistance to legislation and official statements that certain practices 
are torture are much more likely based in fears of exposing specific individuals to legal 
jeopardy.  
See also: Eggen and Pincus, 2007, "FBI, CIA Debate Significance of Terror Suspect," 
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9/11 Mastermind's Interrogation," The New York Times, June 22, 
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consensus international opinion that the methods used were torture.165 Many reports of 
alleged U.S. abuse of detainees are certainly false, greatly exaggerated, and intentional 
propaganda.166 Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups are responsible for far worse, as 
illustrated by the grisly murders of Daniel Pearl, Kenneth Bigley, and many, many more 
local victims whose names are not known internationally but who were tortured and 
killed in “hostage slaughterhouses” in Iraq and other countries.167 It is also likely true, 
contrary to widely held international perceptions, that the United States only approved 
and used “enhanced interrogation” methods for a very limited number of detainees and 
stopped using the most controversial of those practices by 2003.168 A careful reading of 
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specific allegations and officially investigated incidents of abuses suggests three 
categories of cases: the use of highly controversial “enhanced” interrogation methods – 
some of which clearly rose to the level of torture – approved for use by the Bush 
administration for a small number of detainees in the first few years of the conflict (for 
example, waterboarding which the CIA admits was used on three individuals);169 the 
somewhat wider use of relatively less abusive but still controversial methods generally 
initiated at lower levels with some official blessing and likely some influence from top 
level decisions that have subsequently been officially rescinded and legally banned (for 
example, various sleep deprivation tactics); and, the potentially inevitable abuses, 
generally unrelated to interrogations and only tangentially related to official decisions 
through the effects of the enemy-centric social construction, that arose in local contexts 
from a combination of conflict dehumanization, poor and overcrowded conditions, 
frustrated anger at a foreign enemy, and a failure of command oversight (for example, 
Abu Ghraib and similar officially investigated and punished cases of abuse in 
Afghanistan). My judgment is that the vast majority of the tens of thousands of 
detainees who have been in U.S. custody over the past seven years have been well 
treated in keeping with both official U.S. policy and international norms, even for those 
                                                
than 100 people. And actually, fewer than one-third of those people have had any 
techniques used against them, enhanced techniques, in the CIA program... Let me make 
it very clear and to state so officially in front of this committee that waterboarding has 
been used on only three detainees… The CIA has not used waterboarding for almost 
five years. We used it against these three high-value detainees because of the 
circumstances of the time.” Mikkelsen, 2008, "CIA Says Used Waterboarding on Three 
Suspects," Reuters (February 5), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN0517815120080205. 
169 According to a 2005 Justice Department memo, released in 2009, the CIA 
waterboarded 83 times in August 2002, and Khalid Sheikh Mohamed 183 times in 
March 2003. This contradicts a widely cited December 2007 story that Mohamed was 
only waterboarded once for 35 seconds after which he answered every question asked 
and provided information that disrupted several plots. The Justice memo also cast 
doubts on Bush administration claims that the use of “enhanced” interrogation methods 
was kept strictly within established guidelines – which according to the Justice memo 
would have been significantly fewer times that used on these two detainees. Individuals 
involved with the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah claim that he provided all of the 
ultimately useful information before he was ever waterboarded, while critics of the 
policy note that Mohamed’s waterboarding began very soon after his capture. Stack, 
2009, "Is Waterboarding Effective? CIA Did It 266 Times on Two Prisoners," The 
Christian Science Monitor, April 20, http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0420/p99s01-
duts.html. 
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cases where the Bush administration claimed that international treaties and agreements 
did not apply. Unfortunately, the international perception that the United States now 
regularly tortures detainees directly undermines the central counter narrative of 
American hearts and minds efforts. Peter Bergen observes:  
If, as the president explained in a speech last year, the United States is today 
engaged “in the decisive ideological struggle of the twenty-first century,” right 
now we are on the losing side of the battle of ideas. Garrett, for one, understands 
why. “Interrogation techniques that violate human decency ... can weaken others 
supporting us in fighting terrorism and can actually create more enemies,” he 
says. In other words, Bush’s legal strategy in the war on terrorism has been 
counterproductive. And the consequences for our safety are real.170 
Air Force Colonel Morris Davis, who from 2005 to 2007 was the chief prosecutor for 
the military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, explains the fundamental problem is that 
the United States has surrendered the moral high ground and can no longer respond that 
Americans “don’t do stuff like that.”171 
With respect to a social movement analysis of how this effects important 
contested framing processes, Chris Zambeli explains the prominent role government 
torture has played in Islamist narratives: 
Radical Islamist literature and discourse is replete with references to torture. The 
infamous al-Qaeda training manual “Military Studies in the Jihad against the 
Tyrants,” more commonly referred to as the “Manchester Document,” includes 
                                                
170 “Brad Garrett, a former FBI agent who obtained uncoerced confessions from two 
notorious terrorists – Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing, and Mir Aimal Kansi, killer of two CIA employees outside agency 
headquarters that same year – told [Bergen] that ‘coercive interrogation techniques have 
proven to be ineffective in producing reliable intelligence.’” Bergen, "War of Error: 
How Osama Bin Laden Beat George W. Bush." 
171 Colonel Davis’s makes this point with a dramatic anecdote: “Twenty-seven years 
ago, in the final days of the Iran hostage crisis, the C.I.A.’s Tehran station chief, Tom 
Ahern, faced his principal interrogator for the last time. The interrogator said the abuse 
Mr. Ahern had suffered was inconsistent with his own personal values and with the 
values of Islam and, as if to wipe the slate clean, he offered Mr. Ahern a chance to 
abuse him just as he had abused the hostages. Mr. Ahern looked the interrogator in the 
eyes and said, ‘We don’t do stuff like that.’ Today, Tom Ahern might have to say: ‘We 
don’t do stuff like that very often.’ Or, ‘We generally don’t do stuff like that.’ That is a 
shame. Virtues requiring caveats are not virtues. Saying a man is honest is a 
compliment. Saying a man is ‘generally’ honest or honest ‘quite often’ means he lies. 
The mistreatment of detainees, like honesty, is all or nothing: We either do stuff like 
that or we do not. It is in our national interest to restore our reputation for the latter.” 
Davis, 2008, "Unforgivable Behavior, Inadmissible Evidence," The New York Times, 
February 17, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/opinion/17davis.html. 
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references to the oppression and torture endured by Muslims at the hands of 
“apostate” rulers whose prisons are “equipped with the most modern torture 
devices.”172 
After 9/11 militant Islamists were very quick to criticize perceived U.S. hypocrisy on 
human rights with respect to the treatment of detainees. For example, in his October 
2002 letter, Why We are Fighting You, Usama bin Ladin wrote: 
You have claimed to be the “vanguards of human rights,” and your Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs issues annual reports containing statistics of those countries that 
violate any human rights. However, all these things vanished when the 
mujihadin hit you [on 9/11], and you proceeded to implement the same methods 
of those governments you used to curse… What happens in Guantanamo is a 
historical embarrassment to America and its values, and it screams in your faces 
– you hypocrites: What is the value of your signature on any agreement or 
treaty?173 
Al-Qaida second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has similarly frequently criticized 
American treatment of detainees.174 He has also used reports that the U.S. has turned 
over detainees to authoritarian governments where they were subsequently tortured to 
link the U.S. more strongly with these despised “apostate” rulers further undermining 
U.S. counter narratives, especially undercutting claims that the U.S. is promoting 
reforms in these countries. These arguments also feed militant Islamist frames 
connected to the far enemy justification for attacks on the U.S. and other Western 
targets.175 
                                                
172 Hegghammer, "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia.". 
Zambelis, "Is There a Nexus between Torture and Radicalization?." Consistent with a 
social movement theory perspective on the evolution of political violence, many 
researchers have noted that the violent state repression is often related to generating 
more violent forms of collective action. Della Porta, Social Movements, Political 
Violence, and the State. Della Porta, ed Social Movements and Violence. 
173 bin Laden, "Why We are Fighting You: Osama bin Laden's Letter to Americans 
(October 2002)," 206.  
174 Corman lists 26 references to Guantanamo – many also mentioning Abu Ghraib – in 
openly available statements by Zawahiri, bin Ladin, and other senior al-Qaida members 
through January 2008. Corman, 2009, "Guantanamo and al Qaeda Strategic 
Communication," COMOPS Journal (May 26), 
http://comops.org/journal/2009/05/26/guantanamo-and-al-qaeda-strategic-
communication/. 
175 For example: “American hypocrisy, which calls for democracy even as it considers 
[Egyptian president] Hosni Mubarak to be one of its closest friends, and which sends 
detainees to be tortured in Egypt, exports tools of torture to Egypt and spends millions 
to support the security organs and their executioners in Egypt, even as the American 
State Department, in its annual report on human rights, criticizes the Egyptian 
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The U.S. military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has come to 
embody international criticisms of American detainee policies over the seven years 
since 9/11 visually represented by the iconic images of detainees in orange jump suits, 
blindfolded by goggles, restrained with disposable plastic ties, and encaged behind 
open-air chain linked fences and razor wire upon arrival at Camp X-Ray in January 
2002.176 The U.S. administration often responded to reports of abuse and challenges to 
its far-reaching legal opinions with uncompromising defiance and by emphasizing the 
peril posed by these detainees who were repeatedly described as “hard core, well-
trained terrorists,” “all of whom were captured on a battlefield,” and the “worst of the 
worst.”177 Many were dedicated Islamist militants who supported al-Qaida’s 
                                                
government because it tortures detainees!” “Interview with Sheikh Ayman al-
Zawahiri,” Al-Sahab Media, May 5, 2007 cited in Zambelis, "Is There a Nexus between 
Torture and Radicalization?." See also: al-Zawahiri, "Ayman al-Zawahiri Interview 
Four Years After 9/11 (September 2005)," 178, 86. 
176 Emphasizing the conclusion of Chapter Six, that American agency to control its 
hearts and minds efforts is constrained by outside factors, the international media 
continues to illustrate stories about Guantanamo with images of Camp X-Ray from 
2002, despite the fact that this was a temporary holding facility only used for a few 
months (11 January to 29 April 2002) while permanent facilities were constructed. 
However, it is also likely that at least some of the motivation for the media (whether 
conscious or unconscious) to continue to use Camp X-Ray pictures is because they are 
consistent with the larger story of American abuse, which in part is fed by the larger 
decisions of the U.S. administration and therefore something which a different approach 
might have changed. Expressing consternation with the media on this see the column by 
the United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy covering 
Europe: Graffy, 2006, "Guantanamo is Not a Spa, but Neither is it a Torture Camp," 
The Guardian, March 22, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/mar/22/comment.guantanamo. 
177 Various administration figures have frequently invoked hyperbole when describing 
the threat posed by Guantanamo detainees. For example, former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers said, “These are people that would gnaw through 
hydraulic lines in the back of a C-17 to bring it down. So these are very, very dangerous 
people.” Northam, 2007, "Freed from Gitmo, Where do Detainees go?," NPR Morning 
Edition (July 30), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12344597. The 
reaction of government spokespersons to the suicides of three detainees at Guantanamo 
exemplified how the Bush administration’s tendency to respond aggressively to any 
criticism in a manner which forced others to choose between seemingly unreasonable 
extremes undermined its overall credibility and reinforced binary polarizations driving 
potentially supportive or neutral audiences away. From the perspective of this thesis, the 
most ironic of these were comments by Assistant Secretary of State for Public 
Diplomacy Colleen Graffy’s characterization of the suicides: “It was a good PR (public 
relations) move designed to attract attention”. The commander of the detention facilities 
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international goals, travelled from countries around the Muslim world before 9/11 to 
train at camps in Afghanistan often run by or connected to al-Qaida with the intention of 
returning home or going elsewhere, and chose after 9/11 to fight with the Taliban and 
al-Qaida in Afghanistan.178 However, as evidence accumulated questioning the 
culpability, circumstances of capture, and threat posed by a significant number of the 
detainees held at Guantanamo, the government’s credibility in responding to other 
allegations was also undermined.179 A McClatchy investigation found: 
                                                
at Guantanamo, Rear Admiral Harry B Harris Jr. similarly contributed to the negative 
media reaction stating: “They are smart. They are creative, they are committed… I 
believe this was not an act of desperation, but an act of asymmetrical warfare waged 
against us.” Shafi, 2006, "View: The 'Suiciders' have Suicided!," Daily Times, June 15, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C06%5C15%5Cstory_15-6-
2006_pg3_3.  
178 While the credibility of the U.S. government with respect to detainees may be 
internationally at an all time low, claims that all of the detainees at Guantanamo are 
there unjustly are equally unbelievable. For example: Felter and Brachman, 2007, "An 
Assessment of 516 Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Unclassified 
Summaries," CTC Report (July 25), http://ctc.usma.edu/csrt/CTC-CSRT-Report-
072407.pdf. 
179 The actual threat posed by the detainees held at Guantanamo remains an issue of 
contention. In his dissent to the 5-4 Supreme Court decision in Boumediene v. Bush 
Justice Antonin Scalia warned that by likely leading to the release of further detainees 
the Court’s decision will “almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.” 
Supreme Court of the United States, 2008, Boumediene et al. v. Bush, President of the 
United States, et al. (October Term), 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1195.pdf. Republican presidential 
nominee, Senator John McCain, likewise criticized the decision and referred to reports 
also cited by Justice Scalia that 30 released detainees “have already tried to attack 
America again.” A Washington Post “Fact Checker” article criticized Senator McCain’s 
statement, referring to “The latest Pentagon ‘fact sheet’ on ‘former GTMO detainee 
terrorist trends,’ dated June 13” which “states that 37 former Guantanamo detainees are 
‘confirmed or suspected’ of having returned to ‘terrorist activities’ since their release. It 
puts the so-called recidivism rate at ‘between 5 and 7 percent.’” Dobbs, 2008, "The Fact 
Checker: From GITMO to the Battlefield," Washington Post, June 30, 
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/fact-
checker/2008/06/from_gitmo_to_the_battlefield.html. A Seton Hall School of Law 
study, co-authored by a law professor representing two detainees, found “that 45 
percent of 516 Guantanamo detainees examined had committed hostile acts against the 
United States or its allies, and that only 8 percent of them had been al Qaida fighters.” A 
study completed in part as a response by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, 
working from the same unclassified transcripts and documents released from 
Guantanamo military tribunals, “found that while the tribunals determined that 56 
percent of the men had committed or supported hostile acts – such as direct combat, 
manning the front lines or planning combat operations – 73 percent of them posed a 
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Bush administration officials knew within months of opening the Guantanamo 
detention center that many of the prisoners there weren’t “the worst of the 
worst.” From the moment that Guantanamo opened in early 2002, former 
Secretary of the Army Thomas White said, it was obvious that at least a third of 
the population didn’t belong there.180 
The reality that not all detainees at Guantanamo were dangerous al-Qaida masterminds 
was underscored as the U.S. began repatriations in 2004, with over two-thirds of the 234 
transferred in the first 18 months simply designated “for release.”181 In other cases, 
despite U.S. agreements requiring that receiving countries prosecute and continue to 
detain specific detainees, most “were held very briefly in the home countries, were 
never tried, and those that were tried were often acquitted.”182 Although the United 
States was generally only returning those determined to be the least dangerous, or on 
whom the U.S. had the least information, this reinforced the perception that America 
was holding individuals without good cause. The undermining of American credibility 
made other accusations plausible, leaving even populations sympathetic to the United 
States unsure of whom to believe, and once again offsetting any positive effects of other 
U.S. hearts and minds efforts.183 
Credible accusations of specific cases of abuse at Guantanamo and other U.S. 
detention facilities, as well as criticisms that established review processes fell far short 
of American legal standards reinforced a growing perception that the United States had 
                                                
‘demonstrated threat.’” Lasseter, 2008b, "Day 1: Studies Differ on Threat from 
Guantanamo Detainees," McClatchy Washington Bureau, June 15, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/38769.html. See also: Ballen and Bergen, 
2008, "The Worst of the Worst?," Foreign Policy (Web Exclusive) (October), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4535. 
180 Lasseter, 2008a, "Day 1: America's Prison for Terrorist Often Held the Wrong Men," 
McClatchy Washington Bureau, June 15, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/38773.html. 
181 As of mid-2005 the U.S. had released 234 detainees, of which 167 were designated 
“for release” and 67 were to be “transferred to other governments” for continued 
detention. U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, "Eight More Guantanamo Detainees 
Released or Transferred," America.gov (July 20), http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2005/July/20050720174600adynned0.488476.html. 
182 Northam, "Freed from Gitmo, Where do Detainees go?." 
183 With respect to the effect on undermining U.S. hearts and minds efforts: “So 
America spends millions of dollars bolstering public diplomacy and sponsoring chipper 
radio and television broadcasts to the Islamic world – and then undoes it all with 
Guantánamo.” Kristof, 2008c, "When We Torture," The New York Times, February 14, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/opinion/14kristof.html. Similarly see: Dickey, 
"Bush's 10 Commandments." 
 CHAPTER SEVEN: U.S. POLICY AND CONTESTED FRAMING PROCESSES 374 
abandoned its reputation for protecting principles of justice and defending human 
rights.184 The administration’s response to such criticism continued to be characterized 
by adamant denials, an insistence on the need for secrecy, and assertions of essentially 
unchecked presidential power to determine and oversee the entire process.185 With 
respect to the rights and legal procedures covering detainees at Guantanamo Bay this 
created an escalating domestic fight, paralleling international criticisms, where the 
administration’s refusal to compromise its interpretation and repeated efforts to make 
meaningless any judicial or legislative setbacks served to further internationally 
undermine the counter framing of U.S. hearts and minds efforts.186 Peter Bergen notes: 
But Bush’s decision to operate outside the boundaries of U.S. and international 
law has been worse than simply unnecessary; it has also actively harmed 
American interests. For one thing, by refusing to bring terrorists to trial, we have 
passed up valuable opportunities to dispassionately present evidence of Al 
Qaeda’s bloodlust to the world at large. Moreover, Bush’s legal approach to the 
war on terrorism has torpedoed America’s good reputation around the world.187 
While domestic coverage of alleged Guantanamo abuses and arguments about 
appropriate legal procedures has been mixed, international coverage has been far more 
uniformly negative to the extent that, “Outside of the United States, ‘Guantanamo’ is a 
                                                
184 While many criticisms have been exaggerated, were based on rumor, or were false 
claims for propaganda purposes, the findings of various government investigations and 
official records of different agencies support the central truth of several specific 
allegations. The eight-month McClatchy investigation published in June 2008 provides 
a good introduction to many of these criticisms. Lasseter, 2008c, "Guantanamo: Beyond 
the Law," McClatchy Washington Bureau (June 15), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/detainees/story/40334.html. See also: Bazelon and 
Lithwick, 2008, "A Few Good Soldiers: More Members of the Military Turn Against 
the Terror Trials," Slate (May 13), http://www.slate.com/id/2191301/. Carter, "The 
Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration Began at the 
Top." 
185 Phillip Carter, notes other parallels in the administrations approach to legal decisions 
about the detainee issue and its general approach to other issues of governing and 
political campaigning, noting an “all or nothing,” “with us or against us,” combating the 
existential threat of the post-9/11 world mentality. Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: 
The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration Began at the Top." 
186 Horton, 2008, "The Great Guantanamo Puppet Theater," Harper's Magazine 
(February 21), http://harpers.org/archive/2008/02/hbc-90002460. Taylor, 2008, "Bush 
and the Justices Behaved Badly," National Journal (June 21), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/print_friendly.php?ID=or_20080621_9694
. Williams, 2008, "Judge Critical of War Crimes Case is Ousted," Los Angeles Times, 
May 31, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/31/nation/na-gitmo31. 
187 Bergen, "War of Error: How Osama Bin Laden Beat George W. Bush." 
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by-word for torture, authoritarian abuse and injustice.”188 As part of this process, 
Guantanamo has become the embodiment of all criticisms of American detainee policy, 
including notably the controversy over officially sanctioned torture based largely on the 
“enhanced” interrogation approaches used by CIA for high value detainees who were 
not even held at Guantanamo at the time.189 Joseph Nye concludes: 
The effects of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have also thrown us off 
course. Since the shock of those attacks, the U.S. has been exporting fear and 
anger rather than the country’s more traditional values of hope and optimism. 
Guantanamo Bay has become a more powerful global icon than the Statue of 
Liberty.190 
Recognition of the damage the international perception of Guantanamo has done to the 
United States is supported by reports that key administration officials sought, 
unsuccessfully, to convince President Bush to close the facility, including Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice.191 In a January 2008 interview, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
                                                
188 Horton, "The Great Guantanamo Puppet Theater." From a social movement theory 
perspective, one of the factors which the American approach has not given sufficient 
appreciation to is that other populations are less likely to be first sympathetic to and 
give the benefit of the doubt to American troops in the same way as U.S. citizens. For 
the same reason that in-group and out-group affiliations make Americans more likely to 
see things from the perspective of U.S. troops, many Muslim populations are more 
likely to identify with and see things from the perspective of those who are detained. 
189 The U.S. military runs the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay with detainees 
under the control of the Department of Defense. Military interrogations are governed by 
the U.S. Army Field Manual on Interrogation, sometimes referred to as FM 34-52. 
When the U.S. congress moved to ban torture it extended the limits governing military 
interrogations, based upon approaches specifically outlined in the Army manual, to 
cover other U.S. government agencies.  
190 Nye, 2007, "Recovering America's 'Smart Power'," The Korea Times, December 18, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2007/12/137_15729.html. Similarly, 
Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, the former chair and vice chair of the 9/11 
Commission, explained just prior to the sixth anniversary of al-Qaida’s attacks: “No 
word is more poisonous to the reputation of the United States than Guantanamo. 
Fundamental justice requires a fair legal process before the U.S. government detains 
people for significant periods of time, and the president and Congress have not provided 
one. Guantanamo Bay should be closed now.” Kean and Hamilton, "Are We Safer 
Today?." 
191 In 2006 Colin Powell said of his concerns about the current approach to detainee 
policy: “Part of the war on terror is an ideological and political struggle. Our moral 
posture is one of our best weapons. We’re not doing so well on the public-diplomacy 
front. This would be the wrong signal to send the world.” Zakaria, 2006, "American 
Morality Back in Play," Buffalo News, September 19, 
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Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said, “I’d like to see [Guantanamo] shut down” because 
“more than anything else it’s been the image – how Gitmo has become around the 
world, in terms of representing the United States.”192  
Where Guantanamo has become a continuing symbol of international complaints 
about America’s approach to detainees after 9/11, the scandal of Abu Ghraib stands out 
as the most damaging single incident. Mark Bowden observed: 
A committee of devils scheming to thwart American intentions in Iraq could 
have done no worse than turning a group of loutish, leering U.S. soldiers loose 
with a camera on bound, hooded, naked Iraqi prisoners. The U.S. intervention in 
Iraq is troubled, to say the least, and now our own forces have handed our 
enemies a propaganda coup that trumps their best efforts. The photos from Abu 
Ghraib prison portray Americans as exactly the sexually obsessed, crude, 
arrogant, godless occupiers that our enemies say we are... There are predictions 
(including one by Karl Rove, no less) that it will take a generation to repair the 
damage to America’s image in the Middle East.193 
Especially harmful about Abu Ghraib was the undeniable proof of photographs showing 
what had been done if not why: 
There were images of a man standing hooded on a box with wires attached to his 
hands; of guards leering as they forced naked men to simulate sexual acts; of a 
man led around on a leash by a female soldier; of a dead Iraqi detainee, packed 
in ice; and more… The images aroused worldwide indignation, and illustrated in 
graphic detail both the lengths to which the United States would go to get 
intelligence, and the extent to which those efforts had been corrupted by the 
exigencies of the difficult war in Iraq.194 
                                                
http://www.buffalonews.com/editorial/20060919/1007331.asp. See also: "View of US's 
Global Role 'Worse'," 2007, BBC News (January 23), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6286755.stm. Gates, Powell, and Rice advocating 
the closing of GTMO: DeYoung and White, 2007, "Guantanamo Prison Likely to Stay 
Open Through Bush Term," Washington Post, March 24, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/23/AR2007032301755.html. Romero, 2007, "Close Gitmo: 
Republicans, Democrats Agree the Prison is a Disgrace," The Monitor (June 2), 
http://www.themonitor.com/onset?id=2825&template=article.html. Worthington, 2008, 
"US Military Chief's Strategic Call to Close Guantanamo," The Huffington Post 
(January 16), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy-worthington/us-military-chiefs-
strat_b_81795.html.  
192 Associated Press, 2008, "JCS Chairman Wants Gitmo Shut Down," Military.com 
(January 14), 
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,159911,00.html?ESRC=eb.nl. 
193 Bowden, "Lessons of Abu Ghraib." 
194 Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration 
Began at the Top." Compounding the damage was that the detainees in this case were 
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Undermining U.S. efforts and providing a boon to militants in the contest over narrative 
framing, these images have become staple items of anti-American Islamist propaganda: 
Al Qaeda confederates, such as the Ansar al-Islam terror network operating 
inside Iraq, have incorporated the pictures from Abu Ghraib into their recruiting 
literature. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Tawhid and Jihad movement has also 
benefitted from the Abu Ghraib scandal, citing abuses of Iraqi women there as 
the justification for the kidnapping and beheading of several Western hostages. 
It is clear that Abu Ghraib has given Iraqi insurgents – and, potentially, terrorists 
around the world – a new raison d’etre.195 
General Taguba, who was responsible for the official investigation, responded to a 
request of how he characterized the acts depicted saying, “That’s not abuse. That’s 
torture.”196  
The fundamental problem for U.S. hearts and minds efforts was that this scandal 
occurred in a climate where America’s detainee policy was already under scrutiny as the 
subject of widespread criticisms and allegations of abuse. Defenders of the 
administration’s overall approach argued that Abu Ghraib was the result of a few bad 
apples, or maybe a local failure of command to maintain appropriate discipline and 
control.197 However, given assumptions established by previous incidents and the 
administration’s style of response, for many people the argument that this was at least a 
                                                
clearly not “high value terrorists” who might have knowledge of an imminent 
international attack, but at worst low level fighters in Iraq and in too many cases 
representative of the large number of innocent civilians detained under the American 
led occupation. Scelfo and Nordland, 2004, "Beneath the Hoods: Many of the Tortured 
at Abu Ghraib Were Common Criminals, Not Terrorists," Newsweek, July 19, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/54447. 
195 Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration 
Began at the Top." Similarly, Betz labels Abu Ghraib a “propagandic ‘own goal’ of 
huge significance.” Betz, "The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency," 518. 
196 Hersch, 2007, "The General's Report," The New Yorker, June 25, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/06/25/070625fa_fact_hersh. 
197 However, even if Abu Ghraib was a local failure of command and not a direct result 
of interrogation policies employed in Iraq or elsewhere, many have made compelling 
arguments that it was the result of too few troops trying to handle too many detainees, 
which was the result of administration decisions to fight the Iraq war with a smaller 
force and a failure to prepare for difficulties after Saddam was toppled. Carter, "The 
Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration Began at the 
Top." 
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result of top-level legal decisions and “gloves off” directives,198 and more likely 
reflective of standard procedure was unfortunately more persuasive even if subsequent 
investigations suggest that it had little to nothing to do with American interrogation 
practices.199 From the perspective of populations in the Muslim world no argument was 
needed, Abu Ghraib was simply another example of U.S. attitudes and further proof of 
                                                
198 Serrano, 2004, "Prison Interrogators' Gloves Came Off Before Abu Ghraib," Los 
Angeles Times, June 9, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/09/world/fg-prison9. 
Although the conclusions of their investigation was long delayed by political concerns, 
released after the 2008 Presidential elections were completed, the Senate Armed 
Services Committee released a bipartisan report strongly endorsed by both Chairman 
Carl Levin (D) and Ranking Member John McCain (R) which contradicts the claim 
detainee abuse was a low level problem: “The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot 
simply be attributed to the actions of ‘a few bad apples’ acting on their own. The fact is 
that senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use 
aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and 
authorized their use against detainees. Those efforts damaged our ability to collect 
accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and 
compromised our moral authority.” Senate Armed Services Committee, 2008, "Senate 
Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatement of Detainees in U.S. Custody 
(Part 3 - Conclusions)," U.S. Senate, December 11, xii, 
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/Detainees.121108.pdf. And with 
respect to Abu Ghraib concludes: “The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 
was not simply the result of a few soldiers acting on their own. Interrogation techniques 
such as stripping detainees of their clothes, placing them in stress positions, and using 
military working dogs to intimidate them appeared in Iraq only after they had been 
approved for use in Afghanistan and at GTMO. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld’s December 2, 2002 authorization of aggressive interrogation techniques and 
subsequent interrogation policies and plans approved by senior military and civilian 
officials conveyed the message that physical pressures and degradation were 
appropriate treatment for detainees in U.S. military custody. What followed was an 
erosion in standards dictating that detainees be treated humanely.” Senate Armed 
Services Committee, "Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatement of 
Detainees in U.S. Custody (Part 3 - Conclusions)," xxix. 
199 Bowden, "Lessons of Abu Ghraib.". Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest 
Scandal of the Bush Administration Began at the Top.". Sanchez and Phillips, 2008, 
Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story, Harper, 276-8. Sands, "The Green Light.". Sullivan, 
2008, "The War Criminal President," The Daily Dish (March 29), TheAtlantic.com, 
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2008/03/the-war-crimina.html. 
Tapper, 2008, "Retired Gen. Taguba: Bush Administration Committed 'War Crimes'," 
Political Punch (June 19), ABC News, 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2008/06/retired-gen-tag.html. Zakaria, 2005, 
"Pssst... Nobody Loves a Torturer," Newsweek, November 14, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/51176.  
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American hypocrisy.200 The damage done to general U.S. efforts to influence 
international public opinion were exacerbated by a slow response from the 
administration, which put more effort into denying the significance of Abu Ghraib and 
protecting top level officials by maintaining ignorance and plausible deniability. In total 
defence mode, the administration then failed to aggressively pursue or allow the type of 
thorough top to bottom investigations many argue were needed in order to begin to re-
establish American credibility.201  
The photos of Abu Ghraib were a tipping point primed by the context of 
previous allegations and stories of American detainee abuse. The dramatic illustrations, 
proving Western oppression and depravity against Muslims, fed jihadist-framing 
narratives energizing a new wave of movement radicalization and recruitment.202 As 
Fareed Zakaria explains:  
This is a case of more than just bad public relations. Ask any soldier in Iraq 
when the general population really turned against the United States and he will 
say, “Abu Ghraib.” A few months before the scandal broke, Coalition 
Provisional Authority polls showed Iraqi support for the occupation at 63 
percent. A month after Abu Ghraib, the number was 9 percent.203 
                                                
200 While abuses at Abu Ghraib shocked many in the United States and Europe, for 
many in the Middle East these were simply the common behaviour of governments. 
Unfortunately, from a hearts and minds perspective, this supported the argument that 
the United States was no different, undermining a core counter narrative.Zambelis, "Is 
There a Nexus between Torture and Radicalization?." 
201 Bowden, "Lessons of Abu Ghraib.". Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest 
Scandal of the Bush Administration Began at the Top.". Hersch, "The General's 
Report.". Zakaria, "Pssst... Nobody Loves a Torturer."  
202 Kaplan, "It's Not Who We Are, It's What We Do: What Can Terrorists Teach Us?.". 
Mora and Shattuck, "Self-Inflicted Wounds." Former senior military interrogator 
Mathew Alexander, who served in Iraq and was part of the team that located Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, writes: “As a senior interrogator in Iraq, I conducted more than three 
hundred interrogations and monitored more than one thousand. I heard numerous 
foreign fighters state that the reason they came to Iraq to fight was because of the 
torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay. Our policy of torture and abuse 
is Al-Qaeda’s number one recruiting tool. These same insurgents have killed hundreds, 
if not thousands, of our troops in Iraq, not to mention Iraqi civilians. Torture and abuse 
are counterproductive in the long term and, ultimately, cost us more lives than they 
save," Alexander, 2009, "Torture's Rendition," National Interest Online (April 23), 
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21354. 
203 Alberto Mora, who was the General Counsel to the Navy from 2001 to 2006, and 
former Ambassador John Shattuck similarly wrote: “There are other serving military 
officials who maintain that the leading causes of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq are, 
respectively, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, as gauged by their effectiveness in 
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Carter similarly concludes: 
There is no doubt that the abuses at Abu Ghraib stand as an indelible stain on the 
honor of the American military. What is less clear is the degree to which the 
resulting scandal has damaged our national security and undermined our efforts 
to bring peace to Iraq and win the war against radical terrorism – a war that is as 
much a fight for the political and moral high ground as it is a shooting war that 
pits American soldiers against Islamist ones. America suffered a huge defeat the 
moment those photographs became public. Copies of them are now sold in souks 
from Marrakesh to Jakarta, vivid illustrations of the worst suspicions of the Arab 
world: that Americans are corrupt and power-mad, eager to humiliate Muslims 
and mock their values. The acts they document have helped to energize the 
insurgency in Iraq, undermining our rule there and magnifying the risks faced by 
our soldiers each day. If Osama bin Laden had hired a Madison Avenue public 
relations firm to rally Arabs hearts and minds to his cause, it’s hard to imagine 
that it could have devised a better propaganda campaign.204 
From a larger hearts and minds strategic perspective, the images (and worse allegations 
to which they gave credence205) pushed moderate Muslim populations further against 
the U.S., provided more space and potential support for extremists, and made it harder 
for friendly Muslim governments to cooperate with American priorities.206 
Consistent with the military’s adoption of more population-centric 
counterinsurgency approaches, one positive counter note going forward is that the U.S. 
                                                
stimulating the recruitment and fielding of jihadists on the battlefield.” Mora and 
Shattuck, "Self-Inflicted Wounds."  
204 Carter, "The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Administration 
Began at the Top." 
205 Militant Islamist have taken advantage of growing acceptance of allegations that the 
U.S. has abused detainees by making even more extreme claims. For example, in a 
January 2006 audiotaped message bin Ladin extended a “truce offer” to the Americans, 
cited U.S. opinion polls about disapproval of the Iraq war, and included the claim that, 
“As for the torturing of men, this has reached a point to where burning chemical acids 
and electrical drills to dismember them are utilized. And whenever they [the Americans] 
give up on [interrogating] them, they sometimes kill them by drilling them in the head. 
Read, if you will, the humanitarian reports that enumerate the horrors [committed] in 
the Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and Baghram prisons.” bin Laden, 2007a, "Bin Laden's 
Truce Offer to the Americans (January 2006)," In The Al Qaeda Reader, ed. Ibrahim, 
New York: Broadway Books, 222. While there are no humanitarian reports making 
such claims about American abuses, there are reports criticizing the U.S. and there have 
been separate frequent reports that various Shia and Sunni militias in Iraq have 
committed such depraved acts. For an audience that finds bin Ladin credible, and is 
primed to believe the worst of the U.S., his connection of these suggests that the U.S. is 
actually behind these atrocities. 
206 Mora and Shattuck, "Self-Inflicted Wounds.". Nordland, 2005, "Good Intentions 
Gone Bad," Newsweek, June 13, http://www.newsweek.com/id/50077.  
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military is emphasizing the importance of the detainee mission to overall hearts and 
minds goals. The military has strengthened training and policies to prevent future 
scandals such as Abu Ghraib and is initiating proactive programs within detention 
facilities to specifically counter radicalization amongst detainees.207 Given that as of 
early 2008 the United States continued to detain over 20,000 individuals in Iraq and 
Afghanistan such initiatives may be crucial to preventing even further damage to U.S. 
hearts and minds goals, and may win back a little of the ground lost by Abu Ghraib, 
Guantanamo, and overall American detainee policy in the first six years.208  
Unfortunately, these steps only represent the re-learning of old 
counterinsurgency lessons. Based upon his experiences as an officer in the French Army 
in Indochina and Algeria, Roger Trinquier warned future counterinsurgents in 1964 
that: 
One of the first problems encountered, that of lodging the individuals arrested, 
will generally not have been anticipated. Prisons, designed essentially to 
accommodate offenders against common law, will rapidly become inadequate 
and will not meet our needs. We will be compelled to intern the prisoners under 
improvised, often deplorable conditions, which will lead to justifiable criticism 
our adversaries will exploit. From the beginning of hostilities, prison camps 
should be set up according to the conditions laid down by the Geneva 
Convention. They should be sufficiently large to take care of all prisoners until 
the end of the war. 
One is left ton wonder if from the beginning of hostilities in the war on terror what 
would have happened if Trinquier’s advice had been pursued. 
Zambeli summarizes how the coupling of current international assumptions 
about U.S. detainee policy with systematic torture by American supported authoritarian 
                                                
207 Based on his own military experience, the Washington Post’s Philip Carter explains 
the importance of such programs for population-centric strategies: “[D]etention 
operations are absolutely critical for counterinsurgency. When you get them wrong, you 
lose. Marine Maj. Gen. Doug Stone has instituted a number of innovations in his 
command of Task Force 134 (the entity in charge of detentions in Iraq), and Yingling’s 
battalion will play a key role in implementing those. Detention facilities can be 
leveraged to win hearts and minds (see David Galula’s experience in China). They can 
also be used to harvest human intelligence and build informant networks. The military 
police and military intelligence communities now call this ‘COIN inside the wire.’” 
Carter, 2008, "Dissent in the Army," Intel Dump (April 25), WashingtonPost.com, 
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/inteldump/2008/04/dissent_in_the_army.html. 
208 Dreazen, 2008, "U.S. Begins Freeing Thousands of Captives in Iraq," The Wall 
Street Journal, April 18, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120848406669625219.html.  
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regimes became a powerful and widely accepted framing narrative for the view of a 
U.S. led war on Islam driving mobilization for militant groups: 
Explicit references to accounts of torture in the region by al-Qaeda and other 
militants helps sustain the narrative that Muslims and Islam as a whole are under 
siege by a hostile U.S.-led campaign. These messages also resonate with wide 
segments of society in U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes in the region. […] 
Based on the discourse of al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist organizations, the 
current trajectory of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East will continue to serve 
as a battle cry for militants to take up arms against the United States. The 
prevalence of systematic torture and the persistence of authoritarianism in 
countries the United States counts as loyal allies will facilitate this process. 
These conditions will also provide al-Qaeda’s highly-effective media and 
propaganda wings with ample material to implicate the United States in the 
activities of regional security services.209 
Over the seven years since 9/11 U.S. detainee policy has come to be represented by 
rejection of U.S. and international law and hypocrisy on the U.S. promotion of human 
rights, official endorsement of coercive interrogation techniques seen as contributing to 
worse abuses, and the legacies of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib. The related decisions 
were made with the best of intentions by administration officials seeking to protect 
Americans from unknown future threats. The perceptions are also unfair to the 
overwhelming majority of American military personnel who honourably upheld the 
high standards to which they were trained in humanely carrying out detainee missions 
consistent with international norms under often-difficult circumstances. Unfortunately, 
from a hearts and minds perspective the result of official U.S. policy positioning and 
rhetoric has been to undermine the natural counter narrative of the United States as a 
force for good, which defends and promotes human rights, while reinforcing the belief 
that the U.S. is part of a war on Islam. 
Hypocrisy on Democracy Promotion 
While the United States has commenced, expanded, or redirected a wide range 
of policies after 9/11 under the broad justification of a hearts and minds strategy, the 
principal initiative of the Bush administration was a highly publicized program to 
promote democratization in the Middle East and other Muslim countries: 
In a November 6, 2003, speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, 
President George W. Bush announced the launch of what is now known as the 
                                                
209 Zambelis, "Is There a Nexus between Torture and Radicalization?." 
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“Freedom Agenda,” an ambitious policy to improve the long-term stability of 
Arab states and reduce the appeal of extremist ideology by advancing 
democratic transformation in the region. This new strategy, a response to the 
attacks of 9-11, represented a major shift in the traditional U.S. foreign policy 
approach to the Middle East.210 
Robin Wright described the overall initiative as “the most ambitious U.S. effort to 
transform the Islamic world,” observing that “President Bush used bold language last 
November in pledging to end six decades of U.S. policy that opted for stability in the 
oil-rich region over promoting liberty, including in such key allies as Egypt.”211 
Reporting on the emphasis the Bush administration gave this agenda, Steven Cook 
noted in mid-2006 that “President Bush, his two Secretaries of State, and a variety of 
other senior officials have spoken publicly and forcefully in favour of change in the 
Arab world” while committing “approximately $386 million to supporting democratic 
reform in the Middle East.”212 Similarly, in early 2008 during the “first extended tour of 
the Middle East” of his Presidency, Bush reportedly placed “the promotion of 
democracy and freedom at the top of his public agenda.”213 
After only five years it is arguably too early to evaluate whether the variety of 
programs and projects established under this agenda will contribute to the long-term 
processes of democratization.214 However, from a hearts and minds perspective, this 
                                                
210 Cofman Wittes and Yerkes, "The Middle East Freedom Agenda," 31. See also: Bush, 
"President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East." For a description of 
several specific initiatives associated with this agenda see: Carothers, "Uncharted 
Journey," 4. 
211 Wright, "U.S. Struggles to Win Hearts, Minds in the Muslim World." 
212 Cook, 2006, "U.S. Policy: Hypocrisy, Principles, and Reform in the Middle East," 
Arab Reform Bulletin 4 (#6, July), 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18528&prog
=zgp&proj=zted#uspolicy. 
213 Abramowitz, 2008a, "Bush Nudges Mideast on Democracy: Dissidents Skeptical, 
Saying U.S. Has Overlooked Abuses," Washington Post, January 14, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/01/13/AR2008011302848_pf.html. 
214 Towards the end of their term Bush officials increasingly echoed the arguments of 
democratization experts that these are generational projects, likely to progress through 
periods of advancement and retrenchment making any evaluation based on short-term 
trends suspect. However, as a hearts and minds solution for problems related to a lack of 
popular support this also implies that any positive effects dependent upon reaching later 
stages of democratization cannot be advanced as solutions for short-term challenges. In 
many cases, proponents of democratization commit the fallacy of assuming that their 
long-term end-states will solve short-term problems, whereas in reality the short-term 
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section argues that the Bush administration’s Freedom Agenda over the short-term 
undermined the central counter narrative it was in part intended to further of 
establishing the United States as a positive force promoting human rights and political 
development in the Muslim world. The initial rhetoric of the Bush administration 
created exaggerated expectations that quickly collided with other U.S. government 
priorities and preferences, reinforcing pre-existing perspectives that the United States 
only hypocritically talks of human rights and democracy while actually supporting 
authoritarian regimes and continuing to control, oppress, and exploit the Muslim 
world.215 
The bold rhetoric and framing of the administration set high expectations: during 
a speech in Prague, President Bush promised the Secretary of State was going to “send a 
directive to every U.S. ambassador in an un-free nation” to “seek out and meet with 
activists for democracy;”216 elections would be (the only) “path to independence and 
dignity” for the Palestinian people;217 and, “the war in Iraq would unleash a tsunami of 
democracy in the Middle East.”218 Sean Yom continues: 
                                                
challenges out-strip the proposed solution. Douthat, 2008, "Redeeming Dubya," Atlantic 
Monthly, June, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200806/bush. As the analysis of Chapter 
Six explained, the Bush administration plans for democracy promotion as outlined by 
the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism committed this very mistake – 
focusing on how establishing effective democracies would win the war of ideas by 
creating structures in which the underlying causes of terrorism did not exist. "National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism," 9-11. 
215 Esposito, "Political Islam.". Esposito, "It's the Policy, Stupid: Political Islam and US 
Foreign Policy.". Muravchik, 2006, "A Democracy Policy in Ashes," Washington Post, 
June 27, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/26/AR2006062600977.html. Zuhur, Egypt: Security, 
Political, and Islamist Challenges, 7-8. 
216 Bush, 2007b, "President Bush Visits Prague, Czech Republic, Discusses Freedom," 
(June 5), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070605-8.html.  
217 Bush, "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East." 
218 While many administration advisors and other proponents of the benefits of regime 
change in Iraq used the language of a “democratic tsunami,” this characterization of 
their beliefs comes from an evaluation of the prospects and needs of long term 
democracy promotion by Carothers and Ottaway. Carothers and Ottaway, 2005, 
Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 266-7. See also: Ottaway, Carothers, Hawthorne and Brumberg, 
2002, "Democratic Mirage in the Middle East," Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief (#20, 
October), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybrief20.pdf. 
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The “freedom agenda” made a tremendous splash in many Arab countries, 
where it sparked extensive media coverage, political gossip, and academic 
attention. Although many Arab journalists and intellectuals approached the 
budding initiative with skepticism, more than a handful of democratic activists 
in the region saw a historic opportunity to assemble unprecedented American 
support for their campaigns for liberal reforms. Likewise, back in Washington, 
many advocates of democratization – from Bush administration officials to think 
tanks and policy analysts – invested considerable hope in the inevitability of 
democratic progress.219 
At the same time, militant Islamists who reject the idea of U.S. promoted 
democracy were responding to these framing appeals with traditional arguments that the 
United States only talks about such reforms as a means to distract Muslims from 
seeking real change in order to prop up apostate regimes who insure America’s supply 
of cheap oil and enable continued U.S. hegemony. These are demonstrated in bin 
Ladin’s October 2002 statement: 
The freedom and democracy that you call to is for yourselves and the white race 
only; as for the rest of the world, you impose upon them your monstrous, 
destructive policies and governments, which you call “America’s Allies.” Yet 
you prevent them from establishing democracies. When the Islamic party in 
Algeria wanted to practice democracy and they won the election, you unleashed 
your agents in the Algerian army on them, attacking them with tanks and guns, 
imprisoning them and torturing them – a new lesson from the “American book 
of democracy”!!!220 
Building on this framing, in an al-Sahab produced interview released on the 11 
September 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri responded to a question about America’s new 
freedom agenda, saying:  
America does not want to spread freedom. Rather it aims at occupying our 
countries, spreading corruption and promiscuity, encouraging missionary 
activity for the distorted Christianity, and calling for the spread of a new Islam 
that will facilitate its assault and promote its corrupt and corrupting collaborators 
– an Islam without jihad, without resistance, and without [the principle of] 
enjoying good and forbidding evil.221 
                                                
219 Yom, 2008, "The Dilemmas of American Democracy Promotion in the Arab World," 
Yale Journal of International Affairs 3 (1), Winter. 
220 bin Laden, "Why We are Fighting You: Osama bin Laden's Letter to Americans 
(October 2002)," 205. For a short summary of the 1990 and 1991 Algerian elections 
which seemed set to bring Islamists into political power and led to a Western supported, 
or at least quietly tolerated, military coup see: Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 93-5. 
221 al-Zawahiri, "Ayman al-Zawahiri Interview Four Years After 9/11 (September 
2005)," 187. 
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For the administration’s supporters the “Arab spring” of 2005 reinforced their 
confidence in the new Freedom Agenda,222 only to see the promise of democratic 
progress sequentially crash over the following 12 months: 
In the fall of 2005, sectarian gridlock returned to paralyze Lebanon, President 
Mubarak’s “reelection” turned out to be little more than a rigged plebiscite, 
terrorist attacks in Jordan sidelined the palace’s democratic reform project, the 
House of Saud promised no more electoral trials, and civil conflict in Iraq 
intensified. Ironically, though, what chilled American democracy promotion the 
most were democratic events. In November 2005, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (the 
Muslim Brotherhood) captured nearly a fifth of Egypt’s parliament during 
general elections, greatly outnumbering the few seats that went to the secular 
liberal parties championed by American advocates. And in January 2006, 
Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, better known as Hamas, won general 
elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, defeating the incumbent Fatah 
organization that both Israel and the U.S. had quietly endorsed. Such results 
dampened the exuberance of neoconservative pundits in Washington. Some 
concluded that perhaps the Arabs were indeed not ready for democracy after all; 
why else would they elect groups to power that seemed so virulently anti-Israeli 
and anti-Western?223 
These disappointments, fears of what Islamists might do if they were more successful in 
fully democratic elections, and the pressure of other priorities in the war on terror 
reversed much of the momentum for bold action promoting democracy.224 As 
previously discussed, the especially negative reaction to the electoral success of Hamas 
particularly undermined U.S. claims of honestly promoting democracy. 
Part of the problem leading to the creation of unrealistic expectations was that 
the Bush administration turned to democracy promotion as a proactive strategy for two 
short-term problems, in addition to justifying it as part of a root cause solution to the 
                                                
222 “Euphoria swept across legions of observers of Arab politics two years ago. A series 
of unusual scenes on the streets of the Middle East nurtured an inspiring story line of an 
emerging ‘Arab spring’ that mimicked the earlier triumph of democracy from the 
Philippines to Prague: mass demonstrations in Lebanon; joint rallies of Egyptian 
Islamists and liberals against the Mubarak regime; and elections in Iraq, the Palestinian 
territories, Lebanon, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia. Many of the most deeply entrenched 
Arab regimes appeared to be on the verge of losing their authoritarian grip. Symbolized 
by purple fingers in Iraq, orange t-shirts in Lebanon and the single word kifaya 
(‘enough’) in Egypt, the fall of the Arab equivalent of the Berlin Wall seemed at hand.” 
Hamzawy and Brown, 2007, "Arab Spring Fever," The National Interest 91 (40), 
August 29, http://www.nationalinterest.org/General.aspx?id=92&id2=15374. 
223 Yom, "The Dilemmas of American Democracy Promotion in the Arab World." 
224 One State Department Official suggested to David Rose, “With Hamas’s 
[unexpected] election victory, the freedom agenda was dead.” Rose, "The Gaza 
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underlying conditions of terrorism.225 First, after the failure to find weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq the administration needed a new justification in order to buttress 
especially domestic support for continued significant military operations in a growingly 
complex insurgency and civil war. Because the U.S. public was assumed to have limited 
tolerance for a long-term military commitment, language about democracy promotion 
often predicted dramatic short-term successes. 226 Second, instead of following what it 
deemed to be the failed negotiation strategy of previous administrations, the Bush team 
had decided elections would be its response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But again, 
as continued short-term violence in that conflict generated increased pressure for action 
the administration rhetorically focused on the promise of dramatic changes to be 
brought about by Palestinian ballots. Recognition that many violent Islamists were in 
part motivated by, or at least exploited concerns over, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis 
similarly created pressures to frame democracy promotion as promising short-term 
successes given the lack of sustained, high-level pressure from the administration for 
traditional negotiations.227 
Also contributing to the creation of exaggerated expectations by the 
administration’s initial rhetoric and framing was a lack of appreciation for the 
challenges facing democracy promotion in the Middle East and the severe limits on 
                                                
225 Ibid. 
226 Cofman Wittes and Yerkes, "The Middle East Freedom Agenda," 32. Douglas Feith, 
who was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under from July 2001 to August 2005, 
observes: “This change can be quantified: In the year beginning with his first major 
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Sold the War." 
 
227 Highlighting the dramatic shifts in policy on this issue in the 2003 the Bush 
administration listed as one of its primary initiatives for engaging in the war of ideas 
working towards a just settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2006 the next 
version of the same national strategy document only mentioned the conflict to say that it 
was not really a cause of terrorism because al-Qaida had planned the 9/11 attacks during 
a period of activity in the peace process. "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.". 
"National Strategy for Combating Terrorism." 
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American agency for contributing to or encouraging necessary reforms and foundational 
civil structures.228 Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway explain: 
Another consequence of the shortage of experience and expertise in democracy 
promotion in the Arab world is that the new community of enthusiasts of such 
work frequently evidences unrealistic ideas about how much impact outside 
actors can expect to have when they try to alter the political direction of other 
societies. Some people appear to believe that if enough people in Washington 
decide the Middle East needs to become democratic, democratization will 
happen, just by the force of the American will alone. Yet the most basic, 
consistent lesson coming out of the experience of democracy promotion in other 
regions is that external actors, even very determined ones employing significant 
resources, rarely have a decisive impact on the political direction of other 
societies.229 
Their conclusion is that democratization in the Middle East will be a “long, uncertain 
journey” with “no assurance of success.” 230 During the indeterminate phases of 
democratization there are even reasons to believe that violence and terrorism may 
increase.231 Because of these difficulties, and the very limited influence for “external 
actors to encourage recalcitrant, entrenched governments to open up their political 
systems to real competition” Carothers and Ottaway note that “Western governments 
inevitably feel the temptation not to push for real democratization, or even not 
                                                
228 Part of the problem was also an almost “fetish” focus on voting and election over the 
harder long-term requirements of establishing the structures, traditions, and confidence 
of deep civil society structures. This was especially highlighted by the focus of the 
administration on balloting as a solution in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
229 Carothers and Ottaway, Uncharted Journey, 10.  
230 Ibid., 266-7. The election of Islamist parties, as well as opposition to U.S. advocated 
policies, has caused some to question whether populations in the Muslim world actually 
support democracy. This is reinforced by the perception that Islamists, too often defined 
in the Western perception by the extremes of groups like al-Qaida, seek a religious led 
theocracy instead of true representative democratic governance. However a wide series 
of surveys and polls finds that large majorities across the Muslim world support 
democracy and believe that it can work in their own countries. Further, the continuing 
strengthening of democratic traditions in Muslim majorities countries such as Turkey 
and Indonesia especially, as well as Bangladesh, Mali, and Senegal provide positive 
examples. "Islamic Extremism.". Kohut, "American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic 
World." 
231 Haass, 2006, "An Argument to Jettison the Metaphor 'War on Terror'," NPR Talk of 
the Nation (August 14), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5645404. Mansfield and Snyder, 
1995a, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20 (1), 
Summer. Mansfield and Snyder, 1995b, "Democratization and War," Foreign Affairs 74 
(3), May/June. Snyder, 2000, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and the 
Nationalist Conflict, London, W. W. Norton & Company. 
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necessarily very hard for limited liberalization.”232 This in part appears to again explain 
the actions of the Bush administration following the setbacks of 2005 and 2006. 
Unfortunately, from a hearts and minds perspective, the continued aspirational rhetoric 
contrasted against at best superficial regional progress and transparent American 
acquiescence undermines the intended U.S. counter framing and reinforces perceptions 
of hypocrisy. 
How hard the administration was willing to push for real changes to the political 
structures of many Muslim majority countries is further limited by the current realities 
of who would benefit and competing short-term priorities in the war on terror. Many 
regional observers suggest that given current popular preferences coupled with relative 
organizational strengths the reality of any significant political liberalization in the short-
term would often be electoral victories by Islamist parties.233 Democratization experts 
emphasize that what is needed for long term progress are institutional changes creating 
political liberalization and a robust civil society, the necessary neutrality of which also 
requires dealing with the victors whomever they are if the process is to be credible and 
sustainable. Unfortunately, the Bush administration took a factional approach to 
                                                
232 Carothers and Ottaway, Uncharted Journey, 262-3. They similarly argue: 
“Unfortunately, Western democracy promoters, particularly in the United States, often 
feel under great pressure to demonstrate that they are accomplishing rapid results. 
Consequently, they feel driven to focus on what are often superficial manifestations of 
political change, such as whether a country holds elections, rather than the actual degree 
of political competition that the elections truly entail.” Carothers and Ottaway, 
Uncharted Journey, 262. 
233 This is what happened with the 2006 Palestinian elections where Hamas was more 
organized and more popular. Of significant note, as with Islamist parties in many other 
countries, Hamas’s strengths were not inherently religious. Especially compared to 
Fatah, Hamas was viewed as non-corrupt and much better at providing social services 
even when not the government. There is some indication in recent elections, such as 
Pakistan, that especially hard-core Islamist parties are not popular. But, the successes of 
other parties in these cases builds upon a relative organization development not found in 
many authoritarian Muslim countries. As chapter four discusses, many authoritarian 
regimes have severely oppressed all oppositional groups, which for cultural and historic 
reasons has favoured the current strength of Islamist movements as the only real 
alternative. In part this is because authoritarian governments are restricted in their 
ability to oppress or control religious figures and mosques, and in part because many 
regional authoritarian governments used Islamist parties to offset previous nationalist 
and socialist oppositions. Telhami, 2006c, "In the Mideast, the Third Way is a Myth," 
Washington Post, February 17, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/16/AR2006021601576.html. See also: Esposito, "Political 
Islam." 
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democracy promotion, where further U.S. support is dependent upon voters electing the 
right people.234 The biases inherent in this approach are consistent with the dominant 
construction of terrorism discussed in Chapter Five that establishes the war on terror as 
the most important priority, perceives all Islamists as inherently suspect and probably 
part of the threat to the United States, and demands that others choose either our side or 
their side. The resulting reaction to the Palestinian and Lebanese elections especially 
undermined American credibility.235 Graham Fuller, employing a social movement 
understanding of political Islam, further argues that the failure to welcome and engage 
with Islamist electoral successes has a counterproductive effect of pushing these 
movements in a more violent and non-democratic direction while also reinforcing the 
success of their framing of the U.S. as involved in a war on Islam.236 U.S. support for 
democratization efforts was also constrained in the short-term by competing strategic 
priorities tied to the cooperation of the authoritarian regimes Islamist oppositions 
threaten to replace, including both war on terror objectives as well as broader interests 
such as maintaining reliable oil supplies.237 However, the transparency of these 
constraints, often highlighted in muted responses to clearly anti-democratic moves, has 
the counterproductive effect of reinforcing perceptions of America’s ties to and support 
of authoritarian regimes due to the contrast with and emphasized by heightened 
expectations of the new Freedom Agenda democracy promotion rhetoric. 
                                                
234 Fattah, 2007, "U.S. Backs Free Elections, Only to See Allies Lose," The New York 
Times, August 10, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/10/world/middleeast/10arab.html. 
235 Noting the opinions of Efraim Halevy, former chief of the Mossad, that the failure to 
recognize and negotiate with Hamas was especially damaging for the U.S. and Israel, as 
well as for the long-term development of Palestinian democracy. Rozen, 2008, "Israel's 
Mossad, Out of the Shadows," Mother Jones, February 19, 
http://www.motherjones.com/washington_dispatch/2008/02/israel-mossad-out-of-the-
shadows.html. See also: Cook, "U.S. Policy: Hypocrisy, Principles, and Reform in the 
Middle East." 
236 Cited in Carothers and Ottaway, Uncharted Journey, 259-60. See also: Klein, 2008, 
"The Persian Gulf Primary," Time, February 20, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1714844,00.html. Rose, "The Gaza 
Bombshell."  
237 Carothers and Ottaway, Uncharted Journey, 253. Zunes for example observed that 
the speech “appeared to be designed for the domestic U.S. audience,” as “few of the 
foreign delegations or international journalists present could take seriously his rhetoric 
regarding the promotion of democracy in the Middle East, given the reality of U.S. 
policy in the region.” Zunes, 2006, "Bush at the UN: Annotated," FPIF Commentary 
(September 20), Foreign Policy in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3531. 
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President Bush’s September 2006 address to the United Nations General 
Assembly was representative of exaggerated claims of progress, the gaps between the 
administration’s rhetoric and policies, and the biased nature of whom the U.S. 
supports.238 In the speech he hailed the “important steps” taken by several Middle East 
regimes, naming and highlighting specific progress in Algeria, the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen, and Egypt. However, each of 
these cases has been criticized as minor moves that were often blatantly superficial, and 
in some cases part of larger programs representing an actual retrenchment of 
authoritarian power.239 For example, President Bush started by noting, “Algeria has held 
its first competitive presidential election.” In contrast, opposition parties claimed vote 
rigging and the independent newspaper El Watan observed that President Bouteflika’s 
83.49% re-election “is a result worthy of [North Korea’s] Kim Il Sung.”240 President 
Bush praised UAE’s announcements that “half of the seats in its Federal National 
Council will be chosen by elections,” which critics noted was for a body that is purely 
consultative. 241 Jordanian elections were for a lower house of parliament that “cannot 
initiate legislation and cannot enact laws without the approval of the upper house, which 
is appointed by the king,” and even then those elections were marred by “the highly 
unrepresentative drawing of assembly districts in favour of the monarchy as well as 
restrictions on the political platforms parties can advocate in order to take part.”242 
Similarly, the praised reforms in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were minor expansions of 
enfranchisement that removed no significant power from the royal families.243 The most 
                                                
238 Bush, "President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly." 
239 Carothers and Ottaway, Uncharted Journey, 262. Fattah, 2006, "Democracy in the 
Arab World, a U.S. Goal, Falters," The New York Times, April 10, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/10/world/middleeast/10democracy.html. 
240 "Algeria Press Aghast at Election Result," 2004, BBC News (April 10), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3511254.stm. Smith, 2004b, "Algerian President Re-
Elected, Though Rivals Claim Fraud," The New York Times, April 9, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/international/africa/09CND-
ALGERIA.html?ex=1215576000&en=83042e17f0c7a21e&ei=5070. 
241 Zunes, "Bush at the UN: Annotated." 
242 Lynch, 2006a, "Jordan is Making Really Great Strides," Abu Aardvark (October 5), 
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2006/10/jordan_is_makin.html. Zunes, 
"Bush at the UN: Annotated." 
243 Zunes, "Bush at the UN: Annotated." Bush’s praise for Kuwait was particularly 
hypocritical given as he highlighted the inclusion of women while overall only a 
minority of the country’s population is still allowed to vote, whereas in the Palestinian 
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striking gap between U.S. praise and reality was Egypt where President Bush hailed 
“multiparty presidential elections.” Zunes described these: 
Last year’s presidential elections in Egypt were even worse than Yemen’s in that 
the U.S.-backed Mubarak regime declared the largest opposition party illegal, 
effectively banned independent candidates, severely restricted media access and 
publication rights of opposition campaigns, and refused to allow international 
observers. Only 23% of the electorate bothered to go to the polls, and Mubarak 
won re-election with an improbable 88% of the vote. Government security 
forces beat up and arrested protestors demanding more open elections, and the 
runner up in the presidential race received a five-year jail sentence.244 
President Mubarak has continued to reinforce authoritarian control of the government 
through changes to the constitution, renewing the 27-year-old state of emergency, and 
further intimidating and oppressing opposition groups. At the same time the U.S. 
continues to provide at most muted criticism often mixed with praise.245 Following a 
                                                
elections “139 women ran for office, with 52 getting elected to the lower branch of the 
legislature and two elevated to the higher chamber.” Raimondo, 2006, "What's Wrong 
With American Foreign Policy? In a Word: Bush," Behind the Headlines (September 
20), http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=9720. 
244 Zunes, "Bush at the UN: Annotated." Consolatore similarly describes: "The problem 
is that Mubarek was only ‘almost’ elected because the balloting didn't quite amount to a 
legitimate contest, even if it was the first ever in which Egyptian voters had a choice of 
candidates for president. Unwilling to come down on a ‘moderate,’ secular Arab ally, as 
it did on Iran in June, the Bush administration declared the Egyptian vote ‘an important 
step toward holding fully free and fair competitive multiparty elections.’ But the actual 
process was so ridden with irregularities, manipulations, and outright fraud that it more 
resembled, as one influential blogger (known simply by the Arab woman’s name 
Baheyya) put it, a presidential selection spectacle. Even to register, the candidates had 
to clear an array of hurdles on an authoritarian bureaucracy could dream up. For 
example, challengers had to obtain approval of sixty-five members of parliament, 
which, thanks to rigged elections, is conveniently controlled by a two-thirds majority of 
Mubarek's National Democratic Party (NDP)." Consolatore, 2005, "Living with 
Democracy in Egypt," The Humanist 65 (6), November/December: 7-8. 
245 For example, during a January 2008 visit and joint appearance with President 
Mubarak, President Bush emphasized the “vital strategic partnership” of the two 
countries, while appearing to praise both steps by the government for democratic reform 
as well as “progress toward greater political openness” being led by other members of 
civil society “determined to build a democratic future.” The diplomatic language of the 
speech probably was intended as subtle criticism of the regime and encouragement of 
opposition elements, however in comparison to the far blunter language used for 
Palestinian and Lebanese results the administration does not like and aspirational 
democracy promotion rhetoric the speech was easy for critics to frame as further 
hypocrisy. Bush, 2008c, "President Bush Meets with President Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt," (January 16), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080116-2.html. For further 
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visit by President Bush in January 2008, the Egyptian regime cracked down again on 
opposition parties for municipal elections in April, with Mubarak’s ruling party running 
unopposed for 90% of the 52,000 seats. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted 
to contest about 10% (5754) of the seats as independents, succeeded in obtaining court 
rulings ordering authorities to allow 2,664 of those candidates to stand, but ultimately 
called for a boycott after only being allowed by election officials to actually field 20.246 
Perhaps more striking than President Bush’s praise for superficial reforms 
during his September 2006 UN General Assembly speech was what he did not mention. 
While managing to highlight even minor progress in almost every other country in the 
Middle East, President Bush conspicuously omitted elections in the Palestinian 
territories and Lebanon. Steven Cook, of the Council on Foreign Relations, while 
arguing for harsher policies towards Hamas, described the 2006 elections in which they 
prevailed as “free and fair” and “among the fairest in the Arab world.”247 A year earlier 
the Bush administration had been almost the sole advocate pushing for Palestinian 
elections and was touting the Cedar Revolution as historic proof of its entire foreign 
policy approach.248 The omission of electoral successes by Hamas and Hizballah in this 
                                                
discussion of Egypt’s political retrenchment and U.S. hypocrisy: Abramowitz, "Bush 
Nudges Mideast on Democracy: Dissidents Skeptical, Saying U.S. Has Overlooked 
Abuses.". El-Hennawy, 2008, "Egypt: Two More Years of Emergency," Babylon & 
Beyond (May 26), Los Angeles Times, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2008/05/egypt-two-more.html. 
Gerstenzang, 2008, "Bush Praises Egypt's Path to 'Openness'," Los Angeles Times, 
January 17, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/17/world/fg-bush17. Kraidy, "Arab 
Media and US Policy," 7. Miller, 2006b, "Egypt: President Hosnie Mubarak Stifling 
Nascent Democratic Movement," Strategic Warning Issues Review (4), July. Slackman, 
2007, "Rice Speaks Softly in Egypt, Avoiding Democracy Push," The New York Times, 
January 16, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/16/world/middleeast/16egypt.html.  
246 Agence France Presse, 2008, "Egypt Bars 90 Percent of Islamist Hopefuls from 
Vote," AFP (March 13), 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jOdTAXjMsKOGlQWehN_i5VMX8Fzg. "Egypt 
Opposition Boycotts Polls," 2008, BBC News (April 7), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7334191.stm. Lynch, 2008, "MB Boycott," Abu 
Aardvark (April 7), http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2008/04/mb-
boycott.html. 
247 Cook, "U.S. Policy: Hypocrisy, Principles, and Reform in the Middle East." 
248 Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell." A glowing editorial by Charles Krauthammer 
exemplifies the optimism that accompanied administration supporters’ views of the 
Cedar Revolution. Krauthammer, 2005, "Three Cheers for the Bush Doctrine," Time, 
March 7, 
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speech was consistent with the administration’s policies in general, and especially its 
faction-driven approach to democracy promotion.249 The silence or criticism of the 
Bush administration when dealing with democratic results it does not like coupled with 
the praise it heaps in “up is down” statements on minor steps by largely authoritarian 
regimes who are otherwise helpful to broader American policies reinforces a perception 
of an American double standards, hypocrisy, and lack of seriousness on what is suppose 
to be its central transformative policy in the larger war of ideas.250 While one insight of 
the social movement approach is that much of the underlying dynamics are local in 
nature, the Bush administration at times seems to have gone out of its way to reinforce 
perceptions of its hypocrisy across the Muslim world including notable examples 
throughout the Maghreb, in the core of the Middle East, not forgetting Persian Iran, up 
through South and Central Asia, and back down to Southeast Asia.251 
The Bush administration chose to pursue democratization in the Muslim world 
for a complex variety of reasons. Unfortunately the realities of unexpected setbacks 
with the success of Islamist parties, competing security priorities better supported over 
the short-term by authoritarian governments, and the inherent difficulties with limited 
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(May 27), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050527.html. Bush, 2006f, 
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(April 18), The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
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Palestine: Reform and Peace are Interdependent."  
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251 Baker, 2006b, "Ideals and Realities Clash in Bush 'Freedom Agenda'," Ibid., 
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external influence that make democracy promotion a long-term unpredictable process 
have led to a significant rollback of American effort. However sincere the United 
States’ initial rhetoric and however valuable the actual programs initiated will be over 
the long-term,252 the perceptual short-term effect has been to severely undermine U.S. 
credibility and intended counter narratives,253 while reinforcing the old framing that the 
U.S. really only supports authoritarian regimes and seeks to control the Muslim 
world.254 From a social movement perspective the actions of the United States over the 
last few years with respect to democracy promotion have not only been 
counterproductive with respect to American attempts to engage in framing contests, but 
have also undermined moderate Islamists who more directly advocated from within the 
movement for non-violent collective action to reform political systems. U.S. diplomatic 
choices have also encouraged or provided space for authoritarian regimes to continue 
                                                
252 Sean Yom concluded, “Clearly, the Bush White House’s words outstripped deeds.” 
Yom, "The Dilemmas of American Democracy Promotion in the Arab World." 
However, several experts also suggest that many of the lower level programs initiated 
by the administration may produce beneficial results over the long term. Wittes and 
Coffman note that diplomacy is an inevitably compromised tool for democracy 
promotion because of competing priorities and the slow process by which 
democratization occurs. Thus, they are more forgiving of the hyped initial rhetoric and 
failure to follow through in key cases. They specifically praise the administration’s 
flagship program, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) which has made some 
progress even as “diplomatic efforts to support democratic development have lagged 
behind US assistance to governments and civil society groups.” Cofman Wittes and 
Yerkes, "The Middle East Freedom Agenda," 32. See also: Abramowitz, "Bush Nudges 
Mideast on Democracy: Dissidents Skeptical, Saying U.S. Has Overlooked Abuses.". 
Chu Miniter, 2007, "Why George Bush's 'Freedom Agenda' Is Here to Stay," Foreign 
Policy (August), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3959. 
Problematically, these are long term possibilities that are contingent on a wide range of 
factors. Even if this potential is fulfilled, the analysis of this chapter remains that the 
short-term effect of the overall approach to democracy promotion has been to contribute 
to an increase in anti-American attitudes and an undermining of intended counter 
frames. The long-term expectations of these initiatives would be more promising if the 
initial rhetoric of the U.S. had been better calibrated, absent highly visible reversals 
after Islamist successes, and coupled with more consistent pressure on regimes to take 
serious steps towards political liberalization even if on slow time-lines.  
253 Abramowitz, "Bush Nudges Mideast on Democracy: Dissidents Skeptical, Saying 
U.S. Has Overlooked Abuses.". Raum, 2006, "Analysis: Bush Struggles to Deliver," 
Washington Post, September 1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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254 Carothers and Ottaway, Uncharted Journey, 252-3. 
 CHAPTER SEVEN: U.S. POLICY AND CONTESTED FRAMING PROCESSES 396 
repressive policies known to contribute to more extremist movement evolution over the 
long term.255 These effects are supported by the range of polls and surveys conducted 
over the past few years consistently finding majorities in Muslim countries who do not 
believe that “the United States is serious about spreading democracy in their region” 
and very small percentages (often only 5 to 10%) who respond that the United States is 
trustworthy.256 
Emile Nakhleh, who retired in mid-2006 as the head of the CIA’s unit focusing 
on the analysis of political Islam, speaking specifically on the effect of American 
detainee policies and the failures of U.S. democracy promotion for the future threat of 
Islamist violence, observes: 
We’ve lost a generation of goodwill in the Muslim world. The President’s 
democratization and reform program for the Middle East has all but disappeared, 
except for official rhetoric. That was the centerpiece of the President’s policies 
for the region, and now no one is talking about it. We have lost credibility across 
the Islamic world regarding “democracy” and “representative government” and 
“justice.” We are devising new rules and regulations for holding people without 
charge. The FBI has been at Guantánamo for years, and no charges have been 
brought against anyone. The Islamic world says “you talk about human rights, 
but you’re holding people without charging them.” The Islamic world has 
always viewed the war on terror as a war on Islam and we have not been able to 
disabuse them of that notion. Because of Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, and other 
abuses we have lost on the concepts of justice, fairness and the rule of law, and 
that’s the heart of the American idea. That’s very serious, and that’s where I see 
the danger in the years ahead.257 
From a proactive perspective the Freedom Agenda and American promotion of 
democratization in the Muslim world was suppose to reinforce the perception of the 
United States as a force for good and as an exemplar of universally admired ideas – 
which historically surveys and research found behind the positive attitudes many in the 
Muslim world had about the U.S. It is also not difficult to understand the damage done 
to that counter narrative by the rhetoric, decisions, and unfortunate events shaping 
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perception of America’s post-9/11 detention policies. To the extent that American 
actions and rhetoric with respect to detainee policy and democracy promotion are 
representative of the larger post-9/11 war on terror, dominated by an enemy-centric 
approach and overly normative judgments, these examples help to explain how the 
United States failed to successfully put forward a consistently credible positive narrative 
to counter the negative framing of continued controversial policies and the perception 
that America’s war on terror was really a war on Islam. 
Conclusion 
Speaking to a congressional committee in 1963 as the Director of the United 
States Information Agency (USIA) Edward Murrow observed: 
[A]bove all, it is what we do – not what we say – that has the greatest impact 
overseas. USIA can explain, interpret, clarify, synthesize, and project, but we 
cannot change the unchangeable or do the undoable. The United States of 
America cannot and should not try to please everyone on this planet; we have, 
and will always have, some policies that are unpalatable to some people. We are, 
then, and properly so, prisoners of policy… But given intelligent and effective 
American policies, supported by Congress and the American people, we can 
make an important contribution to the achievement of our objectives.258 
Despite the lessons about public diplomacy Murrow and others had learned a half-
century before, American political leaders after 9/11 have too often continued to ignore 
the role of U.S. policy in shaping international attitudes and the significant part those 
opinions play in whether strategic objectives are achieved. This chapter explores how a 
significant component in answering the question of why America has been losing the 
race for Muslim hearts and minds involves understanding the role played by the actions 
and rhetoric employed in the pursuit of post-9/11 U.S. policy.259 While a very long 
history of policy grievances with the United States in the Muslim world contributes to 
the current challenges of anti-American attitudes, central elements of U.S. foreign 
policy with respect to the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq have reinforced those 
existing complaints, validated new ones, and undermined historic strengths. This 
chapter has explored how post-9/11 American rhetoric and policy has reinforced 
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existing grievances, contributed to views that the war on terror is really a war on Islam, 
and undermined America’s natural counter narratives. 
Employing a social movement theory approach focusing on the importance of 
framing processes highlights how U.S. rhetoric and action reinforced and validated the 
narrative arguments of violent Islamists, while undermining counter frames intended to 
defend the U.S. as a force for good built upon American ideals long admired in the 
Muslim world. Framing processes and other concepts from the study of social 
movements serve as orienting tools aiding analysis of the complex dynamics through 
which policy and rhetorical choices shape the evolution of collective action and 
influence decisions to support or turn against violent tactics. 
In looking at the contested nature of these framing processes there are many 
examples of how al-Qaida and associated radical Islamists have successfully used the 
rhetoric and actions of the United States to support their claims in a manner that better 
reaches out to Muslim populations gaining them some short-term support while 
decreasing the support given to the United States. In many cases al-Qaida’s gains have 
come more from the exploitation of America’s mistakes than superior communication 
skills or success at convincing Muslim populations of their own long-term goals.260 
Unfortunately, in addition to mistakes, too often American post 9/11 policies overall 
have also confirmed al-Qaida’s framing arguments.261 
The refusal of political leaders to recognize publicly and in guiding strategy that 
U.S. policies are a significant source of Muslim anger has many counterproductive and 
detrimental effects. It prevents appropriate evaluation of the actual costs and benefits of 
alternatives while undercutting the ability for policies to be developed in a manner to 
more effectively achieve other goals while building support or limiting resentment. It 
constrains the potential effectiveness of targeted American efforts to win hearts and 
minds by reinforcing a lack of credibility, misdiagnosing the problem, and limiting 
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engagement on the real issues. It increases the likelihood further rhetoric and action will 
exacerbate existing resentment and hostility, while enabling other actors to continue to 
exploit anti-Americanism in the pursuit of their goals, often posing increasing threats to 
U.S. and global security. While the opinion of other populations should not determine 
U.S. policies, the bottom line is given the impact foreign attitudes have on increasing or 
decreasing security threats, the attitudes and beliefs of other populations should be a 
consideration.262 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
“On September 11, we experienced another one of those days in our national life  
– a day that will be forever seared in our hearts and minds.”  
-Laura Bush, April 20021 
The goal of this thesis has been to answer the question: Why did the United 
States perform so poorly in the race for Muslim hearts and minds over the first seven 
years after 9/11? The answer is found in how we think and talk about terrorism after 
that attack, the limits to and misunderstandings of U.S. agency, and the effect of 
American rhetoric and policy choices. Analyzing U.S. hearts and minds efforts, as well 
as the larger war on terror, from a perspective informed by lessons from studies of 
counterinsurgencies and social movements exposes and helps to explain many of the 
resulting problems. The biases of an overly enemy-centric focus and a highly normative 
moral analysis repeatedly appear in discussing these explanations. This thesis shows 
how these biases have: limited understanding of the dynamics driving the key conflicts; 
favoured a counterproductive balance of counterterrorism efforts; overestimated U.S. 
agency with negative consequences; and, contributed to policy choices reinforcing 
opposition frames and undermining intended counter narratives. This chapter concludes 
with an overall assessment of U.S. hearts and minds efforts including future prospects, 
an evaluation of the value of a social movement theory approach applied to terrorism 
research, and a discussion of the potential for rescuing a normative conception of 
terrorism. 
Assessing Hearts and Minds 
The logic of a population-centric approach to counterterrorism highlights the 
important role popular support plays in the long-term potential threat posed by a violent 
movement. The ideas, attitudes, beliefs, and expectations of broader publics are 
significant determinants of whether a violent movement is able to attract new recruits, 
raise resources, avoid state enforcement, and carry out operations. Popular sentiment 
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can excuse, sanctify, and glorify or moderate, marginalize, and condemn violent tactics. 
For governments the support of the people increases the flow and quality of 
intelligence, provides credibility and legitimacy, and generates patience. All of which 
are necessary for successfully conducting a larger counterterrorism campaign, including 
aggressive efforts targeting the incorrigible violent core, while providing security, 
promoting development, addressing underlying grievances, and engaging in necessary 
framing competitions. This section revisits the evaluation of this thesis in order to 
highlight the central conclusions about U.S. hearts and minds efforts and discuss their 
prospects going forward. 
The Evaluation of this Thesis 
After the 9/11 attacks the United States reoriented resources towards 
counterterrorism on an unprecedented scale. President Bush, with overwhelming 
domestic support, directed the use of “every means of diplomacy, every tool of 
intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every 
necessary weapon of war” to detect, disrupt, and destroy terrorist networks while 
denying, diminishing, and deterring future threats.2 Many within and outside of the U.S. 
government argued that an essential component of this larger war on terror needed to be 
a focus on winning hearts and minds of general populations across the Muslim world. 
This resulted in a wide range of public diplomacy initiatives, significant increases in 
and retargeting of foreign aid, fundamental changes in military doctrine to stress the 
lessons of counterinsurgency, and reportedly a wide range of covert programs. 
However, in comparison to other elements of the larger war on terror, experts frequently 
observed that hearts and minds efforts were a secondary priority, too often constrained 
by relatively limited resources, and out of balance in comparison to classic 
counterinsurgency recommendations suggesting that the hard or kinetic side of the fight 
should be the small part of the total effort.  
Studies of Muslim attitudes repeatedly reinforced the conclusion that the United 
States performed poorly in the race for Muslim hearts and minds during this time period 
by reporting increasingly negative views of the United States as compared to the 
preceding decade. Much of this research highlights the U.S. invasion of Iraq, stronger 
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association with authoritarian regimes, increased support for Israel, and coercive 
counterterrorism policies as increasing negative attitudes and contributing to a 
perception that the United States is actually engaged in a war on Islam. Limited good 
news for the U.S. is found in positive reactions to American humanitarian efforts, a lack 
of support for the long term goals of Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida, as well as negative 
reactions to increases in terrorist violence observed in several specific Muslim countries 
especially following local attacks. 
To aid analysis of why the United States appears to have performed poorly this 
thesis examines militant Islamists and the potential for popular support as part of a 
larger social movement focused on the rise of political Islam across the Muslim world. 
This approach stresses the importance of understanding dynamics from the perspective 
not of the United States or violent groups using tactics of terrorism, but instead from the 
vantage of larger populations with a specific concern for their grievances and 
aspirations as well as the mobilizing networks, political opportunity structures, and 
framing contests that influence and shape movement evolution. Much of the Muslim 
world is fertile ground for contentious collective action given a wide range of long 
running economic and development problems, high levels of political repression at the 
hands of generally authoritarian and unpopular governments, regular intra- and 
interstate violence, a history of Western colonial and economic domination, and 
perceptions of threats to cultural identity. Previous ideologies, movements, and 
governments have sequentially failed in attempts to address these problems, with many 
current governments most notable only for their efficiency at safeguarding power. 
Outside of Muslim majority countries diaspora communities also play an important role 
in these dynamics with their own local grievances and aspirations connecting with 
transnational movements as well as communities in their countries of origin enabled by 
the global virtual connections. 
Across the Muslim world political Islam is the dominant mobilizing force 
currently shaping popular attitudes with respect to these issues, building upon the 
relatively open space allowed for religion, and employing framing narratives grounded 
in cultural and religious traditions that strongly resonate with Muslim populations. The 
perceived previous successes of Islamist groups, especially with respect to successfully 
delivering local services free of corruption as well as striking successful blows against 
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local enemies and global oppressors, contribute to the credibility of Islamist movements 
as promising alternatives. Militant Islamists are one part of this larger mobilization, 
often competing and disagreeing with other movement actors over significant issues 
such as the use of violence, participation in electoral politics, and interpretations of what 
Islam as a political solution really means. 
Although discussion of terrorism has long been highly normative, the attacks of 
September 11 generated significant changes in the way Americans talk and think about 
the concept. This occurred through an interactive process including the general public, 
highly attentive individuals, political leaders, and the media. The social construction of 
terrorism in the United States after 9/11 became more highly normative, shifting to 
assume that a war on terror was the most appropriate response, and perceiving a threat 
of especially devastating attacks as primarily focused on the United States from a 
generally aggregated, amorphous, and Islamic terrorist enemy. The strategic narrative 
advanced by the Bush administration had a significant effect on shaping this new 
construction – while also reflecting it – and played a direct role in shaping and 
prioritizing U.S. responses at all levels of implementation. While each of these changes 
was based in partial truths supported by observable realities, in combination they 
exaggerated biases that undermine understanding of the phenomenon and encourage 
counterproductive efforts. These biases influence individual analysis and action by 
framing and filtering understanding of the problem, triggering specific associations 
while making others seem inappropriate, and encouraging the pursuit of harder and 
more judgmental perspectives. At a national level the cumulative effect of the opinion 
climate created by the social construction constrains and guides political decision 
making as well as the focus and implementation of bureaucratic agencies. The resulting 
cognitive dissonance for understanding terrorism from a population-centric perspective 
and shifts in presumption to an enemy-centric approach led to an overall war on terror 
that repeatedly involves action and rhetoric negatively affecting popular support in the 
Muslim world with counterproductive long term results. The post-9/11 social 
construction of terrorism in the United States, and the biases it reinforces, as well as the 
related strategic narrative advanced by the Bush administration significantly help to 
explain why hearts and minds strategies too often lacked top level support and 
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prioritization, leaving them discounted, underfunded, and relatively unincorporated in 
overall war on terror efforts and thinking. 
The American approach to counterterrorism in general, and hearts and minds 
efforts specifically, was based on a flawed model of the conflict. This model 
exaggerates American centrality and agency with the result of encouraging 
counterproductive actions when analyzed from a counterinsurgency and social 
movement informed perspective. The central problem of the U.S. model is seeing the 
conflict as principally involving the United States and its terrorist enemy with other 
actors playing secondary roles. Consistent with this approach U.S. policy makers and 
political leaders assume that America has much greater potential to change attitudes and 
control other actors. A social movement and counterinsurgency approach highlights the 
much more complicated dynamics shaping attitudes, including assumptions about the 
causes and best solutions for real grievances, the stronger influences of local social 
networks, associations based upon the actions of local governments and elites, and the 
filtering effect of established framing processes. By failing to appreciate these 
challenges the United States often takes ineffective steps to engage attitudes while 
continuing other counterproductive actions and rhetoric. The American approach to 
dealing with local governments similarly overestimates U.S. agency, while failing to 
fully appreciate the negative effect of associations with these governments on popular 
attitudes as shaped by movement dynamics. Even when the United States recognizes 
that local partners in the war on terror have problematic histories, and attempts to 
influence positive changes consistent with a hearts and minds strategy, the U.S. often 
fails to recognize that local governments have neither the capacity nor the will to pursue 
such initiatives. In many cases, the increased resources and political space created by 
aligning with the U.S. war on terror gives these governments the ability to increase 
repression of local movements with the effect of increasing the violent potential of 
mobilization dynamics as well as the association of blame attributed to the United 
States. 
Analyzing the contested framing processes important to the evolution of 
movement dynamics illustrates how U.S. rhetoric and actions following the attacks of 
9/11 undermined U.S. hearts and minds goals. American political leaders frequently 
insist that U.S. policies are unrelated to the threat of militant violence, instead arguing 
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that it is opposition to American values. While this may help maintain domestic support 
for the war on terror, a social movement informed analysis supports the repeated and 
emphatic explanations of experts and surveys that it is opposition to American policies. 
As a result the U.S. war on terror reinforced long established anger and grievances with 
specific American policies and strengthened framing arguments that the United States is 
really motivated by supporting Israeli dominance, maintaining regional hegemony, and 
exploiting cheap oil. American rhetoric and especially the invasion of Iraq contributed 
to growing acceptance of the militant Islamist frame that the war on terror is a really a 
war on Islam. At the same time widely criticized U.S. rhetoric and action with respect to 
issues such as detainee policy as well as perceived hypocrisy on democracy promotion 
undermined America’s intended counter framing. The mistakes and misperceptions 
underlying each of these cases are driven in large part by the biases of an overly enemy-
centric approach and highly normative moral judgments. 
Prospects Going Forward 
The starting assumption of this thesis was that a hearts and minds strategy 
should be a core component of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the war on terror, based 
upon the persuasive logic for population-centric strategies outlined in Chapter One as 
well as a majority view of the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism literatures. 
Although much of the research conducted for this thesis provides further support to this 
reasoning, at the same time it raises concerns about the limits and challenges of actually 
pursuing such efforts. To examine the prospects for U.S. hearts and minds strategies this 
section briefly reviews the constraints raised, evidence that the U.S. may be learning 
from its experiences, and the potential success for precautionary and incremental efforts 
over the long term building upon America’s current structural strengths. 
A repeated criticism raised in this thesis is that U.S. efforts have been based on 
exaggerated assumptions of centrality and agency. This equally applies to many 
prescriptions for hearts and minds efforts as well as criticisms of the war on terror. 
Tactics of terrorism rarely arise without a long history of festering grievances built upon 
the failure of previous efforts and aggravated by the actual and perceived misdeeds of 
other actors. Reviews of American and British counterinsurgencies stress these lessons, 
noting especially that the influence of an external government supporting a local state is 
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significantly limited. International actors are dependent not only on the successful and 
consistent follow through of strategy by their own forces, but on the capacity to pursue 
and will to follow through of the local counterinsurgent in addressing problems where 
the solution may threaten their own self-interests. Applied to international 
counterterrorism in a globalized world of virtual connections, where the number of 
conflicts involved dramatically increases along with the number of actors who can 
potentially undermine or drown out U.S. action, a global hearts and minds strategy faces 
even more challenges. 
However, while there is a long list of limitations, the research of this thesis also 
indicates that U.S. actions and rhetoric have significant effects. To the degree that 
increases in anti-American attitudes are in part traceable to the approach and specific 
rhetorical and policy choices of the United States, reciprocally this is evidence for the 
potential of positive changes over time. An important lesson of the hearts and minds 
logic discussed throughout this thesis is that marginal changes in the climate of opinion 
are important to security goals as they relatively increase or decrease the chances of 
radicalization, fund raising, social sanction, and other factors directly related to the 
potential threat posed by militant groups. 
While proactive hearts and minds efforts may only make incremental 
differences, a related lesson is in the benefits of a pervasive unity of understanding of 
the importance of popular support at a precautionary level. Similar to the efforts of the 
U.S. military to retrain and refocus its forces on a doctrine of winning the population 
over as the centre of gravity instead of focusing on defeating the enemy, widespread 
understanding of the importance of popular attitudes to counterterrorism goals would 
help avoid many of the mistakes discussed in this thesis that resulted in unnecessary 
increases in resentment. In adopting this advice policy actors and political leaders 
should insure that a population-centric approach is a part of the overall strategic 
narrative, and that consideration of popular attitudes are part of initial policy and 
strategy formation, instead of only being a concern when increasing anti-Americanism 
contributes to national security threats. Attention to hearts and minds must be part of the 
take-offs and not just the crash landings of U.S. policy. 
Although this thesis focuses on a wide range of policy decisions and official 
rhetoric that have negatively affected U.S. hearts and minds goals, there are a number of 
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indications the U.S. may be learning. Towards the end of the Bush administration 
various elements of the government made initiatives to move away from more extreme 
language for framing the war on terror while newer appointees and senior level advisors 
espoused more sophisticated and population-centric views of the conflict.3 Experts have 
praised the long-term potential of programs designed to build civil society structures to 
encourage democratization and address root level grievances,4 while Foreign Service 
personnel began integrating more successfully with the U.S. military in Afghanistan and 
Iraq on Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other assignments where they are 
conducting face to face public diplomacy while making substantive improvements to 
base level grievances that may incrementally contributed to long-term goals.5 Perhaps 
the most impressive indication of related learning came from within the U.S. military 
where a senior level leadership led initiative to develop a new U.S. counterinsurgency 
doctrine combined with complimentary bottom up efforts by a wide range of military 
personnel in response to concerns that the original enemy-centric approach to the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan was failing and probably making things worse. Widespread 
adoption of the new doctrine appears to have contributed to a considerable turn in 
prospects for Iraq and holds out promise for Afghanistan.6 Significant policies critiqued 
in the previous chapters were criticized consistent with population-centric 
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recommendations by both major party nominees running for President in 2008 when 
this thesis was initially completed. 
During the Cold War it took the United States time to develop expertise with a 
more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the challenges faced. It appears a 
similar evolution may be occurring with respect to the war on terror, although how far 
such changes will go, whether they will be sufficient to make pervasive changes to the 
current American approach, and whether they will be able to overcome or slowly 
change the biases inherent in the current social construction of terrorism remain to be 
seen. Optimism based upon the promising signs mentioned above should be tempered 
by the observation that many problems with the current approach of America’s war on 
terror are rooted in similar mistakes and biases that persisted through out the duration of 
the Cold War.  
Another promising prospect for American hearts and minds efforts stems from 
what might be called the passive or inherent benefits of being an established, 
economically successful, liberal democracy. As Chapter Seven highlighted, there is a 
long history of research and expert opinion indicating that Muslim populations 
generally admire these aspects of America and other Western countries. To the degree 
that these features act as weak but continuous attractions, over time they may help to 
offset the damages done by short term but strongly negative reactions to specific policy 
choices and rhetoric. This potential benefit may be heightened to the degree that 
contentious policies that are negatively viewed in the Muslim world are addressed by 
the U.S. political system. For example, the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
granting habeas corpus rights to Guantanamo Bay detainees along with continuing 
international coverage of the resulting judicial cases offers potential to emphasize the 
self-correcting protection of individual rights for which the American system has been 
admired as well as a new opportunity for the government’s evidence of the threat posed 
by some detainees to be made public. Global polls leading into the 2008 U.S. 
presidential elections, although highlighting some international cynicism about the 
prospects for change, found improving attitudes towards the United States based on the 
reinforcement of classic American ideals, perceived rejection of Bush administration 
policies, and the intense international coverage of Barack Obama’s success and rise in 
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American politics.7 The United States then elected an African American with a Muslim 
name whose father was from Kenya and who as a boy had “spent several years in 
Indonesia and heard the call of the azaan at the break of dawn and at the fall of dusk.”8 
An event which probably at least caused many in the Muslim world to be a bit more 
open to change and possible persuasion from future U.S. actions. 
The indications of American learning offer some promise the United States will 
increasingly pursue a more sophisticated approach to terrorism. One possibility is 
adoption of Kilcullen’s suggestions to treat militant Islamists as part of a global 
counterinsurgency emphasizing disaggregation instead of aggregation of terrorist 
groups. By working through official rhetoric and policy to localize conflicts, and 
avoiding actions that create connections between them, American counterterrorism 
efforts could benefit from more degrees of freedom for calibrating individualized 
responses based upon unique local contexts. While the U.S. war on terror is not the only 
aggregating influence encouraging connections between militant Islamist groups it is an 
important one. Further, the natural dynamics of many of these conflicts, as a social 
movement perspective emphasizes, is to focus inward and localize as it is often local 
grievances driving popular attitudes. Thus Hizballah and Hamas, for example, even 
though they share a common primary enemy and a broadly similar religious ideology, 
have often avoided close interconnections, treated each other with suspicion, and over 
time become increasingly focused on nationalist political demands. These tendencies 
are amplified as each becomes more involved in the needs of delivering to broader local 
political constituencies, creating opportunities for nuanced diplomatic approaches to 
isolate extremists while providing non-violent paths for potential moderates and the 
larger potentially sympathetic population.9 
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To the degree that the rise of a more sophisticated view of the challenges faced 
from militant Islamists leads to higher-level support for more fundamental policy 
changes it is possible that more significant progress may be made. For example, while 
U.S. support for Israel’s right to self-defence and existence will not and should not 
change, it is not hard to imagine that the new U.S. administration will give very high 
priority to efforts to find a long term peaceful settlement to the conflict between Israel 
and the Palestinians. Motivated internally by an understanding of the potential benefits 
for U.S. security and a fear of possible catastrophic terrorist attacks, coupled with 
growing belief that Israel’s long term security depends upon finding a peaceful 
permanent solution sooner rather than later. While many administrations have tried and 
failed before, the success of such efforts could dramatically change the mobilizing 
environment. No one should expect increased American efforts to broker Middle East 
peace to dramatically or quickly change negative Muslim attitudes or suspicions of U.S. 
intentions, especially given the long antagonistic history underscored by recent policy 
and rhetoric as discussed in this thesis, but even marginal improvements will be 
beneficial to U.S. security. And if successful many experts believe that the prospects for 
the entire region would significantly improve. 
At the same time it is worth recognizing that terrorism has rarely proven to be a 
successful strategy and often undermines the long-term goals of those who employ it 
despite short-term tactical successes. Groups employing tactics of sub-state terrorism 
generally face significant asymmetric disadvantages and low probabilities of strategic 
success whatever approach they choose. Although the United States may have made 
many mistakes and failed to achieve desired progress with hearts and minds goals over 
the past seven years, the same body of research on attitudes and opinions in the Muslim 
world also finds a failure for many militant Islamist groups to make appreciable 
progress with larger Muslim populations. Al-Qaida and Usama bin Ladin may be 
admired and respected for standing up to the United States, but that has not generated a 
noticeable increase in support for goals such as the pursuit of a transnational caliphate 
or adoption of the fundamentalist Islamist version of sharia governance al-Qaida 
promotes. More troubling for militant Islamists, research has repeatedly found attitudes 
turning against them and their long-term goals in Muslim countries that experience 
increases in terrorist violence on civilian populations.  
 CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  411 
The wide range of grievances underlying mobilization in many countries across 
the Muslim world are good reasons to believe that contentious and violent action will 
not easily or quickly disappear regardless of what the United States does. The long 
history of conflict between the West and these countries, with the United States now 
perceived as the leader of the West and having reinforced these frames through the first 
seven years of the war on terror, also makes it unlikely that attitudes will quickly return 
to 1990s levels. As many critics of hearts and minds strategies are quick to point out, 
Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida planned and carried out a series of increasingly deadly 
transnational mass casualty plots under those conditions. However, the fallacy of this 
thinking is to see hearts and minds strategies as a mutually exclusive choice with other 
efforts, as well as to forget that the agency of other actors including Muslim populations 
can also work with Western actors in a manner they did not in the past. By adjusting the 
balance of how larger publics, political leaders, and those implementing policy think 
about terrorism to include significant population-centric approaches with other more 
targeted but still very aggressive counterterrorism efforts a more optimal overall 
strategy is possible. It is not only possible to both carry out aggressive capture/kill 
missions targeting terrorist leaders while also engaging the aspirations and grievances of 
larger Muslim populations, the two are complimentary with the increased intelligence 
and support of the second improving the chances for success of the first. The choice is 
not between returning to a September 10 worldview, with a “make nice” version of 
hearts and minds, versus pursuing an enemy-centric and aggressive war on terror. The 
fallacy of that framing is reinforced by the enemy-centric biases of the current social 
construction of terrorism, and is part of why the United States performed so poorly over 
the first seven years after 9/11.  
Evaluating a Social Movement Theory of Terrorism 
This thesis incorporated concepts and tools from the social movement literature 
to aid the analysis of dynamics related to popular support and the war on terror. As 
noted in Chapter Two, the social movement and terrorism research traditions have much 
in common in terms of foundational literature, common research questions, and 
evolution of theoretical focuses. In many ways the study of social movements has 
enjoyed deeper and more rigorous academic treatment while the study of terrorism and 
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political violence has enjoyed more integration with questions of public policy. While 
both research traditions should benefit from the cross-fertilization of more integrated 
research, this section focuses on benefits for the study of terrorism looking specifically 
at advantages over the current rational actor approach dominant in terrorism studies and 
the value of a social movement perspective as a reorienting tool to overcome normative 
biases. 
The current rational actor approach to the study of terrorism and political 
violence is beneficial in its direct rejection of previous psychological approaches that 
similar to popular stereotypes sought to explain terrorists as presumptively abnormal, 
and thus reinforced a series of counterproductive and limiting misconceptions. 
However, the current approach in terrorism research still reinforces elements of the 
enemy-centric bias discussed in this thesis. These obscure important larger population 
level phenomenon. Current social movement research similarly is built upon a rational 
actor foundation rejecting the biases of earlier mob-based psychological theories of 
mass action, but has further developed a number of productive research traditions on top 
of this while also emphasizing a population level focus. Application of a social 
movement theory approach to terrorism therefore serves to bring population level 
dynamics into focus, while also providing a series of “orienting devices” in terms of the 
conceptual tools developed in that tradition.10 The focus on grievances, mobilizing 
networks, political opportunity structures, and framing processes in this thesis is an 
example of the potential benefit of these conceptual tools for exploring the complex 
dynamics of popular mobilization related to the war on terror. This thesis used those 
tools broadly to examine a wider range of issues, where future research may choose to 
take advantage of the deeper development of specific social movement concepts to 
enhance a more focused examination of specific research questions of interest. Future 
application of this research tradition to the study of terrorism and political violence thus 
promises the potential for specific richer conceptual exploration of issues such as 
framing processes, while also potentially providing back to the social movement 
literature specific case studies that may help develop the understanding of those 
concepts with respect to forms of mobilization that have often been understudied or 
even ignored. 
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One specific problem in terrorism research, for which the application of social 
movement approaches is especially promising, is in addressing the debate about the root 
causes of terrorism. On one side of this debate researchers and policy experts cite the 
existence of a wide range of grievances as contributing to the rise of terrorism. The 
other side dismisses the role of root causes given the much larger number of similar 
cases that do not give rise to terrorism and the fact that many individuals involved in 
terrorism are better off than others around them. This dismissal often is in part shaped 
by and reinforces the biases of the current social construction of terrorism especially as 
it applies to larger potentially sympathetic populations, and is thus also an impediment 
to hearts and minds efforts. Most terrorism researchers recognize a more complicated 
relationship between underlying conditions and the emergence of tactics of terrorism, 
with root causes playing an important but not determinative role. Unfortunately, 
dismissing these grievances, as popular conceptions and political leaders are inclined to 
do, devalues consideration of the role played by larger potentially sympathetic 
populations. The result increases the likelihood that more coercive or less focused hard 
counterterrorism policies are used and decreases the motivation to pursue the difficult 
and often long-term efforts needed to make marginal improvements in underlying 
conditions. 
The same root causes debate has long been at the heart of the study of social 
movements in answering the questions of movement emergence and how the “free 
rider” problem is overcome for individual participation. Original strain and root cause 
theories of social movement emergence have been replaced or refined by research 
responding to the challenge of these questions in examining especially the effects of 
changes to mobilizing networks, political opportunity structures, and framing processes 
for explaining why movements surface at particular times and not others, as well as why 
they take different forms under similar conditions. Application of a social movement 
theory approach to studying terrorism promises to improve understanding of when such 
grievances are important to radicalization and the emergence of violence, how they are 
exploited by terrorist groups, as well as how changes in these conditions and the 
perception of them influence larger popular attitudes with respect to terrorism.  
Integration of a social movement tradition into terrorism and political violence 
research also promises to serve a beneficial effect as a reorienting tool to overcome 
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normative biases in both traditions.11 Terrorism researchers, usually more closely 
aligned with public policy and governments, have tended to study groups of which 
society (and frequently the researcher) disapproves. Conversely social movement 
researchers, often associated more closely with critical academic traditions, have tended 
to study movements of which they (and those around them) often approve. In the same 
manner that the social construction of terrorism biases understanding at an often 
unconscious level, the positive associations often associated with social movements for 
researchers in that tradition (or suspicious attitudes towards established power 
structures) bring some level of potential bias. Integrating these research traditions is 
likely to have disruptive effects on both biases, bringing them more clearly into 
conscious consideration.  
The normative reorienting effect of this integration is also likely to occur at a 
simpler level, with the application of social movement theories to terrorism increasing 
exploration of the perceptions of potentially sympathetic populations, and with the 
application of terrorism cases to social movement research motivating closer 
examination of the potentially violent and destructive side of mobilization.12 A similar 
reorienting effect is likely to occur by encouraging terrorism research to focus more on 
countermovement actors, and social movement researchers to consider the potential 
desirable or positive effects of state action on movements instead of the dominant focus 
of current research on state repression. 
Rescuing a Normative Conception of Terrorism 
A central explanation of this thesis is that biases in how we talk and think about 
terrorism undermine our understanding of the phenomenon and lead to 
counterproductive efforts in the war on terror. Discourse about terrorism has long been 
criticized for its prejudicial effects and many academics, including prominent social 
movement figures, have argued that the term should be rejected both for academic 
                                                
11 Where as Tilly talks about social movement concepts as orienting tools to help 
identify and examine descriptive elements of a mobilization dynamic, my suggestion is 
that this approach may help to expose and explore normative elements generating biases 
and thus label these as “reorienting tools.” Ibid. 
12 For example, Wiktorowicz argues that applying a social movement perspective to the 
study of Hamas has a “de-orientalizing” effect. Wiktorowicz, Ibid."Introduction: 
Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory," Bloomington, 22. 
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research and public use.13 After 9/11 the American social construction of terrorism 
became even more normatively charged, emotional, and enemy-centric. However, as 
discussed at the beginning of this thesis, I believe that a normative construction of 
terrorism serves a positive role. This final section examines whether a normative 
construction of terrorism can be saved at the same time as overcoming the problematic 
enemy-centric and overly moral judgmental biases by looking specifically at the 
dangers of these biases as self-fulfilling prophecies, why we are unlikely to and should 
not get rid of a normative construction of terrorism, and finally raising warnings for 
counterterrorism if we fail. 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have raised a wide range of problems with 
the biases inherent in how we talk and think about terrorism especially after 9/11 in the 
United States. An especially problematic effect of these biases is that they tend to create 
self-fulfilling prophecies that in turn make them self-reinforcing. Terrorism researchers 
and insurgent theorists have long observed that overly repressive state responses often 
alienate the larger population building sympathy with militant groups. With respect to 
the U.S. war on terror a range of tactics associated with harder and more coercive 
approaches to counterterrorism, stemming from an enemy-centric and highly normative 
approach, have demonstrated these effects including military strikes with a higher 
tolerance for collateral damage, alignment with authoritarian regimes creating space for 
their repressive actions, and inflammatory rhetoric seen as targeting larger Muslim 
populations. When these actions have triggered increasing anti-Americanism and 
protests from larger Muslim populations, they have in turn served to reinforce 
perspectives consistent with the original biases that these general populations are part of 
the problem anyway. Similar self-fulfilling effects occur through a number of other 
mechanisms, including: undermining moderates as when the United States reacted very 
adversely to the success of Islamists in Lebanese, Palestinian, and Egyptian elections; 
the bolstering of transnational extremists caused by engaging in clash of civilizations 
rhetoric consistent with the framing of militants; and, the aggravation of base level 
grievances generated by a range of American policies pursued without considering the 
implications of population level effects. 
                                                
13 Tilly, "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists." 
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Despite the dangers inherent in a normative terrorism discourse there is little 
reason to expect the general construction or language to dramatically change anytime 
soon.14 Nor should we strive for an entirely non-normative discourse. Many of the 
fundamental problems with how we discuss terrorism emerge from the aspects of the 
discourse that are also essential to our shared social desire to prohibit, denounce, and 
deter the use of terrorist violence. As long as we hold to this desirable goal, which we 
should, the realities of an imperfect world will be that the language of terrorism will 
cause problems. The associated moral condemnation exercises a public sanctioning and 
shunning influence and helps to motivate and legitimate government action, which in 
turn help to raise the cost for groups considering such tactics deterring future use. The 
normative condemnation is similarly part of the desired effect of a hearts and minds 
goal in gaining the popular support of a population to discourage recruitment, fund-
raising, concealment, and operations. Actors seeking legitimacy, whether as individuals 
and groups wishing to participate within normal political structures or as states 
participating in the international system, seek to avoid the condemnation of being 
connected with the use of terrorism because of the associated sanctions. From a social 
movement perspective successfully convincing a target population to label actions as 
terrorism or a group as a terrorist, and having those labels perceived as legitimate, is 
part of important contested framing processes that may shape the evolution of a 
movement by discouraging the use of certain repertoires of contention or turning larger 
parts of a movement against violent elements. 
Our desire to overcome the biases yet retain a normative construct of terrorism 
creates competing pressures that leave no perfect resolution. As long as the construct 
carries a powerful normative connotation it will be susceptible to politicized abuse. 
However, while these forces push in opposite directions, they do not entirely trade off. 
In the same manner as errors of false positives and false negatives in quantitative 
research it may be impossible to eliminate both, but it is possible to decrease both by 
refined and more careful usage. The dangers of the enemy-centric and highly normative 
biases discussed in this thesis can be muted while still condemning the tactic of 
terrorism. The reorienting effects of adopting the perspective of the larger population 
                                                
14 Boyle explains that once a phrase such as the “war on terror” has become a core part 
of political discourse and framing it becomes resistant to change and tends to persist. 
Boyle, "The War on Terror in American Grand Strategy." 
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and examining social movement dynamics assist in overcoming these biases. A 
consistent problem with American discussions of terrorism is the failure to recognize 
that local populations make moral judgments by including consideration and balancing 
against other normatively prescribed actions. Ignoring these only exaggerates the 
alienation between populations and decreases understanding. Another step may involve 
learning to embrace some level of ambiguity and the morally unsatisfying reality that 
there are no pure good actors and pure bad actors.15 The flexibility of such ambiguity 
for being able to label something as terrorism while stepping back to adopt the 
perspective of that actor, or more importantly others potentially sympathetic, is key to 
successful analysis as well as public policy and diplomacy. The ultimate measure of 
counterterrorism is saving the most lives balanced with not sacrificing important 
priorities. This may require the type of shrewd and hard hitting diplomacy and approach 
to the war on terror that both condemns a group for using terrorism, but also creates 
space for the that group or more importantly the larger movement around them to 
evolve into non-violent processes as part of a inclusive system. Such a change requires 
top-level support whether from respected academic work or those senior political 
leaders and other influential individuals who may be able to contribute to a change in 
the general social construction over time. 
Specific to the current context of the U.S. war on terror researchers, analysts, 
policy makers, and others conscious of the danger inherent in these biases face a 
significant practical problem in that key elements of the current social construction of 
terrorism are based on more than a grain of truth. The primary groups threatening the 
United States with terrorist attacks are all militant Islamists who at least broadly are 
interconnected through larger Islamist movements and share important commonalities. 
Some of these groups are willing to, capable of, and in important cases intent on 
carrying out mass casualty attacks against U.S. and Western targets. Key movement 
figures do espouse very long-term goals involving the establishment of at least regional 
control governed by an extreme version of fundamentalist theocratic rule. It is easy for 
critics of the type of hearts and minds strategy advocated in this thesis to point to 
                                                
15 Booth does this well acknowledging that he can imagine situations in which he may 
have supported terrorism while also arguing that terrorism is “a powerful word, and one 
with almost wholly negative connotations (and long may it remain so!)” Booth, "The 
Human Faces of Terror," 65,72. 
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examples of each of these realities in making their arguments. It takes a deeper 
understanding of the specific dynamics and histories of various conflicts and groups to 
appreciate the significant differences within Islamist movements, to realize that while 
connected most of these actors and especially the larger populations around them are 
locally focused and not intent on transnational violence, and that the driving motivations 
for most individuals are not related to nor supportive of the long term militant Islamist 
goals used to justify the extreme threat to U.S. and Western interests. While the nuanced 
response in advocating the need for a population-centric approach may be more difficult 
to make, a conclusion of this thesis is that it is necessary to improve our understanding 
of terrorism as well as the counterterrorism efforts governments pursue. 
Writing about the Bush administration’s legal setbacks and the value of judicial 
review, a Texas law professor noted of the sentiments that drove the Iraq war and 
justifications for torture, “we tend to be at our worst when we’re mad and scared.”16 The 
normative construction may perform a valuable role in deterring groups from adopting 
tactics of terrorism and motivating government action. However, the emotions of 
individuals and the larger public after the 9/11 attacks, which continue to be reflected in 
the now unconscious associations and filters of how we talk and think about terrorism, 
are central to the enemy-centric and normative biases discussed throughout this thesis. 
In order to preserve the benefits of a normative construction of terrorism, while striving 
for an unbiased understanding, individual researchers, analysts, and policy makers as 
well as the larger public must strive to be aware of and compensate for these influences. 
A final and problematic danger of the self-fulfilling sort is that despite the overly 
enemy-centric and highly normative biases the United States and the West will prevail 
in the current war on terror with militant Islamists. While this is good news from a 
security perspective, the problem is that these governments can prevail without 
addressing the biases inherent in the current construction. In the process actions and 
rhetoric may then continue to contribute to mobilizing grievances across large parts of 
the world, increasing the damage of violent conflict in the interim, without giving 
sufficient attention to addressing the underlying problems over the long term. As in the 
past, notably for the current crisis as the United States did when the Soviets were driven 
                                                
16 Publius, 2008, "How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love Judicial Review," 
Obsidian Wings (March 27), 
http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2008/03/how-i-learned-t.html. 
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from Afghanistan, because the motivation to engage was based on an enemy-centric 
bias political actors will forget about the problem until those grievances rise up again 
under a new movement. Given the mobilizing dynamics and history of larger parts of 
the Muslim world there is a good chance that the next movement will also include 
violent elements, who blame the United States and the West, and will be willing to carry 
out mass casualty attacks further magnified by newer technology.  
Because of the difficulties discussed in this thesis and limits to agency there is 
no guarantee that addressing the biases now by taking a more population-centric view 
will either guarantee that the solutions pursued will solve the problems contributing to 
mobilization or that government attention will persist after this wave of mobilization 
passes. There is always the possibility that the next mobilization will for whatever 
chances of fate take a completely non-violent path in attempting to address grievances 
and integrate into the international system peacefully. But it seems to me that we are 
better off trying to avoid the risk by raising awareness of the problems and striving 
through individual academic and policy work to address these biases.  
As Laura Bush explains, the attacks of September 11 have left a mark on our 
emotions and our thinking. Whether our goal is to improve the quality of academic 
research and understanding of the dynamics surrounding the use of political violence, or 
to improve a government’s efforts in the race for hearts and minds striving to insure that 
another similar attack does not occur on our watch, the conclusion of this thesis is that 
we need to change how we approach the study and analysis of terrorism. 
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